3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
xiuting.xu
e01b5ab7f8 RC证书解析部分代码 2026-02-03 09:59:07 +08:00
xiuting.xu
da14f26acb RC证书解析部分代码 2026-02-03 09:57:24 +08:00
xuxt
421847d329 增加RC数据结构和资源集合数据结构 (#1)
Co-authored-by: xiuting.xu <xiutingxt.xu@gmail.com>
Reviewed-on: #1
Reviewed-by: yuyr <yuyr@zgclab.edu.cn>
Co-authored-by: xuxt <xuxt@zgclab.edu.cn>
Co-committed-by: xuxt <xuxt@zgclab.edu.cn>
2026-02-02 15:37:05 +08:00
13 changed files with 1330 additions and 1 deletions

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@@ -9,3 +9,7 @@ hex = "0.4.3"
thiserror = "2.0.18"
time = "0.3.45"
x509-parser = { version = "0.18.0", features = ["verify"] }
url = "2.5.8"
asn1-rs = "0.7.1"
asn1-rs-derive = "0.6.0"
asn1 = "0.23.0"

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specs/01_tal.md Normal file
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# 01. Trust Anchor Locator (TAL)
## 1.1 对象定位
TAL是一个数据格式/配置文件,目的是告诉RP信任锚的公钥是什么,以及相关对象可以从哪里获取。
## 1.2 数据格式 (RFC 8630 §2.2)
TAL是一个配置文件,格式定义如下:
```
The TAL is an ordered sequence of:
1. an optional comment section consisting of one or more lines each starting with the "#" character, followed by human-readable informational UTF-8 text, conforming to the restrictions defined
in Section 2 of [RFC5198], and ending with a line break,
2. a URI section that is comprised of one or more ordered lines, each containing a TA URI, and ending with a line break,
3. a line break, and
4. a subjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280] in DER format [X.509], encoded in base64 (see Section 4 of [RFC4648]). To avoid long lines,
line breaks MAY be inserted into the base64-encoded string.
Note that line breaks in this file can use either "<CRLF>" or "<LF>".
```
## 1.3 抽象数据模型
### 1.3.1 TAL
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|----------|-------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------|---------------|
| uris | Vec<TalUri> | 指向TA的URI列表 | 允许rsync和https协议。 | RFC 8630 §2.1 |
| comment | Vec<String> | 注释(可选) | | RFC 8630 §2.2 |
| spki_der | Vec<u8> | 原始的subjectPublicKeyInfo | x.509 SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER编码,再base64编码 | RFC 8630 §2.2 |
### 1.3.2 TalUri
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------------|
| Rsync | String | rsync地址 | | RFC 8630 §2.1 |
| Https | String | https地址 | | RFC 8630 §2.1 |

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specs/02_ta.md Normal file
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# 02. Trust Anchor (TA)
## 2.1 对象定位
TA是一个自签名的CA证书。
## 2.2 原始载体与编码
- 载体:X.509 certificates.
- 编码:DER(遵循 RFC 5280 的 certificate 结构与字段语义,但受限于RFC 8630 §2.3)
## 2.3 抽象数据类型
### 2.3.1 TA
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|-------------------|------------------|---------------|---------|---------------|
| name | String | 标识该TA,如apnic等 | | |
| cert_der | Vec<u8> | 原始DER内容 | | |
| cert | X509Certificate | 基础X509证书 | | RFC 5280 §4.1 |
| resource | ResourceSet | 资源集合 | | |
| publication_point | Uri | 获取该TA的URI | | |
### 2.3.2 ResourceSet
资源集合是来自RFC 3779的IP地址块(§2)和AS号段(§3),受约束于RFC 8630 §2.3
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|------|----------------|--------|-------------|---------------------------|
| ips | IpResourceSet | IP地址集合 | 不能是inherit | RFC 3779 §2和RFC 8630 §2.3 |
| asns | AsnResourceSet | ASN集合 | 不能是inherit | RFC 3779 §3和RFC 8630 §2.3 |
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.3 IpResourceSet)
[//]: # (包括IPv4和IPv6的前缀表示)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|----|------------------------|----------|-------------|--------------|)
[//]: # (| v4 | PrefixSet<Ipv4Prefix> | IPv4前缀集合 | | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # (| v6 | PrefixSet<Ipv6Prefix> | IPv6前缀集合 | | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.4 AsnResourceSet)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|-------|--------------------|-------|-------------|-------------|)
[//]: # (| range | RangeSet<AsnBlock> | ASN集合 | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.5 Ipv4Prefix)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|------|-----|-----|---------|-------------|)
[//]: # (| addr | u32 | 地址 | | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # (| len | u8 | 长度 | 0-32 | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.6 Ipv6Prefix)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|------|------|-----|---------|-------------|)
[//]: # (| addr | u128 | 地址 | | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # (| len | u8 | 长度 | 0-128 | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.7 AsnBlock)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|----------|----------|-------|---------|--------------|)
[//]: # (| asn | Asn | ASN | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
[//]: # (| asnRange | AsnRange | ASN范围 | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.8 Asn)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|-----|-----|-----|---------|-------------|)
[//]: # (| asn | u32 | ASN | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.8 AsnRange)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|-----|-----|-------|---------|--------------|)
[//]: # (| min | Asn | 最小ASN | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
[//]: # (| max | Asn | 最大ASN | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
# 2.4 TA校验流程(RFC 8630 §3)
1. 从TAL的URI列表中获取证书对象。(顺序访问,若前面失效,再访问后面的)
2. 验证证书格式,必须是当前、有效的自签名RPKI证书。
3. 验证公钥匹配。TAL中的SubjectPublicKeyInfo与下载证书的公钥一致。
4. 其他检查。
5. 更新本地存储库缓存。

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specs/03_rc.md Normal file
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# 03. RC (Resource Certifications)
## 3.1 对象定位
RC是资源证书,包括CA和EE
## 3.2 原始载体与编码
- 载体:X.509 certificates.
