增加RC数据结构和资源集合数据结构 #1

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yuyr merged 1 commits from dev_1.0_xuxt into main 2026-02-02 15:37:05 +08:00
13 changed files with 1203 additions and 1 deletions

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@@ -9,3 +9,4 @@ hex = "0.4.3"
thiserror = "2.0.18" thiserror = "2.0.18"
time = "0.3.45" time = "0.3.45"
x509-parser = { version = "0.18.0", features = ["verify"] } x509-parser = { version = "0.18.0", features = ["verify"] }
url = "2.5.8"

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# 01. Trust Anchor Locator (TAL)
## 1.1 对象定位
TAL是一个数据格式/配置文件,目的是告诉RP信任锚的公钥是什么,以及相关对象可以从哪里获取。
## 1.2 数据格式 (RFC 8630 §2.2)
TAL是一个配置文件,格式定义如下:
```
The TAL is an ordered sequence of:
1. an optional comment section consisting of one or more lines each starting with the "#" character, followed by human-readable informational UTF-8 text, conforming to the restrictions defined
in Section 2 of [RFC5198], and ending with a line break,
2. a URI section that is comprised of one or more ordered lines, each containing a TA URI, and ending with a line break,
3. a line break, and
4. a subjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280] in DER format [X.509], encoded in base64 (see Section 4 of [RFC4648]). To avoid long lines,
line breaks MAY be inserted into the base64-encoded string.
Note that line breaks in this file can use either "<CRLF>" or "<LF>".
```
## 1.3 抽象数据模型
### 1.3.1 TAL
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|----------|-------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------|---------------|
| uris | Vec<TalUri> | 指向TA的URI列表 | 允许rsync和https协议。 | RFC 8630 §2.1 |
| comment | Vec<String> | 注释(可选) | | RFC 8630 §2.2 |
| spki_der | Vec<u8> | 原始的subjectPublicKeyInfo | x.509 SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER编码,再base64编码 | RFC 8630 §2.2 |
### 1.3.2 TalUri
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------------|
| Rsync | String | rsync地址 | | RFC 8630 §2.1 |
| Https | String | https地址 | | RFC 8630 §2.1 |

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# 02. Trust Anchor (TA)
## 2.1 对象定位
TA是一个自签名的CA证书。
## 2.2 原始载体与编码
- 载体:X.509 certificates.
- 编码:DER(遵循 RFC 5280 的 certificate 结构与字段语义,但受限于RFC 8630 §2.3)
## 2.3 抽象数据类型
### 2.3.1 TA
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|-------------------|------------------|---------------|---------|---------------|
| name | String | 标识该TA,如apnic等 | | |
| cert_der | Vec<u8> | 原始DER内容 | | |
| cert | X509Certificate | 基础X509证书 | | RFC 5280 §4.1 |
| resource | ResourceSet | 资源集合 | | |
| publication_point | Uri | 获取该TA的URI | | |
### 2.3.2 ResourceSet
资源集合是来自RFC 3779的IP地址块(§2)和AS号段(§3),受约束于RFC 8630 §2.3
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|------|----------------|--------|-------------|---------------------------|
| ips | IpResourceSet | IP地址集合 | 不能是inherit | RFC 3779 §2和RFC 8630 §2.3 |
| asns | AsnResourceSet | ASN集合 | 不能是inherit | RFC 3779 §3和RFC 8630 §2.3 |
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.3 IpResourceSet)
[//]: # (包括IPv4和IPv6的前缀表示)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|----|------------------------|----------|-------------|--------------|)
[//]: # (| v4 | PrefixSet<Ipv4Prefix> | IPv4前缀集合 | | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # (| v6 | PrefixSet<Ipv6Prefix> | IPv6前缀集合 | | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.4 AsnResourceSet)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|-------|--------------------|-------|-------------|-------------|)
[//]: # (| range | RangeSet<AsnBlock> | ASN集合 | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.5 Ipv4Prefix)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|------|-----|-----|---------|-------------|)
[//]: # (| addr | u32 | 地址 | | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # (| len | u8 | 长度 | 0-32 | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.6 Ipv6Prefix)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|------|------|-----|---------|-------------|)
[//]: # (| addr | u128 | 地址 | | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # (| len | u8 | 长度 | 0-128 | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.7 AsnBlock)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|----------|----------|-------|---------|--------------|)
[//]: # (| asn | Asn | ASN | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
[//]: # (| asnRange | AsnRange | ASN范围 | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.8 Asn)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|-----|-----|-----|---------|-------------|)
[//]: # (| asn | u32 | ASN | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.8 AsnRange)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|-----|-----|-------|---------|--------------|)
[//]: # (| min | Asn | 最小ASN | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
[//]: # (| max | Asn | 最大ASN | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
# 2.4 TA校验流程(RFC 8630 §3)
1. 从TAL的URI列表中获取证书对象。(顺序访问,若前面失效,再访问后面的)
2. 验证证书格式,必须是当前、有效的自签名RPKI证书。
3. 验证公钥匹配。TAL中的SubjectPublicKeyInfo与下载证书的公钥一致。
4. 其他检查。
5. 更新本地存储库缓存。

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# 03. RC (Resource Certifications)
## 3.1 对象定位
RC是资源证书,包括CA和EE
## 3.2 原始载体与编码
- 载体:X.509 certificates.
