5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
7be865d7f1 优化时间表示 2026-02-06 15:30:26 +08:00
a58e507f92 重构error code 2026-02-04 17:02:17 +08:00
cc9f3f21de 增加rc,完成所有模型的解析,优化error code 的RFC引用 2026-02-03 16:50:52 +08:00
56ae2ca4fc 增加aspa对象解析 2026-02-02 15:42:30 +08:00
bcd4829486 add signed object, manifest impl. add coverage script 2026-02-02 15:42:01 +08:00
235 changed files with 14325 additions and 33709 deletions

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.git
.gitignore
.idea
target
rtr-db
tests
specs
scripts
README.md

5
.gitignore vendored
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target/ target/
rtr-db/ Cargo.lock
.idea/
logs/
report/

3528
Cargo.lock generated

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[package] [package]
name = "rpki" name = "rpki"
version = "1.3.0" version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024" edition = "2024"
[[bin]]
name = "rpki_rtr"
path = "src/main_rtr.rs"
[dependencies] [dependencies]
der-parser = "10.0.0" der-parser = { version = "10.0.0", features = ["serialize"] }
hex = "0.4.3" hex = "0.4.3"
base64 = "0.22.1"
sha2 = "0.10.8"
thiserror = "2.0.18" thiserror = "2.0.18"
time = "0.3.45" time = "0.3.45"
ring = "0.17.14"
x509-parser = { version = "0.18.0", features = ["verify"] } x509-parser = { version = "0.18.0", features = ["verify"] }
url = "2.5.8" url = "2.5.8"
asn1-rs = "0.7.1"
asn1-rs-derive = "0.6.0"
asn1 = "0.23.0"
arc-swap = "1.7.0"
chrono = { version = "0.4.44", features = ["serde"] }
chrono-tz = "0.10"
bytes = "1.11.1"
tokio = { version = "1.49.0", features = ["full"] }
rand = "0.10.0"
rocksdb = { version = "0.21.0", default-features = false }
serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive", "rc"] }
serde_json = "1"
base64 = "0.22"
anyhow = "1"
tracing = "0.1.44"
sha2 = "0.10"
tempfile = "3"
tokio-rustls = "0.26"
rustls = "0.23"
rustls-pemfile = "2"
rustls-pki-types = "1.14.0"
socket2 = "0.5"
russh = { version = "0.60.0", default-features = false, features = ["ring", "rsa"] }
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter", "fmt"] }

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# RTR Client 使用说明
本文说明仓库内三类 RTR Client 的用途、启动方式和验证命令:
- `deploy/client`: 本仓库自带的 `rtr_debug_client`,适合做 RTR 协议调试、连通性检查和单次查询。
- `deploy/frr`: FRR 作为黑盒 RTR Client,适合验证真实路由软件是否能消费 server 下发的 VRP。
- `deploy/bird`: BIRD 作为黑盒 RTR Client,适合验证 TCP 或 SSH transport 下的 RPKI/ROA/ASPA 数据导入。
以下命令默认从仓库根目录执行。
## 目录
- [前置条件](#前置条件)
- [rtr_debug_client](#rtr_debug_client)
- [Docker attach 交互命令](#docker-attach-交互命令)
- [TCP](#tcp)
- [TLS/mTLS](#tlsmtls)
- [SSH](#ssh)
- [多客户端压测](#多客户端压测)
- [FRR Client](#frr-client)
- [BIRD Client](#bird-client)
- [TCP](#tcp-1)
- [SSH](#ssh-1)
- [如何判断 Client 正常](#如何判断-client-正常)
## 前置条件
先启动 RTR Server。TCP 模式是最常用的本地验证方式:
```bash
./deploy/server/build-run.sh up --mode tcp
```
如果要测试 TLS 或 SSH,需要先启动对应 server 模式,并准备匹配的证书或 SSH key:
```bash
./deploy/server/build-run.sh up --mode tls
./deploy/server/build-run.sh up --mode ssh
```
TLS/SSH 所需的本地开发证书和密钥可以通过脚本生成:
```bash
bash scripts/generate-certs.sh
```
已有 `certs/` 时使用 `--force` 覆盖。脚本生成的 `certs/tls` 和 `certs/ssh` 文件名与本仓库 compose 默认配置一致。
Client 连接地址不要求固定在某个 Docker 网络里。`deploy/client` 的 TCP/TLS/SSH 模式分别通过 `RPKI_RTR_TCP_SERVER_ADDR`、`RPKI_RTR_TLS_SERVER_ADDR`、`RPKI_RTR_SSH_SERVER_ADDR` 指定 server 地址。`deploy/bird` 通过 `RPKI_BIRD_RPKI_HOST`/`RPKI_BIRD_RPKI_PORT` 指定 TCP server 地址,通过 `RPKI_BIRD_SSH_RPKI_HOST`/`RPKI_RTR_SSH_PORT` 指定 SSH server 地址。示例 compose 里的默认值只是为了和本仓库 server compose 直接联调。
`deploy/frr` 示例默认连接 `127.0.0.1:323`,可以通过 `RPKI_FRR_RPKI_HOST`/`RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PORT` 覆盖。
## rtr_debug_client
`rtr_debug_client` 是本仓库提供的调试客户端。它会发起 RTR Reset Query 或 Serial Query,并打印 server 返回的 PDU 摘要。Docker 配置默认执行:
```text
<server_addr> <protocol_version> reset --summary-only
```
Docker 镜像的 `entrypoint.sh` 会把 stdout/stderr 重定向到 `logs/client/*.stdout.log` 和 `logs/client/*.stderr.log`。因此 `docker attach` 后可以输入交互命令,但命令响应和收到的 PDU 仍然主要从日志文件查看:
```bash
tail -f logs/client/*.stdout.log
tail -f logs/client/*.stderr.log
```
### Docker attach 交互命令
如果 debug client 已经通过 compose 启动,可以 attach 到容器后输入命令:
```bash
docker attach --sig-proxy=false <rtr-debug-client-container>
```
脱离 attach 会话时使用 `Ctrl-P` 后接 `Ctrl-Q`,避免 `Ctrl-C` 直接停止客户端进程。
可用交互命令如下:
| 命令 | 作用 |
| --- | --- |
| `help` | 显示可用命令列表。 |
| `state` | 打印当前客户端状态,包括 `session_id`、`serial`、`refresh/retry/expire`、输出模式、自动轮询状态等。 |
| `version` | 查看当前 RTR 协议版本。 |
| `version <n>` | 修改后续查询使用的 RTR 协议版本,例如 `version 2`。 |
| `reset` | 发送 Reset Query,通常用于让 server 重新下发完整数据集。 |
| `serial` | 使用当前已记录的 `session_id` 和 `serial` 发送 Serial Query。需要客户端已经从 EndOfData 中拿到状态。 |
| `serial <session_id> <serial>` | 显式指定参数发送 Serial Query,例如 `serial 31320 156`。 |
| `timeout` | 查看当前读取 PDU 的超时时间。 |
| `timeout <secs>` | 修改读取 PDU 的超时时间。超时只打印提示,连接保持打开。 |
| `poll` | 查看当前自动轮询间隔、来源、refresh hint、错误状态和暂停状态。 |
| `poll <secs>` | 修改自动轮询间隔。 |
| `poll pause` | 暂停自动轮询。 |
| `poll resume` | 恢复自动轮询。 |
| `output` | 查看当前输出模式,以及 summary 模式下跳过的 payload PDU 数量。 |
| `output verbose` | 打印所有收到的 PDU,包括 IPv4 Prefix、IPv6 Prefix、Router Key、ASPA 等 payload PDU。 |
| `output summary` | 只打印摘要,跳过 payload PDU 详情。compose 默认使用该模式。 |
| `quit` / `exit` | 退出客户端进程。 |
常用调试流程:
```text
output verbose
reset
state
serial
```
### TCP
```bash
./deploy/client/build-run.sh up --mode tcp
./deploy/client/build-run.sh logs --mode tcp
./deploy/client/build-run.sh down --mode tcp
```
默认连接 `rpki-rtr:323`,协议版本默认是 `2`。可以通过 `deploy/client/.env` 或环境变量覆盖:
```bash
RPKI_RTR_TCP_SERVER_ADDR=10.0.0.12:323 \
RPKI_RTR_PROTOCOL_VERSION=2 \
./deploy/client/build-run.sh up --mode tcp
```
### TLS/mTLS
```bash
./deploy/client/build-run.sh up --mode tls
./deploy/client/build-run.sh logs --mode tls
./deploy/client/build-run.sh down --mode tls
```
TLS 模式默认读取 `certs/tls` 下的示例证书,并使用 `localhost` 作为 server name。常用变量:
| 变量 | 默认值 | 说明 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `RPKI_RTR_TLS_SERVER_ADDR` | `rpki-rtr:324` | TLS RTR server 地址 |
| `RPKI_RTR_TLS_SERVER_NAME` | `localhost` | 必须匹配 server 证书 SAN dNSName |
| `RPKI_RTR_TLS_CA_CERT_PATH` | `/app/certs/client-ca.crt` | 容器内 CA 证书路径 |
| `RPKI_RTR_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_PATH` | `/app/certs/client-good.crt` | 容器内 client 证书路径 |
| `RPKI_RTR_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_PATH` | `/app/certs/client-good.key` | 容器内 client 私钥路径 |
| `RPKI_RTR_TLS_CERTS_HOST_DIR` | `../../certs/tls` | 宿主机 TLS 证书目录 |
### SSH
```bash
./deploy/client/build-run.sh up --mode ssh
./deploy/client/build-run.sh logs --mode ssh
./deploy/client/build-run.sh down --mode ssh
```
SSH 模式默认连接 `rpki-rtr-ssh:22`,使用 key 认证,并校验 server public key。常用变量:
| 变量 | 默认值 | 说明 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `RPKI_RTR_SSH_SERVER_ADDR` | `rpki-rtr:22` | SSH RTR server 地址 |
| `RPKI_RTR_SSH_USERNAME` | `rpki-rtr` | SSH 用户名 |
| `RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_KEYS_VOLUME` | `../../certs/ssh:/app/certs:ro` | 宿主机 SSH key 目录挂载 |
| `RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_KEY_PATH` | `/app/certs/rtr-client.key` | 容器内 client 私钥 |
| `RPKI_RTR_SSH_SERVER_PUBKEY_PATH` | `/app/certs/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub` | 容器内 server public key |
### 多客户端压测
`--clients multi` 会启动 5 个 TCP debug client,用于观察并发连接、client report 和 server 连接统计。
```bash
./deploy/client/build-run.sh up --mode tcp --clients multi
./deploy/client/build-run.sh logs --mode tcp --clients multi
./deploy/client/build-run.sh down --mode tcp --clients multi
```
## FRR Client
FRR 示例用于验证标准路由软件能否通过 RTR over TCP 从 server 获取前缀验证数据。
启动:
```bash
docker compose --env-file deploy/frr/.env -f deploy/frr/docker-compose.yml up -d
```
默认连接 `127.0.0.1:323`。可以通过环境变量覆盖:
```bash
RPKI_FRR_RPKI_HOST=10.0.0.12 \
RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PORT=323 \
docker compose --env-file deploy/frr/.env -f deploy/frr/docker-compose.yml up -d
```
验证连接和数据:
```bash
docker exec -it frr-rpki-client vtysh -c "show rpki configuration"
docker exec -it frr-rpki-client vtysh -c "show rpki cache-connection"
docker exec -it frr-rpki-client vtysh -c "show rpki prefix-table"
```
停止:
```bash
docker compose --env-file deploy/frr/.env -f deploy/frr/docker-compose.yml down
```
FRR 容器启动时会读取 `deploy/frr/frr.conf.template`,并生成 `/etc/frr/frr.conf`。模板中的 RTR cache 配置为:
```text
rpki cache tcp ${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_HOST} ${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PORT} preference ${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PREFERENCE}
```
如果需要调整 polling、timeout、BGP router-id 等其他 FRR 配置,可以修改 `deploy/frr/frr.conf.template`,或在 compose 中挂载自己的模板和 entrypoint。
## BIRD Client
BIRD 示例用于验证 BIRD 3.x 对 RTR v2、ROA 和 ASPA 的导入情况。容器启动后会周期性输出 RPKI 协议状态和表项摘要。
### TCP
启动:
```bash
docker compose --env-file deploy/bird/.env -f deploy/bird/docker-compose.yml up -d --build
```
查看日志:
```bash
docker logs -f bird-rpki-client
```
停止:
```bash
docker compose --env-file deploy/bird/.env -f deploy/bird/docker-compose.yml down
```
默认连接 `rpki-rtr:323`。可以通过环境变量覆盖:
```bash
RPKI_BIRD_RPKI_HOST=10.0.0.12 \
RPKI_BIRD_RPKI_PORT=323 \
docker compose --env-file deploy/bird/.env -f deploy/bird/docker-compose.yml up -d --build
```
### SSH
先启动 server SSH 模式:
```bash
./deploy/server/build-run.sh up --mode ssh
```
再启动 BIRD SSH client:
```bash
docker compose --env-file deploy/bird/.env \
-f deploy/bird/docker-compose.yml \
-f deploy/bird/docker-compose.ssh.yml \
up -d --build
```
查看日志:
```bash
docker logs -f bird-rpki-client
```
SSH 模式默认读取 `certs/ssh` 目录下的 key,并使用 `bird.conf.ssh.template` 生成运行时配置。关键默认值:
| 变量 | 默认值 | 说明 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `RPKI_BIRD_SSH_RPKI_HOST` | `rpki-rtr` | SSH RTR server 主机名 |
| `RPKI_RTR_SSH_PORT` | `22` | SSH RTR server 端口 |
| `RPKI_BIRD_SSH_CERTS_HOST_DIR` | `../../certs/ssh` | 宿主机 SSH 证书和 key 目录,复用 `rtr-client.key` |
## 如何判断 Client 正常
- `rtr_debug_client`: 日志中能看到 Reset Query 成功、EndOfData 和 payload 统计。
- FRR: `show rpki cache-connection` 显示已连接,`show rpki prefix-table` 有 VRP 条目。
- BIRD: 日志中 RPKI protocol 状态为 `up`,ROA/ASPA 表项摘要不为空。
如果 client 无法连接,优先检查:
- server 是否按对应 transport 启动。
- client 配置的 server 地址是否从当前容器或主机可达。
- TLS 的 server name 是否匹配证书 SAN。
- SSH 的用户名、client key 和 server public key 是否匹配。
- `RPKI_RTR_PROTOCOL_VERSION` 或 BIRD 配置中的 `min version`/`max version` 是否和 server 能力一致。