- 编码:DER(遵循 RFC 5280 的 Certificate 结构与字段语义,但受 RPKI profile 限制)RFC 6487 §4
### 3.2.1 基本语法(RFC 5280 §4,RFC 6487 )
RC是遵循RFC5280定义的X.509Certificate语法(RFC 5280 §4),并且符合RFC 6487 §4的约束。只选取RFC 6487 §4章节列出来的字段。(Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, all the fields listed
here MUST be present, and any other fields MUST NOT appear in a
conforming resource certificate.)
```
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING
}
TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version MUST be v3,
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber,
signature AlgorithmIdentifier,
issuer Name,
subject Name,
validity Validity,
subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
-- If present, version MUST be v3
}
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
notBefore Time,
notAfter Time }
Time ::= CHOICE {
utcTime UTCTime,
generalTime GeneralizedTime }
UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING
SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }
Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension
Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
extnValue OCTET STRING
-- contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value
-- corresponding to the extension type identified
-- by extnID
}
```
> 其中`Name` "a valid X.501 distinguished name"(RFC 6487 §4.4)
### 3.2.2 证书扩展字段 (RFC 6487 §4.8)
RC的证书扩展字段按照RFC 6487 §4.8的规定,有以下几个扩展:
- Basic Constraints
- Subject Key Identifier
- Authority Key Identifier
- Key Usage
- Extended Key Usage(CA证书,以及验证RPKI对象的EE证书不能出现该字段。非RPKI对象的EE可以出现EKU,但必须为non-critical)
- CRL Distribution Points
- Authority Information Access
- Subject Information Access
- SIA for CA Certificates
- SIA for EE Certificates
- Certificate Policies
- IP Resources
- AS Resources
```
# Basic Constraints
id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 }
BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE }
# Subject Key Identifier
id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 }
SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier
KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
# Authority Key Identifier
id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 }
AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL }
# Key Usage
id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 }
KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
digitalSignature (0),
nonRepudiation (1), -- recent editions of X.509 have
-- renamed this bit to contentCommitment
keyEncipherment (2),
dataEncipherment (3),
keyAgreement (4),
keyCertSign (5),
cRLSign (6),
encipherOnly (7),
decipherOnly (8) }
# Extended Key Usage
id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 }
ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
# CRL Distribution Points
id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 31 }
CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint
DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL }
DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE {
fullName [0] GeneralNames }
## Authority Information Access
id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 1 }
AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax ::=
SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription
AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE {
accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
accessLocation GeneralName }
# AccessDescription
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
# CA 证书发布位置
id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 2 }
# OCSP 服务地址
id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 1 }
# Subject Information Access
id-pe-subjectInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 11 }
SubjectInfoAccessSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription
AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE {
accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
accessLocation GeneralName }
## Subject Information Access for CA (RFC 6487 §4.8.8.1)
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
id-ad-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 10 }
必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-caRepository,accessLocation=rsyncURI。
必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-repiManifest, accessLocation=rsync URI,指向该CA的mft对象。
## Subject Information Access for EE (RFC 6487 §4.8.8.2)
id-ad-signedObject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 }
必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-signedObject, accessLocation=rsyncURI
不允许其他的accessMethod
# Certificate Policies
id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 }
anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 }
certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation
PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
policyIdentifier CertPolicyId,
policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL }
CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId,
qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId }
-- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers
id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 }
id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 }
id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 }
PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice )
Qualifier ::= CHOICE {
cPSuri CPSuri,
userNotice UserNotice }
CPSuri ::= IA5String
UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {
noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL }
NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
organization DisplayText,
noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER }
DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)),
visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) }
# IP Resources
id-pe-ipAddrBlocks OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 7 }
IPAddrBlocks ::= SEQUENCE OF IPAddressFamily
IPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE { -- AFI & optional SAFI --
addressFamily OCTET STRING (SIZE (2..3)),
ipAddressChoice IPAddressChoice }
IPAddressChoice ::= CHOICE {
inherit NULL, -- inherit from issuer --
addressesOrRanges SEQUENCE OF IPAddressOrRange }
IPAddressOrRange ::= CHOICE {
addressPrefix IPAddress,
addressRange IPAddressRange }
IPAddressRange ::= SEQUENCE {
min IPAddress,
max IPAddress }
IPAddress ::= BIT STRING
# AS Resources
id-pe-autonomousSysIds OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 8 }
ASIdentifiers ::= SEQUENCE {
asnum [0] EXPLICIT ASIdentifierChoice OPTIONAL,
rdi [1] EXPLICIT ASIdentifierChoice OPTIONAL}
ASIdentifierChoice ::= CHOICE {
inherit NULL, -- inherit from issuer --
asIdsOrRanges SEQUENCE OF ASIdOrRange }
ASIdOrRange ::= CHOICE {
id ASId,
range ASRange }
ASRange ::= SEQUENCE {
min ASId,
max ASId }
ASId ::= INTEGER
```
# 3.3 抽象数据结构
采用X509 Certificate + Resource + 约束校验的方式组合
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|----------|---------------------|----------|---------|---------------|
| cert_der | Vec<u8> | 证书原始数据 | | |
| cert | X509Certificate | 基础X509证书 | | RFC 5280 §4.1 |
| resource | ResourceSet | 资源集合 | | |
# 3.4 约束规则
## 3.4.1 Cert约束校验规则
RFC 6487中规定的证书的字段参见[3.2.1 ](#321-基本语法rfc-5280-4rfc-6487-)
-
| 字段 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|-----------|-------|----------------------------------------------|--------------|
| version | 证书版本 | 必须是v3(值为2) | RFC6487 §4.1 |
| serial | 证书编号 | 同一个CA签发的证书编号必须唯一 | RFC6487 §4.2 |
| validity | 证书有效期 | notBefore:时间不能早于证书的生成时间。若时间段大于上级证书的有效期,也是有效的 | RFC6487 §4.6 |
## 3.4.2 Cert Extentions中字段的约束校验规则
RFC 6487中规定的扩展字段参见[3.2.2 ](#322-证书扩展字段-rfc-6487-48)
| 字段 | critical | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|----------------------------|----------|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| basicConstraints | Y | 证书类型 | CA证书:cA=TRUE; EE证书:cA=FALSE | RFC6487 §4.8.1 |
| subjectKeyIdentifier | N | 证书公钥 | SKI = SHA-1(DER-encoded SPKI bit string) | RFC6487 §4.8.2 |
| authorityKeyIdentifier | N | 父证书的公钥 | 字段只包含keyIdentifier,不能包含authorityCertIssuer和authorityCertSerialNumber;除了自签名CA外,其余证书必须出现。自签名CA若出现该字段,则等于SKI | RFC6487 §4.8.3 |
| keyUsage | Y | 证书公钥的用途权限 | CA证书:keyCertSign = TRUE, cRLSign = TRUE 其他都是FALSE。EE证书:digitalSignature = TRUE 其他都是FALSE | RFC6487 §4.8.4 |
| extendedKeyUsage | N | 扩展证书公钥的用途权限 | CA证书:不能出现EKU;验证 RPKI 对象的 EE 证书:不能出现EKU;非 RPKI 对象的 EE:可以出现EKU,但必须为non-critical. | RFC6487 §4.8.5 |
| cRLDistributionPoints | N | CRL的发布点位置 | 字段:distributionPoint,不能包含reasons、cRLIssuer。其中distributionPoint字段包含:fullName,不能包含nameRelativeToCRLIssuer。fullName的格式必须是URI。自签名证书禁止出现该字段。非自签名证书必须出现。一个CA只能有一个CRL。一个CRLDP只能包含一个distributionPoint。但一个distributionPoint字段中可以包含多于1个的URI,但必须包含rsync URI且必须是最新的。 | RFC6487 §4.8.6 |
| authorityInformationAccess | N | 签发者的发布点位置 | 除了自签名的CA,必须出现。自签名CA,禁止出现。推荐的URI访问方式是rsync,并且rsyncURI的话,必须指定accessMethod=id-ad-caIssuers | RFC6487 §4.8.7 |
| subjectInformationAccess | N | 发布点位置 | CA证书:必须存在。必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-caRepository,accessLocation=rsyncURI。必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-repiManifest,accessLocation=rsync URI,指向该CA的mft对象。 EE证书:必须存在。必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-signedObject,accessLocation=rsyncURI。不允许其他的accessMethod | RFC6487 §4.8.8 |
| certificatePolicies | Y | 证书策略 | 必须存在,并且只能存在一种策略:RFC 6484 — RPKI Certificate Policy (CP) | RFC6487 §4.8.9 |
| iPResources | Y | IP地址集合 | 所有的RPKI证书中必须包含IP Resources或者ASResources,或者两者都包含。 | RFC6487 §4.8.10 |
| aSResources | Y | ASN集合 | 所有的RPKI证书中必须包含IP Resources或者ASResources,或者两者都包含。 | RFC6487 §4.8.11 |

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pub mod crl;
mod rc;
mod tal;
mod ta;
mod resources;
mod oids;