- 编码:DER(遵循 RFC 5280 的 Certificate 结构与字段语义,但受 RPKI profile 限制)RFC 6487 §4
### 3.2.1 基本语法(RFC 5280 §4,RFC 6487 )
RC是遵循RFC5280定义的X.509Certificate语法(RFC 5280 §4),并且符合RFC 6487 §4的约束。只选取RFC 6487 §4章节列出来的字段。(Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, all the fields listed
here MUST be present, and any other fields MUST NOT appear in a
conforming resource certificate.)
```
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING
}
TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version MUST be v3,
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber,
signature AlgorithmIdentifier,
issuer Name,
subject Name,
validity Validity,
subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
-- If present, version MUST be v3
}
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
notBefore Time,
notAfter Time }
Time ::= CHOICE {
utcTime UTCTime,
generalTime GeneralizedTime }
UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING
SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }
Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension
Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
extnValue OCTET STRING
-- contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value
-- corresponding to the extension type identified
-- by extnID
}
```
> 其中`Name` "a valid X.501 distinguished name"(RFC 6487 §4.4)
### 3.2.2 证书扩展字段 (RFC 6487 §4.8)
RC的证书扩展字段按照RFC 6487 §4.8的规定,有以下几个扩展:
- Basic Constraints
- Subject Key Identifier
- Authority Key Identifier
- Key Usage
- Extended Key Usage(CA证书,以及验证RPKI对象的EE证书不能出现该字段。非RPKI对象的EE可以出现EKU,但必须为non-critical)
- CRL Distribution Points
- Authority Information Access
- Subject Information Access
- SIA for CA Certificates
- SIA for EE Certificates
- Certificate Policies
- IP Resources
- AS Resources
```
# Basic Constraints
id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 }
BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE }
# Subject Key Identifier
id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 }
SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier
KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
# Authority Key Identifier
id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 }
AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL }
# Key Usage
id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 }
KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
digitalSignature (0),
nonRepudiation (1), -- recent editions of X.509 have
-- renamed this bit to contentCommitment
keyEncipherment (2),
dataEncipherment (3),
keyAgreement (4),
keyCertSign (5),
cRLSign (6),
encipherOnly (7),
decipherOnly (8) }
# Extended Key Usage
id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 }
ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
# CRL Distribution Points
id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 31 }
CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint
DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL }
DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE {
fullName [0] GeneralNames }
## Authority Information Access
id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 1 }
AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax ::=
SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription
AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE {
accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
accessLocation GeneralName }
# AccessDescription
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
# CA 证书发布位置
id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 2 }
# OCSP 服务地址
id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 1 }
# Subject Information Access
id-pe-subjectInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 11 }
SubjectInfoAccessSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription
AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE {
accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
accessLocation GeneralName }
## Subject Information Access for CA (RFC 6487 §4.8.8.1)
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
id-ad-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 10 }
必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-caRepository,accessLocation=rsyncURI。
必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-repiManifest, accessLocation=rsync URI,指向该CA的mft对象。
## Subject Information Access for EE (RFC 6487 §4.8.8.2)
id-ad-signedObject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 }
必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-signedObject, accessLocation=rsyncURI
不允许其他的accessMethod