377
README.md
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# RPKI RTR Server
这是一个用 Rust 实现的 RPKI-to-Router (RTR) cache server。服务端从 CCR 文件中读取 RPKI 数据,生成 RTR cache snapshot 和 delta,并通过 RTR 协议提供给路由器或调试客户端。
当前代码重点覆盖: # 单元测试
- RTR server:TCP 默认启用,可选启用 TLS/mTLS 和进程内 SSH transport。 ```
- 数据输入:从 CCR 目录选择最新 `.ccr` 文件,解析 VRP 和 VAP/ASPA。
- 本地策略:可选加载 SLURM 文件,对 CCR 解析出的 payload 做过滤和本地断言。
- 持久化:使用 RocksDB 保存 RTR cache 状态。
- 运行报告:输出 source、client、runtime 三类 JSON report。
- 运行期管理:可选启用 HTTP Admin API,修改部分 runtime config、触发 source reload、管理 SLURM 文件。
- 调试工具:`rtr_debug_client` 支持 TCP、TLS 和 SSH 连接 RTR server。
## 目录
- [协议参考](#协议参考)
- [项目结构](#项目结构)
- [构建与测试](#构建与测试)
- [数据输入](#数据输入)
- [快速启动](#快速启动)
- [前置数据生成](#前置数据生成)
- [Docker 运行](#docker-运行)
- [跨架构构建](#跨架构构建)
- [传输模式](#传输模式)
- [主要环境变量](#主要环境变量)
- [运行报告](#运行报告)
- [Admin API](#admin-api)
- [调试客户端](#调试客户端)
- [部署入口](#部署入口)
- [开发说明](#开发说明)
## 协议参考
- RTR: [RFC 6810](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6810.html), [RFC 8210](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8210.html), [draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-26](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-26.html)
- SLURM: [RFC 8416](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8416.html), [draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-slurm-04](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-slurm-04.html)(已过期,Expired 2026-05-20)
- CCR: [draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr-02.html)
## 项目结构
| 路径 | 说明 |
| --- | --- |
| `src/main_rtr.rs` | RTR server 入口 |
| `src/rtr/` | RTR 协议、cache、store、server transport、admin、report |
| `src/source/` | CCR/SLURM source 加载流程 |
| `src/slurm/` | SLURM 文件解析、合并和策略应用 |
| `src/data_model/` | RPKI 相关数据结构 |
| `src/bin/rtr_debug_client/` | RTR 调试客户端 |
| `deploy/server/` | server Docker 镜像和 compose |
| `deploy/client/` | debug client Docker 镜像和 compose |
| `deploy/frr/`, `deploy/bird/` | FRR/BIRD 作为 RTR client 的测试部署 |
| `tests/` | 单元和集成测试 |
## 构建与测试
```bash
cargo build --bin rpki_rtr
cargo build --bin rtr_debug_client
cargo test cargo test
# 查看输出
cargo test -- --nocapture
``` ```
服务端 binary 名称是 `rpki_rtr`: # 覆盖率(cargo-llvm-cov)
```bash 安装工具:
cargo run --bin rpki_rtr
```
rustup component add llvm-tools-preview
cargo install cargo-llvm-cov --locked
``` ```
默认配置会监听 `0.0.0.0:323`,从 `./data` 查找 CCR 文件,并使用 `./rtr-db` 保存 RocksDB 数据。启动前需要确保 CCR 目录里存在可解析的 `.ccr` 文件。 统计行覆盖率并要求 >=90%:
## 数据输入 ```
./scripts/coverage.sh
服务端启动和刷新时会读取 `RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR` 指向的目录: # 或
cargo llvm-cov --fail-under-lines 90
1. 如果该目录下存在包含 `.ccr` 文件的子目录,先按子目录名排序选择最新子目录。
2. 在选中的目录中按文件名排序选择最新 `.ccr` 文件。
3. 从 CCR 中解析 VRP 和 VAP/ASPA。
4. 如果配置了 `RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR`,加载其中启用的 `*.slurm` 文件并应用本地策略。
## 快速启动
### 前置数据生成
TLS/mTLS 或 SSH transport 需要本地证书和密钥。开发和 Docker 联调可用脚本生成 compose 默认引用的最小文件集:
```bash
bash scripts/10_generate-certs.sh
``` ```
如需覆盖已有 `certs/` 内容:
```bash
bash scripts/10_generate-certs.sh --force
```
`10_generate-certs.sh` 常用参数:
| 参数 | 说明 |
| --- | --- |
| `--out-dir DIR` | 指定输出目录,默认生成到 `./certs`。 |
| `--server-dns NAME` | 指定 TLS server 证书的 dNSName SAN,默认 `localhost`。 |
| `--tls-only` | 只生成 `certs/tls` 下的 TLS 证书和私钥。 |
| `--ssh-only` | 只生成 `certs/ssh` 下的 SSH host key、client key 和 `authorized_keys`。 |
| `--force` | 覆盖已有文件。未指定时,如果目标文件已存在会直接报错退出。 |
| `-h`, `--help` | 查看脚本帮助。 |
TLS server name 默认是 `localhost`。如果需要其它 DNS 名称,需要同时设置 `scripts/10_generate-certs.sh --server-dns <name>` 和 client 的 `RPKI_RTR_TLS_SERVER_NAME=<name>`。
### Docker 运行
推荐使用 `deploy/server/build-run.sh` 和 `deploy/client/build-run.sh` 分别管理 server 与 debug client:
以下命令默认从仓库根目录执行。
```bash
chmod +x deploy/server/build-run.sh deploy/client/build-run.sh
./deploy/server/build-run.sh up --mode tcp
./deploy/client/build-run.sh up --mode tcp
./deploy/client/build-run.sh down
./deploy/server/build-run.sh down
```
脚本常用参数:
| 参数/变量 | server | client | 说明 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `--mode base|tcp|tls|ssh`, `MODE` | yes | yes | 选择 compose 模式,默认 `tcp`。 |
| `--clients single|multi`, `CLIENTS` | no | yes | 单 client 或 5 client,默认 `single`。 |
| `--no-build`, `BUILD=0` | yes | yes | 只运行已有镜像,不执行 compose build。 |
| `--server-image TAG`, `SERVER_IMAGE` | yes | no | server 镜像名;会传给 compose 的 `RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE`。 |
| `--client-image TAG`, `CLIENT_IMAGE` | no | yes | client 镜像名;会传给 compose 的 `RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE`。 |
| `--platform VALUE`, `TARGET_PLATFORM` | yes | yes | `buildx` 目标平台,默认 `linux/arm64`。 |
| `--push`, `BUILDX_PUSH=1` | yes | yes | `buildx` 构建后推送到 registry;不设置时加载到本地 Docker。 |
| `--skip-base-pull`, `SKIP_BASE_IMAGE_PULL=1` | yes | yes | 跳过 buildx 前的基础镜像预拉取。 |
支持的 action 包括 `up`、`build`、`buildx`、`rebuild`、`down`/`stop`、`restart`、`logs`、`ps`。完整帮助见:
```bash
./deploy/server/build-run.sh --help
./deploy/client/build-run.sh --help
```
### 跨架构构建
示例:x86 开发机本地构建 ARM 镜像,打包后传到 ARM 部署机。
```bash
./deploy/server/build-run.sh buildx \
--platform linux/arm64 \
--server-image rpki-rtr:arm64
./deploy/client/build-run.sh buildx \
--platform linux/arm64 \
--client-image rpki-rtr-debug-client:arm64
mkdir -p dist/images
docker save rpki-rtr:arm64 -o dist/images/rpki-rtr-arm64.tar
docker save rpki-rtr-debug-client:arm64 -o dist/images/rpki-rtr-debug-client-arm64.tar
scp dist/images/*.tar user@arm-host:/tmp/
```
ARM 部署机加载镜像并运行:
```bash
docker load -i /tmp/rpki-rtr-arm64.tar
docker load -i /tmp/rpki-rtr-debug-client-arm64.tar
SERVER_IMAGE=rpki-rtr:arm64 \
BUILD=0 ./deploy/server/build-run.sh up --mode tcp
CLIENT_IMAGE=rpki-rtr-debug-client:arm64 \
BUILD=0 ./deploy/client/build-run.sh up --mode tcp
```
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/server/docker-compose.yml up -d --build
docker compose -f deploy/server/docker-compose.yml down
```
TLS/mTLS 示例:
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/server/docker-compose.tls.yml up -d --build
docker compose -f deploy/server/docker-compose.tls.yml down
```
## 传输模式
TCP 默认启用。TLS 和 SSH 是附加监听,不会替代 TCP。
| 模式 | 默认地址 | 启用方式 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| TCP | `0.0.0.0:323` | 默认启用 |
| TLS/mTLS | `0.0.0.0:324` | `RPKI_RTR_ENABLE_TLS=true` |
| SSH | `0.0.0.0:22` | `RPKI_RTR_ENABLE_SSH=true` |
TLS server 会加载服务端证书、私钥和 client CA。SSH server 使用 OpenSSH host key 和 authorized_keys 文件;`RPKI_RTR_SSH_AUTH_MODE` 支持 `key`、`password`、`both`。
## 主要环境变量
布尔值支持 `true/false`、`1/0`、`yes/no`、`on/off`。
| 变量 | 默认值 | 说明 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `RPKI_RTR_ENABLE_TLS` | `false` | 是否启用 TLS/mTLS 监听 |
| `RPKI_RTR_ENABLE_SSH` | `false` | 是否启用 SSH 监听 |
| `RPKI_RTR_TCP_ADDR` | `0.0.0.0:323` | TCP 监听地址 |
| `RPKI_RTR_TLS_ADDR` | `0.0.0.0:324` | TLS 监听地址 |
| `RPKI_RTR_SSH_ADDR` | `0.0.0.0:22` | SSH 监听地址 |
| `RPKI_RTR_SSH_PORT` | 未设置 | 仅覆盖 `RPKI_RTR_SSH_ADDR` 中的端口 |
| `RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH` | `./rtr-db` | RocksDB 路径 |
| `RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR` | `./data` | CCR 输入目录 |
| `RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR` | 未设置 | SLURM 目录;空值表示禁用 |
| `RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR` | `./report` | JSON report 输出目录 |
| `RPKI_RTR_MAX_DELTA` | `100` | 每个 RTR 版本保留的最大 delta 数,必须大于 0 |
| `RPKI_RTR_PRUNE_DELTA_BY_SNAPSHOT_SIZE` | `false` | 是否按 snapshot wire size 继续裁剪 delta window |
| `RPKI_RTR_SOURCE_REFRESH_INTERVAL_SECS` | `300` | source 刷新间隔,单位秒 |
| `RPKI_RTR_REFRESH_INTERVAL_SECS` | 未设置 | 旧变量名,仍兼容;建议使用 `RPKI_RTR_SOURCE_REFRESH_INTERVAL_SECS` |
| `RPKI_RTR_TIMING_REFRESH_SECS` | `3600` | RTR EndOfData `refresh` 字段 |
| `RPKI_RTR_TIMING_RETRY_SECS` | `600` | RTR EndOfData `retry` 字段 |
| `RPKI_RTR_TIMING_EXPIRE_SECS` | `7200` | RTR EndOfData `expire` 字段,必须大于 refresh 和 retry |
| `RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONNECTIONS` | `512` | 最大并发 RTR 连接数 |
| `RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONCURRENT_HANDSHAKES` | `128` | 最大并发握手数,不能大于最大连接数 |
| `RPKI_RTR_NOTIFY_QUEUE_SIZE` | `1024` | Serial Notify 广播队列大小 |
| `RPKI_RTR_TCP_KEEPALIVE_SECS` | `60` | TCP keepalive;设为 `0` 表示禁用 |
| `RPKI_RTR_WARN_INSECURE_TCP` | `true` | TCP 模式是否输出安全提示 |
| `RPKI_RTR_REQUIRE_TLS_SERVER_DNS_NAME_SAN` | `false` | 是否要求 TLS 服务端证书包含 dNSName SAN |
| `RPKI_RTR_ENFORCE_TLS_CLIENT_SAN_IP_MATCH` | `true` | 是否校验 TLS client 证书 SAN IP 与 peer IP 匹配 |
| `RPKI_RTR_RUNTIME_REPORT_INTERVAL_SECS` | `300` | runtime report 周期 |
| `RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HISTORY_LIMIT` | `10` | 每类 report 滚动保留数量 |
| `RPKI_RTR_TIMEZONE` | `Asia/Shanghai` | 日志和 report 使用的时区 |
| `RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR` | 未设置 | Admin API 监听地址;未设置时关闭 |
| `RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN` | 未设置 | Admin API Bearer token;非 loopback 监听时必须设置 |
TLS 相关路径:
| 变量 | 默认值 |
| --- | --- |
| `RPKI_RTR_TLS_CERT_PATH` | `./certs/tls/server-dns.crt` |
| `RPKI_RTR_TLS_KEY_PATH` | `./certs/tls/server-dns.key` |
| `RPKI_RTR_TLS_CLIENT_CA_PATH` | `./certs/tls/client-ca.crt` |
SSH 相关配置:
| 变量 | 默认值 |
| --- | --- |
| `RPKI_RTR_SSH_HOST_KEY_PATH` | `./certs/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key` |
| `RPKI_RTR_SSH_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_PATH` | `./certs/ssh/rtr-authorized_keys` |
| `RPKI_RTR_SSH_USERNAME` | `rpki-rtr` |
| `RPKI_RTR_SSH_SUBSYSTEM_NAME` | `rpki-rtr` |
| `RPKI_RTR_SSH_AUTH_MODE` | `key` |
| `RPKI_RTR_SSH_PASSWORD` | 未设置 |
## 运行报告
服务会在 `RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR` 下写入 JSON report,并按 `RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HISTORY_LIMIT` 滚动保留:
- `rtr-source-*.json`:CCR/SLURM source、fingerprint、刷新状态、数据质量、cache 统计。
- `rtr-clients-*.json`:client 连接数和连接方式统计。
- `rtr-runtime-*.json`:进程状态、服务状态和当前生效的 runtime config。
## Admin API
Admin API 默认关闭。设置 `RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR` 后启用:
```bash
export RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR=127.0.0.1:8323
export RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN=change-me
```
如果监听非 loopback 地址,例如 `0.0.0.0:8323`,必须设置 `RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN`。设置 token 后,请求需要携带:
```http
Authorization: Bearer change-me
```
当前实现的主要接口:
| 方法 | 路径 | 说明 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `GET` | `/admin/rtr/health` | 健康检查和能力开关 |
| `GET` | `/admin/rtr/config` | 查看 runtime config |
| `POST` | `/admin/rtr/config` | 修改部分 runtime config |
| `GET` | `/admin/rtr/logs/tail` | 读取 stdout/stderr 日志 tail |
| `POST` | `/admin/rtr/slurm/reload` | 触发 source reload |
| `GET` | `/admin/rtr/slurm/files` | 列出 SLURM 文件 |
| `POST` | `/admin/rtr/slurm/files` | 新增或覆盖 SLURM 文件 |
| `GET` | `/admin/rtr/slurm/files/{name}` | 读取 SLURM 文件 |
| `PUT` | `/admin/rtr/slurm/files/{name}` | 新增或覆盖指定 SLURM 文件 |
| `DELETE` | `/admin/rtr/slurm/files/{name}` | 删除 SLURM 文件 |
| `POST` | `/admin/rtr/slurm/files/{name}/enable` | 启用 `.slurm.disabled` 文件 |
| `POST` | `/admin/rtr/slurm/files/{name}/disable` | 禁用 `.slurm` 文件 |
示例:
```bash
curl http://127.0.0.1:8323/admin/rtr/config \
-H "Authorization: Bearer change-me"
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8323/admin/rtr/config \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer change-me" \
-d '{"max_delta": 6, "source_refresh_interval_seconds": 60}'
```
## 调试客户端
`rtr_debug_client` 用于手动发起 Reset Query 或 Serial Query,并观察服务端返回的 PDU。
RTR Client 的 Docker 调试、FRR/BIRD 互通验证和常用排障步骤见 `README.client.md`。
TCP:
```bash
cargo run --bin rtr_debug_client -- 127.0.0.1:323 1 reset
cargo run --bin rtr_debug_client -- 127.0.0.1:323 1 serial 42 100
```
TLS:
```bash
cargo run --bin rtr_debug_client -- \
127.0.0.1:324 1 reset \
--tls \
--ca-cert certs/tls/client-ca.crt \
--server-name localhost \
--client-cert certs/tls/client-good.crt \
--client-key certs/tls/client-good.key
```
SSH:
```bash
cargo run --bin rtr_debug_client -- \
127.0.0.1:22 1 reset \
--ssh \
--ssh-user rpki-rtr \
--ssh-key certs/ssh/rtr-client.key \
--ssh-server-key certs/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
```
SSH password auth 也已实现;SSH 模式下 `--ssh-key` 和 `--ssh-password` 二选一,同时必须通过 `--ssh-known-hosts` 或 `--ssh-server-key` 做 host key 校验。
更多参数见 `src/bin/rtr_debug_client/README.md`。
## 部署入口
| 用途 | Compose 文件 |
| --- | --- |
| Server | `deploy/server/docker-compose.yml` |
| Server TCP 示例 | `deploy/server/docker-compose.tcp.yml` |
| Server TLS 示例 | `deploy/server/docker-compose.tls.yml` |
| Server SSH 示例 | `deploy/server/docker-compose.ssh.yml` |
| Debug client | `deploy/client/docker-compose.yml` |
| Debug client 多实例 | `deploy/client/docker-compose.clients.yml` |
| FRR client | `deploy/frr/docker-compose.yml` |
| BIRD client | `deploy/bird/docker-compose.yml` |
RTR Client 统一使用说明见 `README.client.md`。
通用操作:
```bash
COMPOSE_FILE=deploy/server/docker-compose.yml
docker compose -f "${COMPOSE_FILE}" up -d --build
docker compose -f "${COMPOSE_FILE}" ps
docker compose -f "${COMPOSE_FILE}" down
```
## 开发说明
- 代码中的 RTR cache 按协议版本维护状态;v0 只包含 Route Origin,v1 包含 Route Origin 和 Router Key,v2 包含 Route Origin、Router Key 和 ASPA。
- 当前 source pipeline 从 CCR 生成 Route Origin 和 ASPA,再可选应用 SLURM。
- `RtrStore::save_cache_state_versioned(...)` 是 cache 状态写入 RocksDB 的核心入口,相关边界测试在 `tests/test_store_boundary.rs`。
- Admin API 的日志 tail 依赖部署入口写出的 stdout/stderr 日志文件;容器入口脚本会把日志写到 `/app/logs`。

View File

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
{
"slurmVersion": 2,
"validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [
{
"prefix": "24.0.0.0/8",
"comment": "Filter many VRPs in current CCR sample"
}
],
"bgpsecFilters": [],
"aspaFilters": [
{
"customerAsn": 80,
"comment": "Filter one ASPA known to exist in current CCR sample"
}
]
},
"locallyAddedAssertions": {
"prefixAssertions": [],
"bgpsecAssertions": [],
"aspaAssertions": []
}
}

View File

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
# Build-time image knob.
RPKI_BIRD_VERSION=3.2.1
# TCP mode target endpoint.
RPKI_BIRD_RPKI_HOST=rpki-rtr
RPKI_BIRD_RPKI_PORT=323
# SSH mode target endpoint.
RPKI_BIRD_SSH_RPKI_HOST=rpki-rtr
RPKI_RTR_SSH_PORT=22
# Config template paths in container.
RPKI_BIRD_CONFIG_TEMPLATE_PATH=/config/bird.conf.template
RPKI_BIRD_SSH_CONFIG_TEMPLATE_PATH=/config/bird.conf.ssh.template
# Observation and output knobs.
RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_PROTO=rpki_tcp
RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_MODE=interval
RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_DEBOUNCE_SECS=1
RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_INTERVAL=30
RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_ASPA_TABLE=rtr_aspa
RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_ROA4_TABLE=rtr_roa_v4
RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_ROA6_TABLE=rtr_roa_v6
RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_ASPA_COUNT=3
RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_ROA4_COUNT=3
RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_ROA6_COUNT=3
RPKI_BIRD_SHOW_ASPA=1
RPKI_BIRD_SHOW_ROA4=1
RPKI_BIRD_SHOW_ROA6=1
# Host volume mounts.
RPKI_BIRD_LOG_HOST_DIR=../../logs/bird
RPKI_BIRD_SSH_CERTS_HOST_DIR=../../certs/ssh

View File

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
FROM debian:bookworm-slim AS builder
ARG BIRD_VERSION=3.2.1
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
build-essential \
bison \
flex \
m4 \
perl \
ca-certificates \
wget \
xz-utils \
libreadline-dev \
libncurses-dev \
libssh-dev \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /build
RUN wget -O bird.tar.gz "https://bird.nic.cz/download/bird-${BIRD_VERSION}.tar.gz" \
&& tar -xzf bird.tar.gz \
&& mv "bird-${BIRD_VERSION}" bird
WORKDIR /build/bird
RUN ./configure \
--prefix=/usr \
--sysconfdir=/etc/bird \
--localstatedir=/run \
&& make -j"$(nproc)" \
&& make install
FROM debian:bookworm-slim
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates \
gettext-base \
tzdata \
netcat-openbsd \
libreadline8 \
libncurses6 \
libtinfo6 \
libssh-4 \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY --from=builder /usr/sbin/bird /usr/sbin/bird
COPY --from=builder /usr/sbin/birdc /usr/sbin/birdc
COPY --from=builder /etc/bird /etc/bird
ENV TZ=Asia/Shanghai
COPY entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
RUN chmod +x /entrypoint.sh \
&& mkdir -p /run/bird
ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.sh"]

View File

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
# BIRD Minimal RTR Client Config
This folder provides a minimal BIRD setup for black-box interop testing
against this repository's RTR server defaults.
Server defaults in this repo:
- TCP: `0.0.0.0:323`
- SSH: `0.0.0.0:22` (when enabled on server)
## Files
- `Dockerfile`: builds a minimal BIRD2 runtime image.
- `bird.conf.example`: sample `/etc/bird/bird.conf`.
- `bird.conf.ssh.example`: sample SSH transport `/etc/bird/bird.conf`.
- `entrypoint.sh`: starts BIRD in foreground mode.
- `docker-compose.yml`: one-click local TCP test client.
- `docker-compose.ssh.yml`: compose override for SSH transport.
By default, the container uses event-driven observation and prints snapshots
only when BIRD reports RPKI-related changes.
## Docker quick start
From repository root:
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/bird/docker-compose.yml up --build
```
Use another terminal to inspect:
```bash
docker logs -f bird-rpki-client
```
If protocol state is `up`, the RTR client path is working.
Detached mode:
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/bird/docker-compose.yml up -d --build
docker logs -f bird-rpki-client
```
Stop:
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/bird/docker-compose.yml down
```
## SSH quick start
Start server in SSH mode first:
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/server/docker-compose.ssh.yml up -d --build
```
Start BIRD client with SSH override:
```bash
docker compose \
-f deploy/bird/docker-compose.yml \
-f deploy/bird/docker-compose.ssh.yml \
up --build
```
In detached mode, observe with:
```bash
docker logs -f bird-rpki-client
```
## Notes
- This setup renders `bird.conf.template` at startup and uses `RPKI_HOST` / `RPKI_PORT`
for the RTR endpoint.
- `network_mode: host` expects your RTR server to be reachable at
`host.docker.internal:323` from the container.
- Observation is controlled by env vars:
`OBSERVE_MODE` (`event` by default, `interval` as fallback),
`OBSERVE_DEBOUNCE_SECS` (default `1`),
`OBSERVE_INTERVAL` (seconds, used when `OBSERVE_MODE=interval`),
and `OBSERVE_PROTO`.
- SSH mode mounts `../../certs/ssh` into `/config/ssh` and expects:
`rtr-client.key` and `ssh_host_rsa_key.pub`.
- Entrypoint auto-generates `/run/bird/known_hosts` from
`/config/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub` for BIRD SSH host-key verification.
- If your environment does not support Docker host networking, switch to a
bridge network and replace `remote` addresses accordingly.

View File

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
# BIRD 最小化 RTR 客户端配置
本目录提供最小化 BIRD 配置,用于与本仓库 RTR Server 做黑盒互通测试。
本仓库默认 RTR 监听地址:
- TCP: `0.0.0.0:323`
- SSH: `0.0.0.0:22`(仅在 server SSH 模式启用时)
## 文件说明
- `Dockerfile`: 构建最小 BIRD 运行镜像(包含 SSH transport 支持)。
- `bird.conf.example`: `/etc/bird/bird.conf` 的 TCP 示例。
- `bird.conf.ssh.example`: `/etc/bird/bird.conf` 的 SSH transport 示例。
- `entrypoint.sh`: 前台启动 BIRD,并周期输出协议快照。
- `docker-compose.yml`: TCP 一键启动。
- `docker-compose.ssh.yml`: SSH 覆盖配置。
容器默认每 30 秒向日志输出一次 RPKI 协议状态快照。
## Docker 快速启动(TCP)
在仓库根目录执行:
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/bird/docker-compose.yml up --build
```
另开终端查看日志:
```bash
docker logs -f bird-rpki-client
```
如果协议状态显示 `up`,说明 RTR 客户端链路正常。
后台模式:
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/bird/docker-compose.yml up -d --build
docker logs -f bird-rpki-client
```
停止:
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/bird/docker-compose.yml down
```
## SSH 快速启动
先启动 server 的 SSH 模式:
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/server/docker-compose.ssh.yml up -d --build
```
再启动 BIRD SSH 客户端:
```bash
docker compose \
-f deploy/bird/docker-compose.yml \
-f deploy/bird/docker-compose.ssh.yml \
up --build
```
查看日志:
```bash
docker logs -f bird-rpki-client
```
## 说明
- 当前 compose 使用 `network_mode: host`,默认通过 `host.docker.internal` 访问 server。
- 观测频率由环境变量控制:`OBSERVE_INTERVAL`(秒,默认 `30`)和 `OBSERVE_PROTO`。
- SSH 模式会将 `../../certs/ssh` 挂载到容器 `/config/ssh`,并使用:
`rtr-client.key`、`ssh_host_rsa_key.pub`。
- 入口脚本会基于 `/config/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub` 自动生成
`/run/bird/known_hosts`,用于 BIRD 的 SSH 主机密钥校验。
- 如果你运行在 Docker Desktop(非 Linux 原生 host network 场景),建议改为自定义 bridge 网络并将 `remote` 地址改成可达的 server 容器名或宿主机地址。

View File

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
log stderr all;
debug protocols all;
router id 192.0.2.2;
roa4 table rtr_roa_v4;
roa6 table rtr_roa_v6;
aspa table rtr_aspa;
protocol device {
}
protocol rpki rpki_ssh {
roa4 { table rtr_roa_v4; };
roa6 { table rtr_roa_v6; };
aspa { table rtr_aspa; };
remote "host.docker.internal" port 22;
min version 2;
max version 2;
refresh 3600;
retry 600;
expire 7200;
transport ssh {
user "rpki-rtr";
bird private key "/config/ssh/rtr-client.key";
remote public key "/run/bird/known_hosts";
};
}

View File

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
log stderr all;
router id 192.0.2.2;
roa4 table rtr_roa_v4;
roa6 table rtr_roa_v6;
aspa table rtr_aspa;
protocol device {
}
protocol rpki rpki_tcp {
roa4 { table rtr_roa_v4; };
roa6 { table rtr_roa_v6; };
aspa { table rtr_aspa; };
remote "host.docker.internal" port 323;
min version 2;
max version 2;
refresh 3600;
retry 600;
expire 7200;
transport tcp {
authentication none;
};
}

View File

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
log stderr all;
router id 192.0.2.2;
roa4 table rtr_roa_v4;
roa6 table rtr_roa_v6;
aspa table rtr_aspa;
protocol device {
}
protocol rpki rpki_tcp {
roa4 { table rtr_roa_v4; };
roa6 { table rtr_roa_v6; };
aspa { table rtr_aspa; };
remote "host.docker.internal" port 323;
min version 2;
max version 2;
refresh 3600;
retry 600;
expire 7200;
transport tcp {
authentication none;
};
}

View File

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
log stderr all;
router id 192.0.2.2;
roa4 table rtr_roa_v4;
roa6 table rtr_roa_v6;
aspa table rtr_aspa;
protocol device {
}
protocol rpki rpki_ssh {
roa4 { table rtr_roa_v4; };
roa6 { table rtr_roa_v6; };
aspa { table rtr_aspa; };
remote "host.docker.internal" port 22;
min version 2;
max version 2;
refresh 3600;
retry 600;
expire 7200;
transport ssh {
user "rpki-rtr";
bird private key "/config/ssh/rtr-client.key";
remote public key "/run/bird/known_hosts";
};
}

View File

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
log stderr all;
router id 192.0.2.2;
roa4 table rtr_roa_v4;
roa6 table rtr_roa_v6;
aspa table rtr_aspa;
protocol device {
}
protocol rpki rpki_ssh {
roa4 { table rtr_roa_v4; };
roa6 { table rtr_roa_v6; };
aspa { table rtr_aspa; };
remote "${RPKI_HOST}" port ${RPKI_PORT};
min version 2;
max version 2;
refresh 3600;
retry 600;
expire 7200;
transport ssh {
user "rpki-rtr";
bird private key "/config/ssh/rtr-client.key";
remote public key "/run/bird/known_hosts";
};
}

View File

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
log stderr all;
router id 192.0.2.2;
roa4 table rtr_roa_v4;
roa6 table rtr_roa_v6;
aspa table rtr_aspa;
protocol device {
}
protocol rpki rpki_tcp {
roa4 { table rtr_roa_v4; };
roa6 { table rtr_roa_v6; };
aspa { table rtr_aspa; };
remote "${RPKI_HOST}" port ${RPKI_PORT};
min version 2;
max version 2;
refresh 3600;
retry 600;
expire 7200;
transport tcp {
authentication none;
};
}

View File

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
services:
bird-rpki-client:
environment:
BIRD_CONFIG_TEMPLATE_PATH: "${RPKI_BIRD_SSH_CONFIG_TEMPLATE_PATH:-/config/bird.conf.ssh.template}"
RPKI_HOST: "${RPKI_BIRD_SSH_RPKI_HOST:-rpki-rtr}"
RPKI_PORT: "${RPKI_RTR_SSH_PORT:-22}"
OBSERVE_PROTO: "rpki_ssh"
volumes:
- ./bird.conf.ssh.template:/config/bird.conf.ssh.template:ro
- ${RPKI_BIRD_SSH_CERTS_HOST_DIR:-../../certs/ssh}:/config/ssh:ro
networks:
- rpki_net
networks:
rpki_net:
name: rpki_net
driver: bridge

View File

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
services:
bird-rpki-client:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: Dockerfile
args:
BIRD_VERSION: "${RPKI_BIRD_VERSION:-3.2.1}"
container_name: bird-rpki-client
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
BIRD_CONFIG_TEMPLATE_PATH: "${RPKI_BIRD_CONFIG_TEMPLATE_PATH:-/config/bird.conf.template}"
RPKI_HOST: "${RPKI_BIRD_RPKI_HOST:-rpki-rtr}"
RPKI_PORT: "${RPKI_BIRD_RPKI_PORT:-323}"
OBSERVE_PROTO: "${RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_PROTO:-rpki_tcp}"
OBSERVE_MODE: "${RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_MODE:-interval}"
OBSERVE_DEBOUNCE_SECS: "${RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_DEBOUNCE_SECS:-1}"
OBSERVE_INTERVAL: "${RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_INTERVAL:-30}"
OBSERVE_ASPA_TABLE: "${RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_ASPA_TABLE:-rtr_aspa}"
OBSERVE_ROA4_TABLE: "${RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_ROA4_TABLE:-rtr_roa_v4}"
OBSERVE_ROA6_TABLE: "${RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_ROA6_TABLE:-rtr_roa_v6}"
OBSERVE_ASPA_COUNT: "${RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_ASPA_COUNT:-3}"
OBSERVE_ROA4_COUNT: "${RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_ROA4_COUNT:-3}"
OBSERVE_ROA6_COUNT: "${RPKI_BIRD_OBSERVE_ROA6_COUNT:-3}"
SHOW_ASPA: "${RPKI_BIRD_SHOW_ASPA:-1}"
SHOW_ROA4: "${RPKI_BIRD_SHOW_ROA4:-1}"
SHOW_ROA6: "${RPKI_BIRD_SHOW_ROA6:-1}"
volumes:
- ./bird.conf.template:/config/bird.conf.template:ro
- ${RPKI_BIRD_LOG_HOST_DIR:-../../logs/bird}:/app/logs
networks:
- rpki_net
networks:
rpki_net:
name: rpki_net
driver: bridge

View File

@@ -1,218 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
mkdir -p /run/bird
SOCK_PATH="/run/bird/bird.ctl"
PROTO="${OBSERVE_PROTO:-rpki_tcp}"
INTERVAL="${OBSERVE_INTERVAL:-30}"
MODE="${OBSERVE_MODE:-event}"
DEBOUNCE_SECS="${OBSERVE_DEBOUNCE_SECS:-1}"
RPKI_HOST="${RPKI_HOST:-host.docker.internal}"
RPKI_PORT="${RPKI_PORT:-323}"
BIRD_CONFIG_PATH="${BIRD_CONFIG_PATH:-/config/bird.conf}"
BIRD_CONFIG_TEMPLATE_PATH="${BIRD_CONFIG_TEMPLATE_PATH:-/config/bird.conf.template}"
ASPA_TABLE="${OBSERVE_ASPA_TABLE:-rtr_aspa}"
ROA4_TABLE="${OBSERVE_ROA4_TABLE:-rtr_roa_v4}"
ROA6_TABLE="${OBSERVE_ROA6_TABLE:-rtr_roa_v6}"
ASPA_COUNT="${OBSERVE_ASPA_COUNT:-3}"
ROA4_COUNT="${OBSERVE_ROA4_COUNT:-3}"
ROA6_COUNT="${OBSERVE_ROA6_COUNT:-3}"
SHOW_ASPA="${SHOW_ASPA:-1}"
SHOW_ROA4="${SHOW_ROA4:-1}"
SHOW_ROA6="${SHOW_ROA6:-1}"
SSH_HOST_PUBKEY_PATH="${SSH_HOST_PUBKEY_PATH:-/config/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub}"
SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS_PATH="${SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS_PATH:-/run/bird/known_hosts}"
LOG_DIR="${LOG_DIR:-/app/logs}"
LOG_NAME="${LOG_NAME:-${HOSTNAME:-bird-rpki-client}}"
STDOUT_LOG="${LOG_DIR}/${LOG_NAME}.stdout.log"
STDERR_LOG="${LOG_DIR}/${LOG_NAME}.stderr.log"
mkdir -p "$LOG_DIR"
exec >>"$STDOUT_LOG" 2>>"$STDERR_LOG"
if [ -r "$BIRD_CONFIG_TEMPLATE_PATH" ]; then
RENDERED_CONFIG_PATH="/run/bird/bird.generated.conf"
envsubst '${RPKI_HOST} ${RPKI_PORT}' < "$BIRD_CONFIG_TEMPLATE_PATH" > "$RENDERED_CONFIG_PATH"
BIRD_CONFIG_PATH="$RENDERED_CONFIG_PATH"
echo "[entrypoint] rendered config : $BIRD_CONFIG_TEMPLATE_PATH -> $BIRD_CONFIG_PATH"
fi
ensure_ssh_known_hosts() {
if [ -s "$SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS_PATH" ]; then
return
fi
if [ ! -r "$SSH_HOST_PUBKEY_PATH" ]; then
echo "[entrypoint] WARNING: SSH host key file not found: $SSH_HOST_PUBKEY_PATH"
return
fi
set -- $(awk 'NF >= 2 { print $1, $2; exit }' "$SSH_HOST_PUBKEY_PATH")
if [ $# -ne 2 ]; then
echo "[entrypoint] WARNING: invalid SSH host key format in $SSH_HOST_PUBKEY_PATH"
return
fi
key_type="$1"
key_data="$2"
if echo "$key_type" | grep -q '^ssh-'; then
{
echo "$RPKI_HOST $key_type $key_data"
echo "[$RPKI_HOST]:$RPKI_PORT $key_type $key_data"
} > "$SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS_PATH"
else
cp "$SSH_HOST_PUBKEY_PATH" "$SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS_PATH"
fi
chmod 600 "$SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS_PATH" || true
echo "[entrypoint] generated known_hosts: $SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS_PATH"
}
print_first_n_objects() {
table_name="$1"
max_objects="$2"
birdc -s "$SOCK_PATH" show route table "$table_name" all 2>/dev/null | awk -v max="$max_objects" '
BEGIN {
count = 0
}
# 直接跳过空行
/^[[:space:]]*$/ {
next
}
# 保留 birdc 的表头
/^BIRD / {
print
next
}
/^Table / {
print
next
}
# 非缩进且不是表头,视为一个新对象的开始
/^[^[:space:]]/ {
count++
if (count > max) {
exit
}
print
next
}
# 缩进内容,只有在已进入前 max 个对象时才打印
{
if (count > 0 && count <= max) {
print
}
}
' || true
}
print_snapshot() {
echo "==== $(date +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S%:z") RPKI snapshot ($PROTO) ===="
birdc -s "$SOCK_PATH" show protocols all "$PROTO" || true
if [ "$SHOW_ASPA" = "1" ]; then
echo "---- ASPA table ($ASPA_TABLE, first ${ASPA_COUNT} objects) ----"
print_first_n_objects "$ASPA_TABLE" "$ASPA_COUNT"
fi
if [ "$SHOW_ROA4" = "1" ]; then
echo "---- ROA4 table ($ROA4_TABLE, first ${ROA4_COUNT} objects) ----"
print_first_n_objects "$ROA4_TABLE" "$ROA4_COUNT"
fi
if [ "$SHOW_ROA6" = "1" ]; then
echo "---- ROA6 table ($ROA6_TABLE, first ${ROA6_COUNT} objects) ----"
print_first_n_objects "$ROA6_TABLE" "$ROA6_COUNT"
fi
}
is_rpki_related_event() {
line="$1"
echo "$line" | grep -Eiq "$PROTO|$ASPA_TABLE|$ROA4_TABLE|$ROA6_TABLE|rpki|rtr"
}
echo "[entrypoint] starting bird"
echo "[entrypoint] config : $BIRD_CONFIG_PATH"
echo "[entrypoint] observe proto : $PROTO"
echo "[entrypoint] observe mode : $MODE"
echo "[entrypoint] observe interval : $INTERVAL (used when mode=interval)"
echo "[entrypoint] debounce secs : $DEBOUNCE_SECS (used when mode=event)"
echo "[entrypoint] target : $RPKI_HOST:$RPKI_PORT"
echo "[entrypoint] show aspa : $SHOW_ASPA ($ASPA_TABLE, first $ASPA_COUNT objects)"
echo "[entrypoint] show roa4 : $SHOW_ROA4 ($ROA4_TABLE, first $ROA4_COUNT objects)"
echo "[entrypoint] show roa6 : $SHOW_ROA6 ($ROA6_TABLE, first $ROA6_COUNT objects)"
if [ "$PROTO" = "rpki_ssh" ] || grep -q 'transport[[:space:]]\+ssh' "$BIRD_CONFIG_PATH"; then
ensure_ssh_known_hosts
fi
if nc -zvw3 "$RPKI_HOST" "$RPKI_PORT"; then
echo "[entrypoint] TCP connectivity to $RPKI_HOST:$RPKI_PORT OK"
else
echo "[entrypoint] WARNING: cannot connect to $RPKI_HOST:$RPKI_PORT before BIRD starts"
fi
bird -f -c "$BIRD_CONFIG_PATH" -s "$SOCK_PATH" &
BIRD_PID="$!"
sleep 1
case "$INTERVAL" in
''|*[!0-9]*)
INTERVAL=0
;;
esac
case "$MODE" in
event)
case "$DEBOUNCE_SECS" in
''|*[!0-9]*)
DEBOUNCE_SECS=1
;;
esac
echo "[entrypoint] waiting for BIRD monitor events and only printing on RPKI-related changes"
LAST_PRINT_TS=0
if birdc -s "$SOCK_PATH" monitor all 2>/dev/null | while IFS= read -r line; do
[ -n "$line" ] || continue
if ! is_rpki_related_event "$line"; then
continue
fi
now_ts="$(date +%s)"
if [ $((now_ts - LAST_PRINT_TS)) -lt "$DEBOUNCE_SECS" ]; then
continue
fi
LAST_PRINT_TS="$now_ts"
echo "[monitor] $line"
print_snapshot
done; then
:
else
echo "[entrypoint] WARNING: birdc monitor failed, fallback to interval polling"
MODE="interval"
fi
;;
esac
if [ "$MODE" = "interval" ] && [ "$INTERVAL" -gt 0 ]; then
while kill -0 "$BIRD_PID" 2>/dev/null; do
print_snapshot
sleep "$INTERVAL"
done
fi
wait "$BIRD_PID"

View File

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
# Target RTR server addresses for client compose files
# build-run.sh auto-detects amd64/arm64 unless IMAGE_ARCH/RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH is set before running it.
# Direct docker compose uses RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH from this file; set it to arm64 on ARM hosts.
RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_BASE=rpki-rtr-debug-client
RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_TAG=v1.3
RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH=arm64
# RPKI_RTR_TARGET_PLATFORM=linux/amd64
# RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE=rpki-rtr-debug-client-amd64:v1.3
# TCP example: 10.0.0.12:323
# TLS example: rpki.example.com:324
# SSH example: 10.0.0.12:22
RPKI_RTR_TCP_SERVER_ADDR=rpki-rtr:323
RPKI_RTR_TLS_SERVER_ADDR=rpki-rtr:324
RPKI_RTR_SSH_SERVER_ADDR=rpki-rtr:22
# RTR protocol version used as client command second argument (supported: 0,1,2)
RPKI_RTR_PROTOCOL_VERSION=2
# TLS server name used by --server-name in TLS mode
# Must match server certificate SAN dNSName.
RPKI_RTR_TLS_SERVER_NAME=localhost
RPKI_RTR_TLS_CA_CERT_PATH=/app/certs/client-ca.crt
RPKI_RTR_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_PATH=/app/certs/client-good.crt
RPKI_RTR_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_PATH=/app/certs/client-good.key
RPKI_RTR_TLS_CERTS_HOST_DIR=../../certs/tls
# Shared client logs mount on host.
RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_LOG_HOST_DIR=../../logs/client
# SSH mode examples:
# RPKI_RTR_SSH_SERVER_ADDR=10.0.0.12:2222
RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_KEYS_VOLUME=../../certs/ssh:/app/certs:ro
RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_KEY_PATH=/app/certs/rtr-client.key
RPKI_RTR_SSH_SERVER_PUBKEY_PATH=/app/certs/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
RPKI_RTR_SSH_USERNAME=rpki-rtr
RPKI_RTR_SSH_PASSWORD=

View File

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
FROM rust:1.89-bookworm AS builder
WORKDIR /build
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends clang libclang-dev pkg-config \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY Cargo.toml Cargo.lock ./
COPY src ./src
RUN cargo build --release --bin rtr_debug_client
FROM debian:bookworm-slim AS runtime
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates tzdata \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /app
ENV TZ=Asia/Shanghai
COPY --from=builder /build/target/release/rtr_debug_client /usr/local/bin/rtr_debug_client
COPY --chmod=755 deploy/client/entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/rtr-debug-client-entrypoint.sh
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/rtr-debug-client-entrypoint.sh"]

View File

@@ -1,314 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
REPO_ROOT="$(cd -- "${SCRIPT_DIR}/../.." && pwd)"
CALLER_TARGET_PLATFORM="${TARGET_PLATFORM:-${RPKI_RTR_TARGET_PLATFORM:-}}"
CALLER_IMAGE_ARCH="${IMAGE_ARCH:-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-}}"
CALLER_CLIENT_IMAGE="${CLIENT_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE:-}}"
load_env_defaults() {
local line key value
[[ -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.env" ]] || return
while IFS= read -r line || [[ -n "${line}" ]]; do
line="${line%$'\r'}"
[[ -z "${line}" || "${line}" =~ ^[[:space:]]*# ]] && continue
[[ "${line}" == *"="* ]] || continue
key="${line%%=*}"
value="${line#*=}"
key="${key#"${key%%[![:space:]]*}"}"
key="${key%"${key##*[![:space:]]}"}"
[[ "${key}" =~ ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$ ]] || continue
if [[ -z "${!key+x}" ]]; then
export "${key}=${value}"
fi
done < "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.env"
}
detect_image_arch() {
case "$(uname -m)" in
x86_64|amd64) printf '%s\n' amd64 ;;
aarch64|arm64) printf '%s\n' arm64 ;;
*) die "unsupported host architecture '$(uname -m)'; set RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH=amd64 or arm64" ;;
esac
}
platform_for_image_arch() {
case "$1" in
amd64) printf '%s\n' linux/amd64 ;;
arm64) printf '%s\n' linux/arm64 ;;
*) die "unsupported image arch '$1', expected amd64 or arm64" ;;
esac
}
image_arch_from_platform() {
case "$1" in
linux/amd64|amd64) printf '%s\n' amd64 ;;
linux/arm64|arm64) printf '%s\n' arm64 ;;
*) return 1 ;;
esac
}
load_env_defaults
MODE="${MODE:-tcp}"
ACTION="up"
DETACH="${DETACH:-1}"
BUILD="${BUILD:-1}"
CLIENTS="${CLIENTS:-single}"
TARGET_PLATFORM="${CALLER_TARGET_PLATFORM}"
IMAGE_ARCH="${CALLER_IMAGE_ARCH}"
CLIENT_IMAGE="${CALLER_CLIENT_IMAGE}"
BUILDX_PUSH="${BUILDX_PUSH:-0}"
BUILDX_BUILDER="${BUILDX_BUILDER:-}"
SKIP_BASE_IMAGE_PULL="${SKIP_BASE_IMAGE_PULL:-0}"
usage() {
cat <<'EOF'
Usage:
deploy/client/build-run.sh [action] [options]
Actions:
up Build and run debug client (default)
build Build debug client image
buildx Build debug client image with docker buildx
rebuild Rebuild image without cache, then run client
down|stop Stop client compose stack
restart Stop, then build and run client
logs Follow client logs
ps Show client compose status
Options:
--mode MODE base|tcp|tls|ssh (default: tcp)
--clients MODE single|multi (default: single)
--platform VALUE Target platform for buildx (default: host architecture)
--image-arch VALUE
Image architecture suffix for default tag: amd64|arm64
--client-image TAG
Client image tag for buildx and compose
--push Push buildx image instead of loading it locally
--builder NAME buildx builder name
--skip-base-pull Do not pull Dockerfile base images before buildx
--foreground Run single client in foreground
--no-build Start without --build
-h|--help Show this help
EOF
}
die() {
echo "error: $*" >&2
exit 1
}
has_compose() {
docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1
}
has_buildx() {
docker buildx version >/dev/null 2>&1
}
pull_base_images() {
[[ "${SKIP_BASE_IMAGE_PULL}" == "1" ]] && return
local platform image
local -a platforms images
IFS=',' read -r -a platforms <<< "${TARGET_PLATFORM}"
images=(rust:1.89-bookworm debian:bookworm-slim)
for platform in "${platforms[@]}"; do
for image in "${images[@]}"; do
docker pull --platform "${platform}" "${image}"
done
done
}
compose_files() {
if [[ "${CLIENTS}" == "multi" ]]; then
[[ "${MODE}" == "tcp" || "${MODE}" == "base" ]] || die "--clients multi is only defined for tcp/base mode"
printf '%s\n' -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/docker-compose.clients.yml"
return
fi
case "${MODE}" in
base) printf '%s\n' -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/docker-compose.yml" ;;
tcp) printf '%s\n' -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/docker-compose.tcp.yml" ;;
tls) printf '%s\n' -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/docker-compose.tls.yml" ;;
ssh) printf '%s\n' -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/docker-compose.ssh.yml" ;;
*) die "unsupported mode '${MODE}', expected base|tcp|tls|ssh" ;;
esac
}
compose_args() {
local -a args files
args=()
[[ -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.env" ]] && args+=(--env-file "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.env")
mapfile -t files < <(compose_files)
args+=("${files[@]}")
printf '%s\n' "${args[@]}"
}
compose_run() {
local -a args
mapfile -t args < <(compose_args)
docker compose "${args[@]}" "$@"
}
up_client() {
local -a up_args
up_args=(up)
[[ "${CLIENTS}" == "multi" || "${DETACH}" == "1" ]] && up_args+=(-d)
[[ "${BUILD}" == "1" && "${CLIENTS}" != "multi" ]] && up_args+=(--build)
compose_run "${up_args[@]}"
}
build_client() {
if [[ "${CLIENTS}" == "multi" ]]; then
docker build "$@" -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/Dockerfile" -t "${CLIENT_IMAGE}" "${REPO_ROOT}"
else
compose_run build "$@"
fi
}
buildx_client() {
has_buildx || die "docker buildx is not available"
if [[ "${TARGET_PLATFORM}" == *,* && "${BUILDX_PUSH}" != "1" ]]; then
die "multi-platform buildx output requires --push"
fi
local -a output_args builder_args
[[ "${BUILDX_PUSH}" == "1" ]] && output_args=(--push) || output_args=(--load)
[[ -n "${BUILDX_BUILDER}" ]] && builder_args=(--builder "${BUILDX_BUILDER}") || builder_args=()
pull_base_images
docker buildx build "${builder_args[@]}" \
--platform "${TARGET_PLATFORM}" \
-f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/Dockerfile" \
-t "${CLIENT_IMAGE}" \
"${output_args[@]}" \
"${REPO_ROOT}"
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case "$1" in
up|build|buildx|rebuild|down|stop|restart|logs|ps)
ACTION="$1"
shift
;;
--mode)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || die "--mode requires a value"
MODE="$2"
shift 2
;;
--clients)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || die "--clients requires a value"
CLIENTS="$2"
shift 2
;;
--platform)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || die "--platform requires a value"
TARGET_PLATFORM="$2"
shift 2
;;
--image-arch)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || die "--image-arch requires a value"
IMAGE_ARCH="$2"
shift 2
;;
--client-image)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || die "--client-image requires a value"
CLIENT_IMAGE="$2"
shift 2
;;
--push)
BUILDX_PUSH=1
shift
;;
--builder)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || die "--builder requires a value"
BUILDX_BUILDER="$2"
shift 2
;;
--skip-base-pull)
SKIP_BASE_IMAGE_PULL=1
shift
;;
--foreground)
DETACH=0
shift
;;
--no-build)
BUILD=0
shift
;;
-h|--help)
usage
exit 0
;;
*)
die "unknown argument '$1'"
;;
esac
done
if [[ -z "${TARGET_PLATFORM}" ]]; then
[[ -n "${IMAGE_ARCH}" ]] || IMAGE_ARCH="$(detect_image_arch)"
TARGET_PLATFORM="$(platform_for_image_arch "${IMAGE_ARCH}")"
elif [[ -z "${IMAGE_ARCH}" ]]; then
if [[ "${TARGET_PLATFORM}" != *,* ]] && IMAGE_ARCH="$(image_arch_from_platform "${TARGET_PLATFORM}")"; then
:
else
IMAGE_ARCH="$(detect_image_arch)"
fi
fi
if [[ -z "${CLIENT_IMAGE}" ]]; then
if [[ "${TARGET_PLATFORM}" == *,* ]]; then
CLIENT_IMAGE="${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr-debug-client}:${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}"
else
CLIENT_IMAGE="${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr-debug-client}-${IMAGE_ARCH}:${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}"
fi
fi
[[ "${CLIENTS}" == "single" || "${CLIENTS}" == "multi" ]] || die "unsupported clients '${CLIENTS}', expected single|multi"
export RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE="${CLIENT_IMAGE}"
if [[ "${ACTION}" == "buildx" ]]; then
has_buildx || die "docker buildx is not available"
else
has_compose || die "docker compose is not available"
fi
cd "${REPO_ROOT}"
case "${ACTION}" in
up)
up_client
;;
build)
build_client
;;
buildx)
buildx_client
;;
rebuild)
build_client --no-cache
up_client
;;
down|stop)
compose_run down
;;
restart)
compose_run down
up_client
;;
logs)
compose_run logs -f
;;
ps)
compose_run ps
;;
esac

View File

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
version: "3.9"
services:
rtr-client-1:
image: ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr-debug-client}-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-amd64}:${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}}
command: ["${RPKI_RTR_TCP_SERVER_ADDR:-rpki-rtr:323}", "${RPKI_RTR_PROTOCOL_VERSION:-2}", "reset", "--keep-after-error", "--summary-only"]
volumes:
- ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_LOG_HOST_DIR:-../../logs/client}:/app/logs
restart: no
networks:
- rpki_net
rtr-client-2:
image: ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr-debug-client}-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-amd64}:${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}}
command: ["${RPKI_RTR_TCP_SERVER_ADDR:-rpki-rtr:323}", "${RPKI_RTR_PROTOCOL_VERSION:-2}", "reset", "--keep-after-error", "--summary-only"]
volumes:
- ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_LOG_HOST_DIR:-../../logs/client}:/app/logs
restart: no
networks:
- rpki_net
rtr-client-3:
image: ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr-debug-client}-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-amd64}:${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}}
command: ["${RPKI_RTR_TCP_SERVER_ADDR:-rpki-rtr:323}", "${RPKI_RTR_PROTOCOL_VERSION:-2}", "reset", "--keep-after-error", "--summary-only"]
volumes:
- ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_LOG_HOST_DIR:-../../logs/client}:/app/logs
restart: no
networks:
- rpki_net
rtr-client-4:
image: ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr-debug-client}-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-amd64}:${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}}
command: ["${RPKI_RTR_TCP_SERVER_ADDR:-rpki-rtr:323}", "${RPKI_RTR_PROTOCOL_VERSION:-2}", "reset", "--keep-after-error", "--summary-only"]
volumes:
- ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_LOG_HOST_DIR:-../../logs/client}:/app/logs
restart: no
networks:
- rpki_net
rtr-client-5:
image: ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr-debug-client}-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-amd64}:${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}}
command: ["${RPKI_RTR_TCP_SERVER_ADDR:-rpki-rtr:323}", "${RPKI_RTR_PROTOCOL_VERSION:-2}", "reset", "--keep-after-error", "--summary-only"]
volumes:
- ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_LOG_HOST_DIR:-../../logs/client}:/app/logs
restart: no
networks:
- rpki_net
networks:
rpki_net:
name: rpki_net
driver: bridge

View File

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
version: "3.9"
services:
rtr-debug-client:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: deploy/client/Dockerfile
image: ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr-debug-client}-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-amd64}:${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}}
command:
[
"${RPKI_RTR_SSH_SERVER_ADDR:-rpki-rtr:22}",
"${RPKI_RTR_PROTOCOL_VERSION:-2}",
"reset",
"--ssh",
"--ssh-user",
"${RPKI_RTR_SSH_USERNAME:-rpki-rtr}",
"--ssh-password",
"${RPKI_RTR_SSH_PASSWORD}",
"--ssh-server-key",
"${RPKI_RTR_SSH_SERVER_PUBKEY_PATH:-/app/certs/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub}",
"--keep-after-error",
"--summary-only"
]
volumes:
- ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_KEYS_VOLUME:-../../certs/ssh:/app/certs:ro}
- ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_LOG_HOST_DIR:-../../logs/client}:/app/logs
restart: no
stdin_open: true
tty: true
networks:
- rpki_net
networks:
rpki_net:
name: rpki_net
driver: bridge

View File

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
version: "3.9"
services:
rtr-debug-client:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: deploy/client/Dockerfile
image: ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr-debug-client}-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-amd64}:${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}}
command:
[
"${RPKI_RTR_SSH_SERVER_ADDR:-rpki-rtr:22}",
"${RPKI_RTR_PROTOCOL_VERSION:-2}",
"reset",
"--ssh",
"--ssh-user",
"${RPKI_RTR_SSH_USERNAME:-rpki-rtr}",
"--ssh-key",
"${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_KEY_PATH:-/app/certs/rtr-client.key}",
"--ssh-server-key",
"${RPKI_RTR_SSH_SERVER_PUBKEY_PATH:-/app/certs/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub}",
"--keep-after-error",
"--summary-only"
]
volumes:
- ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_KEYS_VOLUME:-../../certs/ssh:/app/certs:ro}
- ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_LOG_HOST_DIR:-../../logs/client}:/app/logs
restart: no
stdin_open: true
tty: true
networks:
- rpki_net
networks:
rpki_net:
name: rpki_net
driver: bridge

View File

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
services:
rtr-debug-client:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: deploy/client/Dockerfile
image: ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr-debug-client}-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-amd64}:${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}}
command: ["${RPKI_RTR_TCP_SERVER_ADDR:-rpki-rtr:323}", "${RPKI_RTR_PROTOCOL_VERSION:-2}", "reset", "--keep-after-error", "--summary-only"]
volumes:
- ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_LOG_HOST_DIR:-../../logs/client}:/app/logs
restart: no
stdin_open: true
tty: true
networks:
- rpki_net
networks:
rpki_net:
name: rpki_net
driver: bridge

View File

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
version: "3.9"
services:
rtr-debug-client:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: deploy/client/Dockerfile
image: ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr-debug-client}-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-amd64}:${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}}
command:
[
"${RPKI_RTR_TLS_SERVER_ADDR:-rpki-rtr:324}",
"${RPKI_RTR_PROTOCOL_VERSION:-2}",
"reset",
"--tls",
"--ca-cert",
"${RPKI_RTR_TLS_CA_CERT_PATH:-/app/certs/client-ca.crt}",
"--server-name",
"${RPKI_RTR_TLS_SERVER_NAME:-localhost}",
"--client-cert",
"${RPKI_RTR_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_PATH:-/app/certs/client-good.crt}",
"--client-key",
"${RPKI_RTR_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_PATH:-/app/certs/client-good.key}",
"--keep-after-error",
"--summary-only"
]
volumes:
- ${RPKI_RTR_TLS_CERTS_HOST_DIR:-../../certs/tls}:/app/certs:ro
- ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_LOG_HOST_DIR:-../../logs/client}:/app/logs
restart: no
stdin_open: true
tty: true
networks:
- rpki_net
networks:
rpki_net:
name: rpki_net
driver: bridge

View File

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
services:
rtr-debug-client:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: deploy/client/Dockerfile
image: ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr-debug-client}-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-amd64}:${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}}
command: ["${RPKI_RTR_TCP_SERVER_ADDR:-rpki-rtr:323}", "${RPKI_RTR_PROTOCOL_VERSION:-2}", "reset", "--keep-after-error", "--summary-only"]
volumes:
- ${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_LOG_HOST_DIR:-../../logs/client}:/app/logs
restart: no
stdin_open: true
tty: true
networks:
- rpki_net
networks:
rpki_net:
name: rpki_net
driver: bridge

View File

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
mkdir -p /app/logs
log_name="${HOSTNAME:-rtr-debug-client}"
stdout_log="/app/logs/${log_name}.stdout.log"
stderr_log="/app/logs/${log_name}.stderr.log"
exec /usr/local/bin/rtr_debug_client "$@" >>"$stdout_log" 2>>"$stderr_log"

View File

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
# RTR server endpoint used by deploy/frr/frr.conf.template.
RPKI_FRR_RPKI_HOST=127.0.0.1
RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PORT=323
RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PREFERENCE=1

View File

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
# FRR Minimal RTR Client Config
中文文档: [README.zh.md](./README.zh.md)
This folder provides a minimal FRR setup for black-box interop testing
against this repository's RTR server defaults.
Server defaults in this repo:
- TCP: `0.0.0.0:323`
- TLS: `0.0.0.0:324`
Reference:
- `src/main.rs`
## Files
- `daemons.example`: sample `/etc/frr/daemons`
- `frr.conf.example`: static sample `/etc/frr/frr.conf`
- `frr.conf.template`: Docker template used to generate `/etc/frr/frr.conf`
- `entrypoint.sh`: renders `frr.conf.template` from environment variables before starting FRR
- `.env`: default Docker environment values
## How to apply on an FRR host
1. Copy `daemons.example` to `/etc/frr/daemons`.
2. Copy `frr.conf.example` to `/etc/frr/frr.conf`.
3. Restart FRR:
```bash
sudo systemctl restart frr
```
## Verify
```bash
vtysh -c "show rpki configuration"
vtysh -c "show rpki cache-server"
vtysh -c "show rpki cache-connection"
vtysh -c "show rpki prefix-table"
```
If `show rpki cache-connection` is connected and `show rpki prefix-table`
contains VRPs, the RTR client path is working.
## Docker quick start
From repository root:
```bash
docker compose --env-file deploy/frr/.env -f deploy/frr/docker-compose.yml up -d
docker exec -it frr-rpki-client vtysh -c "show rpki cache-connection"
docker exec -it frr-rpki-client vtysh -c "show rpki prefix-table"
```
The Docker example defaults to `127.0.0.1:323`. Override the RTR server
endpoint with environment variables:
```bash
RPKI_FRR_RPKI_HOST=10.0.0.12 \
RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PORT=323 \
docker compose --env-file deploy/frr/.env -f deploy/frr/docker-compose.yml up -d
```
Stop:
```bash
docker compose --env-file deploy/frr/.env -f deploy/frr/docker-compose.yml down
```
## Notes
- This setup targets RTR over TCP (`rpki cache tcp`).
- Docker mode renders `frr.conf.template` into `/etc/frr/frr.conf` at startup.
- Keep protocol-level conformance checks in Rust tests and
`src/bin/rtr_debug_client`.
- `network_mode: host` is kept for the minimal FRR container example, but the
RTR server address is controlled by `RPKI_FRR_RPKI_HOST` and
`RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PORT`.

View File

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
# FRR 最小化 RTR 客户端配置
本目录提供一个 FRR 最小配置,用于和本仓库 RTR Server 做黑盒互通测试。
本仓库默认 RTR 监听地址:
- TCP:`0.0.0.0:323`
- TLS:`0.0.0.0:324`
参考实现:
- `src/main.rs`
## 文件说明
- `daemons.example`:示例 `/etc/frr/daemons`
- `frr.conf.example`:静态示例 `/etc/frr/frr.conf`
- `frr.conf.template`:Docker 启动时生成 `/etc/frr/frr.conf` 的模板
- `entrypoint.sh`:启动 FRR 前根据环境变量渲染 `frr.conf.template`
- `.env`:Docker 示例使用的默认环境变量
## 在 FRR 主机上应用
1. 复制 `daemons.example` 到 `/etc/frr/daemons`
2. 复制 `frr.conf.example` 到 `/etc/frr/frr.conf`
3. 重启 FRR:
```bash
sudo systemctl restart frr
```
## 验证命令
```bash
vtysh -c "show rpki configuration"
vtysh -c "show rpki cache-server"
vtysh -c "show rpki cache-connection"
vtysh -c "show rpki prefix-table"
```
当 `show rpki cache-connection` 显示已连接,且 `show rpki prefix-table` 出现 VRP 时,说明 RTR 客户端链路工作正常。
## Docker 快速启动
在仓库根目录执行:
```bash
docker compose --env-file deploy/frr/.env -f deploy/frr/docker-compose.yml up -d
docker exec -it frr-rpki-client vtysh -c "show rpki cache-connection"
docker exec -it frr-rpki-client vtysh -c "show rpki prefix-table"
```
Docker 示例默认连接 `127.0.0.1:323`。如果 RTR Server 在其他地址,可以通过环境变量覆盖:
```bash
RPKI_FRR_RPKI_HOST=10.0.0.12 \
RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PORT=323 \
docker compose --env-file deploy/frr/.env -f deploy/frr/docker-compose.yml up -d
```
停止:
```bash
docker compose --env-file deploy/frr/.env -f deploy/frr/docker-compose.yml down
```
## 可测试范围
- FRR 作为 RTR Client 与本仓库 Server 的 TCP 建链能力
- FRR 侧基础会话状态可见性(`cache-server` / `cache-connection`)
- VRP 下发与导入是否成功(`prefix-table` 是否有条目)
- 基于服务端数据变化触发的前缀表更新(可通过替换 `data` 后观察)
- 黑盒互通回归:用于确认“路由器客户端视角”功能可用
## 不覆盖范围
- 不替代协议级单元测试/集成测试(PDU 细节、异常路径、边界条件)
- 不替代 `src/bin/rtr_debug_client` 的逐报文调试能力
- 默认示例以 TCP 为主,TLS/mTLS 需按你的证书与 FRR 配置单独扩展
## 说明
- 当前示例主要针对 RTR over TCP(`rpki cache tcp`)
- Docker 模式会在启动时把 `frr.conf.template` 渲染为 `/etc/frr/frr.conf`
- `network_mode: host` 仍用于最小化 FRR 容器示例,但 RTR Server 地址由 `RPKI_FRR_RPKI_HOST` 和 `RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PORT` 控制

View File

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
# Minimal FRR daemons config for RPKI testing
zebra=yes
bgpd=yes
# Enable bgpd RPKI module
bgpd_options=" -A 127.0.0.1 -M rpki"

View File

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
services:
frr-rpki-client:
image: quay.io/frrouting/frr:10.2.2
container_name: frr-rpki-client
restart: unless-stopped
network_mode: host
privileged: true
environment:
RPKI_FRR_RPKI_HOST: "${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_HOST:-127.0.0.1}"
RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PORT: "${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PORT:-323}"
RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PREFERENCE: "${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PREFERENCE:-1}"
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "/config/entrypoint.sh"]
volumes:
- ./daemons.example:/etc/frr/daemons:ro
- ./frr.conf.template:/config/frr.conf.template:ro
- ./entrypoint.sh:/config/entrypoint.sh:ro

View File

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
: "${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_HOST:=127.0.0.1}"
: "${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PORT:=323}"
: "${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PREFERENCE:=1}"
: "${RPKI_FRR_CONFIG_TEMPLATE_PATH:=/config/frr.conf.template}"
: "${RPKI_FRR_CONFIG_PATH:=/etc/frr/frr.conf}"
escape_sed() {
printf '%s' "$1" | sed 's/[&|\\]/\\&/g'
}
host="$(escape_sed "${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_HOST}")"
port="$(escape_sed "${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PORT}")"
preference="$(escape_sed "${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PREFERENCE}")"
sed \
-e "s|\${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_HOST}|${host}|g" \
-e "s|\${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PORT}|${port}|g" \
-e "s|\${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PREFERENCE}|${preference}|g" \
"${RPKI_FRR_CONFIG_TEMPLATE_PATH}" > "${RPKI_FRR_CONFIG_PATH}"
exec /usr/lib/frr/docker-start

View File

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
frr version 10.2
frr defaults traditional
hostname rpki-lab
service integrated-vtysh-config
!
debug rpki
!
rpki
rpki polling_period 10
rpki timeout 10
rpki retry_interval 10
rpki expire_interval 7200
rpki cache tcp 127.0.0.1 323 preference 1
exit
!
router bgp 65001
bgp router-id 192.0.2.1
!
address-family ipv4 unicast
exit-address-family
!
line vty

View File

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
frr version 10.2
frr defaults traditional
hostname rpki-lab
service integrated-vtysh-config
!
debug rpki
!
rpki
rpki polling_period 10
rpki timeout 10
rpki retry_interval 10
rpki expire_interval 7200
rpki cache tcp ${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_HOST} ${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PORT} preference ${RPKI_FRR_RPKI_PREFERENCE}
exit
!
router bgp 65001
bgp router-id 192.0.2.1
!
address-family ipv4 unicast
exit-address-family
!
line vty

View File

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
# Core runtime knobs.
# build-run.sh auto-detects amd64/arm64 unless IMAGE_ARCH/RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH is set before running it.
# Direct docker compose uses RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH from this file; set it to arm64 on ARM hosts.
RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_BASE=rpki-rtr
RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_TAG=v1.3
RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH=arm64
# RPKI_RTR_TARGET_PLATFORM=linux/amd64
# RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE=rpki-rtr-amd64:v1.3
# Data source directories on host.
RPKI_RTR_CCR_HOST_DIR=../../data
RPKI_RTR_SLURM_HOST_DIR=../../data
# In-container data source directories.
RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR=/app/data
RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR=/app/slurm
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HOST_DIR=../../report
# In-container runtime paths.
RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH=/app/rtr-db
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR=/app/report
# Persistent directories on host.
RPKI_RTR_DB_HOST_DIR=../../rtr-db
RPKI_RTR_LOG_HOST_DIR=../../logs/server
RPKI_RTR_SOURCE_REFRESH_INTERVAL_SECS=300
RPKI_RTR_RUNTIME_REPORT_INTERVAL_SECS=300
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HISTORY_LIMIT=10
RPKI_RTR_TIMEZONE=Asia/Shanghai
RPKI_RTR_MAX_DELTA=10
RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONNECTIONS=100000
RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONCURRENT_HANDSHAKES=128
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR=0.0.0.0:8323
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN=qwert
RUST_LOG=info
# TLS mode knobs.
RPKI_RTR_ENFORCE_TLS_CLIENT_SAN_IP_MATCH=false
RPKI_RTR_TLS_CERT_PATH=/app/certs/server-dns.crt
RPKI_RTR_TLS_KEY_PATH=/app/certs/server-dns.key
RPKI_RTR_TLS_CLIENT_CA_PATH=/app/certs/client-ca.crt
RPKI_RTR_TLS_CERTS_HOST_DIR=../../certs/tls
# SSH mode knobs.
RPKI_RTR_SSH_HOST_PORT=2222
RPKI_RTR_SSH_CONTAINER_PORT=22
RPKI_RTR_SSH_AUTH_MODE=key
RPKI_RTR_SSH_USERNAME=rpki-rtr
RPKI_RTR_SSH_SUBSYSTEM_NAME=rpki-rtr
RPKI_RTR_SSH_HOST_KEY_PATH=/app/certs/ssh_host_rsa_key
RPKI_RTR_SSH_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_PATH=/app/certs/rtr-authorized_keys
RPKI_RTR_SSH_CERTS_HOST_DIR=../../certs/ssh

View File

@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
# Deployment (Docker Compose)
This project runs `src/main.rs` as a long-running server that:
1. loads latest `.ccr` from a configured directory,
2. applies optional SLURM filtering,
3. starts RTR server.
The container runs `rpki` directly as PID 1.
## Files
- `deploy/server/Dockerfile`
- `deploy/server/docker-compose.yml`
## Runtime Paths in Container
- CCR directory: `/app/data`
- RocksDB directory: `/app/rtr-db`
- SLURM directory: `/app/slurm`
- Report directory: `/app/report`
- TLS cert directory (optional): `/app/certs`
## Path Configuration via `.env`
- `RPKI_RTR_CCR_HOST_DIR`: host CCR directory mounted into container
- `RPKI_RTR_SLURM_HOST_DIR`: host SLURM directory mounted into container
- `RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR`: in-container CCR directory path
- `RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR`: in-container SLURM directory path
- `RPKI_RTR_DB_HOST_DIR`: host RocksDB directory
- `RPKI_RTR_LOG_HOST_DIR`: host log directory
- `RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HOST_DIR`: host directory receiving split RTR JSON reports
- `RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH`: in-container RocksDB directory
- `RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR`: in-container report directory
## Runtime Configuration via `.env`
- Core: `RPKI_RTR_SOURCE_REFRESH_INTERVAL_SECS`, `RPKI_RTR_MAX_DELTA`, `RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONCURRENT_HANDSHAKES`, `RPKI_RTR_RUNTIME_REPORT_INTERVAL_SECS`, `RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HISTORY_LIMIT`, `RPKI_RTR_TIMEZONE`, `RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR`, `RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN`, `RUST_LOG`
- TCP mode: `RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONNECTIONS`
- TLS mode: `RPKI_RTR_ENFORCE_TLS_CLIENT_SAN_IP_MATCH`, `RPKI_RTR_TLS_CERT_PATH`, `RPKI_RTR_TLS_KEY_PATH`, `RPKI_RTR_TLS_CLIENT_CA_PATH`, `RPKI_RTR_TLS_CERTS_HOST_DIR`
- SSH mode: `RPKI_RTR_SSH_HOST_PORT`, `RPKI_RTR_SSH_CONTAINER_PORT`, `RPKI_RTR_SSH_AUTH_MODE`, `RPKI_RTR_SSH_USERNAME`, `RPKI_RTR_SSH_SUBSYSTEM_NAME`, `RPKI_RTR_SSH_HOST_KEY_PATH`, `RPKI_RTR_SSH_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_PATH`, `RPKI_RTR_SSH_CERTS_HOST_DIR`
## Start
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/server/docker-compose.yml up -d --build
```
## Stop
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/server/docker-compose.yml down
```
## Logs
```bash
docker compose -f deploy/server/docker-compose.yml logs -f rpki-rtr
```
The admin API can also stream the redirected log file:
```bash
curl -N "http://127.0.0.1:8323/admin/rtr/logs/tail?stream=stdout&lines=200" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN"
```
It reads `/app/logs/${HOSTNAME}.stdout.log` or `.stderr.log` by default. Set
`RPKI_RTR_LOG_DIR` and `RPKI_RTR_LOG_NAME` to override that lookup.
## Runtime Report
The server writes split JSON reports. Each report file uses a local-time
timestamp suffix and each category keeps `RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HISTORY_LIMIT` files,
defaulting to 10.
- `rtr-source-*.json`: CCR and SLURM source metadata, latest refresh status,
data quality counts, cache snapshot counts, and delta counts. Written on
startup and source refresh events.
- `rtr-clients-*.json`: active client connection counts and counts by transport
(`tcp`, `tls`, `ssh`). Written on startup, whenever the active connection
count changes.
- `rtr-runtime-*.json`: service start time, uptime, process RSS, and
non-sensitive runtime configuration. Written on startup and every
`RPKI_RTR_RUNTIME_REPORT_INTERVAL_SECS`, defaulting to 300 seconds.
Timestamps in logs and report JSON files use `RPKI_RTR_TIMEZONE`, which
defaults to `Asia/Shanghai`. Use IANA timezone names such as `Asia/Shanghai`,
`Europe/London`, `America/New_York`, or `UTC`; `Shanghai` is accepted as a
convenience alias for `Asia/Shanghai`.
## Runtime Admin Config
The admin endpoint is disabled by default. Set `RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR` to enable
`POST /admin/rtr/config`. If the address is not loopback, `RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN`
must also be set and requests must include `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.
The endpoint accepts partial JSON updates. See `docs/rtr-admin-api.md` for the
complete request/response schema, examples, and runtime apply semantics.

View File

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
FROM rust:1.89-bookworm AS builder
WORKDIR /build
ENV CARGO_BUILD_JOBS=2
RUN set -eux; \
cat > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources <<'EOF'
Types: deb
URIs: http://mirrors.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/debian
Suites: bookworm bookworm-updates
Components: main
Signed-By: /usr/share/keyrings/debian-archive-keyring.gpg
Types: deb
URIs: http://mirrors.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/debian-security
Suites: bookworm-security
Components: main
Signed-By: /usr/share/keyrings/debian-archive-keyring.gpg
EOF
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --fix-missing --no-install-recommends \
-o Acquire::Retries=10 \
-o Acquire::http::Timeout=60 \
build-essential \
cmake \
pkg-config \
clang \
libclang-dev \
libssl-dev \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY Cargo.toml Cargo.lock ./
COPY src ./src
RUN cargo build --release --bin rpki_rtr
FROM debian:bookworm-slim AS runtime
RUN set -eux; \
cat > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources <<'EOF'
Types: deb
URIs: http://mirrors.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/debian
Suites: bookworm bookworm-updates
Components: main
Signed-By: /usr/share/keyrings/debian-archive-keyring.gpg
Types: deb
URIs: http://mirrors.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/debian-security
Suites: bookworm-security
Components: main
Signed-By: /usr/share/keyrings/debian-archive-keyring.gpg
EOF
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --fix-missing --no-install-recommends \
-o Acquire::Retries=10 \
-o Acquire::http::Timeout=60 \
ca-certificates \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder /build/target/release/rpki_rtr /usr/local/bin/rpki_rtr
COPY --chmod=755 deploy/server/entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/rpki-rtr-entrypoint.sh
RUN mkdir -p /app/data /app/rtr-db /app/certs /app/slurm /app/logs /app/report
ENV RPKI_RTR_ENABLE_TLS=false \
RPKI_RTR_TCP_ADDR=0.0.0.0:323 \
RPKI_RTR_TLS_ADDR=0.0.0.0:324 \
RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH=/app/rtr-db \
RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR=/app/data \
RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR=/app/slurm \
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR=/app/report \
RPKI_RTR_RUNTIME_REPORT_INTERVAL_SECS=300 \
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HISTORY_LIMIT=10 \
RPKI_RTR_REFRESH_INTERVAL_SECS=300 \
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR="" \
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN=""
EXPOSE 323 324
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/rpki-rtr-entrypoint.sh"]

View File

@@ -1,292 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
REPO_ROOT="$(cd -- "${SCRIPT_DIR}/../.." && pwd)"
CALLER_TARGET_PLATFORM="${TARGET_PLATFORM:-${RPKI_RTR_TARGET_PLATFORM:-}}"
CALLER_IMAGE_ARCH="${IMAGE_ARCH:-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-}}"
CALLER_SERVER_IMAGE="${SERVER_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE:-}}"
load_env_defaults() {
local line key value
[[ -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.env" ]] || return
while IFS= read -r line || [[ -n "${line}" ]]; do
line="${line%$'\r'}"
[[ -z "${line}" || "${line}" =~ ^[[:space:]]*# ]] && continue
[[ "${line}" == *"="* ]] || continue
key="${line%%=*}"
value="${line#*=}"
key="${key#"${key%%[![:space:]]*}"}"
key="${key%"${key##*[![:space:]]}"}"
[[ "${key}" =~ ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$ ]] || continue
if [[ -z "${!key+x}" ]]; then
export "${key}=${value}"
fi
done < "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.env"
}
detect_image_arch() {
case "$(uname -m)" in
x86_64|amd64) printf '%s\n' amd64 ;;
aarch64|arm64) printf '%s\n' arm64 ;;
*) die "unsupported host architecture '$(uname -m)'; set RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH=amd64 or arm64" ;;
esac
}
platform_for_image_arch() {
case "$1" in
amd64) printf '%s\n' linux/amd64 ;;
arm64) printf '%s\n' linux/arm64 ;;
*) die "unsupported image arch '$1', expected amd64 or arm64" ;;
esac
}
image_arch_from_platform() {
case "$1" in
linux/amd64|amd64) printf '%s\n' amd64 ;;
linux/arm64|arm64) printf '%s\n' arm64 ;;
*) return 1 ;;
esac
}
load_env_defaults
MODE="${MODE:-tcp}"
ACTION="up"
DETACH="${DETACH:-1}"
BUILD="${BUILD:-1}"
TARGET_PLATFORM="${CALLER_TARGET_PLATFORM}"
IMAGE_ARCH="${CALLER_IMAGE_ARCH}"
SERVER_IMAGE="${CALLER_SERVER_IMAGE}"
BUILDX_PUSH="${BUILDX_PUSH:-0}"
BUILDX_BUILDER="${BUILDX_BUILDER:-}"
SKIP_BASE_IMAGE_PULL="${SKIP_BASE_IMAGE_PULL:-0}"
usage() {
cat <<'EOF'
Usage:
deploy/server/build-run.sh [action] [options]
Actions:
up Build and start server (default)
build Build server image with docker compose
buildx Build server image with docker buildx
rebuild Rebuild image without cache, then start server
down|stop Stop server compose stack
restart Stop, then build and start server
logs Follow server logs
ps Show server compose status
Options:
--mode MODE base|tcp|tls|ssh (default: tcp)
--platform VALUE Target platform for buildx (default: host architecture)
--image-arch VALUE
Image architecture suffix for default tag: amd64|arm64
--server-image TAG
Server image tag for buildx and compose
--push Push buildx image instead of loading it locally
--builder NAME buildx builder name
--skip-base-pull Do not pull Dockerfile base images before buildx
--foreground Run server in foreground
--no-build Start without --build
-h|--help Show this help
EOF
}
die() {
echo "error: $*" >&2
exit 1
}
has_compose() {
docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1
}
has_buildx() {
docker buildx version >/dev/null 2>&1
}
pull_base_images() {
[[ "${SKIP_BASE_IMAGE_PULL}" == "1" ]] && return
local platform image
local -a platforms images
IFS=',' read -r -a platforms <<< "${TARGET_PLATFORM}"
images=(rust:1.89-bookworm debian:bookworm-slim)
for platform in "${platforms[@]}"; do
for image in "${images[@]}"; do
docker pull --platform "${platform}" "${image}"
done
done
}
compose_files() {
case "${MODE}" in
base) printf '%s\n' -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/docker-compose.yml" ;;
tcp) printf '%s\n' -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/docker-compose.tcp.yml" ;;
tls) printf '%s\n' -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/docker-compose.tls.yml" ;;
ssh) printf '%s\n' -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/docker-compose.ssh.yml" ;;
*) die "unsupported mode '${MODE}', expected base|tcp|tls|ssh" ;;
esac
}
compose_args() {
local -a args files
args=()
[[ -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.env" ]] && args+=(--env-file "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.env")
mapfile -t files < <(compose_files)
args+=("${files[@]}")
printf '%s\n' "${args[@]}"
}
compose_run() {
local -a args
mapfile -t args < <(compose_args)
docker compose "${args[@]}" "$@"
}
up_server() {
local -a up_args
up_args=(up)
[[ "${DETACH}" == "1" ]] && up_args+=(-d)
[[ "${BUILD}" == "1" ]] && up_args+=(--build)
compose_run "${up_args[@]}"
}
buildx_server() {
has_buildx || die "docker buildx is not available"
if [[ "${TARGET_PLATFORM}" == *,* && "${BUILDX_PUSH}" != "1" ]]; then
die "multi-platform buildx output requires --push"
fi
local -a output_args builder_args
[[ "${BUILDX_PUSH}" == "1" ]] && output_args=(--push) || output_args=(--load)
[[ -n "${BUILDX_BUILDER}" ]] && builder_args=(--builder "${BUILDX_BUILDER}") || builder_args=()
pull_base_images
docker buildx build "${builder_args[@]}" \
--platform "${TARGET_PLATFORM}" \
-f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/Dockerfile" \
-t "${SERVER_IMAGE}" \
"${output_args[@]}" \
"${REPO_ROOT}"
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case "$1" in
up|build|buildx|rebuild|down|stop|restart|logs|ps)
ACTION="$1"
shift
;;
--mode)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || die "--mode requires a value"
MODE="$2"
shift 2
;;
--platform)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || die "--platform requires a value"
TARGET_PLATFORM="$2"
shift 2
;;
--image-arch)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || die "--image-arch requires a value"
IMAGE_ARCH="$2"
shift 2
;;
--server-image)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || die "--server-image requires a value"
SERVER_IMAGE="$2"
shift 2
;;
--push)
BUILDX_PUSH=1
shift
;;
--builder)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || die "--builder requires a value"
BUILDX_BUILDER="$2"
shift 2
;;
--skip-base-pull)
SKIP_BASE_IMAGE_PULL=1
shift
;;
--foreground)
DETACH=0
shift
;;
--no-build)
BUILD=0
shift
;;
-h|--help)
usage
exit 0
;;
*)
die "unknown argument '$1'"
;;
esac
done
if [[ -z "${TARGET_PLATFORM}" ]]; then
[[ -n "${IMAGE_ARCH}" ]] || IMAGE_ARCH="$(detect_image_arch)"
TARGET_PLATFORM="$(platform_for_image_arch "${IMAGE_ARCH}")"
elif [[ -z "${IMAGE_ARCH}" ]]; then
if [[ "${TARGET_PLATFORM}" != *,* ]] && IMAGE_ARCH="$(image_arch_from_platform "${TARGET_PLATFORM}")"; then
:
else
IMAGE_ARCH="$(detect_image_arch)"
fi
fi
if [[ -z "${SERVER_IMAGE}" ]]; then
if [[ "${TARGET_PLATFORM}" == *,* ]]; then
SERVER_IMAGE="${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr}:${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}"
else
SERVER_IMAGE="${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr}-${IMAGE_ARCH}:${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}"
fi
fi
export RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE="${SERVER_IMAGE}"
if [[ "${ACTION}" == "buildx" ]]; then
has_buildx || die "docker buildx is not available"
else
has_compose || die "docker compose is not available"
fi
cd "${REPO_ROOT}"
case "${ACTION}" in
up)
up_server
;;
build)
compose_run build
;;
buildx)
buildx_server
;;
rebuild)
compose_run build --no-cache
up_server
;;
down|stop)
compose_run down
;;
restart)
compose_run down
up_server
;;
logs)
compose_run logs -f
;;
ps)
compose_run ps
;;
esac

View File

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
version: "3.9"
services:
rpki-rtr:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: deploy/server/Dockerfile
image: ${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr}-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-amd64}:${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}}
container_name: rpki-rtr-ssh
restart: no
ports:
- "323:323"
- "${RPKI_RTR_SSH_HOST_PORT:-2222}:${RPKI_RTR_SSH_CONTAINER_PORT:-22}"
- "8323:8323"
environment:
RPKI_RTR_ENABLE_TLS: "false"
RPKI_RTR_ENABLE_SSH: "true"
RPKI_RTR_TCP_ADDR: "0.0.0.0:323"
RPKI_RTR_SSH_ADDR: "0.0.0.0:${RPKI_RTR_SSH_CONTAINER_PORT:-22}"
RPKI_RTR_SSH_HOST_KEY_PATH: "${RPKI_RTR_SSH_HOST_KEY_PATH:-/app/certs/ssh_host_rsa_key}"
RPKI_RTR_SSH_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_PATH: "${RPKI_RTR_SSH_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_PATH:-/app/certs/rtr-authorized_keys}"
RPKI_RTR_SSH_USERNAME: "${RPKI_RTR_SSH_USERNAME:-rpki-rtr}"
RPKI_RTR_SSH_SUBSYSTEM_NAME: "${RPKI_RTR_SSH_SUBSYSTEM_NAME:-rpki-rtr}"
# SSH auth mode: key | password | both
RPKI_RTR_SSH_AUTH_MODE: "${RPKI_RTR_SSH_AUTH_MODE:-key}"
# Optional: enable password authentication in addition to publickey
# RPKI_RTR_SSH_PASSWORD: "test-password"
RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH: "${RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH:-/app/rtr-db}"
RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR: "${RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR:-/app/data}"
RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR: "${RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR:-/app/slurm}"
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR: "${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR:-/app/report}"
RPKI_RTR_RUNTIME_REPORT_INTERVAL_SECS: "${RPKI_RTR_RUNTIME_REPORT_INTERVAL_SECS:-300}"
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HISTORY_LIMIT: "${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HISTORY_LIMIT:-10}"
RPKI_RTR_TIMEZONE: "${RPKI_RTR_TIMEZONE:-Asia/Shanghai}"
RPKI_RTR_SOURCE_REFRESH_INTERVAL_SECS: "${RPKI_RTR_SOURCE_REFRESH_INTERVAL_SECS:-300}"
RPKI_RTR_MAX_DELTA: "${RPKI_RTR_MAX_DELTA:-10}"
RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONCURRENT_HANDSHAKES: "${RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONCURRENT_HANDSHAKES:-128}"
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR: "${RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR:-}"
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN: "${RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN:-}"
RUST_LOG: "${RUST_LOG:-info}"
volumes:
- ${RPKI_RTR_CCR_HOST_DIR:-../../data}:${RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR:-/app/data}:ro
- ${RPKI_RTR_DB_HOST_DIR:-../../rtr-db}:${RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH:-/app/rtr-db}
- ${RPKI_RTR_SLURM_HOST_DIR:-../../data}:${RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR:-/app/slurm}
- ${RPKI_RTR_SSH_CERTS_HOST_DIR:-../../certs/ssh}:/app/certs:ro
- ${RPKI_RTR_LOG_HOST_DIR:-../../logs/server}:/app/logs
- ${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HOST_DIR:-../../report}:${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR:-/app/report}
networks:
- rpki_net
networks:
rpki_net:
name: rpki_net
driver: bridge

View File

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
version: "3.9"
services:
rpki-rtr:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: deploy/server/Dockerfile
image: ${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr}-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-amd64}:${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}}
container_name: rpki-rtr-tcp
restart: no
ports:
- "323:323"
- "8323:8323"
environment:
RPKI_RTR_ENABLE_TLS: "false"
RPKI_RTR_ENABLE_SSH: "false"
RPKI_RTR_TCP_ADDR: "0.0.0.0:323"
RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH: "${RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH:-/app/rtr-db}"
RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR: "${RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR:-/app/data}"
RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR: "${RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR:-/app/slurm}"
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR: "${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR:-/app/report}"
RPKI_RTR_RUNTIME_REPORT_INTERVAL_SECS: "${RPKI_RTR_RUNTIME_REPORT_INTERVAL_SECS:-300}"
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HISTORY_LIMIT: "${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HISTORY_LIMIT:-10}"
RPKI_RTR_TIMEZONE: "${RPKI_RTR_TIMEZONE:-Asia/Shanghai}"
RPKI_RTR_SOURCE_REFRESH_INTERVAL_SECS: "${RPKI_RTR_SOURCE_REFRESH_INTERVAL_SECS:-60}"
RPKI_RTR_MAX_DELTA: "${RPKI_RTR_MAX_DELTA:-10}"
RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONNECTIONS: "${RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONNECTIONS:-100000}"
RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONCURRENT_HANDSHAKES: "${RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONCURRENT_HANDSHAKES:-128}"
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR: "${RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR:-}"
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN: "${RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN:-}"
RUST_LOG: "${RUST_LOG:-info}"
volumes:
- ${RPKI_RTR_CCR_HOST_DIR:-../../data}:${RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR:-/app/data}:ro
- ${RPKI_RTR_DB_HOST_DIR:-../../rtr-db}:${RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH:-/app/rtr-db}
- ${RPKI_RTR_SLURM_HOST_DIR:-../../data}:${RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR:-/app/slurm}
- ${RPKI_RTR_LOG_HOST_DIR:-../../logs/server}:/app/logs
- ${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HOST_DIR:-../../report}:${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR:-/app/report}
networks:
- rpki_net
networks:
rpki_net:
name: rpki_net
driver: bridge

View File

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
services:
rpki-rtr:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: deploy/server/Dockerfile
image: ${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr}-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-amd64}:${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}}
container_name: rpki-rtr-tls
restart: no
ports:
# - "323:323"
- "324:324"
- "8323:8323"
environment:
RPKI_RTR_ENABLE_TLS: "true"
RPKI_RTR_ENABLE_SSH: "false"
# RPKI_RTR_TCP_ADDR: "0.0.0.0:323"
RPKI_RTR_TLS_ADDR: "0.0.0.0:324"
RPKI_RTR_TLS_CERT_PATH: "${RPKI_RTR_TLS_CERT_PATH:-/app/certs/server-dns.crt}"
RPKI_RTR_TLS_KEY_PATH: "${RPKI_RTR_TLS_KEY_PATH:-/app/certs/server-dns.key}"
RPKI_RTR_TLS_CLIENT_CA_PATH: "${RPKI_RTR_TLS_CLIENT_CA_PATH:-/app/certs/client-ca.crt}"
RPKI_RTR_ENFORCE_TLS_CLIENT_SAN_IP_MATCH: "${RPKI_RTR_ENFORCE_TLS_CLIENT_SAN_IP_MATCH:-false}"
RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH: "${RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH:-/app/rtr-db}"
RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR: "${RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR:-/app/data}"
RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR: "${RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR:-/app/slurm}"
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR: "${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR:-/app/report}"
RPKI_RTR_RUNTIME_REPORT_INTERVAL_SECS: "${RPKI_RTR_RUNTIME_REPORT_INTERVAL_SECS:-300}"
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HISTORY_LIMIT: "${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HISTORY_LIMIT:-10}"
RPKI_RTR_TIMEZONE: "${RPKI_RTR_TIMEZONE:-Asia/Shanghai}"
RPKI_RTR_SOURCE_REFRESH_INTERVAL_SECS: "${RPKI_RTR_SOURCE_REFRESH_INTERVAL_SECS:-300}"
RPKI_RTR_MAX_DELTA: "${RPKI_RTR_MAX_DELTA:-10}"
RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONCURRENT_HANDSHAKES: "${RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONCURRENT_HANDSHAKES:-128}"
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR: "${RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR:-}"
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN: "${RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN:-}"
RUST_LOG: "${RUST_LOG:-info}"
volumes:
- ${RPKI_RTR_CCR_HOST_DIR:-../../data}:${RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR:-/app/data}:ro
- ${RPKI_RTR_DB_HOST_DIR:-../../rtr-db}:${RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH:-/app/rtr-db}
- ${RPKI_RTR_SLURM_HOST_DIR:-../../data}:${RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR:-/app/slurm}
- ${RPKI_RTR_TLS_CERTS_HOST_DIR:-../../certs/tls}:/app/certs:ro
- ${RPKI_RTR_LOG_HOST_DIR:-../../logs/server}:/app/logs
- ${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HOST_DIR:-../../report}:${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR:-/app/report}
networks:
- rpki_net
networks:
rpki_net:
name: rpki_net
driver: bridge

View File

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
version: "3.9"
services:
rpki-rtr:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: deploy/server/Dockerfile
image: ${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_BASE:-rpki-rtr}-${RPKI_RTR_IMAGE_ARCH:-amd64}:${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}}
container_name: rpki-rtr
restart: no
ports:
- "323:323"
- "324:324"
- "8323:8323"
# SSH mode example:
# - "22:22"
environment:
RPKI_RTR_ENABLE_TLS: "false"
RPKI_RTR_TCP_ADDR: "0.0.0.0:323"
RPKI_RTR_TLS_ADDR: "0.0.0.0:324"
RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH: "${RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH:-/app/rtr-db}"
RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR: "${RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR:-/app/data}"
RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR: "${RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR:-/app/slurm}"
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR: "${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR:-/app/report}"
RPKI_RTR_RUNTIME_REPORT_INTERVAL_SECS: "${RPKI_RTR_RUNTIME_REPORT_INTERVAL_SECS:-300}"
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HISTORY_LIMIT: "${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HISTORY_LIMIT:-10}"
RPKI_RTR_TIMEZONE: "${RPKI_RTR_TIMEZONE:-Asia/Shanghai}"
RPKI_RTR_SOURCE_REFRESH_INTERVAL_SECS: "${RPKI_RTR_SOURCE_REFRESH_INTERVAL_SECS:-300}"
RPKI_RTR_MAX_DELTA: "${RPKI_RTR_MAX_DELTA:-10}"
RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONCURRENT_HANDSHAKES: "${RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONCURRENT_HANDSHAKES:-128}"
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR: "${RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR:-}"
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN: "${RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN:-}"
RUST_LOG: "${RUST_LOG:-info}"
# SSH mode example:
# RPKI_RTR_ENABLE_SSH: "true"
# RPKI_RTR_SSH_ADDR: "0.0.0.0:22"
# RPKI_RTR_SSH_PORT: "22"
# RPKI_RTR_SSH_HOST_KEY_PATH: "/app/certs/ssh_host_rsa_key"
# RPKI_RTR_SSH_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_PATH: "/app/certs/rtr-authorized_keys"
# RPKI_RTR_SSH_USERNAME: "rpki-rtr"
# RPKI_RTR_SSH_SUBSYSTEM_NAME: "rpki-rtr"
# Optional: enable password auth in addition to publickey
# RPKI_RTR_SSH_PASSWORD: "test-password"
volumes:
- ${RPKI_RTR_CCR_HOST_DIR:-../../data}:${RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR:-/app/data}:ro
- ${RPKI_RTR_DB_HOST_DIR:-../../rtr-db}:${RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH:-/app/rtr-db}
- ${RPKI_RTR_SLURM_HOST_DIR:-../../data}:${RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR:-/app/slurm}
- ${RPKI_RTR_LOG_HOST_DIR:-../../logs/server}:/app/logs
- ${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HOST_DIR:-../../report}:${RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR:-/app/report}
# TLS mode example:
# - ../../certs/ssh:/app/certs:ro
networks:
- rpki_net
networks:
rpki_net:
name: rpki_net
driver: bridge

View File

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
mkdir -p /app/logs
log_name="${HOSTNAME:-rpki-rtr}"
stdout_log="/app/logs/${log_name}.stdout.log"
stderr_log="/app/logs/${log_name}.stderr.log"
exec /usr/local/bin/rpki_rtr "$@" >>"$stdout_log" 2>>"$stderr_log"

View File

@@ -1,310 +0,0 @@
# RTR Admin API
本文档描述 RTR server 当前提供的 HTTP 管理接口。
## 启用方式
Admin API 默认关闭。设置 `RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR` 后启用:
```env
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR=127.0.0.1:8323
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN=change-me
```
如果在 Docker 中需要从宿主机访问,容器内建议监听:
```env
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR=0.0.0.0:8323
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN=change-me
```
并在 compose 中映射端口:
```yaml
ports:
- "8323:8323"
```
安全规则:
- `RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR` 为空时,不启动 Admin API。
- 非 loopback 地址,例如 `0.0.0.0:8323`,必须配置 `RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN`,否则 admin server 会拒绝启动。
- 设置 token 后,请求必须带 `Authorization: Bearer <token>`。
## 通用 Headers
```http
Authorization: Bearer change-me
Content-Type: application/json
```
GET 请求不需要 `Content-Type`。
## GET /admin/rtr/health
用于检查 Admin API 是否可达,以及当前启用了哪些管理能力。
```bash
curl http://127.0.0.1:8323/admin/rtr/health \
-H "Authorization: Bearer change-me"
```
响应示例:
```json
{
"status": "ok",
"config_api": true,
"source_reload_api": true,
"slurm_api": true,
"logs_api": true
}
```
## GET /admin/rtr/logs/tail
实时读取 RTR 服务日志,效果类似 `tail -f`。默认读取 stdout 日志,先返回最近 200 行,然后持续输出新增内容。
```bash
curl -N "http://127.0.0.1:8323/admin/rtr/logs/tail?stream=stdout&lines=200&follow=true" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer change-me"
```
Query 参数:
| 参数 | 默认值 | 说明 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `stream` | `stdout` | 可选 `stdout` 或 `stderr`。 |
| `lines` | `200` | 首次返回的历史行数,范围会限制在 `1..=5000`。 |
| `follow` | `true` | `true` 时保持连接并持续输出新增日志;`false` 时只返回当前 tail 内容。 |
日志文件路径按容器 entrypoint 的规则解析:
- 目录:`RPKI_RTR_LOG_DIR`,默认 `/app/logs`。
- 文件名前缀:`RPKI_RTR_LOG_NAME`,未设置时使用 `HOSTNAME`,再未设置时为 `rpki-rtr`。
- stdout 文件:`<name>.stdout.log`。
- stderr 文件:`<name>.stderr.log`。
## GET /admin/rtr/config
查询当前运行中的 runtime 配置。
```bash
curl http://127.0.0.1:8323/admin/rtr/config \
-H "Authorization: Bearer change-me"
```
响应示例:
```json
{
"status": "ok",
"config": {
"max_delta": 10,
"prune_delta_by_snapshot_size": true,
"source_refresh_interval_seconds": 300,
"runtime_report_interval_seconds": 300,
"report_history_limit": 10,
"timezone": "Asia/Shanghai",
"timing": {
"refresh": 3600,
"retry": 600,
"expire": 7200
}
}
}
```
## POST /admin/rtr/config
运行中动态修改 RTR server 的部分 runtime 配置。请求体是 JSON object,支持部分更新,只需要传要修改的字段。
| 字段 | 类型 | 说明 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `max_delta` | integer | 每个 RTR 版本最多保留的 delta 条数,必须 `>= 1`。 |
| `prune_delta_by_snapshot_size` | boolean | 是否按 snapshot wire size 裁剪 delta window。 |
| `source_refresh_interval_seconds` | integer | CCR/SLURM source refresh 间隔,单位秒,必须 `>= 1`。 |
| `runtime_report_interval_seconds` | integer | `rtr-runtime-*.json` 周期写入间隔,单位秒,必须 `>= 1`。 |
| `report_history_limit` | integer | 每类 report 文件滚动保留数量,必须 `>= 1`。 |
| `timezone` | string | IANA 时区名,例如 `Asia/Shanghai`、`UTC`、`Europe/London`。 |
| `timing.refresh` | integer | RTR EndOfData `refresh`,单位秒。 |
| `timing.retry` | integer | RTR EndOfData `retry`,单位秒。 |
| `timing.expire` | integer | RTR EndOfData `expire`,必须大于 `refresh` 和 `retry`。 |
示例:
```bash
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8323/admin/rtr/config \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer change-me" \
-d '{"max_delta": 6}'
```
成功响应:
```json
{
"status": "ok",
"config": {
"max_delta": 6,
"prune_delta_by_snapshot_size": true,
"source_refresh_interval_seconds": 300,
"runtime_report_interval_seconds": 300,
"report_history_limit": 10,
"timezone": "Asia/Shanghai",
"timing": {
"refresh": 3600,
"retry": 600,
"expire": 7200
}
}
}
```
## GET /admin/rtr/slurm/files
列出 `RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR` 下的 SLURM 文件。只返回合法的 `*.slurm` 和 `*.slurm.disabled` 文件,不返回 `.backup/`。
```bash
curl http://127.0.0.1:8323/admin/rtr/slurm/files \
-H "Authorization: Bearer change-me"
```
响应示例:
```json
{
"status": "ok",
"files": [
{
"name": "local-policy.slurm",
"path": "/app/slurm/local-policy.slurm",
"enabled": true,
"size_bytes": 168,
"modified_unix_seconds": 1782100000
},
{
"name": "old-policy.slurm.disabled",
"path": "/app/slurm/old-policy.slurm.disabled",
"enabled": false,
"size_bytes": 168,
"modified_unix_seconds": 1782100100
}
]
}
```
## GET /admin/rtr/slurm/files/{name}
读取单个 SLURM 文件,前端编辑页面可以直接使用这个接口加载内容。
```bash
curl http://127.0.0.1:8323/admin/rtr/slurm/files/local-policy.slurm \
-H "Authorization: Bearer change-me"
```
响应示例:
```json
{
"status": "ok",
"file": {
"name": "local-policy.slurm",
"path": "/app/slurm/local-policy.slurm",
"enabled": true,
"size_bytes": 168,
"modified_unix_seconds": 1782100000,
"content": "{ \"slurmVersion\": 1, \"validationOutputFilters\": { \"prefixFilters\": [], \"bgpsecFilters\": [] }, \"locallyAddedAssertions\": { \"prefixAssertions\": [], \"bgpsecAssertions\": [] } }"
}
}
```
## POST /admin/rtr/slurm/files
新增或覆盖一个 SLURM 文件。文件名放在请求体中。
```json
{
"name": "local-policy.slurm",
"content": "{ \"slurmVersion\": 1, \"validationOutputFilters\": { \"prefixFilters\": [], \"bgpsecFilters\": [] }, \"locallyAddedAssertions\": { \"prefixAssertions\": [], \"bgpsecAssertions\": [] } }",
"reload": true
}
```
## PUT /admin/rtr/slurm/files/{name}
新增或覆盖指定 SLURM 文件。
```bash
curl -X PUT http://127.0.0.1:8323/admin/rtr/slurm/files/local-policy.slurm \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer change-me" \
-d '{
"content": "{ \"slurmVersion\": 1, \"validationOutputFilters\": { \"prefixFilters\": [], \"bgpsecFilters\": [] }, \"locallyAddedAssertions\": { \"prefixAssertions\": [], \"bgpsecAssertions\": [] } }",
"reload": true
}'
```
## DELETE /admin/rtr/slurm/files/{name}
删除指定 SLURM 文件。删除前会先备份。
```bash
curl -X DELETE "http://127.0.0.1:8323/admin/rtr/slurm/files/local-policy.slurm?reload=true" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer change-me"
```
## POST /admin/rtr/slurm/files/{name}/disable
将启用文件改名为失效文件:
```text
local-policy.slurm -> local-policy.slurm.disabled
```
```bash
curl -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8323/admin/rtr/slurm/files/local-policy.slurm/disable?reload=true" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer change-me"
```
## POST /admin/rtr/slurm/files/{name}/enable
将失效文件改名为启用文件:
```text
local-policy.slurm.disabled -> local-policy.slurm
```
```bash
curl -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8323/admin/rtr/slurm/files/local-policy.slurm.disabled/enable?reload=true" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer change-me"
```
## POST /admin/rtr/slurm/reload
不修改文件,只立即触发一次 CCR/SLURM source reload。
```bash
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8323/admin/rtr/slurm/reload \
-H "Authorization: Bearer change-me"
```
## SLURM 文件规则
- `*.slurm`:启用,会被 source refresh 加载。
- `*.slurm.disabled`:失效,不会被加载。
- `.backup/`:接口自动生成的备份目录。
- 文件名只能是 basename,不能包含 `/`、`\` 或 `..`。
- 文件名只能包含 ASCII 字母、数字、`.`、`_`、`-`。
- 写入内容必须是合法 JSON,并且能被解析为合法 SLURM 文件。
- 单个请求体默认限制为 5 MiB。
- 覆盖、删除前会写入 `.backup/` 备份。
## 错误响应
| HTTP 状态码 | 含义 |
| --- | --- |
| `400 Bad Request` | JSON 非法、配置值非法、SLURM 文件名非法、目标文件不存在、reload 失败等。 |
| `401 Unauthorized` | 配置了 token,但请求缺少或使用了错误的 `Authorization`。 |
| `404 Not Found` | 路径或方法不支持。 |
| `413 Payload Too Large` | 请求体超过限制。 |

2734
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@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT_DIR="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
IMAGE_DIR="${ROOT_DIR}/images"
SERVER_ENV_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server/.env"
CONSOLE_ENV_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/console/.env"
SERVER_TAR="${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_TAR:-}"
CLIENT_TAR="${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_TAR:-}"
CONSOLE_TAR="${RPKI_RTR_CONSOLE_IMAGE_TAR:-}"
usage() {
cat <<'EOF'
Usage: scripts/00_0_install.sh [options]
Load offline Docker image tarballs from ./images, then run scripts/00_1_pre_check.sh.
Options:
--server-tar FILE Server image tarball. Env: RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE_TAR
--client-tar FILE Debug client image tarball. Env: RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE_TAR
--console-tar FILE Console image tarball. Env: RPKI_RTR_CONSOLE_IMAGE_TAR
-h, --help Show this help.
Default tarballs under ./images:
server: rpki-rtr-*.tar, excluding rpki-rtr-debug-client-*.tar
client: rpki-rtr-debug-client-*.tar
console: rpki-console-ui-*.tar
EOF
}
log() {
printf '[00_install] %s\n' "$*" >&2
}
stage() {
printf '\n====== %s ======\n' "$*" >&2
}
die() {
printf '[00_install] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2
exit 1
}
set_env_var() {
local env_file="$1"
local key="$2"
local value="$3"
local tmp_file
[ -f "${env_file}" ] || die "env file not found: ${env_file}"
tmp_file="${env_file}.tmp.$$"
awk -v key="${key}" -v value="${value}" '
BEGIN { done = 0 }
$0 ~ "^[[:space:]]*#?[[:space:]]*" key "=" {
if (!done) {
print key "=" value
done = 1
}
next
}
{ print }
END {
if (!done) {
print key "=" value
}
}
' "${env_file}" >"${tmp_file}"
mv "${tmp_file}" "${env_file}"
}
while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--server-tar)
[ "$#" -ge 2 ] || die "--server-tar requires a value"
SERVER_TAR="$2"
shift 2
;;
--client-tar)
[ "$#" -ge 2 ] || die "--client-tar requires a value"
CLIENT_TAR="$2"
shift 2
;;
--console-tar)
[ "$#" -ge 2 ] || die "--console-tar requires a value"
CONSOLE_TAR="$2"
shift 2
;;
-h|--help)
usage
exit 0
;;
*)
die "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
resolve_tar() {
local path="$1"
if [ -f "${path}" ]; then
cd "$(dirname "${path}")" && printf '%s/%s\n' "$(pwd -P)" "$(basename "${path}")"
return 0
fi
if [ -f "${ROOT_DIR}/${path}" ]; then
cd "$(dirname "${ROOT_DIR}/${path}")" && printf '%s/%s\n' "$(pwd -P)" "$(basename "${path}")"
return 0
fi
return 1
}
load_image() {
local label="$1"
local tar_path="$2"
local output image
[ -f "${tar_path}" ] || die "${label} image tarball not found: ${tar_path}"
output="$(docker load -i "${tar_path}" 2>&1)" || {
printf '%s\n' "${output}" >&2
die "failed to load ${label} image from ${tar_path}"
}
printf '%s\n' "${output}" >&2
image="$(printf '%s\n' "${output}" | sed -n 's/^Loaded image: //p' | tail -n 1)"
[ -n "${image}" ] || die "cannot determine ${label} image name from docker load output"
printf '%s\n' "${image}"
}
find_single_tar() {
local label="$1"
local include_pattern="$2"
local exclude_pattern="${3:-}"
local matches=()
local file
while IFS= read -r -d '' file; do
matches+=("${file}")
done < <(
if [ -n "${exclude_pattern}" ]; then
find "${IMAGE_DIR}" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name "${include_pattern}" ! -name "${exclude_pattern}" -print0 | sort -z
else
find "${IMAGE_DIR}" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name "${include_pattern}" -print0 | sort -z
fi
)
case "${#matches[@]}" in
0)
die "no ${label} image tarball found under ${IMAGE_DIR} matching ${include_pattern}"
;;
1)
printf '%s\n' "${matches[0]}"
;;
*)
printf '[00_install] ERROR: multiple %s image tarballs found:\n' "${label}" >&2
printf ' %s\n' "${matches[@]}" >&2
die "please specify --${label}-tar or RPKI_RTR_${label^^}_IMAGE_TAR"
;;
esac
}
stage "Checking Docker"
command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "docker command not found"
[ -d "${IMAGE_DIR}" ] || die "image directory not found: ${IMAGE_DIR}"
[ -f "${SERVER_ENV_FILE}" ] || die "server env file not found: ${SERVER_ENV_FILE}"
if [ -n "${SERVER_TAR}" ]; then
SERVER_TAR="$(resolve_tar "${SERVER_TAR}")" || die "server image tarball not found: ${SERVER_TAR}"
else
SERVER_TAR="$(find_single_tar server 'rpki-rtr-*.tar' 'rpki-rtr-debug-client-*.tar')"
fi
if [ -n "${CLIENT_TAR}" ]; then
CLIENT_TAR="$(resolve_tar "${CLIENT_TAR}")" || die "client image tarball not found: ${CLIENT_TAR}"
else
CLIENT_TAR="$(find_single_tar client 'rpki-rtr-debug-client-*.tar')"
fi
if [ -n "${CONSOLE_TAR}" ]; then
CONSOLE_TAR="$(resolve_tar "${CONSOLE_TAR}")" || die "console image tarball not found: ${CONSOLE_TAR}"
else
CONSOLE_TAR="$(find_single_tar console 'rpki-console-ui-*.tar')"
fi
stage "Loading Docker Images"
SERVER_IMAGE="$(load_image server "${SERVER_TAR}")"
CLIENT_IMAGE="$(load_image client "${CLIENT_TAR}")"
CONSOLE_IMAGE="$(load_image console "${CONSOLE_TAR}")"
stage "Updating Deploy Env"
set_env_var "${SERVER_ENV_FILE}" RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE "${SERVER_IMAGE}"
set_env_var "${CONSOLE_ENV_FILE}" RPKI_CONSOLE_UI_IMAGE "${CONSOLE_IMAGE}"
stage "Running Pre-Check"
RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE="${SERVER_IMAGE}" \
RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE="${CLIENT_IMAGE}" \
bash "${SCRIPT_DIR}/00_1_pre_check.sh" || die "pre-check failed"
stage "Install Finished"

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@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT_DIR="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
PRECHECK_WORK_DIR="${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR:-${ROOT_DIR}/.precheck}"
PRECHECK_ENV_FILE="${PRECHECK_ENV_FILE:-${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}/precheck.env}"
PRECHECK_WAIT_SECS="${PRECHECK_WAIT_SECS:-60}"
KEEP_PRECHECK="${KEEP_PRECHECK:-0}"
log() {
printf '[00_1_pre_check] %s\n' "$*"
}
stage() {
printf '\n====== %s ======\n' "$*"
}
die() {
printf '[00_1_pre_check] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2
exit 1
}
command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "docker command not found"
if docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker compose)
elif command -v docker-compose >/dev/null 2>&1 && docker-compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker-compose)
else
die "docker compose is not available"
fi
stage "Preparing Pre-Check Data"
bash "${SCRIPT_DIR}/00_2_pre_check_prepare.sh" || die "prepare step failed"
set -a
# shellcheck disable=SC1090
. "${PRECHECK_ENV_FILE}"
set +a
ADMIN_PORT="${RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR##*:}"
ADMIN_TOKEN="${RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN}"
server_compose() {
"${COMPOSE_BIN[@]}" --env-file "${PRECHECK_ENV_FILE}" -p "${PRECHECK_PROJECT}" -f "${PRECHECK_SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE}" "$@"
}
client_compose() {
"${COMPOSE_BIN[@]}" --env-file "${PRECHECK_ENV_FILE}" -p "${PRECHECK_PROJECT}" -f "${PRECHECK_CLIENT_COMPOSE_FILE}" "$@"
}
cleanup() {
KEEP_PRECHECK="${KEEP_PRECHECK}" PRECHECK_WORK_DIR="${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}" PRECHECK_ENV_FILE="${PRECHECK_ENV_FILE}" \
bash "${SCRIPT_DIR}/00_3_pre_check_cleanup.sh"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
http_get() {
local host="$1"
local port="$2"
local path="$3"
local token="$4"
exec 3<>"/dev/tcp/${host}/${port}" || return 1
printf 'GET %s HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: %s:%s\r\nAuthorization: Bearer %s\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n' \
"${path}" "${host}" "${port}" "${token}" >&3
cat <&3
exec 3>&-
}
wait_for_admin_health() {
local deadline=$((SECONDS + PRECHECK_WAIT_SECS))
local response
log "waiting for server health"
while [ "${SECONDS}" -lt "${deadline}" ]; do
response="$(http_get 127.0.0.1 "${ADMIN_PORT}" /admin/rtr/health "${ADMIN_TOKEN}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
if printf '%s' "${response}" | grep -q '"status"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"ok"'; then
log "admin health check passed"
return 0
fi
if [ "$(server_compose ps -q rpki-rtr | wc -l | tr -d ' ')" = "0" ]; then
server_compose logs rpki-rtr || true
die "server container is not running"
fi
sleep 1
done
server_compose logs rpki-rtr || true
die "admin health check did not pass within ${PRECHECK_WAIT_SECS}s"
}
wait_for_client_eod() {
local deadline=$((SECONDS + PRECHECK_WAIT_SECS))
local log_file
log "waiting for client response"
while [ "${SECONDS}" -lt "${deadline}" ]; do
for log_file in "${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}"/logs/client/*.stdout.log; do
[ -f "${log_file}" ] || continue
if grep -q 'EndOfData:' "${log_file}" && grep -q 'summary[[:space:]]*:' "${log_file}"; then
log "client received EndOfData and payload summary"
return 0
fi
if grep -qi 'Error Report' "${log_file}"; then
cat "${log_file}" >&2
die "client received RTR Error Report"
fi
done
sleep 1
done
find "${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}/logs/client" -type f -maxdepth 1 -print -exec cat {} \; >&2 || true
die "client did not receive EndOfData and summary within ${PRECHECK_WAIT_SECS}s"
}
assert_no_error_logs() {
local bad
log "checking logs"
bad="$(find "${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}/logs" -type f -name '*.log' -print0 \
| xargs -0 grep -Ein 'panic|failed|RTR admin config server exited|Error Report' 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -n "${bad}" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "${bad}" >&2
die "error pattern found in pre-check logs"
fi
}
assert_report_written() {
local deadline=$((SECONDS + PRECHECK_WAIT_SECS))
log "waiting for source report"
while [ "${SECONDS}" -lt "${deadline}" ]; do
if find "${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}/report" -type f -name 'rtr-source-*.json' | grep -q .; then
log "source report written"
return 0
fi
sleep 1
done
die "server did not write rtr-source report within ${PRECHECK_WAIT_SECS}s"
}
stage "Starting RTR Server"
server_compose up -d --no-build rpki-rtr
wait_for_admin_health
assert_report_written
stage "Starting Debug Client"
client_compose up -d --no-build rtr-debug-client
wait_for_client_eod
assert_no_error_logs
stage "Pre-Check Passed"

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@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
OUT_PATH="${1:-}"
usage() {
cat <<'EOF'
Usage: scripts/00_2_generate_ccr.sh OUT.ccr
Generate a small deterministic CCR snapshot for pre-check.
This script writes a fixed base64-encoded CCR fixture and does not require Python.
The generated snapshot contains:
- VRP: 10.0.0.0/24 maxLen 24 AS65001
- VRP: 10.0.1.0/24 maxLen 24 AS65003
- VRP: 2001:db8:1::/48 maxLen 48 AS65002
- ASPA: customer AS65010 providers AS65011, AS65012, AS65013
- ASPA: customer AS65020 provider AS65021
EOF
}
die() {
printf '[00_2_generate_ccr] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2
exit 1
}
if [ "${OUT_PATH}" = "-h" ] || [ "${OUT_PATH}" = "--help" ]; then
usage
exit 0
fi
[ -n "${OUT_PATH}" ] || die "missing OUT.ccr"
mkdir -p "$(dirname "${OUT_PATH}")"
decode_base64() {
if command -v base64 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
base64 -d
return
fi
if command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
openssl base64 -d
return
fi
die "base64 or openssl command is required to write CCR fixture"
}
cat <<'EOF' | decode_base64 >"${OUT_PATH}"
MIIBAwYLKoZIhvcNAQkQATaggfMwgfACAQAwDQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBQAYDzIwMjYwNDAzMDAwMjAx
WqJ9MHswVzAaAgMA/ekwEzARBAIAATALMAkDBAAKAAACARgwGgIDAP3rMBMwEQQCAAEwCzAJAwQA
CgABAgEYMB0CAwD96jAWMBQEAgACMA4wDAMHACABDbgAAQIBMAQgsUgCHfy5AJcFp5RymOD0HuGO
wfhoWpll90ugYECGQPSjTDBKMCYwFgIDAP3yMA8CAwD98wIDAP30AgMA/fUwDAIDAP38MAUCAwD9
/QQgRPxVPOOUsUuuV4tZ8BG5PHNtKiaEr23Ird+yNxlWJ+w=
EOF

View File

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT_DIR="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
PRECHECK_WORK_DIR="${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR:-${ROOT_DIR}/.precheck}"
PRECHECK_PROJECT="${PRECHECK_PROJECT:-rpki-precheck}"
PRECHECK_ADMIN_TOKEN="${PRECHECK_ADMIN_TOKEN:-rpki-precheck-token}"
PRECHECK_PROTOCOL_VERSION="${PRECHECK_PROTOCOL_VERSION:-2}"
PRECHECK_SERVER_IMAGE="${PRECHECK_SERVER_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE:-rpki-rtr-arm64:v1.2}}"
PRECHECK_CLIENT_IMAGE="${PRECHECK_CLIENT_IMAGE:-${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE:-rpki-rtr-debug-client-arm64:v1.2}}"
log() {
printf '[00_1_pre_check_prepare] %s\n' "$*"
}
die() {
printf '[00_1_pre_check_prepare] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2
exit 1
}
abs_dir() {
local path="$1"
mkdir -p "${path}"
cd "${path}" && pwd -P
}
[ -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/00_2_generate_ccr.sh" ] || die "missing ${SCRIPT_DIR}/00_2_generate_ccr.sh"
rm -rf "${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}"
mkdir -p \
"${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}/ccr" \
"${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}/slurm" \
"${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}/db" \
"${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}/logs/server" \
"${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}/logs/client" \
"${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}/report"
bash "${SCRIPT_DIR}/00_2_generate_ccr.sh" \
"${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}/ccr/20260403T000201Z-precheck.ccr"
cat >"${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}/slurm/precheck.slurm" <<'EOF'
{
"slurmVersion": 2,
"validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [],
"bgpsecFilters": [],
"aspaFilters": []
},
"locallyAddedAssertions": {
"prefixAssertions": [
{
"prefix": "203.0.113.0/24",
"maxPrefixLength": 24,
"asn": 64496,
"comment": "pre-check local assertion"
}
],
"bgpsecAssertions": [],
"aspaAssertions": []
}
}
EOF
PRECHECK_WORK_DIR_ABS="$(abs_dir "${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}")"
cat >"${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}/precheck.env" <<EOF
PRECHECK_WORK_DIR=${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR_ABS}
PRECHECK_PROJECT=${PRECHECK_PROJECT}
RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE=${PRECHECK_SERVER_IMAGE}
RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_IMAGE=${PRECHECK_CLIENT_IMAGE}
PRECHECK_SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE=${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server/docker-compose.tcp.yml
PRECHECK_CLIENT_COMPOSE_FILE=${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/client/docker-compose.tcp.yml
RPKI_RTR_CCR_HOST_DIR=${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR_ABS}/ccr
RPKI_RTR_SLURM_HOST_DIR=${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR_ABS}/slurm
RPKI_RTR_DB_HOST_DIR=${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR_ABS}/db
RPKI_RTR_LOG_HOST_DIR=${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR_ABS}/logs/server
RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_LOG_HOST_DIR=${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR_ABS}/logs/client
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HOST_DIR=${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR_ABS}/report
RPKI_RTR_CCR_DIR=/app/data
RPKI_RTR_SLURM_DIR=/app/slurm
RPKI_RTR_DB_PATH=/app/rtr-db
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_DIR=/app/report
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR=0.0.0.0:8323
RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN=${PRECHECK_ADMIN_TOKEN}
RPKI_RTR_RUNTIME_REPORT_INTERVAL_SECS=5
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HISTORY_LIMIT=3
RPKI_RTR_TIMEZONE=Asia/Shanghai
RPKI_RTR_SOURCE_REFRESH_INTERVAL_SECS=30
RPKI_RTR_MAX_DELTA=10
RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONNECTIONS=32
RPKI_RTR_MAX_CONCURRENT_HANDSHAKES=8
RPKI_RTR_TCP_SERVER_ADDR=rpki-rtr:323
RPKI_RTR_PROTOCOL_VERSION=${PRECHECK_PROTOCOL_VERSION}
RUST_LOG=info
EOF

View File

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT_DIR="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
PRECHECK_WORK_DIR="${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR:-${ROOT_DIR}/.precheck}"
ENV_FILE="${PRECHECK_ENV_FILE:-${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}/precheck.env}"
KEEP_PRECHECK="${KEEP_PRECHECK:-0}"
if [ -f "${ENV_FILE}" ]; then
set -a
# shellcheck disable=SC1090
. "${ENV_FILE}"
set +a
fi
PRECHECK_PROJECT="${PRECHECK_PROJECT:-rpki-precheck}"
PRECHECK_SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE="${PRECHECK_SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE:-${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server/docker-compose.tcp.yml}"
PRECHECK_CLIENT_COMPOSE_FILE="${PRECHECK_CLIENT_COMPOSE_FILE:-${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/client/docker-compose.tcp.yml}"
COMPOSE_BIN=()
log() {
printf '[00_1_pre_check_cleanup] %s\n' "$*"
}
compose_run() {
local compose_file="$1"
shift
if [ "${#COMPOSE_BIN[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
if docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker compose)
elif command -v docker-compose >/dev/null 2>&1 && docker-compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker-compose)
else
return 0
fi
fi
"${COMPOSE_BIN[@]}" --env-file "${ENV_FILE}" -p "${PRECHECK_PROJECT}" -f "${compose_file}" "$@"
}
if command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then
log "stopping pre-check client compose stack"
[ -f "${PRECHECK_CLIENT_COMPOSE_FILE}" ] && compose_run "${PRECHECK_CLIENT_COMPOSE_FILE}" down --remove-orphans >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
log "stopping pre-check server compose stack"
[ -f "${PRECHECK_SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE}" ] && compose_run "${PRECHECK_SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE}" down --remove-orphans >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
if [ "${KEEP_PRECHECK}" = "1" ]; then
log "KEEP_PRECHECK=1, preserving ${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}"
else
rm -rf "${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}"
log "removed ${PRECHECK_WORK_DIR}"
fi

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@@ -1,221 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT_DIR="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
COMMON_ENV_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/environment.server"
SERVER_ENV_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server/.env"
CONSOLE_ENV_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/console/.env"
CONSOLE_COMPOSE_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/console/docker-compose.yml"
MODE="${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_MODE:-tcp}"
COMPOSE_PROJECT="${RPKI_RTR_COMPOSE_PROJECT:-rpki-rtr}"
CONSOLE_COMPOSE_PROJECT="${RPKI_CONSOLE_COMPOSE_PROJECT:-rpki-console}"
WAIT_SECS="${RPKI_START_WAIT_SECS:-20}"
usage() {
cat <<'EOF'
Usage: scripts/01_start.sh [options]
Read root ./environment.server, update deploy/server/.env, then start the RTR server and console.
Options:
--env FILE Common env file. Default: ./environment.server
--mode MODE Server mode: tcp|tls|ssh|base. Default: tcp
--wait SECS Wait timeout for container running checks. Default: 20
-h, --help Show this help.
EOF
}
log() {
printf '[01_start] %s\n' "$*" >&2
}
stage() {
printf '\n====== %s ======\n' "$*" >&2
}
die() {
printf '[01_start] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2
exit 1
}
set_env_var() {
local env_file="$1"
local key="$2"
local value="$3"
local tmp_file
tmp_file="${env_file}.tmp.$$"
awk -v key="${key}" -v value="${value}" '
BEGIN { done = 0 }
$0 ~ "^[[:space:]]*#?[[:space:]]*" key "=" {
if (!done) {
print key "=" value
done = 1
}
next
}
{ print }
END {
if (!done) {
print key "=" value
}
}
' "${env_file}" >"${tmp_file}"
mv "${tmp_file}" "${env_file}"
}
compose_file_for_mode() {
case "$1" in
tcp) printf '%s\n' "${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server/docker-compose.tcp.yml" ;;
tls) printf '%s\n' "${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server/docker-compose.tls.yml" ;;
ssh) printf '%s\n' "${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server/docker-compose.ssh.yml" ;;
base) printf '%s\n' "${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server/docker-compose.yml" ;;
*) die "unsupported mode '$1', expected tcp|tls|ssh|base" ;;
esac
}
update_env_from_common() {
local target_env_file="$1"
local updated_count=0
local line key value
while IFS= read -r line || [ -n "${line}" ]; do
case "${line}" in
''|\#*) continue ;;
*=*)
key="${line%%=*}"
value="${line#*=}"
set_env_var "${target_env_file}" "${key}" "${value}"
updated_count=$((updated_count + 1))
;;
esac
done <"${COMMON_ENV_FILE}"
printf '%s\n' "${updated_count}"
}
server_compose() {
"${COMPOSE_BIN[@]}" --env-file "${SERVER_ENV_FILE}" -p "${COMPOSE_PROJECT}" -f "${SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE}" "$@"
}
console_compose() {
"${COMPOSE_BIN[@]}" --env-file "${CONSOLE_ENV_FILE}" -p "${CONSOLE_COMPOSE_PROJECT}" -f "${CONSOLE_COMPOSE_FILE}" "$@"
}
container_running() {
local compose_kind="$1"
local service="$2"
local cid state
if [ "${compose_kind}" = "server" ]; then
cid="$(server_compose ps -q "${service}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
else
cid="$(console_compose ps -q "${service}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
fi
[ -n "${cid}" ] || return 1
state="$(docker inspect -f '{{.State.Running}}' "${cid}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ "${state}" = "true" ]
}
show_service_debug() {
local compose_kind="$1"
local service="$2"
log "${service} is not running, current compose status:"
if [ "${compose_kind}" = "server" ]; then
server_compose ps "${service}" >&2 || true
log "${service} recent logs:"
server_compose logs --tail=80 "${service}" >&2 || true
else
console_compose ps "${service}" >&2 || true
log "${service} recent logs:"
console_compose logs --tail=80 "${service}" >&2 || true
fi
}
wait_for_running() {
local compose_kind="$1"
local service="$2"
local deadline=$((SECONDS + WAIT_SECS))
while [ "${SECONDS}" -lt "${deadline}" ]; do
if container_running "${compose_kind}" "${service}"; then
log "${service} is running"
return 0
fi
sleep 1
done
show_service_debug "${compose_kind}" "${service}"
die "${service} failed to reach running state after ${WAIT_SECS}s"
}
while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--env)
[ "$#" -ge 2 ] || die "--env requires a value"
COMMON_ENV_FILE="$2"
shift 2
;;
--mode)
[ "$#" -ge 2 ] || die "--mode requires a value"
MODE="$2"
shift 2
;;
--wait)
[ "$#" -ge 2 ] || die "--wait requires a value"
WAIT_SECS="$2"
shift 2
;;
-h|--help)
usage
exit 0
;;
*)
die "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE="$(compose_file_for_mode "${MODE}")"
stage "Checking Docker"
command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "docker command not found"
if docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker compose)
elif command -v docker-compose >/dev/null 2>&1 && docker-compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker-compose)
else
die "docker compose is not available"
fi
[ -f "${SERVER_ENV_FILE}" ] || die "server env file not found: ${SERVER_ENV_FILE}"
[ -f "${SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE}" ] || die "server compose file not found: ${SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE}"
[ -f "${CONSOLE_ENV_FILE}" ] || die "console env file not found: ${CONSOLE_ENV_FILE}"
[ -f "${CONSOLE_COMPOSE_FILE}" ] || die "console compose file not found: ${CONSOLE_COMPOSE_FILE}"
if [ -f "${COMMON_ENV_FILE}" ]; then
stage "Reading Environment"
server_updated_count="$(update_env_from_common "${SERVER_ENV_FILE}")"
log "updated ${server_updated_count} server env variable(s)"
else
stage "Reading Environment"
log "environment.server file not found, skip env update"
fi
stage "Starting RTR Server"
log "starting docker compose service: rpki-rtr"
server_compose up -d --no-build rpki-rtr
log "waiting for rpki-rtr to be running"
wait_for_running server rpki-rtr
stage "Starting Console"
log "starting docker compose service: rpki-console-ui"
console_compose up -d --no-build rpki-console-ui
log "waiting for rpki-console-ui to be running"
wait_for_running console rpki-console-ui
stage "Start Finished"

View File

@@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT_DIR="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
SERVER_ENV_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server/.env"
CONSOLE_ENV_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/console/.env"
SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server/docker-compose.tcp.yml"
CONSOLE_COMPOSE_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/console/docker-compose.yml"
SERVER_PROJECT="${RPKI_RTR_COMPOSE_PROJECT:-rpki-rtr}"
CONSOLE_PROJECT="${RPKI_CONSOLE_COMPOSE_PROJECT:-rpki-console}"
WAIT_SECS="${RPKI_SELF_CHECK_WAIT_SECS:-60}"
usage() {
cat <<'EOF'
Usage: scripts/02_self_check.sh [options]
Check whether the RTR server and console started by scripts/01_start.sh are healthy.
Options:
--wait SECS Wait timeout for each check. Default: 60
-h, --help Show this help.
EOF
}
log() {
printf '[02_self_check] %s\n' "$*" >&2
}
stage() {
printf '\n====== %s ======\n' "$*" >&2
}
die() {
printf '[02_self_check] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2
exit 1
}
while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--wait)
[ "$#" -ge 2 ] || die "--wait requires a value"
WAIT_SECS="$2"
shift 2
;;
-h|--help)
usage
exit 0
;;
*)
die "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "docker command not found"
if docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker compose)
elif command -v docker-compose >/dev/null 2>&1 && docker-compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker-compose)
else
die "docker compose is not available"
fi
[ -f "${SERVER_ENV_FILE}" ] || die "server env file not found: ${SERVER_ENV_FILE}"
[ -f "${SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE}" ] || die "server compose file not found: ${SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE}"
[ -f "${CONSOLE_ENV_FILE}" ] || die "console env file not found: ${CONSOLE_ENV_FILE}"
[ -f "${CONSOLE_COMPOSE_FILE}" ] || die "console compose file not found: ${CONSOLE_COMPOSE_FILE}"
set -a
# shellcheck disable=SC1090
. "${SERVER_ENV_FILE}"
# shellcheck disable=SC1090
. "${CONSOLE_ENV_FILE}"
set +a
RTR_PORT="${RPKI_RTR_TCP_HOST_PORT:-323}"
ADMIN_PORT="${RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_ADDR##*:}"
ADMIN_PORT="${ADMIN_PORT:-8323}"
ADMIN_TOKEN="${RPKI_RTR_ADMIN_TOKEN:-}"
CONSOLE_PORT="${RPKI_CONSOLE_UI_PORT:-5173}"
server_compose() {
"${COMPOSE_BIN[@]}" --env-file "${SERVER_ENV_FILE}" -p "${SERVER_PROJECT}" -f "${SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE}" "$@"
}
console_compose() {
"${COMPOSE_BIN[@]}" --env-file "${CONSOLE_ENV_FILE}" -p "${CONSOLE_PROJECT}" -f "${CONSOLE_COMPOSE_FILE}" "$@"
}
container_running() {
local compose_kind="$1"
local service="$2"
local cid state
if [ "${compose_kind}" = "server" ]; then
cid="$(server_compose ps -q "${service}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
else
cid="$(console_compose ps -q "${service}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
fi
[ -n "${cid}" ] || return 1
state="$(docker inspect -f '{{.State.Running}}' "${cid}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ "${state}" = "true" ]
}
tcp_open() {
local host="$1"
local port="$2"
if command -v nc >/dev/null 2>&1; then
nc -z "${host}" "${port}" >/dev/null 2>&1
return
fi
(exec 3<>"/dev/tcp/${host}/${port}") >/dev/null 2>&1
}
http_get() {
local url="$1"
local token="${2:-}"
if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if [ -n "${token}" ]; then
curl -fsS -H "Authorization: Bearer ${token}" "${url}"
else
curl -fsS "${url}"
fi
return
fi
die "curl command is required for HTTP health checks"
}
wait_until() {
local label="$1"
shift
local deadline=$((SECONDS + WAIT_SECS))
while [ "${SECONDS}" -lt "${deadline}" ]; do
if "$@"; then
log "${label}: ok"
return 0
fi
sleep 1
done
die "${label}: failed after ${WAIT_SECS}s"
}
show_command() {
printf '[02_self_check] check command: %s\n' "$*" >&2
}
check_admin_health() {
local body
body="$(http_get "http://127.0.0.1:${ADMIN_PORT}/admin/rtr/health" "${ADMIN_TOKEN}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
printf '%s' "${body}" | grep -q '"status"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"ok"'
}
check_console_http() {
http_get "http://127.0.0.1:${CONSOLE_PORT}/" >/dev/null 2>&1
}
stage "Checking Containers"
show_command "${COMPOSE_BIN[*]} --env-file ${SERVER_ENV_FILE} -p ${SERVER_PROJECT} -f ${SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE} ps -q rpki-rtr && docker inspect"
wait_until "server container" container_running server rpki-rtr
show_command "${COMPOSE_BIN[*]} --env-file ${CONSOLE_ENV_FILE} -p ${CONSOLE_PROJECT} -f ${CONSOLE_COMPOSE_FILE} ps -q rpki-console-ui && docker inspect"
wait_until "console container" container_running console rpki-console-ui
stage "Checking Server"
show_command "tcp connect 127.0.0.1:${RTR_PORT}"
wait_until "RTR port ${RTR_PORT}" tcp_open 127.0.0.1 "${RTR_PORT}"
show_command "curl -fsS -H 'Authorization: Bearer <token>' http://127.0.0.1:${ADMIN_PORT}/admin/rtr/health"
wait_until "Admin health" check_admin_health
stage "Checking Console"
show_command "tcp connect 127.0.0.1:${CONSOLE_PORT}"
wait_until "Console port ${CONSOLE_PORT}" tcp_open 127.0.0.1 "${CONSOLE_PORT}"
show_command "curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:${CONSOLE_PORT}/"
wait_until "Console HTTP" check_console_http
stage "Self-Check Passed"

View File

@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT_DIR="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
SERVER_ENV_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server/.env"
CONSOLE_ENV_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/console/.env"
MODE="${RPKI_RTR_SERVER_MODE:-tcp}"
SERVER_PROJECT="${RPKI_RTR_COMPOSE_PROJECT:-rpki-rtr}"
CONSOLE_PROJECT="${RPKI_CONSOLE_COMPOSE_PROJECT:-rpki-console}"
usage() {
cat <<'EOF'
Usage: scripts/03_shutdown.sh [options]
Stop services started by scripts/01_start.sh.
Options:
--mode MODE Server mode: tcp|tls|ssh|base. Default: tcp
-h, --help Show this help.
EOF
}
log() {
printf '[03_shutdown] %s\n' "$*" >&2
}
stage() {
printf '\n====== %s ======\n' "$*" >&2
}
die() {
printf '[03_shutdown] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2
exit 1
}
compose_file_for_mode() {
case "$1" in
tcp) printf '%s\n' "${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server/docker-compose.tcp.yml" ;;
tls) printf '%s\n' "${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server/docker-compose.tls.yml" ;;
ssh) printf '%s\n' "${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server/docker-compose.ssh.yml" ;;
base) printf '%s\n' "${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server/docker-compose.yml" ;;
*) die "unsupported mode '$1', expected tcp|tls|ssh|base" ;;
esac
}
while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--mode)
[ "$#" -ge 2 ] || die "--mode requires a value"
MODE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-h|--help)
usage
exit 0
;;
*)
die "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE="$(compose_file_for_mode "${MODE}")"
CONSOLE_COMPOSE_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/console/docker-compose.yml"
stage "Checking Docker"
command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "docker command not found"
if docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker compose)
elif command -v docker-compose >/dev/null 2>&1 && docker-compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker-compose)
else
die "docker compose is not available"
fi
stage "Stopping Console"
if [ -f "${CONSOLE_ENV_FILE}" ] && [ -f "${CONSOLE_COMPOSE_FILE}" ]; then
"${COMPOSE_BIN[@]}" --env-file "${CONSOLE_ENV_FILE}" -p "${CONSOLE_PROJECT}" -f "${CONSOLE_COMPOSE_FILE}" down --remove-orphans
else
log "console compose/env not found, skip"
fi
stage "Stopping RTR Server"
if [ -f "${SERVER_ENV_FILE}" ] && [ -f "${SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE}" ]; then
"${COMPOSE_BIN[@]}" --env-file "${SERVER_ENV_FILE}" -p "${SERVER_PROJECT}" -f "${SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE}" down --remove-orphans
else
log "server compose/env not found, skip"
fi
stage "Shutdown Finished"

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@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT_DIR="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
SERVER_DIR="${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/server"
SERVER_ENV_FILE="${SERVER_DIR}/.env"
SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE="${SERVER_DIR}/docker-compose.tcp.yml"
COMPOSE_PROJECT="${RPKI_RTR_COMPOSE_PROJECT:-rpki-rtr}"
FORCE=0
usage() {
cat <<'EOF'
Usage: scripts/04_cleanup.sh [options]
Remove server generated directories: logs, reports, and RTR database.
Options:
--force Clean even if the server container appears to be running.
-h, --help Show this help.
EOF
}
log() {
printf '[04_cleanup] %s\n' "$*" >&2
}
stage() {
printf '\n====== %s ======\n' "$*" >&2
}
die() {
printf '[04_cleanup] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2
exit 1
}
env_value() {
local key="$1"
local default_value="$2"
local line
line="$(grep -E "^[[:space:]]*${key}=" "${SERVER_ENV_FILE}" | tail -n 1 || true)"
if [ -n "${line}" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "${line#*=}"
else
printf '%s\n' "${default_value}"
fi
}
resolve_host_path() {
local raw_path="$1"
case "${raw_path}" in
/*|[A-Za-z]:/*|[A-Za-z]:\\*)
printf '%s\n' "${raw_path}"
;;
*)
(cd "${SERVER_DIR}" && cd "${raw_path}" 2>/dev/null && pwd -P) || printf '%s/%s\n' "${SERVER_DIR}" "${raw_path}"
;;
esac
}
compose_available() {
if docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker compose)
return 0
fi
if command -v docker-compose >/dev/null 2>&1 && docker-compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker-compose)
return 0
fi
return 1
}
server_running() {
local cid state
[ -f "${SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE}" ] || return 1
compose_available || return 1
cid="$("${COMPOSE_BIN[@]}" --env-file "${SERVER_ENV_FILE}" -p "${COMPOSE_PROJECT}" -f "${SERVER_COMPOSE_FILE}" ps -q rpki-rtr 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -n "${cid}" ] || return 1
state="$(docker inspect -f '{{.State.Running}}' "${cid}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ "${state}" = "true" ]
}
clean_dir() {
local label="$1"
local path="$2"
local root_with_slash
if [ ! -d "${path}" ]; then
log "${label}: ${path} not found, skip"
return 0
fi
root_with_slash="${ROOT_DIR}/"
case "${path}/" in
"${root_with_slash}"*) ;;
*)
log "ERROR: ${label} path is outside repo root, refuse to remove: ${path}"
return 1
;;
esac
log "${label}: removing ${path}"
if ! rm -rf "${path}"; then
log "ERROR: failed to remove ${label}: ${path}"
return 1
fi
}
while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--force)
FORCE=1
shift
;;
-h|--help)
usage
exit 0
;;
*)
die "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
stage "Checking Server"
[ -f "${SERVER_ENV_FILE}" ] || die "server env file not found: ${SERVER_ENV_FILE}"
if [ "${FORCE}" -ne 1 ] && command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 && server_running; then
die "rpki-rtr is still running, run scripts/03_shutdown.sh first or use --force"
fi
LOG_DIR="${ROOT_DIR}/logs"
REPORT_DIR="$(resolve_host_path "$(env_value RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HOST_DIR '../../report')")"
DB_DIR="$(resolve_host_path "$(env_value RPKI_RTR_DB_HOST_DIR '../../rtr-db')")"
stage "Removing Server Files"
failed_count=0
clean_dir "logs" "${LOG_DIR}" || failed_count=$((failed_count + 1))
clean_dir "report" "${REPORT_DIR}" || failed_count=$((failed_count + 1))
clean_dir "rtr-db" "${DB_DIR}" || failed_count=$((failed_count + 1))
if [ "${failed_count}" -gt 0 ]; then
die "${failed_count} cleanup item(s) failed"
fi
stage "Cleanup Finished"

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@@ -1,303 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
ROOT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
OUT_DIR="${ROOT_DIR}/certs"
TLS_DIR="${OUT_DIR}/tls"
SSH_DIR="${OUT_DIR}/ssh"
SERVER_DNS="localhost"
FORCE=0
DO_TLS=1
DO_SSH=1
usage() {
cat <<'USAGE'
Generate local development TLS certificates and SSH keys for RTR Docker deploys.
Usage:
scripts/10_generate-certs.sh [options]
Options:
--out-dir DIR Output directory, default: ./certs
--server-dns NAME TLS server dNSName SAN, default: localhost
--tls-only Generate only TLS files
--ssh-only Generate only SSH files
--force Overwrite existing files
-h, --help Show this help
Generated TLS files:
certs/tls/client-ca.crt
certs/tls/client-ca.key
certs/tls/server-dns.crt
certs/tls/server-dns.key
certs/tls/client-good.crt
certs/tls/client-good.key
Generated SSH files:
certs/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
certs/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
certs/ssh/rtr-client.key
certs/ssh/rtr-client.key.pub
certs/ssh/rtr-authorized_keys
USAGE
}
die() {
echo "error: $*" >&2
exit 1
}
info() {
echo "[generate-certs] $*"
}
need_cmd() {
command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "required command not found: $1"
}
run_quiet() {
local log_file
log_file="$(mktemp)"
if "$@" >"${log_file}" 2>&1; then
rm -f "${log_file}"
return 0
fi
cat "${log_file}" >&2
rm -f "${log_file}"
return 1
}
ensure_abs_out_dir() {
case "${OUT_DIR}" in
/*) ;;
[A-Za-z]:*) ;;
*) OUT_DIR="${ROOT_DIR}/${OUT_DIR}" ;;
esac
TLS_DIR="${OUT_DIR}/tls"
SSH_DIR="${OUT_DIR}/ssh"
}
check_overwrite() {
local path="$1"
if [[ -e "${path}" && "${FORCE}" != "1" ]]; then
die "${path} already exists; rerun with --force to overwrite"
fi
}
write_tls_config_files() {
local tmp_dir="$1"
cat >"${tmp_dir}/ca.cnf" <<'EOF'
[ req ]
distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
prompt = no
[ req_distinguished_name ]
CN = rpki-rtr-client-ca
EOF
cat >"${tmp_dir}/server.cnf" <<EOF
[ req ]
distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
prompt = no
[ req_distinguished_name ]
CN = ${SERVER_DNS}
EOF
cat >"${tmp_dir}/client.cnf" <<'EOF'
[ req ]
distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
prompt = no
[ req_distinguished_name ]
CN = rpki-rtr-client
EOF
cat >"${tmp_dir}/server.ext" <<EOF
basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyEncipherment
extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth
subjectAltName=DNS:${SERVER_DNS}
EOF
cat >"${tmp_dir}/client.ext" <<'EOF'
basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyEncipherment
extendedKeyUsage=clientAuth
EOF
}
generate_tls() {
need_cmd openssl
mkdir -p "${TLS_DIR}"
info "generating TLS certificates in ${TLS_DIR}"
info "TLS server dNSName SAN: ${SERVER_DNS}"
local files=(
"${TLS_DIR}/client-ca.crt"
"${TLS_DIR}/client-ca.key"
"${TLS_DIR}/server-dns.crt"
"${TLS_DIR}/server-dns.key"
"${TLS_DIR}/client-good.crt"
"${TLS_DIR}/client-good.key"
)
for file in "${files[@]}"; do
check_overwrite "${file}"
done
local tmp_dir
tmp_dir="$(mktemp -d)"
write_tls_config_files "${tmp_dir}"
run_quiet openssl genrsa -out "${TLS_DIR}/client-ca.key" 2048
info "created TLS CA key: ${TLS_DIR}/client-ca.key"
run_quiet openssl req -x509 -new -nodes \
-config "${tmp_dir}/ca.cnf" \
-key "${TLS_DIR}/client-ca.key" \
-sha256 -days 3650 \
-out "${TLS_DIR}/client-ca.crt"
info "created TLS CA cert: ${TLS_DIR}/client-ca.crt"
run_quiet openssl genrsa -out "${TLS_DIR}/server-dns.key" 2048
info "created TLS server key: ${TLS_DIR}/server-dns.key"
run_quiet openssl req -new \
-config "${tmp_dir}/server.cnf" \
-key "${TLS_DIR}/server-dns.key" \
-out "${tmp_dir}/server-dns.csr"
run_quiet openssl x509 -req \
-in "${tmp_dir}/server-dns.csr" \
-CA "${TLS_DIR}/client-ca.crt" \
-CAkey "${TLS_DIR}/client-ca.key" \
-CAcreateserial \
-out "${TLS_DIR}/server-dns.crt" \
-days 3650 -sha256 \
-extfile "${tmp_dir}/server.ext"
info "created TLS server cert: ${TLS_DIR}/server-dns.crt"
run_quiet openssl genrsa -out "${TLS_DIR}/client-good.key" 2048
info "created TLS client key: ${TLS_DIR}/client-good.key"
run_quiet openssl req -new \
-config "${tmp_dir}/client.cnf" \
-key "${TLS_DIR}/client-good.key" \
-out "${tmp_dir}/client-good.csr"
run_quiet openssl x509 -req \
-in "${tmp_dir}/client-good.csr" \
-CA "${TLS_DIR}/client-ca.crt" \
-CAkey "${TLS_DIR}/client-ca.key" \
-CAcreateserial \
-out "${TLS_DIR}/client-good.crt" \
-days 3650 -sha256 \
-extfile "${tmp_dir}/client.ext"
info "created TLS client cert: ${TLS_DIR}/client-good.crt"
rm -f "${TLS_DIR}/client-ca.srl"
rm -rf "${tmp_dir}"
chmod 600 "${TLS_DIR}"/*.key
chmod 644 "${TLS_DIR}"/*.crt
}
generate_ssh_key() {
local path="$1"
local comment="$2"
check_overwrite "${path}"
check_overwrite "${path}.pub"
rm -f "${path}" "${path}.pub"
run_quiet ssh-keygen -q -t rsa -b 3072 -m PEM -N "" -C "${comment}" -f "${path}"
}
generate_ssh() {
need_cmd ssh-keygen
mkdir -p "${SSH_DIR}"
info "generating SSH keys in ${SSH_DIR}"
generate_ssh_key "${SSH_DIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key" "rpki-rtr-host"
info "created SSH host key: ${SSH_DIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key"
generate_ssh_key "${SSH_DIR}/rtr-client.key" "rpki-rtr-debug-client"
info "created SSH client key: ${SSH_DIR}/rtr-client.key"
check_overwrite "${SSH_DIR}/rtr-authorized_keys"
cp "${SSH_DIR}/rtr-client.key.pub" "${SSH_DIR}/rtr-authorized_keys"
info "created SSH authorized_keys: ${SSH_DIR}/rtr-authorized_keys"
chmod 600 \
"${SSH_DIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key" \
"${SSH_DIR}/rtr-client.key"
chmod 644 "${SSH_DIR}"/*.pub "${SSH_DIR}/rtr-authorized_keys"
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case "$1" in
--out-dir)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || die "--out-dir requires a value"
OUT_DIR="$2"
shift 2
;;
--server-dns)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || die "--server-dns requires a value"
SERVER_DNS="$2"
shift 2
;;
--tls-only)
DO_TLS=1
DO_SSH=0
shift
;;
--ssh-only)
DO_TLS=0
DO_SSH=1
shift
;;
--force)
FORCE=1
shift
;;
-h|--help)
usage
exit 0
;;
*)
die "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
ensure_abs_out_dir
if [[ "${DO_TLS}" == "1" ]]; then
generate_tls
fi
if [[ "${DO_SSH}" == "1" ]]; then
generate_ssh
fi
info "done"
info "generated files under ${OUT_DIR}"
if [[ "${DO_TLS}" == "1" ]]; then
cat <<EOF
TLS files:
${TLS_DIR}/client-ca.crt
${TLS_DIR}/server-dns.crt
${TLS_DIR}/server-dns.key
${TLS_DIR}/client-good.crt
${TLS_DIR}/client-good.key
${TLS_DIR}/client-ca.key (local signing key; not mounted by compose)
EOF
fi
if [[ "${DO_SSH}" == "1" ]]; then
cat <<EOF
SSH files:
${SSH_DIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key
${SSH_DIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
${SSH_DIR}/rtr-client.key
${SSH_DIR}/rtr-client.key.pub
${SSH_DIR}/rtr-authorized_keys
EOF
fi

View File

@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT_DIR="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
COMMON_ENV_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/environment.client"
CLIENT_ENV_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/client/.env"
MODE="${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_MODE:-tcp}"
COMPOSE_PROJECT="${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_COMPOSE_PROJECT:-rpki-rtr-client}"
usage() {
cat <<'EOF'
Usage: scripts/11_start_client.sh [options]
Read root ./environment.client, update deploy/client/.env, then start the RTR debug client.
Options:
--mode MODE Client mode: tcp|tls|ssh. Default: tcp
--env FILE Client common env file. Default: ./environment.client
-h, --help Show this help.
EOF
}
log() {
printf '[11_start_client] %s\n' "$*" >&2
}
stage() {
printf '\n====== %s ======\n' "$*" >&2
}
die() {
printf '[11_start_client] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2
exit 1
}
set_env_var() {
local env_file="$1"
local key="$2"
local value="$3"
local tmp_file
tmp_file="${env_file}.tmp.$$"
awk -v key="${key}" -v value="${value}" '
BEGIN { done = 0 }
$0 ~ "^[[:space:]]*#?[[:space:]]*" key "=" {
if (!done) {
print key "=" value
done = 1
}
next
}
{ print }
END {
if (!done) {
print key "=" value
}
}
' "${env_file}" >"${tmp_file}"
mv "${tmp_file}" "${env_file}"
}
compose_file_for_mode() {
case "$1" in
tcp) printf '%s\n' "${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/client/docker-compose.tcp.yml" ;;
tls) printf '%s\n' "${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/client/docker-compose.tls.yml" ;;
ssh) printf '%s\n' "${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/client/docker-compose.ssh.yml" ;;
*) die "unsupported mode '$1', expected tcp|tls|ssh" ;;
esac
}
while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--mode)
[ "$#" -ge 2 ] || die "--mode requires a value"
MODE="$2"
shift 2
;;
--env)
[ "$#" -ge 2 ] || die "--env requires a value"
COMMON_ENV_FILE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-h|--help)
usage
exit 0
;;
*)
die "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
CLIENT_COMPOSE_FILE="$(compose_file_for_mode "${MODE}")"
stage "Checking Docker"
command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "docker command not found"
if docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker compose)
elif command -v docker-compose >/dev/null 2>&1 && docker-compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker-compose)
else
die "docker compose is not available"
fi
[ -f "${CLIENT_ENV_FILE}" ] || die "deploy client env file not found: ${CLIENT_ENV_FILE}"
[ -f "${CLIENT_COMPOSE_FILE}" ] || die "client compose file not found: ${CLIENT_COMPOSE_FILE}"
stage "Reading Client Environment"
if [ -f "${COMMON_ENV_FILE}" ]; then
updated_count=0
while IFS= read -r line || [ -n "${line}" ]; do
case "${line}" in
''|\#*) continue ;;
*=*)
key="${line%%=*}"
value="${line#*=}"
set_env_var "${CLIENT_ENV_FILE}" "${key}" "${value}"
updated_count=$((updated_count + 1))
;;
esac
done <"${COMMON_ENV_FILE}"
log "updated ${updated_count} client env variable(s)"
else
log "environment.client file not found, skip env update"
fi
stage "Starting RTR Debug Client"
log "mode: ${MODE}"
"${COMPOSE_BIN[@]}" --env-file "${CLIENT_ENV_FILE}" -p "${COMPOSE_PROJECT}" -f "${CLIENT_COMPOSE_FILE}" up -d --no-build rtr-debug-client
log "checking client compose status"
"${COMPOSE_BIN[@]}" --env-file "${CLIENT_ENV_FILE}" -p "${COMPOSE_PROJECT}" -f "${CLIENT_COMPOSE_FILE}" ps rtr-debug-client
stage "Client Started"

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@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT_DIR="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
CLIENT_ENV_FILE="${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/client/.env"
MODE="${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_MODE:-tcp}"
COMPOSE_PROJECT="${RPKI_RTR_CLIENT_COMPOSE_PROJECT:-rpki-rtr-client}"
usage() {
cat <<'EOF'
Usage: scripts/12_shutdown_client.sh [options]
Stop the RTR debug client started by scripts/11_start_client.sh.
Options:
--mode MODE Client mode: tcp|tls|ssh. Default: tcp
-h, --help Show this help.
EOF
}
log() {
printf '[12_shutdown_client] %s\n' "$*" >&2
}
stage() {
printf '\n====== %s ======\n' "$*" >&2
}
die() {
printf '[12_shutdown_client] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2
exit 1
}
compose_file_for_mode() {
case "$1" in
tcp) printf '%s\n' "${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/client/docker-compose.tcp.yml" ;;
tls) printf '%s\n' "${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/client/docker-compose.tls.yml" ;;
ssh) printf '%s\n' "${ROOT_DIR}/deploy/client/docker-compose.ssh.yml" ;;
*) die "unsupported mode '$1', expected tcp|tls|ssh" ;;
esac
}
while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--mode)
[ "$#" -ge 2 ] || die "--mode requires a value"
MODE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-h|--help)
usage
exit 0
;;
*)
die "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
CLIENT_COMPOSE_FILE="$(compose_file_for_mode "${MODE}")"
stage "Checking Docker"
command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "docker command not found"
if docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker compose)
elif command -v docker-compose >/dev/null 2>&1 && docker-compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
COMPOSE_BIN=(docker-compose)
else
die "docker compose is not available"
fi
stage "Stopping RTR Debug Client"
log "mode: ${MODE}"
if [ -f "${CLIENT_ENV_FILE}" ] && [ -f "${CLIENT_COMPOSE_FILE}" ]; then
"${COMPOSE_BIN[@]}" --env-file "${CLIENT_ENV_FILE}" -p "${COMPOSE_PROJECT}" -f "${CLIENT_COMPOSE_FILE}" down --remove-orphans
else
log "client compose/env not found, skip"
fi
stage "Client Shutdown Finished"

View File

@@ -1,218 +0,0 @@
# 脚本说明
`scripts/` 目录用于离线安装、启动、健康检查、关闭和清理。
所有脚本建议在仓库根目录执行:
```bash
bash scripts/00_0_install.sh
```
## 目录
- [推荐流程](#推荐流程)
- [环境变量文件](#环境变量文件)
- [00 安装](#00-安装)
- [00 Pre-Check](#00-pre-check)
- [01 启动 Server 和 Console](#01-启动-server-和-console)
- [02 自检](#02-自检)
- [03 关闭 Server 和 Console](#03-关闭-server-和-console)
- [04 清理](#04-清理)
- [10 生成证书](#10-生成证书)
- [11 启动 Client](#11-启动-client)
- [12 关闭 Client](#12-关闭-client)
- [Windows 路径注意事项](#windows-路径注意事项)
## 推荐流程
```bash
# 1. 加载镜像并执行 pre-check。
bash scripts/00_0_install.sh
# 2. 启动真实 server 和 console。
bash scripts/01_start.sh --mode tcp
# 3. 检查 server 和 console 是否正常。
bash scripts/02_self_check.sh
# 4. 关闭 server 和 console。
bash scripts/03_shutdown.sh --mode tcp
# 5. 清理 server 运行产生的文件。
bash scripts/04_cleanup.sh
```
client 单独启动和关闭:
```bash
bash scripts/11_start_client.sh --mode tcp
bash scripts/12_shutdown_client.sh --mode tcp
```
支持的模式:
- server:`tcp`、`tls`、`ssh`、`base`
- client:`tcp`、`tls`、`ssh`
## 环境变量文件
`01_start.sh` 会读取根目录下的 `environment.server`。如果文件存在,会将其中所有 `KEY=VALUE` 同步到 `deploy/server/.env`。
示例:
```env
RPKI_RTR_CCR_HOST_DIR=/opt/rpki-rtr/data
RPKI_RTR_SLURM_HOST_DIR=/opt/rpki-rtr/data
RPKI_RTR_DB_HOST_DIR=/opt/rpki-rtr/rtr-db
RPKI_RTR_LOG_HOST_DIR=/opt/rpki-rtr/logs/server
RPKI_RTR_REPORT_HOST_DIR=/opt/rpki-rtr/report
```
`11_start_client.sh` 会读取根目录下的 `environment.client`。如果文件存在,会将其中所有 `KEY=VALUE` 同步到 `deploy/client/.env`。
如果 `environment.server` 或 `environment.client` 不存在,对应脚本会跳过更新,直接使用已有的 deploy `.env` 文件。
## 00 安装
`00_0_install.sh` 用于从 `images/` 目录加载离线 Docker 镜像,更新 deploy `.env` 中的镜像名,然后执行 pre-check。
默认镜像包查找规则:
- server:`images/rpki-rtr-*.tar`,排除 `rpki-rtr-debug-client-*.tar`
- client:`images/rpki-rtr-debug-client-*.tar`
- console:`images/rpki-console-ui-*.tar`
也可以显式指定镜像包:
```bash
bash scripts/00_0_install.sh \
--server-tar images/rpki-rtr-amd64-v1.2.tar \
--client-tar images/rpki-rtr-debug-client-amd64-v1.2.tar \
--console-tar images/rpki-console-ui-amd64-v1.0.tar
```
脚本会从 `docker load` 输出中解析真实镜像名,并写入:
- `deploy/server/.env` 的 `RPKI_RTR_SERVER_IMAGE`
- `deploy/console/.env` 的 `RPKI_CONSOLE_UI_IMAGE`
## 00 Pre-Check
`00_1_pre_check.sh` 会在 `.precheck/` 下准备隔离测试数据,使用仓库里的 Docker Compose 文件启动 server 和 debug client,然后检查:
- admin health 接口返回正常。
- server 写出了 source report。
- debug client 收到了 EndOfData 和 payload summary。
- pre-check 日志中没有 fatal 错误模式。
相关辅助脚本:
- `00_2_generate_ccr.sh`:生成固定的 CCR 测试文件。
- `00_2_pre_check_prepare.sh`:创建 `.precheck/` 数据、SLURM 文件和 env 文件。
- `00_3_pre_check_cleanup.sh`:停止 pre-check 容器并清理 `.precheck/`。
## 01 启动 Server 和 Console
`01_start.sh` 用于启动真实的 RTR server 和 console。
```bash
bash scripts/01_start.sh --mode tcp
```
启动后脚本会检查容器是否进入 `running` 状态。如果容器启动后退出,脚本会打印 compose 状态和最近日志,然后报错退出,不会继续打印 `Start Finished`。
常用参数:
```bash
bash scripts/01_start.sh --mode tls
bash scripts/01_start.sh --mode ssh
bash scripts/01_start.sh --wait 60
bash scripts/01_start.sh --env ./environment.server
```
注意:console 不读取 `environment.server`,只使用 `deploy/console/.env`。
## 02 自检
`02_self_check.sh` 用于检查 `01_start.sh` 启动的 server 和 console 是否正常。
```bash
bash scripts/02_self_check.sh
```
检查内容包括:
- server 容器是否 running。
- console 容器是否 running。
- RTR TCP 端口是否可连接。
- admin health 接口是否健康。
- console 端口和 HTTP 根路径是否可访问。
如果启动较慢,可以增加等待时间:
```bash
bash scripts/02_self_check.sh --wait 120
```
## 03 关闭 Server 和 Console
`03_shutdown.sh` 用于关闭 `01_start.sh` 启动的服务。
```bash
bash scripts/03_shutdown.sh --mode tcp
```
脚本会先关闭 console,再关闭 RTR server。
## 04 清理
`04_cleanup.sh` 用于删除 server 运行产生的目录:
- `logs/`
- `report/`
- `rtr-db/`
推荐先关闭服务,再清理:
```bash
bash scripts/03_shutdown.sh
bash scripts/04_cleanup.sh
```
清理前脚本会检查 `rpki-rtr` 是否仍在运行。如果仍在运行,会拒绝清理。只有明确需要强制清理时才使用:
```bash
bash scripts/04_cleanup.sh --force
```
清理脚本会拒绝删除仓库根目录之外的路径。如果某一项清理失败,会继续清理后续项,最后返回失败。
## 10 生成证书
`10_generate_certs.sh` 用于生成 TLS/SSH 模式需要的本地证书材料(测试用)。
```bash
bash scripts/10_generate_certs.sh
```
## 11 启动 Client
`11_start_client.sh` 用于启动 RTR debug client。
```bash
bash scripts/11_start_client.sh --mode tcp
bash scripts/11_start_client.sh --mode tls
bash scripts/11_start_client.sh --mode ssh
```
如果 `environment.client` 存在,脚本会将其中所有 `KEY=VALUE` 同步到 `deploy/client/.env`;如果不存在,则直接使用已有的 `deploy/client/.env`。
## 12 关闭 Client
`12_shutdown_client.sh` 用于关闭 `11_start_client.sh` 启动的 client。
```bash
bash scripts/12_shutdown_client.sh --mode tcp
```
关闭时建议使用和启动时相同的 mode。

80
scripts/coverage.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
# Requires:
# rustup component add llvm-tools-preview
# cargo install cargo-llvm-cov --locked
run_out="$(mktemp)"
text_out="$(mktemp)"
html_out="$(mktemp)"
cleanup() {
rm -f "$run_out" "$text_out" "$html_out"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
# Preserve colored output even though we post-process output by running under a pseudo-TTY.
# We run tests only once, then generate both CLI text + HTML reports without rerunning tests.
set +e
cargo llvm-cov clean --workspace >/dev/null 2>&1
# 1) Run tests once to collect coverage data (no report).
script -q -e -c "CARGO_TERM_COLOR=always cargo llvm-cov --no-report" "$run_out" >/dev/null 2>&1
run_status="$?"
# 2) CLI summary report + fail-under gate (no test rerun).
script -q -e -c "CARGO_TERM_COLOR=always cargo llvm-cov report --fail-under-lines 90" "$text_out" >/dev/null 2>&1
text_status="$?"
# 3) HTML report (no test rerun).
script -q -e -c "CARGO_TERM_COLOR=always cargo llvm-cov report --html" "$html_out" >/dev/null 2>&1
html_status="$?"
set -e
strip_script_noise() {
tr -d '\r' | sed '/^Script \(started\|done\) on /d'
}
strip_ansi_for_parse() {
awk '
{
line = $0
gsub(/\033\[[0-9;]*[A-Za-z]/, "", line) # CSI escapes
gsub(/\033\([A-Za-z]/, "", line) # charset escapes (e.g., ESC(B)
gsub(/\r/, "", line)
print line
}
'
}
cat "$run_out" | strip_script_noise
cat "$text_out" | strip_script_noise
cat "$html_out" | strip_script_noise
cat "$run_out" | strip_ansi_for_parse | awk '
BEGIN {
passed=0; failed=0; ignored=0; measured=0; filtered=0;
}
/^test result: / {
if (match($0, /([0-9]+) passed; ([0-9]+) failed; ([0-9]+) ignored; ([0-9]+) measured; ([0-9]+) filtered out;/, m)) {
passed += m[1]; failed += m[2]; ignored += m[3]; measured += m[4]; filtered += m[5];
}
}
END {
executed = passed + failed;
total = passed + failed + ignored + measured;
printf("\nTEST SUMMARY (all suites): passed=%d failed=%d ignored=%d measured=%d filtered_out=%d executed=%d total=%d\n",
passed, failed, ignored, measured, filtered, executed, total);
}
'
echo
echo "HTML report: target/llvm-cov/html/index.html"
status="$text_status"
if [ "$run_status" -ne 0 ]; then status="$run_status"; fi
if [ "$html_status" -ne 0 ]; then status="$html_status"; fi
exit "$status"

View File

@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ RFC 引用:RFC 5280 §4.2.2.1;RFC 5280 §4.2.2.2;RFC 5280 §4.2.1.6。
| `1.2.840.113549.1.9.5` | CMS signedAttrs: signing-time | RFC 9589 §4(更新 RFC 6488 §3(1f)/(1g)) | | `1.2.840.113549.1.9.5` | CMS signedAttrs: signing-time | RFC 9589 §4(更新 RFC 6488 §3(1f)/(1g)) |
| `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24` | ROA eContentType: id-ct-routeOriginAuthz | RFC 9582 §3 | | `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24` | ROA eContentType: id-ct-routeOriginAuthz | RFC 9582 §3 |
| `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26` | Manifest eContentType: id-ct-rpkiManifest | RFC 9286 §4.1 | | `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26` | Manifest eContentType: id-ct-rpkiManifest | RFC 9286 §4.1 |
| `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.35` | Ghostbusters eContentType: id-ct-rpkiGhostbusters | RFC 6493 §6;RFC 6493 §9.1 |
| `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49` | ASPA eContentType: id-ct-ASPA | `draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §2 |
| `1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1` | X.509 v3 扩展:authorityInfoAccess | RFC 5280 §4.2.2.1 | | `1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1` | X.509 v3 扩展:authorityInfoAccess | RFC 5280 §4.2.2.1 |
| `1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11` | X.509 v3 扩展:subjectInfoAccess | RFC 5280 §4.2.2.2;RPKI 约束见 RFC 6487 §4.8.8 | | `1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11` | X.509 v3 扩展:subjectInfoAccess | RFC 5280 §4.2.2.2;RPKI 约束见 RFC 6487 §4.8.8 |
| `1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2` | AIA accessMethod: id-ad-caIssuers | RFC 5280 §4.2.2.1 | | `1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2` | AIA accessMethod: id-ad-caIssuers | RFC 5280 §4.2.2.1 |

View File

@@ -1,36 +1,94 @@
# 01. Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) # 01. TAL(Trust Anchor Locator)
## 1.1 对象定位 ## 1.1 对象定位
TAL是一个数据格式/配置文件,目的是告诉RP信任锚的公钥是什么,以及相关对象可以从哪里获取。
## 1.2 数据格式 (RFC 8630 §2.2) TAL(Trust Anchor Locator)用于向 RP 提供:
TAL是一个配置文件,格式定义如下:
``` 1) 可检索“当前 TA 证书”的一个或多个 URI;以及
The TAL is an ordered sequence of: 2) 该 TA 证书的 `subjectPublicKeyInfo`(SPKI)期望值(用于绑定/防替换)。
1. an optional comment section consisting of one or more lines each starting with the "#" character, followed by human-readable informational UTF-8 text, conforming to the restrictions defined
in Section 2 of [RFC5198], and ending with a line break, RFC 8630 §2;RFC 8630 §2.3。
2. a URI section that is comprised of one or more ordered lines, each containing a TA URI, and ending with a line break,
3. a line break, and ## 1.2 原始载体与编码
4. a subjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280] in DER format [X.509], encoded in base64 (see Section 4 of [RFC4648]). To avoid long lines,
line breaks MAY be inserted into the base64-encoded string. - 载体:文本文件(ASCII/UTF-8 兼容的行文本)。
Note that line breaks in this file can use either "<CRLF>" or "<LF>". - 行结束:允许 `CRLF` 或 `LF`。RFC 8630 §2.2。
- 结构:`[可选注释区] + URI 区 + 空行 + Base64(SPKI DER)`。RFC 8630 §2.2。
### 1.2.1 注释区
- 一行或多行,以 `#` 开头,后随人类可读 UTF-8 文本。RFC 8630 §2.2。
- 注释行文本需符合 RFC 5198 §2 的限制(RFC 8630 §2.2 引用)。
### 1.2.2 URI 区
- 一行或多行,每行一个 TA URI,按序排列。RFC 8630 §2.2。
- TA URI **MUST** 是 `rsync` 或 `https`。RFC 8630 §2.2。
### 1.2.3 空行分隔
- URI 区后必须有一个额外的换行(即空行),用于与 Base64 区分隔。RFC 8630 §2.2(第 3 点)。
### 1.2.4 SPKI(Base64)
- `subjectPublicKeyInfo` 以 DER 编码(ASN.1)后,再 Base64 编码表示。RFC 8630 §2.2(第 4 点)。
- 为避免长行,Base64 字符串中 **MAY** 插入换行。RFC 8630 §2.2。
- SPKI ASN.1 类型来自 X.509 / RFC 5280。RFC 8630 §2.2(第 4 点);RFC 5280 §4.1.2.7。
#### 1.2.4.1 `SubjectPublicKeyInfo` 的 ASN.1 定义(RFC 5280 §4.1)
TAL 中携带的是一个 X.509 `SubjectPublicKeyInfo` 的 DER 字节串(再 Base64)。其 ASN.1 定义如下:RFC 5280 §4.1。
```asn1
SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }
``` ```
## 1.3 抽象数据模型 其中 `algorithm`/`subjectPublicKey` 的取值受 RPKI 算法 profile 约束(例如 RSA 2048 + SHA-256 等;SKI/AKI 计算仍用 SHA-1)。RFC 5280 §4.1.2.7;RFC 7935 §2-§3.1;RFC 6487 §4.8.2-§4.8.3。
### 1.3.1 TAL ## 1.3 解析规则(语义层)
输入:`TalFileBytes: bytes`。
解析步骤:
1) 按 `LF` / `CRLF` 识别行。RFC 8630 §2.2。
2) 从文件开头读取所有以 `#` 开头的行,作为 `comments`(保留去掉 `#` 后的 UTF-8 文本或保留原始行均可,但需保持 UTF-8)。RFC 8630 §2.2。
3) 继续读取一行或多行非空行,作为 `ta_uris`(保持顺序)。RFC 8630 §2.2(第 2 点)。
4) 读取一个空行(必须存在)。RFC 8630 §2.2(第 3 点)。
5) 将剩余行拼接为 Base64 文本(移除行分隔),Base64 解码得到 `subject_public_key_info_der`。RFC 8630 §2.2(第 4 点)。
6) 可选:将 `subject_public_key_info_der` 解析为 X.509 `SubjectPublicKeyInfo` 结构(用于与 TA 证书比对)。RFC 8630 §2.3;RFC 5280 §4.1.2.7。
URI 解析与约束:
- `ta_uris[*]` 的 scheme **MUST** 为 `rsync` 或 `https`。RFC 8630 §2.2。
- 每个 `ta_uri` **MUST** 指向“单个对象”,且 **MUST NOT** 指向目录或集合。RFC 8630 §2.3。
## 1.4 抽象数据模型(接口)
### 1.4.1 `Tal`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 | | 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|----------|-------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------|---------------| |---|---|---|---|---|
| uris | Vec<TalUri> | 指向TA的URI列表 | 允许rsync和https协议。 | RFC 8630 §2.1 | | `raw` | `bytes` | TAL 原始文件字节 | 原样保留(可选但建议) | RFC 8630 §2.2 |
| comment | Vec<String> | 注释(可选) | | RFC 8630 §2.2 | | `comments` | `list[Utf8Text]` | 注释行(按出现顺序) | 每行以 `#` 开头;文本为 UTF-8;内容限制见 RFC 5198 §2 | RFC 8630 §2.2 |
| spki_der | Vec<u8> | 原始的subjectPublicKeyInfo | x.509 SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER编码,再base64编码 | RFC 8630 §2.2 | | `ta_uris` | `list[Uri]` | TA 证书位置列表 | 至少 1 个;按序;每个 scheme 必须是 `rsync` 或 `https` | RFC 8630 §2.2 |
| `subject_public_key_info_der` | `DerBytes` | TA 证书 SPKI 的期望 DER | Base64 解码所得 DER;Base64 中可有换行 | RFC 8630 §2.2 |
### 1.4.2 `TaUri`(可选细化)
### 1.3.2 TalUri > 若你的实现希望对 URI 做更强类型化,可在 `Tal.ta_uris` 上进一步拆分为 `TaUri` 结构。
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 | | 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|-------|--------|---------|---------|---------------| |---|---|---|---|---|
| Rsync | String | rsync地址 | | RFC 8630 §2.1 | | `uri` | `Uri` | 完整 URI 文本 | scheme 为 `rsync` 或 `https` | RFC 8630 §2.2 |
| Https | String | https地址 | | RFC 8630 §2.1 | | `scheme` | `enum` | `rsync` / `https` | 从 `uri` 解析 | RFC 8630 §2.2 |
## 1.5 字段级约束清单(实现对照)
- TAL 由(可选)注释区 + URI 区 + 空行 + Base64(SPKI DER) 组成。RFC 8630 §2.2。
- URI 区至少 1 行,每行一个 TA URI,顺序有意义。RFC 8630 §2.2。
- TA URI 仅允许 `rsync` 或 `https`。RFC 8630 §2.2。
- Base64 区允许插入换行。RFC 8630 §2.2。
- 每个 TA URI 必须引用单个对象,不能指向目录/集合。RFC 8630 §2.3。