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src/data_model/oids.rs Normal file
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pub const OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: &str = "2.5.29.19";
pub const OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER: &str = "2.5.29.14";
pub const OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER: &str = "2.5.29.35";
pub const OID_KEY_USAGE: &str = "2.5.29.15";
pub const OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE: &str = "2.5.29.37";
pub const OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS: &str = "2.5.29.31";
pub const OID_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1";
pub const OID_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48";
pub const OID_AD_CA_ISSUERS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2";
pub const OID_AD_OCSP: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1";
pub const OID_SUBJECT_INFO_ACCESS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11";
pub const OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES: &str = "2.5.29.32";
pub const OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: &str = "1.2.840.113549.1.1.11";
pub const OID_IP_ADDRESS_BLOCKS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.7";
pub const OID_AS_IDENTIFIERS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.8";
pub const OID_RPKI_CP: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2";

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use asn1::{parse, BitString};
use der_parser::asn1_rs::Tag;
use der_parser::num_bigint::BigUint;
use url::Url;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use x509_parser::x509::AlgorithmIdentifier;
use x509_parser::prelude::{Validity, KeyUsage, X509Certificate, FromDer,
X509Version, X509Extension, ParsedExtension,
DistributionPointName, GeneralName};
use crate::data_model::crl::CrlDecodeError;
use crate::data_model::resources::ip_resources::{Afi, IPAddrBlocks, IPAddress, IPAddressChoice,
IPAddressOrRange, IPAddressPrefix, IPAddressRange,
IPAddressFamily};
use crate::data_model::resources::as_resources::ASIdentifiers;
use crate::data_model::oids;
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SubjectPublicKeyInfo {
pub algorithm_oid: String,
pub subject_public_key: u8,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AccessDescription {
pub access_method_oid: String,
pub access_location: Url,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct PolicyInformation {
pub policy_oid: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RcExtension {
pub basic_constraints: bool,
pub subject_key_identifier: u8,
pub authority_key_identifier: u8,
pub key_usage: KeyUsage,
pub extended_key_usage_oid: u8,
pub crl_distribution_points: Vec<Url>,
pub authority_info_access: Vec<AccessDescription>,
pub subject_info_access: Vec<AccessDescription>,
pub certificate_policies: Vec<PolicyInformation>,
pub ip_resource: IPAddrBlocks,
pub as_resource: ASIdentifiers,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ResourceCert {
/// 证书原始DER内容
pub cert_der: Vec<u8>,
/// 基本证书信息
pub version: u32,
pub serial_number: BigUint,
pub signature_algorithm_oid: String,
pub issuer_dn: String,
pub subject_dn: String,
pub validity: Validity,
pub subject_public_key_info: SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
pub extensions: RcExtension,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ResourceCertError {
#[error("X.509 parse resource cert error: {0}")]
ParseCert(String),
#[error("trailing bytes after CRL DER: {0} bytes")]
TrailingBytes(usize),
#[error("invalid version {0}")]
InvalidVersion(u32),
#[error("signatureAlgorithm does not match tbsCertificate.signature")]
SignatureAlgorithmMismatch,
#[error("unsupported signature algorithm")]
UnsupportedSignatureAlgorithm,
#[error("invalid Cert signature algorithm parameters")]
InvalidSignatureParameters,
#[error("invalid Cert validity range")]
InvalidValidityRange,
#[error("Cert not yet valid")]
NotYetValid,
#[error("expired")]
Expired,
#[error("Critical error, {0} should be {1}")]
CriticalError(String, String),
#[error("Duplicate Extension: {0}")]
DuplicateExtension(String),
#[error("AKI missing keyIdentifier")]
AkiMissingKeyIdentifier,
#[error("Unexpected parameter: {0}")]
UnexceptedParameter(String),
#[error("Missing parameter: {0}")]
MissingParameter(String),
#[error("CRL DP invalid distributionPointName: {0}")]
CrlDpInvalidDistributionPointName(String),
#[error("CRL DP unexpected distributionPointType: {0}")]
CrlDpUnexpectedDistributionPointType(String),
#[error("invalid URI: {0}")]
InvalidUri(String),
#[error("Unsupported General Name in {0}")]
UnsupportedGeneralName(String),
#[error("Unsupported CRL Distribution Point")]
UnsupportedCrlDistributionPoint,
#[error("Invalid Access Location Type")]
InvalidAccessLocationType,
#[error("Empty AuthorityInfoAccess!")]