# Certificate Policies
id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 }
anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 }
certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation
PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
policyIdentifier CertPolicyId,
policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL }
CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId,
qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId }
-- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers
id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 }
id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 }
id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 }
PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice )
Qualifier ::= CHOICE {
cPSuri CPSuri,
userNotice UserNotice }
CPSuri ::= IA5String
UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {
noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL }
NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
organization DisplayText,
noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER }
DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)),
visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) }
# IP Resources
id-pe-ipAddrBlocks OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 7 }
IPAddrBlocks ::= SEQUENCE OF IPAddressFamily
IPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE { -- AFI & optional SAFI --
addressFamily OCTET STRING (SIZE (2..3)),
ipAddressChoice IPAddressChoice }
IPAddressChoice ::= CHOICE {
inherit NULL, -- inherit from issuer --
addressesOrRanges SEQUENCE OF IPAddressOrRange }
IPAddressOrRange ::= CHOICE {
addressPrefix IPAddress,
addressRange IPAddressRange }
IPAddressRange ::= SEQUENCE {
min IPAddress,
max IPAddress }
IPAddress ::= BIT STRING
# AS Resources
id-pe-autonomousSysIds OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 8 }
ASIdentifiers ::= SEQUENCE {
asnum [0] EXPLICIT ASIdentifierChoice OPTIONAL,
rdi [1] EXPLICIT ASIdentifierChoice OPTIONAL}
ASIdentifierChoice ::= CHOICE {
inherit NULL, -- inherit from issuer --
asIdsOrRanges SEQUENCE OF ASIdOrRange }
ASIdOrRange ::= CHOICE {
id ASId,
range ASRange }
ASRange ::= SEQUENCE {
min ASId,
max ASId }
ASId ::= INTEGER
```
# 3.3 抽象数据结构
采用X509 Certificate + Resource + 约束校验的方式组合
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|----------|---------------------|----------|---------|---------------|
| cert_der | Vec<u8> | 证书原始数据 | | |
| cert | X509Certificate | 基础X509证书 | | RFC 5280 §4.1 |
| resource | ResourceSet | 资源集合 | | |
# 3.4 约束规则
## 3.4.1 Cert约束校验规则
RFC 6487中规定的证书的字段参见[3.2.1 ](#321-基本语法rfc-5280-4rfc-6487-)
-
| 字段 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|-----------|-------|----------------------------------------------|--------------|
| version | 证书版本 | 必须是v3(值为2) | RFC6487 §4.1 |
| serial | 证书编号 | 同一个CA签发的证书编号必须唯一 | RFC6487 §4.2 |
| validity | 证书有效期 | notBefore:时间不能早于证书的生成时间。若时间段大于上级证书的有效期,也是有效的 | RFC6487 §4.6 |
## 3.4.2 Cert Extentions中字段的约束校验规则
RFC 6487中规定的扩展字段参见[3.2.2 ](#322-证书扩展字段-rfc-6487-48)
| 字段 | critical | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|----------------------------|----------|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| basicConstraints | Y | 证书类型 | CA证书:cA=TRUE; EE证书:cA=FALSE | RFC6487 §4.8.1 |
| subjectKeyIdentifier | N | 证书公钥 | SKI = SHA-1(DER-encoded SPKI bit string) | RFC6487 §4.8.2 |
| authorityKeyIdentifier | N | 父证书的公钥 | 字段只包含keyIdentifier,不能包含authorityCertIssuer和authorityCertSerialNumber;除了自签名CA外,其余证书必须出现。自签名CA若出现该字段,则等于SKI | RFC6487 §4.8.3 |
| keyUsage | Y | 证书公钥的用途权限 | CA证书:keyCertSign = TRUE, cRLSign = TRUE 其他都是FALSE。EE证书:digitalSignature = TRUE 其他都是FALSE | RFC6487 §4.8.4 |
| extendedKeyUsage | N | 扩展证书公钥的用途权限 | CA证书:不能出现EKU;验证 RPKI 对象的 EE 证书:不能出现EKU;非 RPKI 对象的 EE:可以出现EKU,但必须为non-critical. | RFC6487 §4.8.5 |
| cRLDistributionPoints | N | CRL的发布点位置 | 字段:distributionPoint,不能包含reasons、cRLIssuer。其中distributionPoint字段包含:fullName,不能包含nameRelativeToCRLIssuer。fullName的格式必须是URI。自签名证书禁止出现该字段。非自签名证书必须出现。一个CA只能有一个CRL。一个CRLDP只能包含一个distributionPoint。但一个distributionPoint字段中可以包含多于1个的URI,但必须包含rsync URI且必须是最新的。 | RFC6487 §4.8.6 |
| authorityInformationAccess | N | 签发者的发布点位置 | 除了自签名的CA,必须出现。自签名CA,禁止出现。推荐的URI访问方式是rsync,并且rsyncURI的话,必须指定accessMethod=id-ad-caIssuers | RFC6487 §4.8.7 |
| subjectInformationAccess | N | 发布点位置 | CA证书:必须存在。必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-caRepository,accessLocation=rsyncURI。必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-repiManifest,accessLocation=rsync URI,指向该CA的mft对象。 EE证书:必须存在。必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-signedObject,accessLocation=rsyncURI。不允许其他的accessMethod | RFC6487 §4.8.8 |