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@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
# 02. Trust Anchor (TA)
## 2.1 对象定位
TA是一个自签名的CA证书。
## 2.2 原始载体与编码
- 载体:X.509 certificates.
- 编码:DER(遵循 RFC 5280 的 certificate 结构与字段语义,但受限于RFC 8630 §2.3)
## 2.3 抽象数据类型
### 2.3.1 TA
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|-------------------|------------------|---------------|---------|---------------|
| name | String | 标识该TA,如apnic等 | | |
| cert_der | Vec<u8> | 原始DER内容 | | |
| cert | X509Certificate | 基础X509证书 | | RFC 5280 §4.1 |
| resource | ResourceSet | 资源集合 | | |
| publication_point | Uri | 获取该TA的URI | | |
### 2.3.2 ResourceSet
资源集合是来自RFC 3779的IP地址块(§2)和AS号段(§3),受约束于RFC 8630 §2.3
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|------|----------------|--------|-------------|---------------------------|
| ips | IpResourceSet | IP地址集合 | 不能是inherit | RFC 3779 §2和RFC 8630 §2.3 |
| asns | AsnResourceSet | ASN集合 | 不能是inherit | RFC 3779 §3和RFC 8630 §2.3 |
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.3 IpResourceSet)
[//]: # (包括IPv4和IPv6的前缀表示)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|----|------------------------|----------|-------------|--------------|)
[//]: # (| v4 | PrefixSet<Ipv4Prefix> | IPv4前缀集合 | | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # (| v6 | PrefixSet<Ipv6Prefix> | IPv6前缀集合 | | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.4 AsnResourceSet)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|-------|--------------------|-------|-------------|-------------|)
[//]: # (| range | RangeSet<AsnBlock> | ASN集合 | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.5 Ipv4Prefix)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|------|-----|-----|---------|-------------|)
[//]: # (| addr | u32 | 地址 | | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # (| len | u8 | 长度 | 0-32 | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.6 Ipv6Prefix)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|------|------|-----|---------|-------------|)
[//]: # (| addr | u128 | 地址 | | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # (| len | u8 | 长度 | 0-128 | RFC 3779 §2 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.7 AsnBlock)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|----------|----------|-------|---------|--------------|)
[//]: # (| asn | Asn | ASN | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
[//]: # (| asnRange | AsnRange | ASN范围 | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.8 Asn)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|-----|-----|-----|---------|-------------|)
[//]: # (| asn | u32 | ASN | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (### 2.3.8 AsnRange)
[//]: # ()
[//]: # (| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |)
[//]: # (|-----|-----|-------|---------|--------------|)
[//]: # (| min | Asn | 最小ASN | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
[//]: # (| max | Asn | 最大ASN | | RFC 3779 §3 |)
# 2.4 TA校验流程(RFC 8630 §3)
1. 从TAL的URI列表中获取证书对象。(顺序访问,若前面失效,再访问后面的)
2. 验证证书格式,必须是当前、有效的自签名RPKI证书。
3. 验证公钥匹配。TAL中的SubjectPublicKeyInfo与下载证书的公钥一致。
4. 其他检查。
5. 更新本地存储库缓存。