EmptyAuthorityInfoAccess,
#[error("Certificate Policies must exists one policy")]
CertificatePoliciesTooMany,
#[error("Certificate Policies invalid")]
CertificatePoliciesInvalid,
}
impl ResourceCert{
pub fn from_der(cert_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ResourceCertError> {
let (rem, x509_rc) = X509Certificate::from_der(cert_der)
.map_err(|e| ResourceCertError::ParseCert(e.to_string()))?;
if !rem.is_empty() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::TrailingBytes(rem.len()));
}
// 校验
parse_and_validate_cert(x509_rc)
}
}
fn parse_and_validate_cert(x509_rc: X509Certificate) -> Result<ResourceCert, ResourceCertError> {
///逐个校验RC的内容, 如果有任何一个校验失败, 则返回错误
// 1. 版本号必须是V3
let version = match x509_rc.version() {
X509Version::V3 => X509Version::V3,
v => {
return Err(ResourceCertError::InvalidVersion(v.0));
}
};
// 2.校验签名算法
// 2.1. 校验外层的签名算法与里层的一致
let outer = &x509_rc.signature_algorithm;
let inner = &x509_rc.tbs_certificate.signature;
if outer.algorithm != inner.algorithm || outer.parameters != inner.parameters {
return Err(ResourceCertError::SignatureAlgorithmMismatch);
}
//2.2 RPKI的签名算法必须是rsaWithSHA256
let signature_algorithm = &x509_rc.signature_algorithm;
if signature_algorithm.algorithm.to_id_string() != oids::OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION {
return Err(ResourceCertError::UnsupportedSignatureAlgorithm);
}
validate_sig_params(signature_algorithm)?;
// 3. 校验Validity
let validity = x509_rc.validity();
validate_validity(validity, OffsetDateTime::now_utc())?;
// 4. SubjectPublicKeyInfo
let subject_public_key_info = x509_rc.tbs_certificate.subject_pki;
let extensions = parse_and_validate_extensions(x509_rc.extensions())?;
// TODO
Ok(ResourceCert {
})
}
fn validate_sig_params(sig: &AlgorithmIdentifier<'_>) -> Result<(), CrlDecodeError> {
match sig.parameters.as_ref() {
None => Ok(()),
Some(p) if p.tag() == Tag::Null => Ok(()),
Some(_p) => Err(CrlDecodeError::InvalidSignatureAlgorithmParameters),
}
}
fn validate_validity(
validity: &Validity,
now: OffsetDateTime,
) -> Result<(), ResourceCertError> {
let not_before = validity.not_before.to_datetime();
let not_after = validity.not_after.to_datetime();
if not_after < not_before {
return Err(ResourceCertError::InvalidValidityRange);
}
if now < not_before {
return Err(ResourceCertError::NotYetValid);
}
if now > not_after {
return Err(ResourceCertError::Expired);
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn parse_and_validate_extensions(
exts: &[X509Extension<'_>],
) -> Result<RcExtension, ResourceCertError> {
let mut basic_constraints = None;
let mut ip_addr_blocks = None;
let mut as_identifiers = None;
let mut ski = None;
let mut aki = None;
let mut crl_dp = None;
let mut aia = None;
let mut sia = None;
let mut key_usage = None;
let mut extended_key_usage = None;
let mut certificate_policies = None;
for ext in exts {
let oid = ext.oid.to_id_string();
let critical = ext.critical;
match oid.as_str() {
oids::OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS => {
if basic_constraints.is_some() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("basicConstraints".into()));
}
if !critical {
return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("basicConstraints".into(), "critical".into()));
}
let bc = parse_basic_constraints(ext)?;
basic_constraints = Some(bc);
}
oids::OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER => {
if ski.is_some() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("subjectKeyIdentifier".into()));
}
if critical {
return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("subjectKeyIdentifier".into(), "non-critical".into()));
}
let s = parse_subject_key_identifier(ext)?;
ski = Some(s);
}
oids::OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER => {
if aki.is_some() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("authorityKeyIdentifier".into()));
}
if critical {
return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("authorityKeyIdentifier".into(), "non-critical".into()));
}
let a = parse_authority_key_identifier(ext)?;
aki = Some(a);
}
oids::OID_KEY_USAGE => {
if key_usage.is_some() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("keyUsage".into()));
}
if !critical {
return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("keyUsage".into(), "critical".into()));
}
let ku = parse_key_usage(ext)?;
key_usage = Some(ku);
}
oids::OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE => {
if extended_key_usage.is_some() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("extendedKeyUsage".into()));
}
if critical {
return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("extendedKeyUsage".into(), "non-critical".into()));
}
let eku = oids::OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE;