| certificatePolicies | Y | 证书策略 | 必须存在,并且只能存在一种策略:RFC 6484 — RPKI Certificate Policy (CP) | RFC6487 §4.8.9 |
| iPResources | Y | IP地址集合 | 所有的RPKI证书中必须包含IP Resources或者ASResources,或者两者都包含。 | RFC6487 §4.8.10 |
| aSResources | Y | ASN集合 | 所有的RPKI证书中必须包含IP Resources或者ASResources,或者两者都包含。 | RFC6487 §4.8.11 |

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pub mod crl; pub mod crl;
mod rc;
mod tal;
mod ta;
mod resources;
mod oids;

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pub const OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: &str = "2.5.29.19";
pub const OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER: &str = "2.5.29.14";
pub const OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER: &str = "2.5.29.35";
pub const OID_KEY_USAGE: &str = "2.5.29.15";
pub const OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE: &str = "2.5.29.37";
pub const OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS: &str = "2.5.29.31";
pub const OID_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1";
pub const OID_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48";
pub const OID_AD_CA_ISSUERS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2";
pub const OID_AD_OCSP: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1";
pub const OID_SUBJECT_INFO_ACCESS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11";
pub const OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES: &str = "2.5.29.32";
pub const OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: &str = "1.2.840.113549.1.1.11";

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use der_parser::asn1_rs::Tag;
use der_parser::num_bigint::BigUint;
use url::Url;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use x509_parser::x509::AlgorithmIdentifier;
use x509_parser::prelude::{Validity, KeyUsage, X509Certificate, FromDer,
X509Version, X509Extension, ParsedExtension,
CRLDistributionPoints, DistributionPointName, GeneralName};
use crate::data_model::crl::CrlDecodeError;
use crate::data_model::resources::ip_resources::IPAddrBlocks;
use crate::data_model::resources::as_resources::ASIdentifiers;
use crate::data_model::oids;
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SubjectPublicKeyInfo {
pub algorithm_oid: String,
pub subject_public_key: u8,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AccessDescription {
pub access_method_oid: String,
pub access_location: Url,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct PolicyInformation {
pub policy_oid: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RcExtension {
pub basic_constraints: bool,
pub subject_key_identifier: u8,
pub authority_key_identifier: u8,
pub key_usage: KeyUsage,
pub extended_key_usage_oid: u8,
pub crl_distribution_points: Vec<Url>,
pub authority_info_access: Vec<AccessDescription>,
pub subject_info_access: Vec<AccessDescription>,
pub certificate_policies: Vec<PolicyInformation>,
pub ip_resource: IPAddrBlocks,
pub as_resource: ASIdentifiers,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ResourceCert {
/// 证书原始DER内容
pub cert_der: Vec<u8>,
/// 基本证书信息
pub version: u32,
pub serial_number: BigUint,
pub signature_algorithm_oid: String,
pub issuer_dn: String,
pub subject_dn: String,
pub validity: Validity,
pub subject_public_key_info: SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
pub extensions: RcExtension,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ResourceCertError {
#[error("X.509 parse resource cert error: {0}")]
ParseCert(String),
#[error("trailing bytes after CRL DER: {0} bytes")]
TrailingBytes(usize),
#[error("invalid version {0}")]
InvalidVersion(u32),
#[error("signatureAlgorithm does not match tbsCertificate.signature")]
SignatureAlgorithmMismatch,
#[error("unsupported signature algorithm")]
UnsupportedSignatureAlgorithm,
#[error("invalid Cert signature algorithm parameters")]
InvalidSignatureParameters,
#[error("invalid Cert validity range")]
InvalidValidityRange,
#[error("Cert not yet valid")]
NotYetValid,
#[error("expired")]
Expired,
#[error("Critical error, {0} should be {1}")]
CriticalError(String, String),
#[error("Duplicate Extension: {0}")]
DuplicateExtension(String),
#[error("AKI missing keyIdentifier")]
AkiMissingKeyIdentifier,
#[error("Unexpected parameter: {0}")]
UnexceptedParameter(String),
#[error("Missing parameter: {0}")]
MissingParameter(String),
#[error("CRL DP invalid distributionPointName: {0}")]
CrlDpInvalidDistributionPointName(String),
#[error("CRL DP unexpected distributionPointType: {0}")]