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@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
# 02. TA(Trust Anchor)自签名证书
## 2.1 对象定位
在 RP 侧,“信任锚(Trust Anchor, TA)”以一个**自签名 CA 资源证书**体现,其可获取位置与期望公钥由 TAL 提供。RFC 8630 §2.3。
本文件描述两个紧密相关的数据对象:
1) `TaCertificate`:TA 自签名资源证书本体(X.509 DER)
2) `TrustAnchor`:语义组合对象(`TAL` + `TaCertificate` 的绑定语义)
## 2.2 原始载体与编码
- 载体:X.509 证书(通常以 `.cer` 存放于仓库,但文件扩展名不作为语义依据)。
- 编码:DER。TA 证书必须符合 RPKI 资源证书 profile。RFC 8630 §2.3;RFC 6487 §4。
### 2.2.1 X.509 Certificate 的 ASN.1 定义(RFC 5280 §4.1;TA 与 RC 共享)
TA 证书与普通资源证书(RC)在编码层面都是 X.509 `Certificate`(DER)。其 ASN.1 定义如下:RFC 5280 §4.1。
```asn1
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING }
```
其中 `tbsCertificate.extensions`(v3 扩展)是 RPKI 语义的主要承载处(IP/AS 资源扩展、SIA/AIA/CRLDP 等)。RFC 5280 §4.1;RPKI 对字段/扩展存在性与关键性约束见 RFC 6487 §4。
> 说明:更完整的 RC 编码层结构(包括 Extension 外层“extnValue 二次 DER 解码”的套娃方式)在 `03_resource_certificate_rc.md` 与 `00_common_types.md` 中给出。
## 2.3 TA 证书的 RPKI 语义约束(在 RC profile 基础上额外强调)
### 2.3.1 自签名与 profile
- TA URI 指向的对象 **MUST** 是一个**自签名 CA 证书**,并且 **MUST** 符合 RPKI 证书 profile。RFC 8630 §2.3;RFC 6487 §4。
- 自签名证书在 RC profile 下的通用差异(例如 CRLDP/AIA 的省略规则、AKI 的规则)见 RFC 6487。RFC 6487 §4.8.3;RFC 6487 §4.8.6;RFC 6487 §4.8.7。
### 2.3.2 INR(IP/AS 资源扩展)在 TA 上的额外约束
- TA 的 INR 扩展(IP/AS 资源扩展,RFC 3779)**MUST** 是非空资源集合。RFC 8630 §2.3。
- TA 的 INR 扩展 **MUST NOT** 使用 `inherit` 形式。RFC 8630 §2.3。
- 说明:一般 RC profile 允许 `inherit`。RFC 6487 §4.8.10;RFC 6487 §4.8.11;RFC 3779 §2.2.3.5;RFC 3779 §3.2.3.3。
### 2.3.3 TAL ↔ TA 公钥绑定
- 用于验证 TA 的公钥(来自 TAL 中的 SPKI)**MUST** 与 TA 证书中的 `subjectPublicKeyInfo` 相同。RFC 8630 §2.3。
### 2.3.4 TA 稳定性语义(实现需建模为“约束/假设”,但不属于验证结果态)
- TA 公钥与 TAL 中公钥必须保持稳定(用于 RP 侧长期信任锚)。RFC 8630 §2.3。
### 2.3.5 TA 与 CRL/Manifest 的关系(语义)
- RFC 8630 指出:TA 为自签名证书,没有对应 CRL,且不会被 manifest 列出;TA 的获取/轮换由 TAL 控制。RFC 8630 §2.3。
> 注:这条更偏“发布/运维语义”,但对数据对象建模有影响:`TrustAnchor` 组合对象不应依赖 CRL/MFT 的存在。
## 2.4 抽象数据模型(接口)
### 2.4.1 `TaCertificate`
> 该对象在字段层面复用 `RC(CA)` 的语义模型(见 `03_resource_certificate_rc.md`),但增加 TA 特有约束。
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `raw_der` | `DerBytes` | TA 证书 DER | X.509 DER;证书 profile 约束见 RC 文档 | RFC 8630 §2.3;RFC 6487 §4 |
| `rc_ca` | `ResourceCaCertificate` | 以 RC(CA) 语义解析出的字段集合 | 必须满足“自签名 CA”分支约束;且 INR 必须非空且不允许 inherit | RFC 8630 §2.3;RFC 6487 §4;RFC 3779 §2/§3 |
### 2.4.2 `TrustAnchor`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `tal` | `Tal` | TAL 文件语义对象 | 见 `01_tal.md` | RFC 8630 §2.2 |
| `ta_certificate` | `TaCertificate` | TA 证书语义对象 | TA URI 指向的对象 | RFC 8630 §2.3 |
| `tal_spki_der` | `DerBytes` | 从 TAL 解析出的 SPKI DER | `tal.subject_public_key_info_der` | RFC 8630 §2.2 |
| `ta_spki_der` | `DerBytes` | 从 TA 证书抽取的 SPKI DER | `ta_certificate` 的 `subjectPublicKeyInfo` | RFC 8630 §2.3;RFC 5280 §4.1.2.7 |
**绑定约束(字段级)**
- `tal_spki_der` 必须与 `ta_spki_der` 完全相等(字节层面的 DER 等价)。RFC 8630 §2.3。
## 2.5 字段级约束清单(实现对照)
- TA URI 指向的对象必须是自签名 CA 证书,且符合 RPKI 证书 profile。RFC 8630 §2.3;RFC 6487 §4。
- TA 的 INR 扩展必须非空,且不得使用 inherit。RFC 8630 §2.3。
- TAL 中 SPKI 必须与 TA 证书的 `subjectPublicKeyInfo` 匹配。RFC 8630 §2.3。
- TA 不依赖 CRL/MFT(无对应 CRL,且不被 manifest 列出)。RFC 8630 §2.3。