}
oids::OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS => {
if crl_dp.is_some() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("crlDistributionPoints".into()));
}
if critical {
return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("crlDistributionPoints".into(), "non-critical".into()));
}
let cdp = parse_crl_distribution_points(ext)?;
crl_dp = Some(cdp);
}
oids::OID_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS => {
if aia.is_some() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("authorityInfoAccess".into()));
}
if critical {
return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("authorityInfoAccess".into(), "non-critical".into()));
}
let p_aia = parse_authority_info_access(ext)?;
aia = Some(p_aia);
}
oids::OID_SUBJECT_INFO_ACCESS => {
if sia.is_some() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("subjectInfoAccess".into()));
}
if critical {
return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("subjectInfoAccess".into(), "non-critical".into()));
}
let p_sia = parse_subject_info_access(ext)?;
sia = Some(p_sia);
}
oids::OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES => {
if certificate_policies.is_some() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("certificatePolicies".into()));
}
if !critical {
return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("certificatePolicies".into(), "critical".into()));
}
let p_cp = parse_certificate_policies(ext)?;
certificate_policies = Some(p_cp);
}
oids::OID_IP_ADDRESS_BLOCKS => {
if ip_addr_blocks.is_some() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("ipAddressBlocks".into()));
}
if !critical {
return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("ipAddressBlocks".into(), "critical".into()));
}
let p_ip = parse_ip_address_blocks(ext)?;
ip_addr_blocks = Some(p_ip);
}
oids::OID_AS_IDENTIFIERS => {
if as_identifiers.is_some() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("asIdentifiers".into()));
}
if !critical {
return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("asIdentifiers".into(), "critical".into()));
}
let p_as = parse_as_identifiers(ext)?;
as_identifiers = Some(p_as);
}
}
}
// TODO:
Ok(RcExtension {
}
}
fn parse_basic_constraints(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<bool, ResourceCertError> {
let ParsedExtension::BasicConstraints(bc) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert("basicConstraints parse failed".into()));
};
Ok(bc.ca)
}
fn parse_subject_key_identifier(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ResourceCertError> {
let ParsedExtension::SubjectKeyIdentifier(s) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert("subjectKeyIdentifier parse failed".into()));
};
Ok(s.0.to_vec())
}
fn parse_authority_key_identifier(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ResourceCertError> {
let ParsedExtension::AuthorityKeyIdentifier(aki) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert("authorityKeyIdentifier parse failed".into()));
};
let key_id = aki
.key_identifier
.as_ref()
.ok_or(ResourceCertError::MissingParameter("key_identifier".into()))?;
if aki.authority_cert_issuer.is_some() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::UnexceptedParameter("authority_cert_issuer".into()));
}
if aki.authority_cert_serial.is_some() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::UnexceptedParameter("authority_cert_serial".into()));
}
Ok(key_id.0.to_vec())
}
fn parse_key_usage(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<KeyUsage, ResourceCertError> {
let ParsedExtension::KeyUsage(ku) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert("keyUsage parse failed".into()));
};
Ok(ku.clone())
}
fn parse_crl_distribution_points(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<Vec<Url>, ResourceCertError> {
let ParsedExtension::CRLDistributionPoints(cdp) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert("crlDistributionPoints parse failed".into()));
};
let mut urls = Vec::new();
for point in cdp.points.iter() {
if point.reasons.is_some() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::UnexceptedParameter("reasons".into()));
}
if point.crl_issuer.is_some() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::UnexceptedParameter("crl_issuer".into()));
}
let dp_name = point.distribution_point.as_ref()
.ok_or(ResourceCertError::MissingParameter("distribution_point".into()))?;
match dp_name {
DistributionPointName::FullName(names) => {
for name in names {
match name {
GeneralName::URI(uri) => {
let url = Url::parse(uri)
.map_err(|_| ResourceCertError::InvalidUri(uri.to_string()))?;
urls.push(url);
}
_ => {
return Err(ResourceCertError::UnsupportedGeneralName("distribution_point".into()));
}
}
}
}
DistributionPointName::NameRelativeToCRLIssuer(_) => {