CrlDpUnexpectedDistributionPointType(String),
#[error("invalid URI: {0}")]
InvalidUri(String),
#[error("Unsupported General Name in {0}")]
UnsupportedGeneralName(String),
#[error("Unsupported CRL Distribution Point")]
UnsupportedCrlDistributionPoint,
#[error("Invalid Access Location Type")]
InvalidAccessLocationType,
#[error("Empty AuthorityInfoAccess!")]
EmptyAuthorityInfoAccess,
}
// impl ResourceCert{
// pub fn from_der(cert_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ResourceCertError> {
// let (rem, x509_rc) = X509Certificate::from_der(cert_der)
// .map_err(|e| ResourceCertError::ParseCert(e.to_string()))?;
//
// if !rem.is_empty() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::TrailingBytes(rem.len()));
// }
//
// // 校验
// parse_and_validate_cert(x509_rc)
// }
//
//
//
// }
//
// fn parse_and_validate_cert(x509_rc: X509Certificate) -> Result<ResourceCert, ResourceCertError> {
// ///逐个校验RC的内容, 如果有任何一个校验失败, 则返回错误
//
// // 1. 版本号必须是V3
// let version = match x509_rc.version() {
// X509Version::V3 => X509Version::V3,
// v => {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::InvalidVersion(v.0));
// }
// };
//
// // 2.校验签名算法
// // 2.1. 校验外层的签名算法与里层的一致
// let outer = &x509_rc.signature_algorithm;
// let inner = &x509_rc.tbs_certificate.signature;
//
// if outer.algorithm != inner.algorithm || outer.parameters != inner.parameters {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::SignatureAlgorithmMismatch);
// }
// //2.2 RPKI的签名算法必须是rsaWithSHA256
// let signature_algorithm = &x509_rc.signature_algorithm;
// if signature_algorithm.algorithm.to_id_string() != oids::OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::UnsupportedSignatureAlgorithm);
// }
// validate_sig_params(signature_algorithm)?;
//
// // 3. 校验Validity
// let validity = x509_rc.validity();
// validate_validity(validity, OffsetDateTime::now_utc())?;
//
// // 4. SubjectPublicKeyInfo
// let subject_public_key_info = x509_rc.tbs_certificate.subject_pki;
//
// let extensions = parse_and_validate_extensions(x509_rc.extensions())?;
//
// Ok(ResourceCert {
// cert_der: x509_rc.to_der().to_vec(),
// version: version.0,
// serial_number: x509_rc.serial(),
// signature_algorithm_oid: signature_algorithm.algorithm.to_id_string(),
// issuer_dn: x509_rc.issuer().to_string(),
// subject_dn: x509_rc.subject().to_string(),
// validity,
// subject_public_key_info: SubjectPublicKeyInfo {
// // algorithm_oid: x509_rc.tbs_certificate.subject_pki.algorithm.algorithm.to_id_string(),
// // subject_public_key: x509_rc.tbs_certificate.subject_pki.subject_public_key.unused_bits,
// },
// extensions,
// })
//
//
// }
//
// fn validate_sig_params(sig: &AlgorithmIdentifier<'_>) -> Result<(), CrlDecodeError> {
// match sig.parameters.as_ref() {
// None => Ok(()),
// Some(p) if p.tag() == Tag::Null => Ok(()),
// Some(_p) => Err(CrlDecodeError::InvalidSignatureAlgorithmParameters),
// }
// }
//
// fn validate_validity(
// validity: &Validity,
// now: OffsetDateTime,
// ) -> Result<(), ResourceCertError> {
// let not_before = validity.not_before.to_datetime();
// let not_after = validity.not_after.to_datetime();
//
// if not_after < not_before {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::InvalidValidityRange);
// }
//
// if now < not_before {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::NotYetValid);
// }
//
// if now > not_after {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::Expired);
// }
//
// Ok(())
// }
//
//
// pub fn parse_and_validate_extensions(
// exts: &[X509Extension<'_>],
// ) -> Result<RcExtension, ResourceCertError> {
// let mut basic_constraints = None;
// let mut ip_addr_blocks = None;
// let mut as_identifiers = None;
// let mut ski = None;
// let mut aki = None;
// let mut crl_dp = None;
// let mut aia = None;
// let mut sia = None;
// let mut key_usage = None;
// let mut extended_key_usage = None;
// let mut certificate_policies = None;
//
// for ext in exts {
// let oid = ext.oid.to_id_string();
// let critical = ext.critical;
// match oid.as_str() {
// oids::OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS => {
// if basic_constraints.is_some() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("basicConstraints".into()));
// }
// if !critical {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("basicConstraints".into(), "critical".into()));
// }
// let bc = parse_basic_constraints(ext)?;
// basic_constraints = Some(bc);
// }
// oids::OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER => {
// if ski.is_some() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("subjectKeyIdentifier".into()));