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# 03. RC (Resource Certifications)
## 3.1 对象定位
RC是资源证书,包括CA和EE
## 3.2 原始载体与编码
- 载体:X.509 certificates.
- 编码:DER(遵循 RFC 5280 的 Certificate 结构与字段语义,但受 RPKI profile 限制)RFC 6487 §4
### 3.2.1 基本语法(RFC 5280 §4,RFC 6487 )
RC是遵循RFC5280定义的X.509Certificate语法(RFC 5280 §4),并且符合RFC 6487 §4的约束。只选取RFC 6487 §4章节列出来的字段。(Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, all the fields listed
here MUST be present, and any other fields MUST NOT appear in a
conforming resource certificate.)
```
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING
}
TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version MUST be v3,
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber,
signature AlgorithmIdentifier,
issuer Name,
subject Name,
validity Validity,
subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
-- If present, version MUST be v3
}
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
notBefore Time,
notAfter Time }
Time ::= CHOICE {
utcTime UTCTime,
generalTime GeneralizedTime }
UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING
SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }
Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension
Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
extnValue OCTET STRING
-- contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value
-- corresponding to the extension type identified
-- by extnID
}
```
> 其中`Name` "a valid X.501 distinguished name"(RFC 6487 §4.4)
### 3.2.2 证书扩展字段 (RFC 6487 §4.8)
RC的证书扩展字段按照RFC 6487 §4.8的规定,有以下几个扩展:
- Basic Constraints
- Subject Key Identifier
- Authority Key Identifier
- Key Usage
- Extended Key Usage(CA证书,以及验证RPKI对象的EE证书不能出现该字段。非RPKI对象的EE可以出现EKU,但必须为non-critical)
- CRL Distribution Points
- Authority Information Access
- Subject Information Access
- SIA for CA Certificates
- SIA for EE Certificates
- Certificate Policies
- IP Resources
- AS Resources
```
# Basic Constraints
id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 }
BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE }
# Subject Key Identifier
id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 }
SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier
KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
# Authority Key Identifier
id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 }
AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL }
# Key Usage
id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 }
KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
digitalSignature (0),
nonRepudiation (1), -- recent editions of X.509 have
-- renamed this bit to contentCommitment
keyEncipherment (2),
dataEncipherment (3),
keyAgreement (4),
keyCertSign (5),
cRLSign (6),
encipherOnly (7),
decipherOnly (8) }
# Extended Key Usage
id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 }
ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
# CRL Distribution Points
id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 31 }
CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint
DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL }
DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE {
fullName [0] GeneralNames }
## Authority Information Access
id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 1 }
AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax ::=
SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription
AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE {
accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
accessLocation GeneralName }
# AccessDescription
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
# CA 证书发布位置
id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 2 }
# OCSP 服务地址
id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 1 }
# Subject Information Access
id-pe-subjectInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 11 }
SubjectInfoAccessSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription
AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE {
accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
accessLocation GeneralName }
## Subject Information Access for CA (RFC 6487 §4.8.8.1)
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
id-ad-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 10 }
必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-caRepository,accessLocation=rsyncURI。
必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-repiManifest, accessLocation=rsync URI,指向该CA的mft对象。
## Subject Information Access for EE (RFC 6487 §4.8.8.2)
id-ad-signedObject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 }
必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-signedObject, accessLocation=rsyncURI
不允许其他的accessMethod
# Certificate Policies
id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 }
anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 }
certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation
PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
policyIdentifier CertPolicyId,
policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL }
CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId,
qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId }
-- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers
id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 }
id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 }
id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 }
PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice )
Qualifier ::= CHOICE {
cPSuri CPSuri,
userNotice UserNotice }
CPSuri ::= IA5String
UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {
noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL }
NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
organization DisplayText,
noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER }
DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)),
visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) }
# IP Resources
id-pe-ipAddrBlocks OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 7 }
IPAddrBlocks ::= SEQUENCE OF IPAddressFamily
IPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE { -- AFI & optional SAFI --
addressFamily OCTET STRING (SIZE (2..3)),
ipAddressChoice IPAddressChoice }
IPAddressChoice ::= CHOICE {
inherit NULL, -- inherit from issuer --
addressesOrRanges SEQUENCE OF IPAddressOrRange }
IPAddressOrRange ::= CHOICE {
addressPrefix IPAddress,
addressRange IPAddressRange }
IPAddressRange ::= SEQUENCE {
min IPAddress,
max IPAddress }
IPAddress ::= BIT STRING
# AS Resources
id-pe-autonomousSysIds OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 8 }
ASIdentifiers ::= SEQUENCE {
asnum [0] EXPLICIT ASIdentifierChoice OPTIONAL,
rdi [1] EXPLICIT ASIdentifierChoice OPTIONAL}
ASIdentifierChoice ::= CHOICE {
inherit NULL, -- inherit from issuer --
asIdsOrRanges SEQUENCE OF ASIdOrRange }
ASIdOrRange ::= CHOICE {
id ASId,
range ASRange }
ASRange ::= SEQUENCE {
min ASId,
max ASId }
ASId ::= INTEGER
```
# 3.3 抽象数据结构
采用X509 Certificate + Resource + 约束校验的方式组合
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|----------|---------------------|----------|---------|---------------|
| cert_der | Vec<u8> | 证书原始数据 | | |
| cert | X509Certificate | 基础X509证书 | | RFC 5280 §4.1 |
| resource | ResourceSet | 资源集合 | | |
# 3.4 约束规则
## 3.4.1 Cert约束校验规则
RFC 6487中规定的证书的字段参见[3.2.1 ](#321-基本语法rfc-5280-4rfc-6487-)
-
| 字段 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|-----------|-------|----------------------------------------------|--------------|
| version | 证书版本 | 必须是v3(值为2) | RFC6487 §4.1 |
| serial | 证书编号 | 同一个CA签发的证书编号必须唯一 | RFC6487 §4.2 |
| validity | 证书有效期 | notBefore:时间不能早于证书的生成时间。若时间段大于上级证书的有效期,也是有效的 | RFC6487 §4.6 |
## 3.4.2 Cert Extentions中字段的约束校验规则
RFC 6487中规定的扩展字段参见[3.2.2 ](#322-证书扩展字段-rfc-6487-48)
| 字段 | critical | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|----------------------------|----------|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| basicConstraints | Y | 证书类型 | CA证书:cA=TRUE; EE证书:cA=FALSE | RFC6487 §4.8.1 |
| subjectKeyIdentifier | N | 证书公钥 | SKI = SHA-1(DER-encoded SPKI bit string) | RFC6487 §4.8.2 |
| authorityKeyIdentifier | N | 父证书的公钥 | 字段只包含keyIdentifier,不能包含authorityCertIssuer和authorityCertSerialNumber;除了自签名CA外,其余证书必须出现。自签名CA若出现该字段,则等于SKI | RFC6487 §4.8.3 |
| keyUsage | Y | 证书公钥的用途权限 | CA证书:keyCertSign = TRUE, cRLSign = TRUE 其他都是FALSE。EE证书:digitalSignature = TRUE 其他都是FALSE | RFC6487 §4.8.4 |
| extendedKeyUsage | N | 扩展证书公钥的用途权限 | CA证书:不能出现EKU;验证 RPKI 对象的 EE 证书:不能出现EKU;非 RPKI 对象的 EE:可以出现EKU,但必须为non-critical. | RFC6487 §4.8.5 |
| cRLDistributionPoints | N | CRL的发布点位置 | 字段:distributionPoint,不能包含reasons、cRLIssuer。其中distributionPoint字段包含:fullName,不能包含nameRelativeToCRLIssuer。fullName的格式必须是URI。自签名证书禁止出现该字段。非自签名证书必须出现。一个CA只能有一个CRL。一个CRLDP只能包含一个distributionPoint。但一个distributionPoint字段中可以包含多于1个的URI,但必须包含rsync URI且必须是最新的。 | RFC6487 §4.8.6 |
| authorityInformationAccess | N | 签发者的发布点位置 | 除了自签名的CA,必须出现。自签名CA,禁止出现。推荐的URI访问方式是rsync,并且rsyncURI的话,必须指定accessMethod=id-ad-caIssuers | RFC6487 §4.8.7 |
| subjectInformationAccess | N | 发布点位置 | CA证书:必须存在。必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-caRepository,accessLocation=rsyncURI。必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-repiManifest,accessLocation=rsync URI,指向该CA的mft对象。 EE证书:必须存在。必须存在一个accessMethod=id-ad-signedObject,accessLocation=rsyncURI。不允许其他的accessMethod | RFC6487 §4.8.8 |
| certificatePolicies | Y | 证书策略 | 必须存在,并且只能存在一种策略:RFC 6484 — RPKI Certificate Policy (CP) | RFC6487 §4.8.9 |
| iPResources | Y | IP地址集合 | 所有的RPKI证书中必须包含IP Resources或者ASResources,或者两者都包含。 | RFC6487 §4.8.10 |
| aSResources | Y | ASN集合 | 所有的RPKI证书中必须包含IP Resources或者ASResources,或者两者都包含。 | RFC6487 §4.8.11 |