return Err(ResourceCertError::UnsupportedCrlDistributionPoint);
}
}
}
if urls.is_empty() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::MissingParameter("distribution_point".into()));
}
Ok(urls)
}
fn parse_authority_info_access(
ext: &X509Extension<'_>,
) -> Result<Vec<AccessDescription>, ResourceCertError> {
let ParsedExtension::AuthorityInfoAccess(aia) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert(
"authorityInfoAccess parse failed".into(),
));
};
let mut access_descriptions = Vec::new();
for access in &aia.accessdescs {
let access_method_oid = access.access_method.to_id_string();
let uri = match &access.access_location {
GeneralName::URI(uri) => uri,
_ => {
return Err(ResourceCertError::InvalidAccessLocationType);
}
};
let url = Url::parse(uri)
.map_err(|_| ResourceCertError::InvalidUri(uri.to_string()))?;
access_descriptions.push(AccessDescription {
access_method_oid,
access_location: url,
});
}
if access_descriptions.is_empty() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::EmptyAuthorityInfoAccess);
}
Ok(access_descriptions)
}
fn parse_subject_info_access(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<Vec<AccessDescription>, ResourceCertError> {
let ParsedExtension::SubjectInfoAccess(sia) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert(
"subjectInfoAccess parse failed".into(),
));
};
let mut access_descriptions = Vec::new();
for access in &sia.accessdescs {
let access_method_oid = access.access_method.to_id_string();
// accessLocation: MUST be URI in RPKI
let uri = match &access.access_location {
GeneralName::URI(uri) => uri,
_ => {
return Err(ResourceCertError::InvalidAccessLocationType);
}
};
let url = Url::parse(uri)
.map_err(|_| ResourceCertError::InvalidUri(uri.to_string()))?;
access_descriptions.push(AccessDescription {
access_method_oid,
access_location: url,
});
}
if access_descriptions.is_empty() {
return Err(ResourceCertError::EmptyAuthorityInfoAccess);
}
Ok(access_descriptions)
}
fn parse_certificate_policies(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<Vec<PolicyInformation>, ResourceCertError> {
let ParsedExtension::CertificatePolicies(cp) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert(
"certificatePolicies parse failed".into(),
));
};
let mut policies = Vec::new();
if cp.len() > 1 {
return Err(ResourceCertError::CertificatePoliciesTooMany);
}
let policy_info = cp.first().unwrap();
let policy_id = policy_info.policy_id.to_id_string();
if policy_id != oids::OID_RPKI_CP {
return Err(ResourceCertError::CertificatePoliciesInvalid);
}
let policy_info = PolicyInformation{
policy_oid: policy_id,
};
policies.push(policy_info);
Ok(policies)
}
fn bitstring_to_ip(b: &BitString, afi: &Afi) -> Result<IPAddress, ResourceCertError> {
let bytes = b.as_bytes();
let ip = match afi {
Afi::Ipv4 => {
if bytes.len() != 4 { return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert("IPv4 length mismatch".into())); }
u32::from_be_bytes([bytes[0], bytes[1], bytes[2], bytes[3]]) as u128
},
Afi::Ipv6 => {
if bytes.len() != 16 { return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert("IPv6 length mismatch".into())); }
u128::from_be_bytes([
bytes[0], bytes[1], bytes[2], bytes[3],
bytes[4], bytes[5], bytes[6], bytes[7],
bytes[8], bytes[9], bytes[10], bytes[11],
bytes[12], bytes[13], bytes[14], bytes[15],
])
},
};
Ok(IPAddress(ip))
}
fn parse_ip_address_blocks(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<IPAddrBlocks, ResourceCertError> {
let ip_blocks_der = ext.value;
let ips = parse(ip_blocks_der, |p| {
// 顶层 SEQUENCE OF IPAddressFamily
let mut ip_families = Vec::new();
p.read_sequence_of(|p2| {
// 每个 IPAddressFamily 是 SEQUENCE { addressFamily OCTET STRING, ipAddressChoice }
p2.read_sequence(|p3| {
let address_family_bytes = p3.read_element::<&[u8]>()?;
let afi = match address_family_bytes {
[0,1] => Afi::Ipv4,
[0,2] => Afi::Ipv6,
_ => return Err(asn1::ParseError::new(asn1::ParseErrorKind::InvalidValue)),
};
// 解析 IPAddressChoice
let ip_address_choice = {
let peek_tag = p3.peek_tag()?;
match peek_tag.tag_number() {
5 => IPAddressChoice::Inherit, // NULL
16 => { // SEQUENCE OF IPAddressOrRange
let ranges = p3.read_sequence_of(|p4| {
// 解析 IPAddressOrRange CHOICE
let peek = p4.peek_tag()?.tag_number();
if peek == 16 { // SEQUENCE -> AddressPrefix
let (addr_bytes, prefix_len): (&[u8], u8) = p4.read_sequence(|p5| {
let addr = p5.read_element::<BitString>()?.as_bytes();
let prefix_len = addr.len() as u8 * 8; // 简化:用字节长度推前缀
Ok((addr, prefix_len))
})?;
Ok(IPAddressOrRange::AddressPrefix(IPAddressPrefix{
address: bitstring_to_ip(addr_bytes, &afi)?,
prefix_length: prefix_len,
}))
} else {
// AddressRange
let (min_bytes, max_bytes) = p4.read_sequence(|p5| {
let min = p5.read_element::<BitString>()?.as_bytes();