// }
// if critical {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("subjectKeyIdentifier".into(), "non-critical".into()));
// }
// let s = parse_subject_key_identifier(ext)?;
// ski = Some(s);
// }
// oids::OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER => {
// if aki.is_some() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("authorityKeyIdentifier".into()));
// }
// if critical {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("authorityKeyIdentifier".into(), "non-critical".into()));
// }
// let a = parse_authority_key_identifier(ext)?;
// aki = Some(a);
// }
// oids::OID_KEY_USAGE => {
// if key_usage.is_some() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("keyUsage".into()));
// }
// if !critical {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("keyUsage".into(), "critical".into()));
// }
// let ku = parse_key_usage(ext)?;
// key_usage = Some(ku);
// }
// oids::OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE => {
// if extended_key_usage.is_some() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("extendedKeyUsage".into()));
// }
// if critical {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("extendedKeyUsage".into(), "non-critical".into()));
// }
// let eku = oids::OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE;
// }
// oids::OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS => {
// if crl_dp.is_some() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("crlDistributionPoints".into()));
// }
// if critical {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("crlDistributionPoints".into(), "non-critical".into()));
// }
// let cdp = parse_crl_distribution_points(ext)?;
// crl_dp = Some(cdp);
// }
// oids::OID_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS => {
// if aia.is_some() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("authorityInfoAccess".into()));
// }
// if critical {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("authorityInfoAccess".into(), "non-critical".into()));
// }
// let p_aia = parse_authority_info_access(ext)?;
// aia = Some(p_aia);
// }
// oids::OID_SUBJECT_INFO_ACCESS => {
// if sia.is_some() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("subjectInfoAccess".into()));
// }
// if critical {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("subjectInfoAccess".into(), "non-critical".into()));
// }
// let p_sia = parse_subject_info_access(ext)?;
// sia = Some(p_sia);
// }
// oids::OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES => {
// if certificate_policies.is_some() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::DuplicateExtension("certificatePolicies".into()));
// }
// if !critical {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::CriticalError("certificatePolicies".into(), "critical".into()));
// }
// let p_cp = parse_certificate_policies(ext)?;
// certificate_policies = Some(p_cp);
// }
// }
//
//
// }
// Ok(RcExtension {
// basic_constraints,
// ip_addr_blocks,
// as_identifiers,
// subject_key_id: ski,
// authority_key_id: aki,
// crl_distribution_points: crl_dp,
// authority_info_access: aia,
// })
// }
//
// fn parse_basic_constraints(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<bool, ResourceCertError> {
// let ParsedExtension::BasicConstraints(bc) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert("basicConstraints parse failed".into()));
// };
// Ok(bc.ca)
// }
//
// fn parse_subject_key_identifier(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ResourceCertError> {
// let ParsedExtension::SubjectKeyIdentifier(s) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert("subjectKeyIdentifier parse failed".into()));
// };
// Ok(s.0.to_vec())
// }
//
// fn parse_authority_key_identifier(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ResourceCertError> {
// let ParsedExtension::AuthorityKeyIdentifier(aki) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert("authorityKeyIdentifier parse failed".into()));
// };
// let key_id = aki
// .key_identifier
// .as_ref()
// .ok_or(ResourceCertError::MissingParameter("key_identifier".into()))?;
//
// if aki.authority_cert_issuer.is_some() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::UnexceptedParameter("authority_cert_issuer".into()));
// }
// if aki.authority_cert_serial.is_some() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::UnexceptedParameter("authority_cert_serial".into()));
// }
//
//
// Ok(key_id.0.to_vec())
// }
//
// fn parse_key_usage(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<KeyUsage, ResourceCertError> {