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# 03. RC(Resource Certificate:资源证书,CA/EE)
## 3.1 对象定位
资源证书(RC)是 X.509 v3 证书,遵循 PKIX profile(RFC 5280),并受 RPKI profile 进一步约束。RFC 6487 §4。
RC 在 RPKI 中至少分为两类语义用途:
- `CA 证书`:签发下级证书/CRL,并在 SIA 中声明发布点与 manifest。RFC 6487 §4.8.8.1。
- `EE 证书`:用于验证某个 RPKI Signed Object(如 ROA/MFT),在 SIA 中指向被验证对象。RFC 6487 §4.8.8.2。
## 3.2 原始载体与编码
- 载体:X.509 证书。
- 编码:DER。RFC 6487 §4(“valid X.509 public key certificate consistent with RFC 5280” + RPKI 限制)。
### 3.2.1 X.509 v3 证书基本语法(ASN.1;RFC 5280 §4.1)
资源证书在编码层面是 RFC 5280 定义的 X.509 v3 `Certificate`(DER),其中 `tbsCertificate` 携带主体字段与扩展集合(`Extensions`)。RFC 5280 §4.1。
```asn1
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING }
TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber,
signature AlgorithmIdentifier,
issuer Name,
validity Validity,
subject Name,
subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3
subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3
extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
-- If present, version MUST be v3
}
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
notBefore Time,
notAfter Time }
Time ::= CHOICE {
utcTime UTCTime,
generalTime GeneralizedTime }
UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING
SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }
Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension
Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
extnValue OCTET STRING
-- contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value
-- corresponding to the extension type identified
-- by extnID
}
```
### 3.2.2 AlgorithmIdentifier(ASN.1;RFC 5280 §4.1.1.2)
```asn1
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL }
```
### 3.2.3 Name / DN 结构(ASN.1;RFC 5280 §4.1.2.4)
```asn1
Name ::= CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now --
rdnSequence RDNSequence }
RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
RelativeDistinguishedName ::=
SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
type AttributeType,
value AttributeValue }
AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
AttributeValue ::= ANY -- DEFINED BY AttributeType
DirectoryString ::= CHOICE {
teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..MAX)),
printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX)),
universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..MAX)) }
```
### 3.2.4 GeneralNames / GeneralName(ASN.1;RFC 5280 §4.2.1.6)
> 说明:RPKI 的 AIA/SIA/CRLDP 等扩展通常把 URI 编码在 `uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String` 分支中。RFC 5280 §4.2.1.6。
```asn1
GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
otherName [0] OtherName,
rfc822Name [1] IA5String,
dNSName [2] IA5String,
x400Address [3] ORAddress,
directoryName [4] Name,
ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName,
uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,
registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE {
nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
partyName [1] DirectoryString }
```
### 3.2.5 AIA(Authority Information Access;ASN.1;RFC 5280 §4.2.2.1)
```asn1
id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 1 }
AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax ::=
SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription
AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE {
accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
accessLocation GeneralName }
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 2 }
```
### 3.2.6 SIA(Subject Information Access;ASN.1;RFC 5280 §4.2.2.2)
```asn1
id-pe-subjectInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 11 }
SubjectInfoAccessSyntax ::=
SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription
AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE {
accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
accessLocation GeneralName }
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
id-ad-caRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 5 }
```
### 3.2.7 RPKI 在 SIA 中新增/使用的 accessMethod OID(RFC 6487 §4.8.8.1 / §4.8.8.2;RFC 8182 §3.2)
> 说明:下列 OID 用于 `AccessDescription.accessMethod`,并放在 SIA 的 `extnValue` 内层结构中(其外层 extnID 仍为 SIA:`id-pe-subjectInfoAccess`)。RFC 6487 §4.8.8;RFC 8182 §3.2。
```asn1
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
id-ad-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 10 } -- 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.10
id-ad-signedObject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 } -- 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.11
id-ad-rpkiNotify OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 13 } -- 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.13
```
### 3.2.8 CRLDistributionPoints(CRLDP;ASN.1;RFC 5280 §4.2.1.13)
```asn1
id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 31 }
CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint
DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL }
DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE {
fullName [0] GeneralNames,
nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName }
ReasonFlags ::= BIT STRING {
unused (0),
keyCompromise (1),
cACompromise (2),
affiliationChanged (3),
superseded (4),
cessationOfOperation (5),
certificateHold (6),
privilegeWithdrawn (7),
aACompromise (8) }
```
### 3.2.9 Certificate Policies(ASN.1;RFC 5280 §4.2.1.4)
```asn1
id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 }
anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 }
certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation
PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
policyIdentifier CertPolicyId,
policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL }
CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId,
qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId }
-- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers
id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 }
id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 }
id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 }
PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice )
Qualifier ::= CHOICE {
cPSuri CPSuri,
userNotice UserNotice }
CPSuri ::= IA5String
```
### 3.2.10 RFC 3779 IP/AS 资源扩展(ASN.1;RFC 3779 §2.2.1-§2.2.3;RFC 3779 §3.2.1-§3.2.3)
> 说明:RFC 3779 给出两个扩展的 OID 与 ASN.1 语法;它们作为 X.509 v3 扩展出现在 `extensions` 中(外层 extnID 为下列 OID)。RPKI profile 进一步约束 criticality/SAFI/RDI 等,见 RFC 6487 §4.8.10-§4.8.11。
```asn1
-- IP Address Delegation Extension
id-pe-ipAddrBlocks OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 7 }
IPAddrBlocks ::= SEQUENCE OF IPAddressFamily
IPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE { -- AFI & optional SAFI --
addressFamily OCTET STRING (SIZE (2..3)),
ipAddressChoice IPAddressChoice }
IPAddressChoice ::= CHOICE {
inherit NULL, -- inherit from issuer --
addressesOrRanges SEQUENCE OF IPAddressOrRange }
IPAddressOrRange ::= CHOICE {
addressPrefix IPAddress,
addressRange IPAddressRange }
IPAddressRange ::= SEQUENCE {
min IPAddress,
max IPAddress }
IPAddress ::= BIT STRING
-- Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension
id-pe-autonomousSysIds OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 8 }
ASIdentifiers ::= SEQUENCE {
asnum [0] EXPLICIT ASIdentifierChoice OPTIONAL,
rdi [1] EXPLICIT ASIdentifierChoice OPTIONAL}
ASIdentifierChoice ::= CHOICE {
inherit NULL, -- inherit from issuer --
asIdsOrRanges SEQUENCE OF ASIdOrRange }
ASIdOrRange ::= CHOICE {
id ASId,
range ASRange }
ASRange ::= SEQUENCE {
min ASId,
max ASId }
ASId ::= INTEGER
```
### 3.2.11 其它 RPKI profile 相关扩展的 ASN.1 定义(RFC 5280 §4.2.1.1-§4.2.1.3;RFC 5280 §4.2.1.9;RFC 5280 §4.2.1.12)
> 说明:这些是 RPKI 资源证书 profile(RFC 6487 §4.8)所引用的通用 PKIX 扩展语法。RPKI 对其“必须/禁止/criticality/字段允许性”有额外限制(见本文件 3.3/3.4),但编码层的 ASN.1 类型来自 RFC 5280。
```asn1
id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 }
AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL }
KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 }
SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier
id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 }
KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
digitalSignature (0),
nonRepudiation (1), -- recent editions of X.509 have
-- renamed this bit to contentCommitment
keyEncipherment (2),
dataEncipherment (3),
keyAgreement (4),
keyCertSign (5),
cRLSign (6),
encipherOnly (7),
decipherOnly (8) }
id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 }
BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }
id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 }
ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
```
## 3.3 抽象数据模型(接口)
> 说明:本模型面向“语义化解析产物”。实现可保留 `raw_der` 作为可追溯入口。
### 3.3.1 顶层联合类型:`ResourceCertificate`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `raw_der` | `DerBytes` | 证书 DER | 原样保留(建议) | RFC 6487 §4 |
| `tbs` | `RpkixTbsCertificate` | 证书语义字段(见下) | 仅允许 RFC 6487 允许的字段/扩展;其他字段 MUST NOT 出现 | RFC 6487 §4 |
| `kind` | `enum { ca, ee }` | 语义分类 | 来自 BasicConstraints + 用途约束 | RFC 6487 §4.8.1;RFC 6487 §4.8.8 |
### 3.3.1.1 派生类型(用于字段类型标注)
为避免在其它对象文档里反复写“`ResourceCertificate` 且 `kind==...`”,这里定义两个派生/别名类型:
- `ResourceCaCertificate`:`ResourceCertificate` 且 `kind == ca`
- `ResourceEeCertificate`:`ResourceCertificate` 且 `kind == ee`
这些派生类型不引入新字段,只是对 `ResourceCertificate.kind` 的约束化视图。
### 3.3.2 `RpkixTbsCertificate`(语义字段集合)
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `version` | `int` | X.509 版本 | MUST 为 v3(字段值为 2) | RFC 6487 §4.1 |
| `serial_number` | `int` | 序列号 | 正整数;对每 CA 签发唯一 | RFC 6487 §4.2 |
| `signature_algorithm` | `Oid` | 证书签名算法 | 必须为 `sha256WithRSAEncryption`(`1.2.840.113549.1.1.11`) | RFC 6487 §4.3;RFC 7935 §2(引用 RFC 4055) |
| `issuer_dn` | `RpkixDistinguishedName` | 颁发者 DN | 必含 1 个 CommonName;可含 1 个 serialNumber;CN 必须 PrintableString | RFC 6487 §4.4 |
| `subject_dn` | `RpkixDistinguishedName` | 主体 DN | 同 issuer 约束;且对同一 issuer 下“实体+公钥”唯一 | RFC 6487 §4.5 |
| `validity_not_before` | `UtcTime` | 有效期起 | X.509 `Time`(UTCTime/GeneralizedTime)解析为 UTC 时间点 | RFC 6487 §4.6.1;RFC 5280 §4.1.2.5 |
| `validity_not_after` | `UtcTime` | 有效期止 | X.509 `Time`(UTCTime/GeneralizedTime)解析为 UTC 时间点 | RFC 6487 §4.6.2;RFC 5280 §4.1.2.5 |
| `subject_public_key_info` | `DerBytes` | SPKI DER | 算法 profile 指定 | RFC 6487 §4.7;RFC 7935 §3.1 |
| `extensions` | `RpkixExtensions` | 扩展集合 | 见下表;criticality/存在性/内容受约束 | RFC 6487 §4.8 |
### 3.3.3 `RpkixDistinguishedName`(RPKI profile 下的 DN 语义)
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `common_name` | `string` | CommonName (CN) | MUST 存在且仅 1 个;类型为 PrintableString | RFC 6487 §4.4;RFC 6487 §4.5 |
| `serial_number` | `optional[string]` | serialNumber | MAY 存在且仅 1 个 | RFC 6487 §4.4;RFC 6487 §4.5 |
| `rfc4514` | `string` | DN 的 RFC4514 字符串表示 | 便于日志/索引(实现自选) | RFC 6487 §4.5(引用 RFC4514) |
### 3.3.4 `RpkixExtensions`(核心扩展语义)
> 表中 “存在性/criticality” 指 RPKI profile 下对该扩展的要求;实现应能区分 “字段缺失” 与 “字段存在但不符合约束”。
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 存在性/criticality 与内容约束 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `basic_constraints` | `optional[BasicConstraints]` | CA 标志 | **extnID=`2.5.29.19`**;CA 证书:MUST present & critical;EE:MUST NOT present;pathLen MUST NOT present | RFC 6487 §4.8.1;RFC 5280 §4.2.1.9 |
| `subject_key_identifier` | `bytes` | SKI | **extnID=`2.5.29.14`**;MUST present & non-critical;值为 subjectPublicKey 的 DER bit string 的 SHA-1 哈希 | RFC 6487 §4.8.2(引用 RFC 5280 §4.2.1.2) |
| `authority_key_identifier` | `optional[AuthorityKeyIdentifier]` | AKI | **extnID=`2.5.29.35`**;自签名:MAY present 且可等于 SKI;非自签名:MUST present;authorityCertIssuer/authorityCertSerialNumber MUST NOT present;non-critical | RFC 6487 §4.8.3;RFC 5280 §4.2.1.1 |
| `key_usage` | `KeyUsage` | KeyUsage | **extnID=`2.5.29.15`**;MUST present & critical;CA:仅 `keyCertSign` 与 `cRLSign` 为 TRUE;EE:仅 `digitalSignature` 为 TRUE | RFC 6487 §4.8.4;RFC 5280 §4.2.1.3 |
| `extended_key_usage` | `optional[OidSet]` | EKU | **extnID=`2.5.29.37`**;CA:MUST NOT appear;用于验证 RPKI 对象的 EE:MUST NOT appear;若出现不得标 critical | RFC 6487 §4.8.5;RFC 5280 §4.2.1.12 |
| `crl_distribution_points` | `optional[CrlDistributionPoints]` | CRLDP | **extnID=`2.5.29.31`**;自签名:MUST be omitted;非自签名:MUST present & non-critical;仅 1 个 DistributionPoint;fullName URI;必须包含至少 1 个 `rsync://` | RFC 6487 §4.8.6;RFC 5280 §4.2.1.13 |
| `authority_info_access` | `optional[AuthorityInfoAccess]` | AIA | **extnID=`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1`**;自签名:MUST be omitted;非自签名:MUST present & non-critical;必须含 accessMethod `id-ad-caIssuers`(**`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2`**) 的 `rsync://` URI;可含同对象其它 URI | RFC 6487 §4.8.7;RFC 5280 §4.2.2.1 |
| `subject_info_access_ca` | `optional[SubjectInfoAccessCa]` | SIA(CA) | **extnID=`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11`**;CA:MUST present & non-critical;必须含 accessMethod `id-ad-caRepository`(**`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.5`**)(`rsync://` 目录 URI)与 `id-ad-rpkiManifest`(**`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.10`**)(`rsync://` 对象 URI);若 CA 使用 RRDP,还会包含 `id-ad-rpkiNotify`(**`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.13`**)(HTTPS Notification URI) | RFC 6487 §4.8.8.1;RFC 5280 §4.2.2.2;RFC 8182 §3.2 |
| `subject_info_access_ee` | `optional[SubjectInfoAccessEe]` | SIA(EE) | **extnID=`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11`**;EE:MUST present & non-critical;必须含 accessMethod `id-ad-signedObject`(**`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.11`**);URI **MUST include** `rsync://`;EE 的 SIA 不允许其它 AccessMethods | RFC 6487 §4.8.8.2;RFC 5280 §4.2.2.2 |
| `certificate_policies` | `CertificatePolicies` | 证书策略 | **extnID=`2.5.29.32`**;MUST present & critical;恰好 1 个 policy;并允许 0 或 1 个 CPS qualifier(若存在其 id 必为 `id-qt-cps`(**`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.2.1`**)) | RFC 6487 §4.8.9;RFC 7318 §2;RFC 5280 §4.2.1.4 |
| `ip_resources` | `optional[IpResourceSet]` | IP 资源扩展 | **extnID=`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.7`**;IP/AS 两者至少其一 MUST present;若 present MUST be critical;内容为 RFC 3779 语义;在公用互联网场景 SAFI MUST NOT 使用;且必须为非空或 inherit | RFC 6487 §4.8.10;RFC 3779 §2.2.1;RFC 3779 §2.2.2 |
| `as_resources` | `optional[AsResourceSet]` | AS 资源扩展 | **extnID=`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.8`**;IP/AS 两者至少其一 MUST present;若 present MUST be critical;内容为 RFC 3779 语义;RDI MUST NOT 使用;且必须为非空或 inherit | RFC 6487 §4.8.11;RFC 3779 §3.2.1;RFC 3779 §3.2.2 |
### 3.3.5 结构化子类型(建议)
#### `BasicConstraints`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `ca` | `bool` | 是否 CA | 由 issuer 决定;在 CA 证书中该扩展必须存在 | RFC 6487 §4.8.1 |
| `path_len_constraint` | `None` | pathLenConstraint | MUST NOT present(RPKI profile 不使用) | RFC 6487 §4.8.1 |
#### `AuthorityKeyIdentifier`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `key_identifier` | `bytes` | AKI.keyIdentifier | 使用 issuer 公钥的 SHA-1 哈希(按 RFC 5280 的定义) | RFC 6487 §4.8.3(引用 RFC 5280 §4.2.1.1) |
| `authority_cert_issuer` | `None` | authorityCertIssuer | MUST NOT present | RFC 6487 §4.8.3 |
| `authority_cert_serial_number` | `None` | authorityCertSerialNumber | MUST NOT present | RFC 6487 §4.8.3 |
#### `CrlDistributionPoints`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `distribution_point_uris` | `list[Uri]` | CRL 位置列表 | 仅 1 个 DistributionPoint;必须包含至少 1 个 `rsync://` URI 指向该 issuer 最新 CRL;可含其它 URI | RFC 6487 §4.8.6 |
#### `AuthorityInfoAccess`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `ca_issuers_uris` | `list[Uri]` | 上级 CA 证书位置 | accessMethod=`id-ad-caIssuers`(`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2`);必含 `rsync://` URI;可含同对象其它 URI | RFC 6487 §4.8.7;RFC 5280 §4.2.2.1 |
#### `SubjectInfoAccessCa`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `ca_repository_uris` | `list[Uri]` | CA 发布点目录(repository publication point) | accessMethod=`id-ad-caRepository`(`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.5`);至少 1 个;必须包含 `rsync://`;也可包含其它机制(例如 `https://`)作为“同一目录”的替代访问方式;顺序表示 CA 偏好 | RFC 6487 §4.8.8.1;RFC 5280 §4.2.2.2 |
| `rpki_manifest_uris` | `list[Uri]` | 当前 manifest 对象 URI | accessMethod=`id-ad-rpkiManifest`(`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.10`);至少 1 个;必须包含 `rsync://`;也可包含其它机制(例如 `https://`)作为“同一对象”的替代访问方式 | RFC 6487 §4.8.8.1;RFC 5280 §4.2.2.2 |
| `rpki_notify_uris` | `optional[list[Uri]]` | RRDP Notification(Update Notification File)URI | accessMethod=`id-ad-rpkiNotify`(`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.13`);若存在则 accessLocation MUST 为 `https://` URI,指向 RRDP Notification 文件 | RFC 8182 §3.2;RFC 5280 §4.2.2.2 |
#### `SubjectInfoAccessEe`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `signed_object_uris` | `list[Uri]` | 被 EE 证书验证的签名对象位置 | accessMethod=`id-ad-signedObject`(`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.11`);必须包含 `rsync://`;其它 URI 可作为同对象替代机制;EE SIA 不允许其它 AccessMethods | RFC 6487 §4.8.8.2;RFC 5280 §4.2.2.2 |
#### `CertificatePolicies`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `policy_oid` | `Oid` | 唯一 policy OID | 恰好 1 个 policy;RPKI CP 分配的 OID 为 `id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber`(`1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2`) | RFC 6487 §4.8.9;RFC 6484 §1.2 |
| `cps_uri` | `optional[Uri]` | CPS policy qualifier URI | MAY 存在且最多 1 个;若存在其 `policyQualifierId` 必为 `id-qt-cps`;对该 URI 不施加处理要求 | RFC 7318 §2;RFC 5280 §4.2.1.4 |
## 3.4 字段级约束清单(实现对照)
- 仅允许 RFC 6487 §4 指定的字段/扩展;未列出字段 MUST NOT 出现。RFC 6487 §4。
- 证书版本必须为 v3。RFC 6487 §4.1。
- CA/EE 在 BasicConstraints 与 SIA 的约束不同。RFC 6487 §4.8.1;RFC 6487 §4.8.8.1;RFC 6487 §4.8.8.2。
- KeyUsage:CA 仅 `keyCertSign`/`cRLSign`;EE 仅 `digitalSignature`。RFC 6487 §4.8.4。
- CRLDP/AIA:自签名必须省略;非自签名必须存在并包含 `rsync://`。RFC 6487 §4.8.6;RFC 6487 §4.8.7。
- IP/AS 资源扩展:两者至少其一存在;若存在必须 critical;语义来自 RFC 3779;在公用互联网场景 SAFI 与 RDI 均不得使用。RFC 6487 §4.8.10;RFC 6487 §4.8.11;RFC 3779 §2.2.3;RFC 3779 §3.2.3。

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# 05. RPKI Signed Object(CMS SignedData 外壳)
## 5.1 对象定位
ROA、Manifest 等都属于 “RPKI Signed Object”,其外壳是 CMS SignedData,并受 RFC 6488 的 profile 约束;RFC 9589 进一步更新了 `signedAttrs` 的要求。RFC 6488 §2-§4;RFC 9589 §4。
本文件描述**通用外壳模型**(eContentType/eContent 由具体对象文档给出)。
## 5.2 原始载体与编码
- 载体:CMS `ContentInfo`,其中 `contentType` 为 SignedData。RFC 6488 §2;RFC 6488 §3(1a)。
- 编码:DER。RFC 6488 §2;RFC 6488 §3(1l)。
### 5.2.1 CMS 外壳:ContentInfo(ASN.1;RFC 5652 §3)
```asn1
ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
contentType ContentType,
content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType }
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
```
### 5.2.2 CMS 外壳:SignedData(ASN.1;RFC 5652 §5.1)
```asn1
id-signedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 2 }
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
crls [1] IMPLICIT RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL,
signerInfos SignerInfos }
DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo
```
### 5.2.3 CMS 外壳:EncapsulatedContentInfo(ASN.1;RFC 5652 §5.2)
```asn1
EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
eContentType ContentType,
eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
```
> 注:CMS 允许 `eContent` 不一定 DER 编码(RFC 5652 §5.2);但 RPKI signed object profile 要求**整个对象 DER 编码**(RFC 6488 §2;RFC 6488 §3(1l)),且 eContent(payload)由对象规范定义并通常为 DER(如 ROA:RFC 9582 §4;Manifest:RFC 9286 §4.2)。
### 5.2.4 CMS 外壳:SignerInfo 与 Attribute(ASN.1;RFC 5652 §5.3)
```asn1
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
sid SignerIdentifier,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
signature SignatureValue,
unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes OPTIONAL }
SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier }
SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
UnsignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
attrValues SET OF AttributeValue }
AttributeValue ::= ANY
SignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING
```
### 5.2.5 RPKI 对 CMS 外壳字段的 profile 约束(RFC 6488 §2.1;RFC 6488 §3;更新:RFC 9589 §4)
> 说明:上面是 CMS 的通用 ASN.1;RPKI 进一步约束取值与允许出现的字段(例如 SignedData.version 必须为 3、crls 必须省略、signedAttrs 的内容限制等)。RFC 6488 §2-§3;RFC 9589 §4。
### 5.2.6 signedAttrs 中允许的属性与 attrType OID(RFC 6488 §2.1.6.4.1-§2.1.6.4.2;更新:RFC 9589 §4)
RPKI signed object profile 对 `SignerInfo.signedAttrs` 的 Attribute 集合施加限制(除 ASN.1 结构外,还包含“只允许哪些 attrType”的编码约束):
- `content-type`:attrType OID `1.2.840.113549.1.9.3`。RFC 6488 §2.1.6.4.1。
- `message-digest`:attrType OID `1.2.840.113549.1.9.4`。RFC 6488 §2.1.6.4.2。
- `signing-time`:attrType OID `1.2.840.113549.1.9.5`。RFC 9589 §4(更新 RFC 6488 的相关要求)。
并且:
- 每种属性在集合中只能出现一次;且 `attrValues` 虽然语法是 `SET OF`,但在 RPKI 中必须只含一个值。RFC 6488 §2.1.6.4。
## 5.3 抽象数据模型(接口)
### 5.3.1 `RpkiSignedObject`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `raw_der` | `DerBytes` | CMS DER | 原样保留(建议) | RFC 6488 §2;RFC 6488 §3(1l) |
| `content_info_content_type` | `Oid` | ContentInfo.contentType | MUST 为 SignedData:`1.2.840.113549.1.7.2` | RFC 6488 §3(1a) |
| `signed_data` | `SignedDataProfiled` | SignedData 语义字段 | 见下 | RFC 6488 §2.1;RFC 6488 §3 |
### 5.3.2 `SignedDataProfiled`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `version` | `int` | SignedData.version | MUST 为 3 | RFC 6488 §3(1b);RFC 6488 §2.1.1 |
| `digest_algorithms` | `list[Oid]` | SignedData.digestAlgorithms | MUST contain exactly one digest algorithm,且必须为 `id-sha256`(`2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1`) | RFC 6488 §2.1.2;RFC 7935 §2(引用 RFC 5754) |
| `encap_content_info` | `EncapsulatedContentInfo` | EncapsulatedContentInfo | 见下;eContentType 由具体对象定义 | RFC 6488 §2.1.3 |
| `certificates` | `list[ResourceEeCertificate]` | SignedData.certificates | MUST present;且仅包含 1 个 EE 证书;该 EE 的 SKI 必须匹配 SignerInfo.sid | RFC 6488 §3(1c) |
| `crls` | `None` | SignedData.crls | MUST be omitted | RFC 6488 §3(1d) |
| `signer_infos` | `list[SignerInfoProfiled]` | SignedData.signerInfos | MUST contain exactly one SignerInfo | RFC 6488 §2.1;RFC 6488 §2.1(SignerInfos 约束段落) |
### 5.3.3 `EncapsulatedContentInfo`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `econtent_type` | `Oid` | eContentType | MUST 与 signedAttrs.content-type 的 attrValues 一致;具体值由对象定义(如 ROA/MFT) | RFC 6488 §3(1h);RFC 6488 §2.1.3.1 |
| `econtent_der` | `DerBytes` | eContent(对象 payload) | DER 编码的对象特定 ASN.1(ROA/MFT 文档定义);在 CMS 中以 OCTET STRING 承载 | RFC 6488 §2.1.3;RFC 9286 §4.2;RFC 9582 §4 |
### 5.3.4 `SignerInfoProfiled`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `version` | `int` | SignerInfo.version | MUST 为 3 | RFC 6488 §3(1e) |
| `sid_ski` | `bytes` | sid(SubjectKeyIdentifier) | 必须与 EE 证书的 SKI 匹配 | RFC 6488 §3(1c) |
| `digest_algorithm` | `Oid` | SignerInfo.digestAlgorithm | 必须为 `id-sha256`(`2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1`) | RFC 6488 §3(1j);RFC 7935 §2(引用 RFC 5754) |
| `signature_algorithm` | `Oid` | SignerInfo.signatureAlgorithm | 生成时 MUST 为 `rsaEncryption`(`1.2.840.113549.1.1.1`);验证时实现必须接受 `rsaEncryption` 或 `sha256WithRSAEncryption`(`1.2.840.113549.1.1.11`) | RFC 6488 §3(1k);RFC 7935 §2 |
| `signed_attrs` | `SignedAttrsProfiled` | signedAttrs | MUST present;仅允许特定 3 个属性 | RFC 9589 §4(更新 RFC 6488 §3(1f)/(1g)) |
| `unsigned_attrs` | `None` | unsignedAttrs | MUST be omitted | RFC 6488 §3(1i) |
### 5.3.5 `SignedAttrsProfiled`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `content_type` | `Oid` | signedAttrs.content-type | attrType=`1.2.840.113549.1.9.3`;MUST present;attrValues 等于 eContentType | RFC 9589 §4;RFC 6488 §3(1h) |
| `message_digest` | `bytes` | signedAttrs.message-digest | attrType=`1.2.840.113549.1.9.4`;MUST present | RFC 9589 §4(更新 RFC 6488 §3(1f)) |
| `signing_time` | `UtcTime` | signedAttrs.signing-time | attrType=`1.2.840.113549.1.9.5`;MUST present(时间值正确性不用于安全假设) | RFC 9589 §4;RFC 9589 §5 |
| `other_attrs` | `None` | 其它 signed attributes | MUST NOT be included(binary-signing-time 也不允许) | RFC 9589 §4 |
## 5.4 字段级约束清单(实现对照)
- ContentInfo.contentType 必须为 SignedData(OID `1.2.840.113549.1.7.2`)。RFC 6488 §3(1a)。
- SignedData.version 必须为 3,且 SignerInfos 仅允许 1 个 SignerInfo。RFC 6488 §3(1b);RFC 6488 §2.1。
- SignedData.certificates 必须存在且仅含 1 个 EE 证书;该证书 SKI 必须匹配 SignerInfo.sid。RFC 6488 §3(1c)。
- SignedData.crls 必须省略。RFC 6488 §3(1d)。
- signedAttrs 必须存在,且仅允许 content-type/message-digest/signing-time;其它全部禁止。RFC 9589 §4。
- eContentType 必须与 content-type attribute 一致。RFC 6488 §3(1h)。
- unsignedAttrs 必须省略。RFC 6488 §3(1i)。
- digest/signature 算法必须符合算法 profile。RFC 6488 §3(1j)/(1k);RFC 7935 §2。
- 整个对象必须 DER 编码。RFC 6488 §3(1l)。

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# 06. Manifest(MFT)
## 6.1 对象定位
Manifest 是 CA 发布点内对象的“清单”(文件名 + hash),用于 RP 侧检测删除/替换/回放等不一致情况。RFC 9286 §1;RFC 9286 §6。
Manifest 是一种 RPKI Signed Object:CMS 外壳遵循 RFC 6488/9589,eContent 遵循 RFC 9286。RFC 9286 §4;RFC 6488 §4;RFC 9589 §4。
## 6.2 原始载体与编码
- 外壳:CMS SignedData DER(见 `05_signed_object_cms.md`)。RFC 9286 §4;RFC 6488 §2。
- eContentType:`id-ct-rpkiManifest`,OID `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26`。RFC 9286 §4.1。
- eContent:DER 编码 ASN.1 `Manifest`。RFC 9286 §4.2。
### 6.2.1 eContentType 与 eContent 的 ASN.1 定义(RFC 9286 §4.1;RFC 9286 §4.2)
Manifest 是一种 RPKI signed object(CMS 外壳见 `05_signed_object_cms.md`)。其 `eContentType` 与 `eContent` 的 ASN.1 由 RFC 9286 明确定义。RFC 9286 §4。
**eContentType(OID)**:RFC 9286 §4.1。
```asn1
id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 }
id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
id-ct-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 26 }
```
**eContent(Manifest 结构)**:RFC 9286 §4.2。
```asn1
Manifest ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
manifestNumber INTEGER (0..MAX),
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
nextUpdate GeneralizedTime,
fileHashAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
fileList SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX) OF FileAndHash
}
FileAndHash ::= SEQUENCE {
file IA5String,
hash BIT STRING
}
```
解码要点:
- `fileHashAlg` 决定 `FileAndHash.hash` 的算法与输出长度(RPKI profile 要求 SHA-256)。RFC 9286 §4.2.1;RFC 7935 §2。
- `hash` 在 ASN.1 中是 BIT STRING,但 hash 输出是按字节的比特串,DER 编码时应为 “unused bits = 0” 的 octet-aligned BIT STRING(实现可据此做一致性检查)。RFC 9286 §4.2。
## 6.3 解析规则(eContent 语义层)
输入:`RpkiSignedObject`。
1) 先按通用 Signed Object 外壳解析得到 `encap_content_info.econtent_type` 与 `econtent_der`。RFC 6488 §3;RFC 9589 §4。
2) 要求 `econtent_type == 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26`。RFC 9286 §4.1;RFC 9286 §4.4(1)。
3) 将 `econtent_der` 以 DER 解析为 `Manifest` ASN.1。RFC 9286 §4.2。
4) 将 `fileList` 映射为语义字段 `files: list[FileAndHash]`,其中 `hash` 为 `fileHashAlg` 对应算法的输出字节序列。RFC 9286 §4.2.1(fileHashAlg/fileList 定义)。
## 6.4 抽象数据模型(接口)
### 6.4.1 `ManifestObject`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `signed_object` | `RpkiSignedObject` | CMS 外壳 | 外壳约束见 RFC 6488/9589 | RFC 9286 §4;RFC 6488 §3;RFC 9589 §4 |
| `econtent_type` | `Oid` | eContentType | 必须为 `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26` | RFC 9286 §4.1 |
| `manifest` | `ManifestEContent` | eContent 语义对象 | 见下 | RFC 9286 §4.2 |
### 6.4.2 `ManifestEContent`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `version` | `int` | Manifest.version | MUST 为 0 | RFC 9286 §4.2.1(version) |
| `manifest_number` | `int` | manifestNumber | 0..MAX;可达 20 octets;issuer 必须单调递增;RP 必须可处理至 20 octets | RFC 9286 §4.2;RFC 9286 §4.2.1(manifestNumber) |
| `this_update` | `UtcTime` | thisUpdate | 由 ASN.1 `GeneralizedTime` 解析为 UTC 时间点;且必须比先前生成的 manifest 更新 | RFC 9286 §4.2;RFC 9286 §4.2.1(thisUpdate) |
| `next_update` | `UtcTime` | nextUpdate | 由 ASN.1 `GeneralizedTime` 解析为 UTC 时间点;且必须晚于 thisUpdate | RFC 9286 §4.2;RFC 9286 §4.2.1(nextUpdate) |
| `file_hash_alg` | `Oid` | fileHashAlg | 必须为 `id-sha256`(`2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1`) | RFC 9286 §4.2.1(fileHashAlg);RFC 7935 §2(引用 RFC 5754) |
| `files` | `list[FileAndHash]` | fileList | `SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX)`;每项含文件名与 hash | RFC 9286 §4.2;RFC 9286 §4.2.1(fileList) |
### 6.4.3 `FileAndHash`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `file_name` | `string` | 文件名(不含路径) | 字符集限制:`[a-zA-Z0-9-_]+` + `.` + 三字母扩展;扩展必须在 IANA “RPKI Repository Name Schemes” 注册表中 | RFC 9286 §4.2.2 |
| `hash_bytes` | `bytes` | 文件内容 hash | 由 `file_hash_alg` 指定算法计算 | RFC 9286 §4.2.1(fileHashAlg/fileList) |
## 6.5 字段级约束清单(实现对照)
- eContentType 必须为 `id-ct-rpkiManifest`(OID `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26`)。RFC 9286 §4.1。
- eContent 必须 DER 编码且符合 `Manifest` ASN.1。RFC 9286 §4.2。
- `version` 必须为 0。RFC 9286 §4.2.1。
- `manifestNumber` 由 issuer 单调递增;RP 必须能处理至 20 octets;issuer 不得超过 20 octets。RFC 9286 §4.2.1。
- `nextUpdate` 必须晚于 `thisUpdate`。RFC 9286 §4.2.1。
- `fileHashAlg` 必须符合算法 profile(SHA-256)。RFC 9286 §4.2.1;RFC 7935 §2。
- `fileList` 中 `file` 名称字符集与扩展名受限;实现需按 RFC 限制解析并保留大小写语义。RFC 9286 §4.2.2。
## 6.6 与 EE 证书的语义约束(为后续验证准备)
Manifest 使用“one-time-use EE certificate”进行签名验证,规范对该 EE 证书的使用方式给出约束:
- Manifest 相关 EE 证书应为 one-time-use(每次新 manifest 生成新密钥对/新 EE)。RFC 9286 §4(Section 4 前导段落)。
- 用于签名/验证 manifest 的 EE 证书在 RFC 3779 的资源扩展中描述 INRs 时,**MUST** 使用 `inherit`(而不是显式列出资源集合)。RFC 9286 §5.1(生成步骤 2)。
- 若证书包含 **IP Address Delegation Extension**(IP prefix delegation):内容必须为 `inherit`(不得显式列 prefix/range)。RFC 9286 §5.1;RFC 3779。
- 若证书包含 **AS Identifier Delegation Extension**(ASN delegation):内容必须为 `inherit`(不得显式列 ASID/range)。RFC 9286 §5.1;RFC 3779。
- 另外按资源证书 profile:资源证书 **MUST** 至少包含上述两类扩展之一(也可两者都有),且这些扩展 **MUST** 标记为 critical。RFC 6487 §2。
- 用于验证 manifest 的 EE 证书 **MUST** 具有与 `thisUpdate..nextUpdate` 区间一致的有效期,以避免 CRL 无谓增长。RFC 9286 §4.2.1(manifestNumber 段落前的说明)。
- 替换 manifest 时,CA 必须撤销旧 manifest 对应 EE 证书;且若新 manifest 早于旧 manifest 的 nextUpdate 发行,则 CA **MUST** 同时发行新 CRL 撤销旧 manifest EE。RFC 9286 §4.2.1(nextUpdate 段落末);RFC 9286 §5.1(生成步骤)。

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# 07. ROA(Route Origin Authorization)
## 7.1 对象定位
ROA 是一种 RPKI Signed Object,用于声明“某 AS 被授权起源某些前缀”。RFC 9582 §1;RFC 9582 §4。
ROA 由 CMS 外壳 + ROA eContent 组成:
- 外壳:RFC 6488(更新:RFC 9589)
- eContent:RFC 9582
## 7.2 原始载体与编码
- 外壳:CMS SignedData DER(见 `05_signed_object_cms.md`)。RFC 9582 §1(引用 RFC 6488)。
- eContentType:`id-ct-routeOriginAuthz`,OID `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24`。RFC 9582 §3。
- eContent:DER 编码 ASN.1 `RouteOriginAttestation`。RFC 9582 §4。
### 7.2.1 eContentType 与 eContent 的 ASN.1 定义(RFC 9582 §3;RFC 9582 §4)
ROA 是一种 RPKI signed object(CMS 外壳见 `05_signed_object_cms.md`)。RFC 9582 定义了其 `eContentType` 以及 `eContent`(payload)的 ASN.1。RFC 9582 §3-§4。
**eContentType(OID)**:RFC 9582 §3。
```asn1
id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) }
```
**eContent(ROA ASN.1 模块)**:RFC 9582 §4。
```asn1
RPKI-ROA-2023
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0)
id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(75) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;
ct-routeOriginAttestation CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE RouteOriginAttestation
IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-routeOriginAuthz }
id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) }
RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
asID ASID,
ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }
ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
addressFamily ADDRESS-FAMILY.&afi ({AddressFamilySet}),
addresses ADDRESS-FAMILY.&Addresses
({AddressFamilySet}{@addressFamily}) }
ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= CLASS {
&afi OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) UNIQUE,
&Addresses
} WITH SYNTAX { AFI &afi ADDRESSES &Addresses }
AddressFamilySet ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
{ addressFamilyIPv4 | addressFamilyIPv6 }
addressFamilyIPv4 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
{ AFI afi-IPv4 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv4 }
addressFamilyIPv6 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
{ AFI afi-IPv6 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv6 }
afi-IPv4 OCTET STRING ::= '0001'H
afi-IPv6 OCTET STRING ::= '0002'H
ROAAddressesIPv4 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv4}
ROAAddressesIPv6 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv6}
ub-IPv4 INTEGER ::= 32
ub-IPv6 INTEGER ::= 128
ROAIPAddress {INTEGER: ub} ::= SEQUENCE {
address BIT STRING (SIZE(0..ub)),
maxLength INTEGER (0..ub) OPTIONAL }
END
```
编码/解码要点(与上面 ASN.1 结构直接对应):
- `addressFamily` 仅允许 IPv4/IPv6 两种 AFI,并且每个 AFI 最多出现一次。RFC 9582 §4.3.1。
- `address` 是 BIT STRING 表示的前缀,语义与 RFC 3779 的 `IPAddress` 一致(按前缀长度截断,DER unused bits 置零)。RFC 9582 §4.3.2.1(引用 RFC 3779 §2.2.3.8)。
- `maxLength` 为可选字段,出现与否会影响语义与编码规范约束(例如等于前缀长时不建议编码)。RFC 9582 §4.3.2.2。
## 7.3 解析规则(eContent 语义层)
输入:`RpkiSignedObject`。
1) 解析 CMS 外壳,得到 `econtent_type` 与 `econtent_der`。RFC 6488 §3;RFC 9589 §4。
2) 要求 `econtent_type == 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24`。RFC 9582 §3。
3) 将 `econtent_der` 以 DER 解析为 `RouteOriginAttestation` ASN.1。RFC 9582 §4。
4) 将 `ipAddrBlocks` 解析为“前缀集合”的语义结构,并建议按 RFC 9582 给出的 canonicalization 过程做去重/排序/归一化(以便后续处理一致)。RFC 9582 §4.3.3。
## 7.4 抽象数据模型(接口)
### 7.4.1 `RoaObject`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `signed_object` | `RpkiSignedObject` | CMS 外壳 | 外壳约束见 RFC 6488/9589 | RFC 9582 §1;RFC 6488 §3;RFC 9589 §4 |
| `econtent_type` | `Oid` | eContentType | 必须为 `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24` | RFC 9582 §3 |
| `roa` | `RoaEContent` | eContent 语义对象 | 见下 | RFC 9582 §4 |
### 7.4.2 `RoaEContent`(RouteOriginAttestation)
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `version` | `int` | version | MUST 为 0 | RFC 9582 §4.1 |
| `as_id` | `int` | asID | 0..4294967295 | RFC 9582 §4(ASID 定义);RFC 9582 §4.2 |
| `ip_addr_blocks` | `list[RoaIpAddressFamily]` | ipAddrBlocks | `SIZE(1..2)`;最多 IPv4/IPv6 各一个;建议 canonicalize | RFC 9582 §4;RFC 9582 §4.3.1;RFC 9582 §4.3.3 |
### 7.4.3 `RoaIpAddressFamily`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `afi` | `enum { ipv4, ipv6 }` | Address Family | MUST 为 IPv4(0001) 或 IPv6(0002) | RFC 9582 §4.3.1 |
| `addresses` | `list[RoaIpAddress]` | 前缀列表 | `SIZE(1..MAX)`;每项为前缀 + 可选 maxLength | RFC 9582 §4(ROAAddressesIPv4/IPv6);RFC 9582 §4.3.2 |
### 7.4.4 `RoaIpAddress`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `prefix` | `IpPrefix` | 前缀 | address 以 BIT STRING 表示前缀(同 RFC 3779 IPAddress 表示) | RFC 9582 §4.3.2.1(引用 RFC 3779 §2.2.3.8) |
| `max_length` | `optional[int]` | 最大允许前缀长 | 若存在:必须 `>= prefix_len` 且 `<= 32/128`;并且 `maxLength == prefix_len` 时 **SHOULD NOT** 编码(未来 RP 可能视为编码错误) | RFC 9582 §4.3.2.2 |
## 7.5 字段级约束清单(实现对照)
- eContentType 必须为 `id-ct-routeOriginAuthz`(OID `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24`),且该 OID 必须同时出现在 eContentType 与 signedAttrs.content-type。RFC 9582 §3(引用 RFC 6488)。
- eContent 必须 DER 编码并符合 `RouteOriginAttestation` ASN.1。RFC 9582 §4。
- `version` 必须为 0。RFC 9582 §4.1。
- `ipAddrBlocks` 长度为 1..2;每种 AFI 最多出现一次;仅支持 IPv4/IPv6。RFC 9582 §4;RFC 9582 §4.3.1。
- `maxLength` 若存在必须在范围内,且不应出现“等于前缀长”的冗余编码。RFC 9582 §4.3.2.2。
- 建议按 canonical form 归一化/排序以利一致处理。RFC 9582 §4.3.3。
## 7.6 与 EE 证书的语义约束(为后续验证准备)
ROA 的外壳包含一个 EE 证书,用于验证 ROA 签名;RFC 对该 EE 证书与 ROA payload 的匹配关系提出要求:
- ROA 的 EE 证书必须是有效的 RPKI EE 证书(路径从 TA 到 EE 可建立),并用于验证 CMS 签名。RFC 9582 §1(引用 RFC 6488);RFC 6488 §3(2)-(3)。
- ROA EE 证书中的 IP 资源扩展必须存在且不得使用 inherit。RFC 9582 §5。
- ROA EE 证书中 AS 资源扩展不得出现。RFC 9582 §5。
- ROA payload 中每个前缀必须包含在 EE 证书的 IP 资源集合内(资源包含语义来自 RFC 3779)。RFC 9582 §5;RFC 3779 §2.3。