let max = p5.read_element::<BitString>()?.as_bytes();
Ok((min, max))
})?;
Ok(IPAddressOrRange::AddressRange(IPAddressRange{
min: bitstring_to_ip(min_bytes, &afi)?,
max: bitstring_to_ip(max_bytes, &afi)?,
}))
}
})?;
IPAddressChoice::AddressOrRange(ranges)
}
_ => return Err(asn1::ParseError::new(asn1::ParseErrorKind::InvalidValue)),
}
};
ip_families.push(IPAddressFamily {
address_family: afi,
ip_address_choice,
});
Ok(())
})
})?;
Ok(IPAddrBlocks { ips: ip_families })
}).map_err(|_| ResourceCertError::ParseCert("Failed to parse IPAddrBlocks DER".into()))?;
Ok(ips)
}
fn parse_as_identifiers(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<Vec<AsIdentifier>, ResourceCertError> {
let as_identifiers_der = ext.value;
// TODO: 解析 ASIdentifiers DER
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ASIdentifiers {
pub asn: Vec<ASIdentifierChoice>
}
// ASN
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ASIdentifierChoice {
Inherit,
ASIDsOrRanges(Vec<ASIDOrRange>),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ASIDOrRange {
Id(Asn),
AsRange(ASRange),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ASRange {
pub min: Asn,
pub max: Asn,
}
impl ASRange {
/// Creates a new AS number range from the smallest and largest number.
pub fn new(min: Asn, max: Asn) -> Self {
ASRange { min, max }
}
/// Returns an AS block covering all ASNs.
pub fn all() -> ASRange {
ASRange::new(Asn::MIN, Asn::MAX)
}
/// Returns the smallest AS number that is part of this range.
pub fn min(self) -> Asn {
self.min
}
/// Returns the largest AS number that is still part of this range.
pub fn max(self) -> Asn {
self.max
}
/// Returns the number of ASNs covered by this value.
pub fn asn_count(self) -> u32 {
u32::from(self.max) - u32::from(self.min) + 1
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
pub struct Asn(u32);
impl Asn {
pub const MIN: Asn = Asn(u32::MIN);
pub const MAX: Asn = Asn(u32::MAX);
/// Creates an AS number from a `u32`.
pub fn from_u32(value: u32) -> Self {
Asn(value)
}
/// Converts an AS number into a `u32`.
pub fn into_u32(self) -> u32 {
self.0
}
/// Converts an AS number into a network-order byte array.
pub fn to_raw(self) -> [u8; 4] {
self.0.to_be_bytes()
}
}
impl From<u32> for Asn {
fn from(id: u32) -> Self {
Asn(id)
}
}
impl From<Asn> for u32 {
fn from(id: Asn) -> Self {
id.0
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct IPAddrBlocks {
pub ips: Vec<IPAddressFamily>
}
// IP Address Family
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct IPAddressFamily {
pub address_family: Afi,
pub ip_address_choice: IPAddressChoice,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Afi {
Ipv4,
Ipv6,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum IPAddressChoice {
Inherit,
AddressOrRange(Vec<IPAddressOrRange>),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum IPAddressOrRange {
AddressPrefix(IPAddressPrefix),
AddressRange(IPAddressRange),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct IPAddressPrefix {
pub address: IPAddress,
pub prefix_length: u8,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct IPAddressRange {
pub min: IPAddress,
pub max: IPAddress,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
pub struct IPAddress(u128);

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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
pub(crate) mod ip_resources;
pub(crate) mod as_resources;
pub mod resource;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
use crate::data_model::resources::as_resources::ASIdentifiers;
use crate::data_model::resources::ip_resources::IPAddrBlocks;
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ResourceSet {
ip_addr_blocks: IPAddrBlocks,
as_identifiers: ASIdentifiers,
}

27
src/data_model/ta.rs Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
use url::Url;
use x509_parser::prelude::*;
use crate::data_model::resources::resource::ResourceSet;
//
// #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
// pub struct TrustAnchorCert {
// /// 信任锚证书名称
// pub name: String,
//
// /// 证书原始DER内容
// pub cert_der: Vec<u8>,
//
// /// 证书
// pub cert: X509Certificate<'static>,
//
// /// 资源集合
// pub resources: ResourceSet,
//
// ///发布点
// pub publication_point: Url,
// }
//
// impl TrustAnchorCert {
//
// }

18
src/data_model/tal.rs Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
/// TAL Model
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct Tal {
/// Optional human-readable comments
pub comments: Vec<String>,
/// Ordered list of URIs pointing to the TA certificate
pub uris: Vec<TalUri>,
/// SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER
pub spki_der: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum TalUri {
Rsync(String),
Https(String),
}