// let ParsedExtension::KeyUsage(ku) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert("keyUsage parse failed".into()));
// };
// Ok(ku.clone())
// }
//
// fn parse_crl_distribution_points(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<Vec<Url>, ResourceCertError> {
// let ParsedExtension::CRLDistributionPoints(cdp) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert("crlDistributionPoints parse failed".into()));
// };
// let mut urls = Vec::new();
// for point in cdp.points.iter() {
// if point.reasons.is_some() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::UnexceptedParameter("reasons".into()));
// }
// if point.crl_issuer.is_some() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::UnexceptedParameter("crl_issuer".into()));
// }
//
// let dp_name = point.distribution_point.as_ref()
// .ok_or(ResourceCertError::MissingParameter("distribution_point".into()))?;
// match dp_name {
// DistributionPointName::FullName(names) => {
// for name in names {
// match name {
// GeneralName::URI(uri) => {
// let url = Url::parse(uri)
// .map_err(|_| ResourceCertError::InvalidUri(uri.to_string()))?;
// urls.push(url);
// }
// _ => {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::UnsupportedGeneralName("distribution_point".into()));
// }
// }
// }
//
// }
// DistributionPointName::NameRelativeToCRLIssuer(_) => {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::UnsupportedCrlDistributionPoint);
// }
// }
// }
// if urls.is_empty() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::MissingParameter("distribution_point".into()));
// }
// Ok(urls)
// }
//
// fn parse_authority_info_access(
// ext: &X509Extension<'_>,
// ) -> Result<Vec<AccessDescription>, ResourceCertError> {
// let ParsedExtension::AuthorityInfoAccess(aia) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert(
// "authorityInfoAccess parse failed".into(),
// ));
// };
//
// let mut access_descriptions = Vec::new();
//
// for access in &aia.accessdescs {
// let access_method_oid = access.access_method.to_id_string();
//
// let uri = match &access.access_location {
// GeneralName::URI(uri) => uri,
// _ => {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::InvalidAccessLocationType);
// }
// };
//
// let url = Url::parse(uri)
// .map_err(|_| ResourceCertError::InvalidUri(uri.to_string()))?;
//
// access_descriptions.push(AccessDescription {
// access_method_oid,
// access_location: url,
// });
// }
//
// if access_descriptions.is_empty() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::EmptyAuthorityInfoAccess);
// }
//
// Ok(access_descriptions)
// }
//
// fn parse_subject_info_access(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<Vec<AccessDescription>, ResourceCertError> {
// let ParsedExtension::SubjectInfoAccess(sia) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert(
// "subjectInfoAccess parse failed".into(),
// ));
// };
// let mut access_descriptions = Vec::new();
//
// for access in &sia.accessdescs {
// let access_method_oid = access.access_method.to_id_string();
//
// // accessLocation: MUST be URI in RPKI
// let uri = match &access.access_location {
// GeneralName::URI(uri) => uri,
// _ => {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::InvalidAccessLocationType);
// }
// };
//
// let url = Url::parse(uri)
// .map_err(|_| ResourceCertError::InvalidUri(uri.to_string()))?;
//
// access_descriptions.push(AccessDescription {
// access_method_oid,
// access_location: url,
// });
// }
//
// if access_descriptions.is_empty() {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::EmptyAuthorityInfoAccess);
// }
//
// Ok(access_descriptions)
// }
//
// fn parse_certificate_policies(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<Vec<PolicyInformation>, ResourceCertError> {
// let ParsedExtension::CertificatePolicies(cp) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
// return Err(ResourceCertError::ParseCert(
// "certificatePolicies parse failed".into(),
// ));
// };
// let mut policies = Vec::new();
//
// }

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@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ASIdentifiers {
pub asn: Vec<ASIdentifierChoice>
}
// ASN
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ASIdentifierChoice {
Inherit,
ASIDsOrRanges(Vec<ASIDOrRange>),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ASIDOrRange {
Id(Asn),
AsRange(ASRange),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ASRange {
pub min: Asn,
pub max: Asn,
}
impl ASRange {
/// Creates a new AS number range from the smallest and largest number.