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# 08. ASPA(Autonomous System Provider Authorization)
## 8.1 对象定位
ASPA(Autonomous System Provider Authorization)是一种 RPKI Signed Object,用于由“客户 AS”(Customer AS, CAS)签名声明其上游“提供者 AS”(Provider AS, PAS)集合,以支持路由泄漏(route leak)检测/缓解。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21`;`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification`。
ASPA 由 CMS 外壳 + ASPA eContent 组成:
- 外壳:RFC 6488(更新:RFC 9589)
- eContent:`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21`
## 8.2 原始载体与编码
- 外壳:CMS SignedData DER(见 `05_signed_object_cms.md`)。RFC 6488 §2-§3;RFC 9589 §4。
- eContentType:`id-ct-ASPA`,OID `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49`。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §2。
- eContent:DER 编码 ASN.1 `ASProviderAttestation`。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §3。
### 8.2.1 eContentType 与 eContent 的 ASN.1 定义(`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §2-§3)
ASPA 是一种 RPKI signed object(CMS 外壳见 `05_signed_object_cms.md`)。其 `eContentType` 与 `eContent`(payload)的 ASN.1 定义见 `draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §2-§3。
**eContentType(OID)**:`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §2。
```asn1
id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) aspa(49) }
```
**eContent(ASPA ASN.1 模块)**:`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §3。
```asn1
ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
customerASID ASID,
providers ProviderASSet }
ProviderASSet ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASID
ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
```
编码/解码要点(与上面 ASN.1 结构直接对应):
- `version`:规范要求 **MUST 为 1** 且 **MUST 显式编码**(不得依赖 DEFAULT 省略)。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §3.1。
- `customerASID`:客户 AS 号(CAS)。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §3.2。
- `providers`:授权的提供者 AS 集合(SPAS)。并对“自包含/排序/去重”施加额外约束(见下)。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §3.3。
## 8.3 解析规则(eContent 语义层)
输入:`RpkiSignedObject`。
1) 解析 CMS 外壳,得到 `econtent_type` 与 `econtent_der`。RFC 6488 §3;RFC 9589 §4。
2) 要求 `econtent_type == 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49`。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §2。
3) 将 `econtent_der` 以 DER 解析为 `ASProviderAttestation` ASN.1。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §3。
4) 将 `providers` 映射为语义字段 `provider_as_ids: list[int]`,并对其执行“约束检查/(可选)归一化”。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §3.3。
## 8.4 抽象数据模型(接口)
### 8.4.1 `AspaObject`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | 规范引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `signed_object` | `RpkiSignedObject` | CMS 外壳 | 外壳约束见 RFC 6488/9589 | RFC 6488 §3;RFC 9589 §4 |
| `econtent_type` | `Oid` | eContentType | 必须为 `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49` | `draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §2 |
| `aspa` | `AspaEContent` | eContent 语义对象 | 见下 | `draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §3 |
### 8.4.2 `AspaEContent`(ASProviderAttestation)
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | 规范引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `version` | `int` | ASPA 版本 | MUST 为 `1` 且 MUST 显式编码(字段不可省略) | `draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §3.1 |
| `customer_as_id` | `int` | Customer ASID | 0..4294967295 | `draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §3.2(ASID 定义) |
| `provider_as_ids` | `list[int]` | Provider ASID 列表(SPAS) | 长度 `>= 1`;且满足“不得包含 customer、升序、去重” | `draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §3.3 |
## 8.5 字段级约束清单(实现对照)
- eContentType 必须为 `id-ct-ASPA`(OID `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49`),且该 OID 必须同时出现在 eContentType 与 signedAttrs.content-type。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §2(引用 RFC 6488)。
- eContent 必须 DER 编码并符合 `ASProviderAttestation` ASN.1。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §3。
- `version` 必须为 1,且必须显式编码(缺失视为不合规)。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §3.1。
- `providers`(`provider_as_ids`)必须满足:
- `customer_as_id` **MUST NOT** 出现在 `provider_as_ids` 中;
- `provider_as_ids` 必须按数值 **升序排序**;
- `provider_as_ids` 中每个 ASID 必须 **唯一**。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §3.3。
## 8.6 与 EE 证书的语义约束(为后续验证准备)
ASPA 的外壳包含一个 EE 证书,用于验证 ASPA 签名;规范对该 EE 证书与 ASPA payload 的匹配关系提出要求:
- EE 证书必须包含 AS 资源扩展(Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension),且 `customer_as_id` 必须与该扩展中的 ASId 匹配。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §4(引用 RFC 3779)。
- EE 证书的 AS 资源扩展 **必须**:
- 恰好包含 1 个 `id` 元素;
- **不得**包含 `inherit` 元素;
- **不得**包含 `range` 元素。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §4(引用 RFC 3779 §3.2.3.3 / §3.2.3.6 / §3.2.3.7)。
- EE 证书 **不得**包含 IP 资源扩展(IP Address Delegation Extension)。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §4(引用 RFC 3779)。
## 8.7 实现建议(非规范约束)
`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` 给出了一条 RP 侧建议:实现可对单个 `customer_as_id` 的 `provider_as_ids` 数量施加上界(例如 4,000~10,000),超过阈值时建议将该 `customer_as_id` 的所有 ASPA 视为无效并记录错误日志。`draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §6。

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# 09. Ghostbusters Record(GBR)
## 9.1 对象定位
Ghostbusters Record(GBR)是一个可选的 RPKI Signed Object,用于承载“联系人信息”(人类可读的联系渠道),以便在证书过期、CRL 失效、密钥轮换等事件中能够联系到维护者。RFC 6493 §1。
GBR 由 CMS 外壳 + vCard 载荷组成:
- 外壳:RFC 6488(更新:RFC 9589)
- 载荷(payload):RFC 6493 定义的 vCard profile(基于 RFC 6350 vCard 4.0 的严格子集)。RFC 6493 §5。
## 9.2 原始载体与编码
- 外壳:CMS SignedData DER(见 `05_signed_object_cms.md`)。RFC 6493 §6(引用 RFC 6488)。
- eContentType:`id-ct-rpkiGhostbusters`,OID `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.35`。RFC 6493 §6;RFC 6493 §9.1。
- eContent:一个 OCTET STRING,其 octets 是 vCard 文本(vCard 4.0,且受 RFC 6493 的 profile 约束)。RFC 6493 §5;RFC 6493 §6。
> 说明:与 ROA/MFT 这类“eContent 内部再 DER 解码为 ASN.1 结构”的对象不同,GBR 的 eContent 语义上就是“vCard 文本内容本身”(由 Signed Object Template 的 `eContent OCTET STRING` 承载)。RFC 6493 §6。
## 9.3 vCard profile(RFC 6493 §5)
GBR 的 vCard payload 是 RFC 6350 vCard 4.0 的严格子集,仅允许以下属性(properties):
- `BEGIN`:必须为第一行,值必须为 `BEGIN:VCARD`。RFC 6493 §5。
- `VERSION`:必须为第二行,值必须为 `VERSION:4.0`。RFC 6493 §5(引用 RFC 6350 §3.7.9)。
- `FN`:联系人姓名或角色名。RFC 6493 §5(引用 RFC 6350 §6.2.1)。
- `ORG`:组织信息(可选)。RFC 6493 §5(引用 RFC 6350 §6.6.4)。
- `ADR`:邮寄地址(可选)。RFC 6493 §5(引用 RFC 6350 §6.3)。
- `TEL`:语音/传真电话(可选)。RFC 6493 §5(引用 RFC 6350 §6.4.1)。
- `EMAIL`:邮箱(可选)。RFC 6493 §5(引用 RFC 6350 §6.4.2)。
- `END`:必须为最后一行,值必须为 `END:VCARD`。RFC 6493 §5。
额外约束:
- `BEGIN`、`VERSION`、`FN`、`END` 必须包含。RFC 6493 §5。
- 为保证可用性,`ADR`/`TEL`/`EMAIL` 三者中至少一个必须包含。RFC 6493 §5。
- 除上述属性外,**其他属性 MUST NOT** 出现。RFC 6493 §5。
## 9.4 解析规则(payload 语义层)
输入:`RpkiSignedObject`。
1) 解析 CMS 外壳,得到 `econtent_type` 与 `econtent_bytes`。RFC 6488 §3;RFC 9589 §4。
2) 要求 `econtent_type == 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.35`。RFC 6493 §6。
3) 将 `econtent_bytes` 解析为 vCard 文本,并按 RFC 6493 §5 的 profile 校验(属性集合、必选项、行首/行尾约束)。RFC 6493 §5;RFC 6493 §7。
4) 通过校验后,将允许属性映射为 `GhostbustersVCard` 语义对象(见下)。
## 9.5 抽象数据模型(接口)
### 9.5.1 `GhostbustersObject`
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `signed_object` | `RpkiSignedObject` | CMS 外壳 | 外壳约束见 RFC 6488/9589 | RFC 6493 §6;RFC 6488 §3;RFC 9589 §4 |
| `econtent_type` | `Oid` | eContentType | 必须为 `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.35` | RFC 6493 §6 |
| `vcard` | `GhostbustersVCard` | vCard 语义对象 | 由 eContent 文本解析并校验 profile | RFC 6493 §5;RFC 6493 §7 |
### 9.5.2 `GhostbustersVCard`(vCard 4.0 profile)
| 字段 | 类型 | 语义 | 约束/解析规则 | RFC 引用 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `raw_text` | `string` | 原始 vCard 文本 | 由 eContent bytes 解码得到;用于保留原文/诊断 | RFC 6493 §5-§7 |
| `fn` | `string` | 联系人姓名/角色名 | `FN` 必须存在 | RFC 6493 §5 |
| `org` | `optional[string]` | 组织 | `ORG` 可选 | RFC 6493 §5 |
| `adrs` | `list[string]` | 邮寄地址(原始 ADR value) | 允许 0..N;至少满足“ADR/TEL/EMAIL 至少一项存在” | RFC 6493 §5 |
| `tels` | `list[Uri]` | 电话 URI(从 TEL 提取的 `tel:` 等 URI) | 允许 0..N;至少满足“ADR/TEL/EMAIL 至少一项存在” | RFC 6493 §5 |
| `emails` | `list[string]` | 邮箱地址 | 允许 0..N;至少满足“ADR/TEL/EMAIL 至少一项存在” | RFC 6493 §5 |
> 说明:RFC 6493 并未要求 RP 必须完整解析 vCard 参数(例如 `TYPE=WORK`、`VALUE=uri`),因此此处将 `ADR`/`TEL`/`EMAIL` 建模为“足以联络”的最小语义集合;实现可在保留 `raw_text` 的同时按 RFC 6350 扩展解析能力。
## 9.6 字段级约束清单(实现对照)
- eContentType 必须为 `id-ct-rpkiGhostbusters`(OID `1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.35`),且该 OID 必须同时出现在 eContentType 与 signedAttrs.content-type。RFC 6493 §6(引用 RFC 6488)。
- eContent 必须是 vCard 4.0 文本,且必须满足 RFC 6493 §5 的 profile:
- 第一行 `BEGIN:VCARD`;
- 第二行 `VERSION:4.0`;
- 末行 `END:VCARD`;
- 必须包含 `FN`;
- `ADR`/`TEL`/`EMAIL` 至少一个存在;
- 除允许集合外不得出现其他属性。RFC 6493 §5;RFC 6493 §7。
## 9.7 与 EE 证书的语义约束(为后续验证准备)
GBR 使用 CMS 外壳内的 EE 证书验证签名。RFC 6493 对该 EE 证书提出一条资源扩展约束:
- 用于验证 GBR 的 EE 证书在描述 Internet Number Resources 时,必须使用 `inherit`,而不是显式资源集合。RFC 6493 §6(引用 RFC 3779)。

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# 10. SLURM(Simplified Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI)
## 10.1 目标与范围
SLURM 用于让 RP(Relying Party)在本地对上游 RPKI 验证结果做“过滤”和“补充断言”,而不修改上游发布对象。
本文档基于:
- RFC 8416(SLURM v1,ROA/BGPsec)
- draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-slurm-04(SLURM v2,新增 ASPA)
## 10.2 版本与顶层结构
### 10.2.1 SLURM v1(RFC 8416)
`slurmVersion` 必须为 `1`,且顶层 JSON 对象必须包含且仅包含以下成员:
- `slurmVersion`
- `validationOutputFilters`(必须包含 `prefixFilters`、`bgpsecFilters`)
- `locallyAddedAssertions`(必须包含 `prefixAssertions`、`bgpsecAssertions`)
空策略示例:
```json
{
"slurmVersion": 1,
"validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [],
"bgpsecFilters": []
},
"locallyAddedAssertions": {
"prefixAssertions": [],
"bgpsecAssertions": []
}
}
```
### 10.2.2 SLURM v2(draft-04)
`slurmVersion` 必须为 `2`,在 v1 基础上扩展 ASPA 两类成员:
- `validationOutputFilters.aspaFilters`
- `locallyAddedAssertions.aspaAssertions`
空策略示例:
```json
{
"slurmVersion": 2,
"validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [],
"bgpsecFilters": [],
"aspaFilters": []
},
"locallyAddedAssertions": {
"prefixAssertions": [],
"bgpsecAssertions": [],
"aspaAssertions": []
}
}
```
## 10.3 字段规范(RFC 8416)
### 10.3.1 `prefixFilters`
数组元素每项:
- 必须至少包含一个:`prefix` 或 `asn`
- 可选:`comment`
匹配规则:
- 若配置了 `prefix`:匹配“被该前缀覆盖(encompassed)”的 VRP 前缀
- 若配置了 `asn`:匹配该 ASN
- 同时配置时:两者都要匹配
### 10.3.2 `bgpsecFilters`
数组元素每项:
- 必须至少包含一个:`asn` 或 `SKI`
- 可选:`comment`
匹配规则:
- 按 `asn`/`SKI` 单独或联合匹配 Router Key(BGPsec)
### 10.3.3 `prefixAssertions`
数组元素每项:
- 必须:`prefix`、`asn`
- 可选:`maxPrefixLength`、`comment`
约束:
- 若给出 `maxPrefixLength`,应满足 `prefix 长度 <= maxPrefixLength <= 地址位宽(IPv4=32, IPv6=128)`
### 10.3.4 `bgpsecAssertions`
数组元素每项:
- 必须:`asn`、`SKI`、`routerPublicKey`
- 可选:`comment`
## 10.4 ASPA 扩展(draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-slurm-04)
### 10.4.1 `aspaFilters`
数组元素每项:
- 必须:`customerAsn`
- 可选:`comment`
匹配规则:
- 当 VAP(Validated ASPA Payload)的 `customerAsn` 等于过滤器 `customerAsn` 时命中并移除。
### 10.4.2 `aspaAssertions`
数组元素每项:
- 必须:`customerAsn`
- 必须:`providerAsns`(ASN 数组)
- 可选:`comment`
关键约束(draft-04):
- `customerAsn` 不得出现在 `providerAsns` 中
- `providerAsns` 必须按升序排列
- `providerAsns` 里的 ASN 必须唯一(无重复)
语义补充(draft-04):
- `aspaAssertions` 仅用于“新增断言”,不构成隐式过滤(不会自动替代 `aspaFilters`)。
- 在 RTRv2 输出阶段,新增的 ASPA 断言应加入 ASPA PDU 集合,并做去重。
## 10.5 应用语义(RFC 8416 Section 4)
### 10.5.1 原子性
SLURM 应用必须是原子的:
- 要么完全不生效(等同未使用 SLURM)
- 要么完整按当前 SLURM 配置生效
### 10.5.2 处理顺序
在同一次计算中:
1. 先执行 `validationOutputFilters`(移除匹配验证结果)
2. 再追加 `locallyAddedAssertions`
### 10.5.3 多文件
实现可以支持多个 SLURM 文件并行使用(取并集),但在启用前应检查断言重叠冲突;若存在冲突,整组文件应被拒绝。
## 10.6 最小可用示例(SLURM v2)
```json
{
"slurmVersion": 2,
"validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [
{
"prefix": "203.0.113.0/24",
"comment": "Filter a broken VRP from upstream"
}
],
"bgpsecFilters": [],
"aspaFilters": [
{
"customerAsn": 64496,
"comment": "Filter one customer ASPA"
}
]
},
"locallyAddedAssertions": {
"prefixAssertions": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"prefix": "203.0.113.0/24",
"maxPrefixLength": 24,
"comment": "Local business exception"
}
],
"bgpsecAssertions": [],
"aspaAssertions": [
{
"customerAsn": 64496,
"providerAsns": [64497, 64498],
"comment": "Local ASPA assertion"
}
]
}
}
```
## 10.7 参考文献
- RFC 8416: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8416.html
- draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-slurm-04: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-slurm-04.html

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# 11. RTR(RPKI to Router Protocol)
## 11.1 目标与文档范围
RTR 用于把 RP/Cache 已完成密码学验证的 RPKI 数据下发给路由器。
本文按以下规范整理:
- RFC 6810(RTR v0)
- RFC 8210(RTR v1,更新 RFC 6810)
- draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-26(RTR v2,草案)
## 11.2 协议演进
### 11.2.1 RFC 6810(v0)
- 只定义 Prefix Origin 相关 payload(IPv4/IPv6 Prefix PDU)。
- 主要 PDU:Serial Notify / Serial Query / Reset Query / Cache Response / Prefix / End of Data / Cache Reset / Error Report。
### 11.2.2 RFC 8210(v1)
在 v0 基础上新增/强化:
- 新增 `Router Key PDU`(PDU Type 9,v1 可用,v0 保留)。
- 强化协议版本协商与降级行为。
- `End of Data` 在 v1 中携带 `Refresh/Retry/Expire` 三个计时参数。
### 11.2.3 Version 2(草案)
在 v1 基础上新增/强化:
- 新增 `ASPA PDU`(PDU Type 11,仅 v2)。
- 新增 “Races, Ordering, and Transactions” 章节,要求缓存按规定顺序输出 payload 以降低路由器短暂误判。
- 协议版本提升到 `2`。
- 明确 PDU 最大长度上限为 64k(65535)。
## 11.3 PDU 与版本矩阵
PDU 类型(按规范注册表):
| PDU Type | 名称 | v0 (RFC6810) | v1 (RFC8210) | v2 (8210bis-26) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | Serial Notify | 支持 | 支持 | 支持 |
| 1 | Serial Query | 支持 | 支持 | 支持 |
| 2 | Reset Query | 支持 | 支持 | 支持 |
| 3 | Cache Response | 支持 | 支持 | 支持 |
| 4 | IPv4 Prefix | 支持 | 支持 | 支持 |
| 6 | IPv6 Prefix | 支持 | 支持 | 支持 |
| 7 | End of Data | 支持 | 支持(含计时参数) | 支持 |
| 8 | Cache Reset | 支持 | 支持 | 支持 |
| 9 | Router Key | 保留 | 支持 | 支持 |
| 10 | Error Report | 支持 | 支持 | 支持 |
| 11 | ASPA | 保留 | 保留 | 支持 |
通用字段约束:
- `Protocol Version`:8-bit。
- `PDU Type`:8-bit。
- `Session ID`:16-bit。
- `Length`:32-bit。
- 保留位(zero/reserved)发送必须为 0,接收时按规范处理。
## 11.4 关键 PDU 语义
### 11.4.1 Serial Notify(Type 0)
- 由 Cache 主动发送,提示有新序列可拉取。
- 是少数可不由 Router 请求触发的消息。
### 11.4.2 Reset Query(Type 2)与 Cache Response(Type 3)
- Router 启动或失配时发 `Reset Query` 请求全量。
- Cache 回复 `Cache Response`,随后发送全量 payload,最后 `End of Data`。
### 11.4.3 Serial Query(Type 1)
- Router 持有上次 `Session ID + Serial` 时请求增量。
- Cache 若可提供增量:返回变化集。
- Cache 若无法从该 serial 补增量:返回 `Cache Reset`,要求 Router 走全量。
### 11.4.4 Prefix / Router Key / ASPA payload
- `IPv4 Prefix`(Type 4)/ `IPv6 Prefix`(Type 6):表示 VRP 的 announce/withdraw。
- `Router Key`(Type 9,v1+):表示 BGPsec Router Key 的 announce/withdraw。
- `ASPA`(Type 11,v2 草案):表示 ASPA 数据单元的 announce/withdraw。
语义要点(v1 / v2 草案):
- 对同一 payload 键(如 Prefix 四元组、Router Key 三元组、ASPA customer 键)应维护清晰的替换/撤销关系。
- Cache 负责把历史变化“合并简化”后再发给 Router,避免无意义抖动。
### 11.4.5 End of Data(Type 7)
- 标识一次响应结束,并给出当前 serial。
- v0:不含定时器字段。
- v1/v2:携带 `Refresh Interval`、`Retry Interval`、`Expire Interval`。
## 11.5 协议时序
### 11.5.1 初始同步(Full Sync)
1. Router 建连后发 `Reset Query`(带支持的协议版本)。
2. Cache 回 `Cache Response`。
3. Cache 按规范发送 payload 集合。
4. Cache 发 `End of Data` 收尾。
### 11.5.2 增量同步(Incremental Sync)
1. Router 发 `Serial Query(session_id, serial)`。
2. Cache 若可增量,返回变化并以 `End of Data` 收尾。
3. 若不可增量,返回 `Cache Reset`;Router 退回 Full Sync。
### 11.5.3 Cache Restart / Cache Shutdown(v2)
- `Cache Restart`:Cache 即将对已连接客户端不可用,但预计会在客户端达到 Expire Interval 前恢复;v2 session 应发送 `Error Report` code 12,随后关闭连接。
- `Cache Shutdown`:Cache 即将有意下线,并希望客户端 flush 从该 cache 学到的数据;v2 session 应发送 `Error Report` code 13,随后关闭连接。
- 这两个错误码只属于 v2。v0/v1 session 不得发送 code 12/13,只能关闭连接。
## 11.6 版本协商与降级
- Router 每次新连接必须由 `Reset Query` 或 `Serial Query` 启动,携带其协议版本。
- 双方在协商完成后,本连接内版本固定。
- 遇到不支持版本时,可按规范降级(例如 v1 对 v0、v2 对 v1/v0)或返回 `Unsupported Protocol Version` 后断开。
- 协商期若收到 `Serial Notify`,Router 应按规范兼容处理(通常忽略,待协商完成)。
## 11.7 计时器与失效(v1/v2)
`End of Data` 下发三个参数:
- `Refresh Interval`:多久后主动刷新。
- `Retry Interval`:失败后重试间隔。
- `Expire Interval`:本地数据最长可保留时长。
规范边界(RFC 8210):
- Refresh: 1 .. 86400(推荐 3600)
- Retry: 1 .. 7200(推荐 600)
- Expire: 600 .. 172800(推荐 7200)
- 且 `Expire` 必须大于 `Refresh` 和 `Retry`。
## 11.8 Version 2(草案)新增关注点
### 11.8.1 ASPA PDU
- 新增 ASPA 传输能力(Type 11)。
- 针对同一 customer ASN,Cache 需向 Router 提供一致且可替换的 ASPA 视图。
### 11.8.2 排序与事务
- 草案新增 race 条件说明(如前缀替换、撤销先后导致短暂误判)。
- 对 Cache 输出 payload 的顺序提出约束。
- 建议 Router 使用“事务式应用”(例如接收到完整响应后再切换生效)降低中间态影响。
### 11.8.3 Error Code 版本范围
- v0(RFC6810):0..7。
- v1(RFC8210):继承 v0,并新增 8 `Unexpected Protocol Version`。
- v2(8210bis-26):继承 v1,并新增 9 `ASPA Provider List Error`、10 `Transport Failure`、11 `Ordering Error`、12 `Cache Restart`、13 `Cache Shutdown`。
- 实现发送 Error Report 时,只能发送当前 session 协议版本定义过的错误码。
### 11.8.4 本实现的生命周期控制
- `RPKI_RTR_STOP_REASON=cache-restart|cache-shutdown|close-only` 控制进程收到 Ctrl-C 后的服务停止语义,默认 `cache-restart`。
- Admin API:
- `POST /admin/rtr/lifecycle/restart`:向 v2 established clients 发送 `Cache Restart`,然后走进程退出路径;实际重新拉起由 systemd/Docker/Kubernetes/Windows Service 等 supervisor 完成。若没有外部机制在客户端 `Expire Interval` 到期前恢复服务,不应使用该接口。
- `POST /admin/rtr/lifecycle/shutdown`:向 v2 established clients 发送 `Cache Shutdown`,然后退出进程。
- v0/v1 或尚未完成版本协商的连接不会收到 code 12/13。
## 11.9 传输与安全
规范定义可承载于多种传输:
- SSH
- TLS
- TCP MD5
- TCP-AO
安全原则:
- Router 与 Cache 之间必须建立可信关系。
- 需要完整性/机密性时优先使用具备认证与加密能力的传输。
- 若使用普通 TCP,部署上应限制在可信受控网络中。
## 11.10 参考文献
- RFC 6810: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6810.html
- RFC 8210: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8210.html
- draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-26: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-26.html

86
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use std::fs;
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
const CONTENT_TYPE_OID: &str = "1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.54";
const SHA256_OID: &str = "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1";
#[derive(Clone)]
struct Vrp {
addr: IpAddr,
prefix_len: u8,
max_len: u8,
asn: u32,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
struct Vap {
customer_asn: u32,
providers: Vec<u32>,
}
fn main() -> Result<()> {
let out_dir = parse_out_dir_arg();
fs::create_dir_all(&out_dir)
.with_context(|| format!("failed to create output dir {}", out_dir.display()))?;
write_snapshot(
&out_dir.join("20260403T000001Z-mini-a.ccr"),
"20260403000001Z",
vec![
Vrp {
addr: IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 0, 0, 0)),
prefix_len: 24,
max_len: 24,
asn: 65001,
},
Vrp {
addr: IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(0x2001, 0xdb8, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)),
prefix_len: 48,
max_len: 48,
asn: 65002,
},
],
vec![Vap {
customer_asn: 65010,
providers: vec![65011, 65012],
}],
)?;
write_snapshot(
&out_dir.join("20260403T000101Z-mini-b.ccr"),
"20260403000101Z",
vec![
Vrp {
addr: IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 0, 0, 0)),
prefix_len: 24,
max_len: 24,
asn: 65001,
},
Vrp {
addr: IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 0, 1, 0)),
prefix_len: 24,
max_len: 24,
asn: 65003,
},
Vrp {
addr: IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(0x2001, 0xdb8, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)),
prefix_len: 48,
max_len: 48,
asn: 65002,
},
],
vec![Vap {
customer_asn: 65010,
providers: vec![65011, 65012, 65013],
}],
)?;
write_snapshot(
&out_dir.join("20260403T000201Z-mini-c.ccr"),
"20260403000201Z",
vec![
Vrp {
addr: IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 0, 1, 0)),
prefix_len: 24,
max_len: 24,
asn: 65003,
},
Vrp {
addr: IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(0x2001, 0xdb8, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)),
prefix_len: 48,
max_len: 48,
asn: 65004,
},
],
vec![
Vap {
customer_asn: 65010,
providers: vec![65012, 65013],
},
Vap {
customer_asn: 65020,
providers: vec![65021],
},
],
)?;
println!("generated CCR fixtures under {}", out_dir.display());
Ok(())
}
fn parse_out_dir_arg() -> PathBuf {
let mut args = std::env::args().skip(1);
let mut out_dir = PathBuf::from("data");
while let Some(arg) = args.next() {
if arg == "--out-dir" {
if let Some(v) = args.next() {
out_dir = PathBuf::from(v);
}
}
}
out_dir
}
fn write_snapshot(path: &Path, produced_at: &str, vrps: Vec<Vrp>, vaps: Vec<Vap>) -> Result<()> {
let bytes = encode_ccr_snapshot(produced_at, vrps, vaps);
fs::write(path, bytes).with_context(|| format!("failed to write {}", path.display()))?;
println!("wrote {}", path.display());
Ok(())
}
fn encode_ccr_snapshot(produced_at: &str, vrps: Vec<Vrp>, vaps: Vec<Vap>) -> Vec<u8> {
let vrp_sets = vrps
.into_iter()
.map(encode_roa_payload_set)
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let vap_sets = vaps
.into_iter()
.map(encode_aspa_payload_set)
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let vrp_set_seq = der_sequence(vrp_sets);
let vap_set_seq = der_sequence(vap_sets);
let vrp_hash = Sha256::digest(&vrp_set_seq).to_vec();
let vap_hash = Sha256::digest(&vap_set_seq).to_vec();
// draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr-02:
// ROAPayloadState/ASPAPayloadState include payload-set sequence + hash.
let vrp_state = der_sequence(vec![vrp_set_seq, der_octet_string(vrp_hash)]);
let vap_state = der_sequence(vec![vap_set_seq, der_octet_string(vap_hash)]);
// AlgorithmIdentifier for SHA-256.
let hash_alg = der_sequence(vec![der_oid(SHA256_OID), der_null()]);
let payload = der_sequence(vec![
der_integer(0),
hash_alg,
der_generalized_time(produced_at),
der_ctx(2, vrp_state),
der_ctx(3, vap_state),
]);
der_sequence(vec![der_oid(CONTENT_TYPE_OID), der_ctx(0, payload)])
}
fn encode_roa_payload_set(v: Vrp) -> Vec<u8> {
let (afi, addr_bytes) = match v.addr {
IpAddr::V4(ip) => ([0u8, 1u8].to_vec(), ip.octets().to_vec()),
IpAddr::V6(ip) => ([0u8, 2u8].to_vec(), ip.octets().to_vec()),
};
let bit_string = prefix_to_bit_string(&addr_bytes, v.prefix_len);
let roa_ip = der_sequence(vec![
der_bit_string(0, bit_string),
der_integer(u32::from(v.max_len)),
]);
let family = der_sequence(vec![der_octet_string(afi), der_sequence(vec![roa_ip])]);
der_sequence(vec![der_integer(v.asn), der_sequence(vec![family])])
}
fn encode_aspa_payload_set(v: Vap) -> Vec<u8> {
let providers = v.providers.into_iter().map(der_integer).collect::<Vec<_>>();
der_sequence(vec![der_integer(v.customer_asn), der_sequence(providers)])
}
fn prefix_to_bit_string(addr: &[u8], prefix_len: u8) -> Vec<u8> {
let byte_len = usize::from(prefix_len).div_ceil(8);
let mut out = addr[..byte_len].to_vec();
let rem = prefix_len % 8;
if rem != 0 {
let mask = 0xFFu8 << (8 - rem);
let last = out.len() - 1;
out[last] &= mask;
}
out
}
fn der_sequence(items: Vec<Vec<u8>>) -> Vec<u8> {
let content = items.concat();
der_tlv(0x30, content)
}
fn der_integer(v: u32) -> Vec<u8> {
if v == 0 {
return der_tlv(0x02, vec![0]);
}
let mut bytes = v.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
while bytes.len() > 1 && bytes[0] == 0 {
bytes.remove(0);
}
if bytes[0] & 0x80 != 0 {
bytes.insert(0, 0);
}
der_tlv(0x02, bytes)
}
fn der_oid(oid: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
let parts = oid
.split('.')
.map(|s| s.parse::<u32>().unwrap())
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
assert!(parts.len() >= 2);
let mut out = Vec::new();
out.push((parts[0] * 40 + parts[1]) as u8);
for &part in &parts[2..] {
out.extend(base128(part));
}
der_tlv(0x06, out)
}
fn base128(mut n: u32) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut buf = vec![(n & 0x7F) as u8];
n >>= 7;
while n > 0 {
buf.push(((n & 0x7F) as u8) | 0x80);
n >>= 7;
}
buf.reverse();
buf
}
fn der_octet_string(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Vec<u8> {
der_tlv(0x04, bytes)
}
fn der_null() -> Vec<u8> {
der_tlv(0x05, Vec::new())
}
fn der_bit_string(unused_bits: u8, bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut content = Vec::with_capacity(1 + bytes.len());
content.push(unused_bits);
content.extend(bytes);
der_tlv(0x03, content)
}
fn der_generalized_time(v: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
der_tlv(0x18, v.as_bytes().to_vec())
}
fn der_ctx(tag_no: u8, encoded_inner_der: Vec<u8>) -> Vec<u8> {
der_tlv(0xA0 + tag_no, encoded_inner_der)
}
fn der_tlv(tag: u8, content: Vec<u8>) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(2 + content.len());
out.push(tag);
out.extend(der_len(content.len()));
out.extend(content);
out
}
fn der_len(len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
if len < 128 {
return vec![len as u8];
}
let mut bytes = Vec::new();
let mut n = len;
while n > 0 {
bytes.push((n & 0xFF) as u8);
n >>= 8;
}
bytes.reverse();
let mut out = vec![0x80 | (bytes.len() as u8)];
out.extend(bytes);
out
}

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@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
# rtr_debug_client
`rtr_debug_client` 是用于 RTR 协议联调的命令行调试客户端,支持 `TCP`、`TLS`、`SSH` 三种传输。
它用于:
- 手动发送 `Reset Query`、`Serial Query`
- 持续接收并打印服务端 PDU
- 观察 `session_id`、`serial`、`EndOfData` timing hint、`ErrorReport` 等状态变化
## 构建
```sh
cargo build --bin rtr_debug_client
```
## 基本用法
```sh
cargo run --bin rtr_debug_client -- <addr> <version> [reset|serial <session_id> <serial>] [options]
```
默认值:
- `addr`: `127.0.0.1:323`
- `version`: `1`
- `mode`: `reset`
- `--timeout`: `30`
- `--poll`: `600`
## TCP 用法
```sh
cargo run --bin rtr_debug_client -- 127.0.0.1:323 1 reset
```
```sh
cargo run --bin rtr_debug_client -- 127.0.0.1:323 1 serial 42 100
```
## TLS 用法
仅校验服务端证书:
```sh
cargo run --bin rtr_debug_client -- \
127.0.0.1:324 1 reset \
--tls \
--ca-cert tests/fixtures/tls/client-ca.crt \
--server-name localhost
```
双向 TLS:
```sh
cargo run --bin rtr_debug_client -- \
127.0.0.1:324 1 reset \
--tls \
--ca-cert tests/fixtures/tls/client-ca.crt \
--server-name localhost \
--client-cert tests/fixtures/tls/client-good.crt \
--client-key tests/fixtures/tls/client-good.key
```
## SSH 用法(按 draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-25)
`rtr_debug_client --ssh` 采用以下流程:
- SSHv2 连接
- `session` channel
- 请求 `subsystem`,默认 `rpki-rtr`
- 使用 `publickey` 认证
- 强制服务端 host key 校验(`known_hosts` 或 pinned server key 二选一)
### 1. 使用 known_hosts 校验服务端
```sh
cargo run --bin rtr_debug_client -- \
127.0.0.1:22 1 reset \
--ssh \
--ssh-user rpki-rtr \
--ssh-key certs/rtr-client.key \
--ssh-known-hosts certs/known_hosts
```
### 2. 使用固定服务端公钥校验
```sh
cargo run --bin rtr_debug_client -- \
127.0.0.1:22 1 reset \
--ssh \
--ssh-user rpki-rtr \
--ssh-key certs/rtr-client.key \
--ssh-server-key certs/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
```
### 3. 自定义 subsystem 名称
```sh
cargo run --bin rtr_debug_client -- \
127.0.0.1:22 1 reset \
--ssh \
--ssh-user rpki-rtr \
--ssh-key certs/rtr-client.key \
--ssh-known-hosts certs/known_hosts \
--ssh-subsystem rpki-rtr
```
## 参数说明
通用参数:
- `--timeout <secs>`:读取 PDU 超时时间(秒)
- `--poll <secs>`:默认自动轮询间隔(秒)
- `--keep-after-error`:兼容旧脚本的保留参数;默认已按 RFC/draft 处理 `ErrorReport`
- `--summary-only`:仅打印摘要,抑制 payload PDU 详细内容
TLS 参数:
- `--tls`
- `--ca-cert <path>`
- `--server-name <name>`
- `--client-cert <path>`
- `--client-key <path>`
SSH 参数:
- `--ssh`
- `--ssh-user <name>`
- `--ssh-key <path>`(OpenSSH 私钥)
- `--ssh-subsystem <name>`(默认 `rpki-rtr`)
- `--ssh-known-hosts <path>` 或 `--ssh-server-key <path>`(二选一,必须提供)
## SSH 连通性测试建议
如果你已经在 Docker 中启动了支持 SSH 的 RTR server,可按以下方式验证:
1. 先用 `ssh` 命令确认认证与 host key 配置正确(可连通)。
2. 再用 `rtr_debug_client --ssh` 发起连接并发送 `reset`。
3. 观察是否收到 `Cache Response` 和 `EndOfData`。
如果 `rtr_debug_client` 报 `failed to request SSH subsystem 'rpki-rtr'`,通常表示服务端未开启对应 subsystem 名称,或名称不一致。
## 运行时交互命令
客户端启动后可在标准输入中使用:
- `help`
- `state`
- `version` / `version <n>`
- `reset`
- `serial` / `serial <sid> <serial>`
- `timeout` / `timeout <secs>`
- `poll` / `poll <secs>` / `poll pause` / `poll resume`
- `output` / `output verbose` / `output summary`
- `quit`
## SSH Password Auth (Added)
`rtr_debug_client` now supports password auth in SSH mode.
- Use exactly one auth option in SSH mode:
- `--ssh-key <path>`
- `--ssh-password <value>`
- Host key verification is still required:
- `--ssh-known-hosts <path>` or `--ssh-server-key <path>`
Example:
```sh
cargo run --bin rtr_debug_client -- \
127.0.0.1:22 1 reset \
--ssh \
--ssh-user rpki-rtr \
--ssh-password 'your-password' \
--ssh-server-key certs/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
```