pub fn new(min: Asn, max: Asn) -> Self {
ASRange { min, max }
}
/// Returns an AS block covering all ASNs.
pub fn all() -> ASRange {
ASRange::new(Asn::MIN, Asn::MAX)
}
/// Returns the smallest AS number that is part of this range.
pub fn min(self) -> Asn {
self.min
}
/// Returns the largest AS number that is still part of this range.
pub fn max(self) -> Asn {
self.max
}
/// Returns the number of ASNs covered by this value.
pub fn asn_count(self) -> u32 {
u32::from(self.max) - u32::from(self.min) + 1
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
pub struct Asn(u32);
impl Asn {
pub const MIN: Asn = Asn(u32::MIN);
pub const MAX: Asn = Asn(u32::MAX);
/// Creates an AS number from a `u32`.
pub fn from_u32(value: u32) -> Self {
Asn(value)
}
/// Converts an AS number into a `u32`.
pub fn into_u32(self) -> u32 {
self.0
}
/// Converts an AS number into a network-order byte array.
pub fn to_raw(self) -> [u8; 4] {
self.0.to_be_bytes()
}
}
impl From<u32> for Asn {
fn from(id: u32) -> Self {
Asn(id)
}
}
impl From<Asn> for u32 {
fn from(id: Asn) -> Self {
id.0
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct IPAddrBlocks {
ips: Vec<IPAddressFamily>
}
// IP Address Family
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct IPAddressFamily {
pub address_family: Afi,
pub ip_address_choice: IPAddressChoice,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Afi {
Ipv4,
Ipv6,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum IPAddressChoice {
Inherit,
AddressOrRange(Vec<IPAddressOrRange>),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum IPAddressOrRange {
AddressPrefix(IPAddressPrefix),
AddressRange(IPAddressRange),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct IPAddressPrefix {
pub address: IPAddress,
pub prefix_length: u8,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct IPAddressRange {
pub min: IPAddress,
pub max: IPAddress,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
pub struct IPAddress(u128);

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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
pub(crate) mod ip_resources;
pub(crate) mod as_resources;
pub mod resource;

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@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
use crate::data_model::resources::as_resources::ASIdentifiers;
use crate::data_model::resources::ip_resources::IPAddrBlocks;
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ResourceSet {
ip_addr_blocks: IPAddrBlocks,
as_identifiers: ASIdentifiers,
}

27
src/data_model/ta.rs Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
use url::Url;
use x509_parser::prelude::*;
use crate::data_model::resources::resource::ResourceSet;
//
// #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
// pub struct TrustAnchorCert {
// /// 信任锚证书名称
// pub name: String,
//
// /// 证书原始DER内容
// pub cert_der: Vec<u8>,
//
// /// 证书
// pub cert: X509Certificate<'static>,
//
// /// 资源集合
// pub resources: ResourceSet,
//
// ///发布点
// pub publication_point: Url,
// }
//
// impl TrustAnchorCert {
//
// }

18
src/data_model/tal.rs Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
/// TAL Model
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct Tal {
/// Optional human-readable comments
pub comments: Vec<String>,
/// Ordered list of URIs pointing to the TA certificate
pub uris: Vec<TalUri>,
/// SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER
pub spki_der: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum TalUri {
Rsync(String),
Https(String),
}