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@@ -1,404 +0,0 @@
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
use crate::protocol::{
ASPA_FIXED_BODY_LEN, END_OF_DATA_V0_BODY_LEN, END_OF_DATA_V1_BODY_LEN, IPV4_PREFIX_BODY_LEN,
IPV6_PREFIX_BODY_LEN, PduHeader, PduType, ROUTER_KEY_FIXED_BODY_LEN, flag_meaning, hex_bytes,
};
pub fn print_pdu(header: &PduHeader, body: &[u8]) {
println!("--------------------------------------------------");
println!("PDU: {}", header.pdu_type());
println!("version : {}", header.version);
println!("length : {}", header.length);
match header.pdu_type() {
PduType::CacheResponse => {
println!("session_id : {}", header.session_id());
}
PduType::CacheReset => {
println!("cache reset");
}
PduType::Ipv4Prefix => {
print_ipv4_prefix(header, body);
}
PduType::Ipv6Prefix => {
print_ipv6_prefix(header, body);
}
PduType::RouterKey => {
print_router_key(header, body);
}
PduType::EndOfData => {
print_end_of_data(header, body);
}
PduType::ErrorReport => {
print_error_report(header, body);
}
PduType::SerialNotify => {
print_serial_notify(header, body);
}
PduType::SerialQuery => {
print_serial_query(header, body);
}
PduType::Aspa => {
print_aspa(header, body);
}
PduType::ResetQuery => {
println!("reset query");
}
PduType::Unknown(_) => {
println!("field1 : {}", header.field1);
println!("body : {}", hex_bytes(body));
}
}
}
fn print_ipv4_prefix(header: &PduHeader, body: &[u8]) {
if body.len() != IPV4_PREFIX_BODY_LEN {
println!("invalid IPv4 Prefix body length: {}", body.len());
println!("raw body: {}", hex_bytes(body));
return;
}
let flags = body[0];
let prefix_len = body[1];
let max_len = body[2];
let zero = body[3];
let prefix = Ipv4Addr::new(body[4], body[5], body[6], body[7]);
let asn = u32::from_be_bytes([body[8], body[9], body[10], body[11]]);
println!("session_id : {}", header.session_id());
println!("flags : 0x{:02x} ({})", flags, flag_meaning(flags));
println!("prefix_len : {}", prefix_len);
println!("max_len : {}", max_len);
println!("zero : {}", zero);
println!("prefix : {}", prefix);
println!("asn : {}", asn);
}
fn print_ipv6_prefix(header: &PduHeader, body: &[u8]) {
if body.len() != IPV6_PREFIX_BODY_LEN {
println!("invalid IPv6 Prefix body length: {}", body.len());
println!("raw body: {}", hex_bytes(body));
return;
}
let flags = body[0];
let prefix_len = body[1];
let max_len = body[2];
let zero = body[3];
let mut addr = [0u8; 16];
addr.copy_from_slice(&body[4..20]);
let prefix = Ipv6Addr::from(addr);
let asn = u32::from_be_bytes([body[20], body[21], body[22], body[23]]);
println!("session_id : {}", header.session_id());
println!("flags : 0x{:02x} ({})", flags, flag_meaning(flags));
println!("prefix_len : {}", prefix_len);
println!("max_len : {}", max_len);
println!("zero : {}", zero);
println!("prefix : {}", prefix);
println!("asn : {}", asn);
}
fn print_end_of_data(header: &PduHeader, body: &[u8]) {
println!("session_id : {}", header.session_id());
match body.len() {
END_OF_DATA_V0_BODY_LEN => {
let serial = u32::from_be_bytes([body[0], body[1], body[2], body[3]]);
println!("serial : {}", serial);
println!("variant : v0");
}
END_OF_DATA_V1_BODY_LEN => {
let serial = u32::from_be_bytes([body[0], body[1], body[2], body[3]]);
let refresh = u32::from_be_bytes([body[4], body[5], body[6], body[7]]);
let retry = u32::from_be_bytes([body[8], body[9], body[10], body[11]]);
let expire = u32::from_be_bytes([body[12], body[13], body[14], body[15]]);
println!("serial : {}", serial);
println!("refresh : {}", refresh);
println!("retry : {}", retry);
println!("expire : {}", expire);
println!("variant : v1/v2");
}
_ => {
println!("invalid EndOfData body length: {}", body.len());
println!("raw body : {}", hex_bytes(body));
}
}
}
fn print_error_report(header: &PduHeader, body: &[u8]) {
println!(
"error_code : {} ({})",
header.error_code(),
error_code_name(header.error_code())
);
if body.len() < 8 {
println!("invalid ErrorReport body length: {}", body.len());
println!("raw body : {}", hex_bytes(body));
return;
}
let encapsulated_len = u32::from_be_bytes([body[0], body[1], body[2], body[3]]) as usize;
if body.len() < 4 + encapsulated_len + 4 {
println!("invalid ErrorReport: truncated encapsulated PDU");
println!("raw body : {}", hex_bytes(body));
return;
}
let encapsulated = &body[4..4 + encapsulated_len];
let text_len_offset = 4 + encapsulated_len;
let text_len = u32::from_be_bytes([
body[text_len_offset],
body[text_len_offset + 1],
body[text_len_offset + 2],
body[text_len_offset + 3],
]) as usize;
if body.len() < text_len_offset + 4 + text_len {
println!("invalid ErrorReport: truncated text");
println!("raw body : {}", hex_bytes(body));
return;
}
let text_bytes = &body[text_len_offset + 4..text_len_offset + 4 + text_len];
let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(text_bytes);
println!("encap_len : {}", encapsulated_len);
if let Some(encap_header) = parse_encapsulated_header(encapsulated) {
println!("encap_pdu_type : {}", encap_header.pdu_type());
println!("encap_version : {}", encap_header.version);
println!("encap_length : {}", encap_header.length);
match encap_header.pdu_type() {
PduType::ErrorReport => {
println!("encap_field1 : error_code={}", encap_header.error_code());
}
PduType::Unknown(_) => {
println!("encap_field1 : {}", encap_header.field1);
}
_ => {
println!("encap_field1 : session_id={}", encap_header.session_id());
}
}
} else if encapsulated_len > 0 {
println!("encap_header : <truncated or unavailable>");
}
println!("encap_pdu : {}", hex_bytes(encapsulated));
println!("text_len : {}", text_len);
println!("text_utf8 : {}", std::str::from_utf8(text_bytes).is_ok());
println!("text : {}", text);
}
fn print_serial_notify(header: &PduHeader, body: &[u8]) {
if body.len() != 4 {
println!("invalid Serial Notify body length: {}", body.len());
println!("raw body : {}", hex_bytes(body));
return;
}
let serial = u32::from_be_bytes([body[0], body[1], body[2], body[3]]);
println!("session_id : {}", header.session_id());
println!("serial : {}", serial);
}
fn print_serial_query(header: &PduHeader, body: &[u8]) {
if body.len() != 4 {
println!("invalid Serial Query body length: {}", body.len());
println!("raw body : {}", hex_bytes(body));
return;
}
let serial = u32::from_be_bytes([body[0], body[1], body[2], body[3]]);
println!("session_id : {}", header.session_id());
println!("serial : {}", serial);
}
fn print_router_key(_header: &PduHeader, body: &[u8]) {
if body.len() < ROUTER_KEY_FIXED_BODY_LEN {
println!("invalid Router Key body length: {}", body.len());
println!("raw body : {}", hex_bytes(body));
return;
}
let flags = _header.flags();
let zero = _header.zero();
let ski = &body[0..20];
let asn = u32::from_be_bytes([body[20], body[21], body[22], body[23]]);
let spki = &body[24..];
println!("flags : 0x{:02x} ({})", flags, flag_meaning(flags));
println!("zero : {}", zero);
println!("ski : {}", hex_bytes(ski));
println!("asn : {}", asn);
println!("spki_len : {}", spki.len());
println!("spki : {}", hex_bytes(spki));
if flags & !0x01 != 0 {
println!("warning : Router Key flags use reserved bits");
}
if zero != 0 {
println!("warning : Router Key reserved zero octet is non-zero");
}
if asn == 0 {
println!("warning : Router Key ASN is AS0");
}
if spki.is_empty() {
println!("warning : Router Key SPKI is empty");
}
}
pub fn print_raw_pdu(header: &PduHeader, body: &[u8]) {
let mut raw = Vec::with_capacity(8 + body.len());
raw.push(header.version);
raw.push(header.pdu_type_raw);
raw.extend_from_slice(&header.field1.to_be_bytes());
raw.extend_from_slice(&header.length.to_be_bytes());
raw.extend_from_slice(body);
println!("--------------------------------------------------");
println!("[raw] pdu_type : {}", header.pdu_type());
println!("[raw] octets : {}", hex_bytes(&raw));
}
fn error_code_name(code: u16) -> &'static str {
match code {
0 => "Corrupt Data",
1 => "Internal Error",
2 => "No Data Available",
3 => "Invalid Request",
4 => "Unsupported Protocol Version",
5 => "Unsupported PDU Type",
6 => "Withdrawal of Unknown Record",
7 => "Duplicate Announcement Received",
8 => "Unexpected Protocol Version",
9 => "ASPA Provider List Error",
10 => "Transport Failure",
11 => "Ordering Error",
12 => "Cache Restart",
13 => "Cache Shutdown",
_ => "Unknown Error Code",
}
}
fn parse_encapsulated_header(encapsulated: &[u8]) -> Option<PduHeader> {
if encapsulated.len() < 8 {
return None;
}
let mut header = [0u8; 8];
header.copy_from_slice(&encapsulated[..8]);
Some(PduHeader::from_bytes(header))
}
fn print_aspa(_header: &PduHeader, body: &[u8]) {
if body.len() < ASPA_FIXED_BODY_LEN {
println!("invalid ASPA body length: {}", body.len());
println!("raw body : {}", hex_bytes(body));
return;
}
let flags = _header.flags();
let zero = _header.zero();
let customer_asn = u32::from_be_bytes([body[0], body[1], body[2], body[3]]);
println!("flags : 0x{:02x} ({})", flags, flag_meaning(flags));
println!("reserved : {}", zero);
println!("customer_as : {}", customer_asn);
let providers_raw = &body[4..];
if providers_raw.len() % 4 != 0 {
println!("invalid ASPA providers length: {}", providers_raw.len());
println!("providers : {}", hex_bytes(providers_raw));
return;
}
let mut providers = Vec::new();
for chunk in providers_raw.chunks_exact(4) {
providers.push(u32::from_be_bytes([chunk[0], chunk[1], chunk[2], chunk[3]]));
}
println!("providers : {:?}", providers);
if flags & !0x01 != 0 {
println!("warning : ASPA flags use reserved bits");
}
if zero != 0 {
println!("warning : ASPA reserved zero octet is non-zero");
}
if customer_asn == 0 {
println!("warning : ASPA customer ASN is AS0");
}
let is_announcement = flags & 0x01 == 0x01;
if is_announcement {
if providers.is_empty() {
println!("warning : ASPA announcement has empty provider list");
}
} else if !providers.is_empty() {
println!("warning : ASPA withdrawal must not contain providers");
}
if providers.iter().any(|asn| *asn == 0) {
println!("warning : ASPA provider list contains AS0");
}
let strictly_increasing = providers.windows(2).all(|pair| pair[0] < pair[1]);
if !strictly_increasing && providers.len() > 1 {
println!("warning : ASPA providers are not in strictly increasing order");
}
}
pub fn parse_serial_notify_serial(body: &[u8]) -> Option<u32> {
if body.len() != 4 {
return None;
}
Some(u32::from_be_bytes([body[0], body[1], body[2], body[3]]))
}
pub fn parse_end_of_data_serial(body: &[u8]) -> Option<u32> {
match body.len() {
4 | 16 => Some(u32::from_be_bytes([body[0], body[1], body[2], body[3]])),
_ => None,
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
pub struct EndOfDataInfo {
pub serial: u32,
pub refresh: Option<u32>,
pub retry: Option<u32>,
pub expire: Option<u32>,
}
pub fn parse_end_of_data_info(body: &[u8]) -> Option<EndOfDataInfo> {
match body.len() {
4 => {
let serial = u32::from_be_bytes([body[0], body[1], body[2], body[3]]);
Some(EndOfDataInfo {
serial,
refresh: None,
retry: None,
expire: None,
})
}
16 => {
let serial = u32::from_be_bytes([body[0], body[1], body[2], body[3]]);
let refresh = u32::from_be_bytes([body[4], body[5], body[6], body[7]]);
let retry = u32::from_be_bytes([body[8], body[9], body[10], body[11]]);
let expire = u32::from_be_bytes([body[12], body[13], body[14], body[15]]);
Some(EndOfDataInfo {
serial,
refresh: Some(refresh),
retry: Some(retry),
expire: Some(expire),
})
}
_ => None,
}
}

View File

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
use std::fmt;
pub const HEADER_LEN: usize = 8;
pub const SERIAL_QUERY_LEN: usize = 12;
pub const MAX_PDU_LEN: u32 = 65_535;
pub const IPV4_PREFIX_BODY_LEN: usize = 12;
pub const IPV6_PREFIX_BODY_LEN: usize = 24;
pub const END_OF_DATA_V0_BODY_LEN: usize = 4;
pub const END_OF_DATA_V1_BODY_LEN: usize = 16;
pub const ROUTER_KEY_FIXED_BODY_LEN: usize = 24;
pub const ASPA_FIXED_BODY_LEN: usize = 4;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum QueryMode {
Reset,
Serial { session_id: u16, serial: u32 },
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum PduType {
SerialNotify,
SerialQuery,
ResetQuery,
CacheResponse,
Ipv4Prefix,
Ipv6Prefix,
RouterKey,
EndOfData,
CacheReset,
ErrorReport,
Aspa,
Unknown(u8),
}
impl PduType {
pub fn code(self) -> u8 {
match self {
Self::SerialNotify => 0,
Self::SerialQuery => 1,
Self::ResetQuery => 2,
Self::CacheResponse => 3,
Self::Ipv4Prefix => 4,
Self::Ipv6Prefix => 6,
Self::RouterKey => 9,
Self::EndOfData => 7,
Self::CacheReset => 8,
Self::ErrorReport => 10,
Self::Aspa => 11,
Self::Unknown(v) => v,
}
}
pub fn name(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::SerialNotify => "Serial Notify",
Self::SerialQuery => "Serial Query",
Self::ResetQuery => "Reset Query",
Self::CacheResponse => "Cache Response",
Self::Ipv4Prefix => "IPv4 Prefix",
Self::Ipv6Prefix => "IPv6 Prefix",
Self::RouterKey => "Router Key",
Self::EndOfData => "End of Data",
Self::CacheReset => "Cache Reset",
Self::ErrorReport => "Error Report",
Self::Aspa => "ASPA",
Self::Unknown(_) => "Unknown",
}
}
}
impl From<u8> for PduType {
fn from(value: u8) -> Self {
match value {
0 => Self::SerialNotify,
1 => Self::SerialQuery,
2 => Self::ResetQuery,
3 => Self::CacheResponse,
4 => Self::Ipv4Prefix,
6 => Self::Ipv6Prefix,
9 => Self::RouterKey,
7 => Self::EndOfData,
8 => Self::CacheReset,
10 => Self::ErrorReport,
11 => Self::Aspa,
x => Self::Unknown(x),
}
}
}
impl fmt::Display for PduType {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
match self {
Self::Unknown(v) => write!(f, "{} ({})", self.name(), v),
_ => write!(f, "{} ({})", self.name(), self.code()),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct PduHeader {
pub version: u8,
pub pdu_type_raw: u8,
pub field1: u16,
pub length: u32,
}
impl PduHeader {
pub fn from_bytes(buf: [u8; HEADER_LEN]) -> Self {
Self {
version: buf[0],
pdu_type_raw: buf[1],
field1: u16::from_be_bytes([buf[2], buf[3]]),
length: u32::from_be_bytes([buf[4], buf[5], buf[6], buf[7]]),
}
}
pub fn pdu_type(&self) -> PduType {
self.pdu_type_raw.into()
}
pub fn session_id(&self) -> u16 {
self.field1
}
pub fn error_code(&self) -> u16 {
self.field1
}
pub fn flags(&self) -> u8 {
self.field1.to_be_bytes()[0]
}
pub fn zero(&self) -> u8 {
self.field1.to_be_bytes()[1]
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct RawPdu {
pub header: PduHeader,
pub body: Vec<u8>,
}
pub fn flag_meaning(flags: u8) -> &'static str {
if flags & 0x01 == 0x01 {
"announcement"
} else {
"withdrawal"
}
}
pub fn hex_bytes(data: &[u8]) -> String {
if data.is_empty() {
return "<empty>".to_string();
}
let mut out = String::with_capacity(data.len() * 3 - 1);
for (idx, b) in data.iter().enumerate() {
if idx > 0 {
out.push(' ');
}
use std::fmt::Write as _;
let _ = write!(out, "{:02x}", b);
}
out
}

View File

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
use std::io;
use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncReadExt, AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt};
use crate::protocol::{HEADER_LEN, MAX_PDU_LEN, PduHeader, PduType, RawPdu, SERIAL_QUERY_LEN};
pub async fn send_reset_query<S>(stream: &mut S, version: u8) -> io::Result<()>
where
S: AsyncWrite + Unpin,
{
let mut buf = [0u8; HEADER_LEN];
buf[0] = version;
buf[1] = PduType::ResetQuery.code();
buf[2..4].copy_from_slice(&0u16.to_be_bytes());
buf[4..8].copy_from_slice(&(HEADER_LEN as u32).to_be_bytes());
stream.write_all(&buf).await?;
stream.flush().await
}
pub async fn send_serial_query<S>(
stream: &mut S,
version: u8,
session_id: u16,
serial: u32,
) -> io::Result<()>
where
S: AsyncWrite + Unpin,
{
let mut buf = [0u8; SERIAL_QUERY_LEN];
buf[0] = version;
buf[1] = PduType::SerialQuery.code();
buf[2..4].copy_from_slice(&session_id.to_be_bytes());
buf[4..8].copy_from_slice(&(SERIAL_QUERY_LEN as u32).to_be_bytes());
buf[8..12].copy_from_slice(&serial.to_be_bytes());
stream.write_all(&buf).await?;
stream.flush().await
}
pub async fn read_header<S>(stream: &mut S) -> io::Result<PduHeader>
where
S: AsyncRead + Unpin,
{
let mut buf = [0u8; HEADER_LEN];
stream.read_exact(&mut buf).await?;
Ok(PduHeader::from_bytes(buf))
}
pub async fn read_pdu<S>(stream: &mut S) -> io::Result<RawPdu>
where
S: AsyncRead + Unpin,
{
let header = read_header(stream).await?;
if header.length < HEADER_LEN as u32 {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
format!("invalid PDU length {} < {}", header.length, HEADER_LEN),
));
}
if header.length > MAX_PDU_LEN {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
format!(
"PDU length {} exceeds max allowed {}",
header.length, MAX_PDU_LEN
),
));
}
let body_len = header.length as usize - HEADER_LEN;
let mut body = vec![0u8; body_len];
stream.read_exact(&mut body).await?;
Ok(RawPdu { header, body })
}

View File

@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
use std::env;
use std::fs::File;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use anyhow::{Context, Result, anyhow};
use serde::Serialize;
use rpki::rtr::payload::Payload;
use rpki::slurm::file::SlurmFile;
use rpki::source::ccr::{
find_latest_ccr_file, load_ccr_snapshot_from_file, snapshot_to_payloads_with_options,
};
#[derive(Debug)]
struct Cli {
ccr_path: PathBuf,
slurm_path: PathBuf,
dump_payloads: bool,
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
struct Output {
ccr_path: String,
slurm_path: String,
produced_at: Option<String>,
slurm_version: u32,
input_payload_count: usize,
input_vrp_count: usize,
input_vap_count: usize,
output_payload_count: usize,
output_vrp_count: usize,
output_vap_count: usize,
invalid_vrps: Vec<String>,
invalid_vaps: Vec<String>,
sample_output_aspa_customers: Vec<u32>,
payloads: Option<Vec<Payload>>,
}
fn main() -> Result<()> {
let cli = parse_args(env::args().skip(1))?;
let snapshot = load_ccr_snapshot_from_file(&cli.ccr_path)
.with_context(|| format!("failed to load CCR snapshot: {}", cli.ccr_path.display()))?;
let slurm = load_slurm(&cli.slurm_path)?;
let conversion = snapshot_to_payloads_with_options(&snapshot, true)?;
let payloads = slurm.apply(&conversion.payloads);
let (input_vrp_count, input_vap_count) = count_vrps_and_vaps(&conversion.payloads);
let (output_vrp_count, output_vap_count) = count_vrps_and_vaps(&payloads);
let output = Output {
ccr_path: cli.ccr_path.display().to_string(),
slurm_path: cli.slurm_path.display().to_string(),
produced_at: snapshot.produced_at.clone(),
slurm_version: slurm.version().as_u32(),
input_payload_count: conversion.payloads.len(),
input_vrp_count,
input_vap_count,
output_payload_count: payloads.len(),
output_vrp_count,
output_vap_count,
invalid_vrps: conversion.invalid_vrps,
invalid_vaps: conversion.invalid_vaps,
sample_output_aspa_customers: sample_aspa_customers(&payloads, 8),
payloads: cli.dump_payloads.then_some(payloads),
};
println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&output)?);
Ok(())
}
fn load_slurm(path: &PathBuf) -> Result<SlurmFile> {
let file = File::open(path)
.with_context(|| format!("failed to open SLURM file: {}", path.display()))?;
SlurmFile::from_reader(file)
.with_context(|| format!("failed to parse SLURM file: {}", path.display()))
}
fn parse_args(args: impl Iterator<Item = String>) -> Result<Cli> {
let mut dump_payloads = false;
let mut positionals = Vec::new();
for arg in args {
match arg.as_str() {
"--dump-payloads" => dump_payloads = true,
"-h" | "--help" => {
print_help();
std::process::exit(0);
}
_ if arg.starts_with('-') => {
return Err(anyhow!("unknown option: {}", arg));
}
_ => positionals.push(arg),
}
}
if positionals.is_empty() {
return Ok(Cli {
ccr_path: find_latest_ccr_file("data")
.context("failed to find latest .ccr in ./data for default run")?,
slurm_path: PathBuf::from("data/example.slurm"),
dump_payloads,
});
}
if positionals.len() != 2 {
print_help();
return Err(anyhow!(
"expected: slurm_apply_client <snapshot.ccr> <policy.slurm>"
));
}
Ok(Cli {
ccr_path: PathBuf::from(&positionals[0]),
slurm_path: PathBuf::from(&positionals[1]),
dump_payloads,
})
}
fn print_help() {
eprintln!(
"Usage: cargo run --bin slurm_apply_client -- [--dump-payloads] <snapshot.ccr> <policy.slurm>"
);
eprintln!();
eprintln!("Reads a CCR snapshot, converts it into payloads, applies SLURM, and prints JSON.");
eprintln!(
"When no arguments are provided, it defaults to the latest .ccr under ./data and ./data/example.slurm."
);
eprintln!("Use --dump-payloads to include the full payload list in the JSON output.");
}
fn count_vrps_and_vaps(payloads: &[Payload]) -> (usize, usize) {
let mut vrps = 0;
let mut vaps = 0;
for payload in payloads {
match payload {
Payload::RouteOrigin(_) => vrps += 1,
Payload::Aspa(_) => vaps += 1,
Payload::RouterKey(_) => {}
}
}
(vrps, vaps)
}
fn sample_aspa_customers(payloads: &[Payload], limit: usize) -> Vec<u32> {
let mut customers = Vec::new();
for payload in payloads {
if let Payload::Aspa(aspa) = payload {
let customer = aspa.customer_asn().into_u32();
if !customers.contains(&customer) {
customers.push(customer);
if customers.len() == limit {
break;
}
}
}
}
customers
}

375
src/data_model/aspa.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
use crate::data_model::oid::OID_CT_ASPA;
use crate::data_model::rc::ResourceCertificate;
use crate::data_model::signed_object::{
RpkiSignedObject, RpkiSignedObjectParsed, SignedObjectParseError, SignedObjectValidateError,
};
use der_parser::ber::Class;
use der_parser::der::{DerObject, Tag, parse_der};
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AspaObject {
pub signed_object: RpkiSignedObject,
pub econtent_type: String,
pub aspa: AspaEContent,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AspaObjectParsed {
pub signed_object: RpkiSignedObjectParsed,
pub econtent_type: String,
pub aspa: Option<AspaEContentParsed>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AspaEContent {
pub version: u32,
pub customer_as_id: u32,
pub provider_as_ids: Vec<u32>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AspaEContentParsed {
der: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum AspaParseError {
#[error("signed object parse error: {0} (RFC 6488 §2-§3; RFC 9589 §4)")]
SignedObject(#[from] SignedObjectParseError),
#[error("ASPA parse error: {0} (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §3; DER)")]
Parse(String),
#[error("ASPA trailing bytes: {0} bytes (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §3; DER)")]
TrailingBytes(usize),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum AspaProfileError {
#[error("signed object profile error: {0} (RFC 6488 §2-§3; RFC 9589 §4)")]
SignedObject(#[from] SignedObjectValidateError),
#[error(
"ASPA eContentType must be {OID_CT_ASPA}, got {0} (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §2)"
)]
InvalidEContentType(String),
#[error("ASPA profile decode error: {0} (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §3; DER)")]
ProfileDecode(String),
#[error(
"ASProviderAttestation must be a SEQUENCE of 3 elements (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §3)"
)]
InvalidAttestationSequence,
#[error(
"ASPA version must be 1 and MUST be explicitly encoded (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §3.1)"
)]
VersionMustBeExplicitOne,
#[error(
"ASPA customerASID out of range (0..=4294967295), got {0} (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §3.2)"
)]
CustomerAsIdOutOfRange(u64),
#[error(
"ASPA providers must contain at least one ASID (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §3.3)"
)]
EmptyProviders,
#[error(
"ASPA provider ASID out of range (0..=4294967295), got {0} (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §3.3)"
)]
ProviderAsIdOutOfRange(u64),
#[error(
"ASPA providers must be in strictly increasing order (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §3.3)"
)]
ProvidersNotStrictlyIncreasing,
#[error(
"ASPA providers contains the customerASID ({0}) which is not allowed (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §3.3)"
)]
ProvidersContainCustomer(u32),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum AspaDecodeError {
#[error("{0}")]
Parse(#[from] AspaParseError),
#[error("{0}")]
Validate(#[from] AspaProfileError),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum AspaValidateError {
#[error(
"ASPA EE certificate must contain AS resources extension (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §4; RFC 3779 §3.2)"
)]
EeAsResourcesMissing,
#[error(
"ASPA EE certificate AS resources must not use inherit (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §4; RFC 3779 §3.2.3.3)"
)]
EeAsResourcesInherit,
#[error(
"ASPA EE certificate AS resources must not include ranges (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §4; RFC 3779 §3.2.3.6-§3.2.3.7)"
)]
EeAsResourcesRangePresent,
#[error(
"ASPA EE certificate AS resources must not include RDI (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §4; RFC 3779 §3.2.3.5; RFC 6487 §4.8.11)"
)]
EeAsResourcesRdiPresent,
#[error(
"ASPA EE certificate AS resources must contain exactly one ASID (id element) (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §4)"
)]
EeAsResourcesNotSingleId,
#[error(
"ASPA customerASID ({customer_as_id}) does not match EE AS resources ({ee_as_id}) (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §4)"
)]
CustomerAsIdMismatch { customer_as_id: u32, ee_as_id: u32 },
#[error(
"ASPA EE certificate must not contain IP resources extension (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §4; RFC 3779 §2.2)"
)]
EeIpResourcesPresent,
}
impl AspaObject {
/// Parse step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
pub fn parse_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<AspaObjectParsed, AspaParseError> {
let signed_object = RpkiSignedObject::parse_der(der)?;
let econtent_type = signed_object
.signed_data
.encap_content_info
.econtent_type
.clone();
let aspa = signed_object
.signed_data
.encap_content_info
.econtent
.as_deref()
.map(AspaEContent::parse_der)
.transpose()?;
Ok(AspaObjectParsed {
signed_object,
econtent_type,
aspa,
})
}
/// Profile validate step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
///
/// `AspaObject` is already profile-validated when constructed via `decode_der()` /
/// `AspaObjectParsed::validate_profile()`.
pub fn validate_profile(&self) -> Result<(), AspaProfileError> {
Ok(())
}
pub fn decode_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, AspaDecodeError> {
Ok(Self::parse_der(der)?.validate_profile()?)
}
pub fn from_signed_object(signed_object: RpkiSignedObject) -> Result<Self, AspaDecodeError> {
let econtent_type = signed_object
.signed_data
.encap_content_info
.econtent_type
.clone();
if econtent_type != OID_CT_ASPA {
return Err(AspaProfileError::InvalidEContentType(econtent_type).into());
}
let aspa =
AspaEContent::decode_der(&signed_object.signed_data.encap_content_info.econtent)?;
Ok(Self {
aspa,
signed_object,
econtent_type: OID_CT_ASPA.to_string(),
})
}
/// Validate this ASPA's embedded EE certificate resources.
pub fn validate_embedded_ee_cert(&self) -> Result<(), AspaValidateError> {
let ee = &self.signed_object.signed_data.certificates[0].resource_cert;
self.aspa.validate_against_ee_cert(ee)
}
}
impl AspaEContent {
/// Parse step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
pub fn parse_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<AspaEContentParsed, AspaParseError> {
let (rem, _obj) = parse_der(der).map_err(|e| AspaParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
if !rem.is_empty() {
return Err(AspaParseError::TrailingBytes(rem.len()));
}
Ok(AspaEContentParsed { der: der.to_vec() })
}
/// Profile validate step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
///
/// `AspaEContent` is already profile-validated when constructed via `decode_der()` /
/// `AspaEContentParsed::validate_profile()`.
pub fn validate_profile(&self) -> Result<(), AspaProfileError> {
Ok(())
}
/// Decode the DER-encoded ASProviderAttestation defined in
/// draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21 §3 (`parse + validate`).
pub fn decode_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, AspaDecodeError> {
Ok(Self::parse_der(der)?.validate_profile()?)
}
/// Validate ASPA payload against the embedded EE resource certificate.
///
/// This implements the EE/payload semantic checks described in
/// `draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-21` §4 (as summarized in `rpki/specs/08_aspa.md`).
pub fn validate_against_ee_cert(
&self,
ee: &ResourceCertificate,
) -> Result<(), AspaValidateError> {
if ee.tbs.extensions.ip_resources.is_some() {
return Err(AspaValidateError::EeIpResourcesPresent);
}
let asn = ee
.tbs
.extensions
.as_resources
.as_ref()
.ok_or(AspaValidateError::EeAsResourcesMissing)?;
if asn.rdi.is_some() {
return Err(AspaValidateError::EeAsResourcesRdiPresent);
}
if asn.is_asnum_inherit() {
return Err(AspaValidateError::EeAsResourcesInherit);
}
if asn.has_any_range() {
return Err(AspaValidateError::EeAsResourcesRangePresent);
}
let ee_as_id = asn
.asnum_single_id()
.ok_or(AspaValidateError::EeAsResourcesNotSingleId)?;
if ee_as_id != self.customer_as_id {
return Err(AspaValidateError::CustomerAsIdMismatch {
customer_as_id: self.customer_as_id,
ee_as_id,
});
}
Ok(())
}
}
impl AspaObjectParsed {
pub fn validate_profile(self) -> Result<AspaObject, AspaProfileError> {
let signed_object = self.signed_object.validate_profile()?;
let econtent_type = signed_object
.signed_data
.encap_content_info
.econtent_type
.clone();
if econtent_type != OID_CT_ASPA {
return Err(AspaProfileError::InvalidEContentType(econtent_type));
}
let aspa = self
.aspa
.ok_or_else(|| AspaProfileError::ProfileDecode("ASPA.eContent missing".into()))?
.validate_profile()?;
Ok(AspaObject {
signed_object,
econtent_type: OID_CT_ASPA.to_string(),
aspa,
})
}
}
impl AspaEContentParsed {
pub fn validate_profile(self) -> Result<AspaEContent, AspaProfileError> {
let (_rem, obj) =
parse_der(&self.der).map_err(|e| AspaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
let seq = obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|e| AspaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if seq.len() != 3 {
return Err(AspaProfileError::InvalidAttestationSequence);
}
// version [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER MUST be present and MUST be 1.
let v_obj = &seq[0];
if v_obj.class() != Class::ContextSpecific || v_obj.tag() != Tag(0) {
return Err(AspaProfileError::VersionMustBeExplicitOne);
}
let inner_der = v_obj
.as_slice()
.map_err(|e| AspaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
let (rem, inner) =
parse_der(inner_der).map_err(|e| AspaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if !rem.is_empty() {
return Err(AspaProfileError::ProfileDecode(
"trailing bytes inside ASProviderAttestation.version".into(),
));
}
let v = inner
.as_u64()
.map_err(|e| AspaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if v != 1 {
return Err(AspaProfileError::VersionMustBeExplicitOne);
}
let customer_u64 = seq[1]
.as_u64()
.map_err(|e| AspaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if customer_u64 > u32::MAX as u64 {
return Err(AspaProfileError::CustomerAsIdOutOfRange(customer_u64));
}
let customer_as_id = customer_u64 as u32;
let providers = parse_providers(&seq[2], customer_as_id)?;
Ok(AspaEContent {
version: 1,
customer_as_id,
provider_as_ids: providers,
})
}
}
fn parse_providers(obj: &DerObject<'_>, customer_as_id: u32) -> Result<Vec<u32>, AspaProfileError> {
let seq = obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|e| AspaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if seq.is_empty() {
return Err(AspaProfileError::EmptyProviders);
}
let mut out: Vec<u32> = Vec::with_capacity(seq.len());
let mut prev: Option<u32> = None;
for item in seq {
let v = item
.as_u64()
.map_err(|e| AspaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if v > u32::MAX as u64 {
return Err(AspaProfileError::ProviderAsIdOutOfRange(v));
}
let asn = v as u32;
if asn == customer_as_id {
return Err(AspaProfileError::ProvidersContainCustomer(customer_as_id));
}
if let Some(p) = prev {
if asn <= p {
return Err(AspaProfileError::ProvidersNotStrictlyIncreasing);
}
}
prev = Some(asn);
out.push(asn);
}
Ok(out)
}

111
src/data_model/common.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
use x509_parser::asn1_rs::Tag;
use x509_parser::x509::AlgorithmIdentifier;
pub type UtcTime = time::OffsetDateTime;
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Asn1TimeEncoding {
UtcTime,
GeneralizedTime,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Asn1TimeUtc {
pub utc: UtcTime,
pub encoding: Asn1TimeEncoding,
}
impl Asn1TimeUtc {
/// Validate Time encoding rules (RFC 5280): years 1950-2049 use UTCTime,
/// other years use GeneralizedTime.
pub fn validate_encoding_rfc5280(
&self,
field: &'static str,
) -> Result<(), InvalidTimeEncodingError> {
let year = self.utc.year();
let expected = if year <= 2049 {
Asn1TimeEncoding::UtcTime
} else {
Asn1TimeEncoding::GeneralizedTime
};
if self.encoding != expected {
return Err(InvalidTimeEncodingError {
field,
year,
encoding: self.encoding,
});
}
Ok(())
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct BigUnsigned {
/// Minimal big-endian bytes. For zero, this is `[0]`.
pub bytes_be: Vec<u8>,
}
impl BigUnsigned {
pub fn from_biguint(n: &der_parser::num_bigint::BigUint) -> Self {
let mut bytes = n.to_bytes_be();
if bytes.is_empty() {
bytes.push(0);
}
Self { bytes_be: bytes }
}
pub fn to_hex_upper(&self) -> String {
hex::encode_upper(&self.bytes_be)
}
pub fn to_u64(&self) -> Option<u64> {
if self.bytes_be.len() > 8 {
return None;
}
let mut value: u64 = 0;
for &b in &self.bytes_be {
value = (value << 8) | (b as u64);
}
Some(value)
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
#[error(
"{field} time encoding invalid for year {year}: got {encoding:?} (RFC 5280 §4.1.2.5; RFC 5280 §5.1.2.4-§5.1.2.6)"
)]
pub struct InvalidTimeEncodingError {
pub field: &'static str,
pub year: i32,
pub encoding: Asn1TimeEncoding,
}
pub fn asn1_time_to_model(t: x509_parser::time::ASN1Time) -> Asn1TimeUtc {
let encoding = if t.is_utctime() {
Asn1TimeEncoding::UtcTime
} else {
Asn1TimeEncoding::GeneralizedTime
};
Asn1TimeUtc {
utc: t.to_datetime(),
encoding,
}
}
pub fn algorithm_params_absent_or_null(sig: &AlgorithmIdentifier<'_>) -> bool {
match sig.parameters.as_ref() {
None => true,
Some(p) if p.tag() == Tag::Null => true,
Some(_p) => false,
}
}
/// Filename extensions registered in IANA "RPKI Repository Name Schemes".
///
/// Source: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki/rpki.xhtml>
/// Snapshot date: 2026-01-28.
///
/// Notes:
/// - Includes entries marked TEMPORARY/DEPRECATED by IANA (e.g., `asa`, `gbr`).
pub const IANA_RPKI_REPOSITORY_FILENAME_EXTENSIONS: &[&str] =
&["asa", "cer", "crl", "gbr", "mft", "roa", "sig", "tak"];

View File

@@ -1,51 +1,14 @@
use x509_parser::extensions::{AuthorityKeyIdentifier, ParsedExtension, X509Extension}; pub use crate::data_model::common::{Asn1TimeEncoding, Asn1TimeUtc, BigUnsigned};
use x509_parser::prelude::FromDer; use crate::data_model::oid::{
use x509_parser::prelude::X509Version; OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, OID_CRL_NUMBER, OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION,
use x509_parser::revocation_list::CertificateRevocationList; OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
use x509_parser::asn1_rs::Tag; };
use x509_parser::certificate::X509Certificate; use x509_parser::certificate::X509Certificate;
use x509_parser::x509::SubjectPublicKeyInfo; use x509_parser::extensions::{ParsedExtension, X509Extension};
use x509_parser::x509::AlgorithmIdentifier; use x509_parser::prelude::{FromDer, X509Version};
use x509_parser::revocation_list::CertificateRevocationList;
const OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: &str = "1.2.840.113549.1.1.11"; use x509_parser::x509::{AlgorithmIdentifier, SubjectPublicKeyInfo};
const OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER: &str = "2.5.29.35"; use x509_parser::{asn1_rs::Class as Asn1Class, asn1_rs::Tag as Asn1Tag};
const OID_CRL_NUMBER: &str = "2.5.29.20";
const OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER: &str = "2.5.29.14";
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Asn1TimeEncoding {
UtcTime,
GeneralizedTime,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Asn1TimeUtc {
pub utc: time::OffsetDateTime,
pub encoding: Asn1TimeEncoding,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct BigUnsigned {
/// Minimal big-endian bytes. For zero, this is `[0]`.
pub bytes_be: Vec<u8>,
}
impl BigUnsigned {
pub fn to_hex_upper(&self) -> String {
hex::encode_upper(&self.bytes_be)
}
pub fn to_u64(&self) -> Option<u64> {
if self.bytes_be.len() > 8 {
return None;
}
let mut value: u64 = 0;
for &b in &self.bytes_be {
value = (value << 8) | (b as u64);
}
Some(value)
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RevokedCert { pub struct RevokedCert {
@@ -71,54 +34,131 @@ pub struct RpkixCrl {
pub extensions: CrlExtensions, pub extensions: CrlExtensions,
} }
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RpkixCrlParsed {
pub raw_der: Vec<u8>,
pub version: Option<X509Version>,
pub issuer_dn: String,
pub signature_algorithm: AlgorithmIdentifierValue,
pub tbs_signature_algorithm: AlgorithmIdentifierValue,
pub this_update: Asn1TimeUtc,
pub next_update: Option<Asn1TimeUtc>,
pub revoked_certs: Vec<RevokedCertParsed>,
pub extensions: Vec<CrlExtensionParsed>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RevokedCertParsed {
pub serial_number: BigUnsigned,
pub revocation_date: Asn1TimeUtc,
pub has_extensions: bool,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum CrlExtensionParsed {
AuthorityKeyIdentifier {
key_identifier: Option<Vec<u8>>,
has_other_fields: bool,
critical: bool,
},
CrlNumber {
number: der_parser::num_bigint::BigUint,
critical: bool,
},
Other {
oid: String,
critical: bool,
},
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AlgorithmIdentifierValue {
pub oid: String,
pub parameters: Option<AlgorithmParametersValue>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AlgorithmParametersValue {
pub class: Asn1Class,
pub tag: Asn1Tag,
pub data: Vec<u8>,
}
impl AlgorithmIdentifierValue {
pub fn params_absent_or_null(&self) -> bool {
match &self.parameters {
None => true,
Some(p) if p.class == Asn1Class::Universal && p.tag == Asn1Tag::Null => true,
Some(_p) => false,
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)] #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum CrlDecodeError { pub enum CrlParseError {
#[error("X.509 CRL parse error: {0}")] #[error("X.509 CRL parse error: {0} (RFC 5280 §5.1; RFC 6487 §5)")]
Parse(String), Parse(String),
#[error("trailing bytes after CRL DER: {0} bytes")] #[error("trailing bytes after CRL DER: {0} bytes (DER; RFC 5280 §5.1)")]
TrailingBytes(usize), TrailingBytes(usize),
}
#[error("CRL version must be v2, got {0:?}")] #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum CrlProfileError {
#[error("CRL version must be v2, got {0:?} (RFC 5280 §5.1; RFC 6487 §5)")]
InvalidVersion(Option<u32>), InvalidVersion(Option<u32>),
#[error("CRL signatureAlgorithm must be sha256WithRSAEncryption ({OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION}), got {0}")] #[error("CRL signatureAlgorithm must match TBSCertList.signature (RFC 5280 §5.1)")]
InvalidSignatureAlgorithm(String),
#[error("CRL signature algorithm parameters must be absent or NULL")]
InvalidSignatureAlgorithmParameters,
#[error("CRL signatureAlgorithm must match TBSCertList.signature")]
SignatureAlgorithmMismatch, SignatureAlgorithmMismatch,
#[error("CRL extensions must be exactly two (AKI + CRLNumber), got {0}")] #[error(
"CRL signatureAlgorithm must be sha256WithRSAEncryption ({OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION}), got {0} (RFC 6487 §5; RFC 7935 §2)"
)]
InvalidSignatureAlgorithm(String),
#[error(
"CRL signature algorithm parameters must be absent or NULL (RFC 5280 §4.1.1.2; RFC 7935 §2)"
)]
InvalidSignatureAlgorithmParameters,
#[error("CRL extensions must be exactly two (AKI + CRLNumber), got {0} (RFC 9829 §3.1)")]
InvalidExtensionsCount(usize), InvalidExtensionsCount(usize),
#[error("unsupported CRL extension OID {0}")] #[error("unsupported CRL extension OID {0} (RFC 9829 §3.1)")]
UnsupportedExtension(String), UnsupportedExtension(String),
#[error("duplicate CRL extension OID {0}")] #[error("duplicate CRL extension OID {0} (RFC 5280 §4.2; RFC 9829 §3.1)")]
DuplicateExtension(String), DuplicateExtension(String),
#[error("AuthorityKeyIdentifier must contain keyIdentifier")] #[error("AuthorityKeyIdentifier CRL extension missing (RFC 9829 §3.1; RFC 5280 §5.2.1)")]
AkiMissing,
#[error("AuthorityKeyIdentifier must contain keyIdentifier (RFC 5280 §5.2.1; RFC 9829 §3.1)")]
AkiMissingKeyIdentifier, AkiMissingKeyIdentifier,
#[error("AuthorityKeyIdentifier must not contain authorityCertIssuer or authorityCertSerialNumber")] #[error(
"AuthorityKeyIdentifier must not contain authorityCertIssuer or authorityCertSerialNumber (RFC 5280 §5.2.1; RFC 9829 §3.1)"
)]
AkiHasOtherFields, AkiHasOtherFields,
#[error("CRLNumber must be non-critical")] #[error("CRLNumber CRL extension missing (RFC 9829 §3.1; RFC 5280 §5.2.3)")]
CrlNumberMissing,
#[error("CRLNumber must be non-critical (RFC 9829 §3.1; RFC 5280 §5.2.3)")]
CrlNumberCritical, CrlNumberCritical,
#[error("CRLNumber out of range (must fit in 0..2^159-1)")] #[error("CRLNumber out of range (must fit in 0..2^159-1) (RFC 9829 §3.1)")]
CrlNumberOutOfRange, CrlNumberOutOfRange,
#[error("CRL entry extensions must not be present")] #[error("CRL entry extensions must not be present (RFC 6487 §5; RFC 5280 §5.1)")]
EntryExtensionsNotAllowed, EntryExtensionsNotAllowed,
#[error("CRL nextUpdate must be present (RFC 5280 §5.1.2.5)")] #[error("CRL nextUpdate must be present (RFC 5280 §5.1.2.5; RFC 6487 §5)")]
NextUpdateMissing, NextUpdateMissing,
#[error("{field} time encoding invalid for year {year}: got {encoding:?}")] #[error(
"{field} time encoding invalid for year {year}: got {encoding:?} (RFC 5280 §5.1.2.4-§5.1.2.6)"
)]
InvalidTimeEncoding { InvalidTimeEncoding {
field: &'static str, field: &'static str,
year: i32, year: i32,
@@ -126,64 +166,47 @@ pub enum CrlDecodeError {
}, },
} }
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum CrlDecodeError {
#[error("{0}")]
Parse(#[from] CrlParseError),
#[error("{0}")]
Validate(#[from] CrlProfileError),
}
impl RpkixCrl { impl RpkixCrl {
/// Decode a DER-encoded X.509 v2 CRL and enforce the RPKI profile constraints from /// Parse step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
/// `specs/prepare/data_models/04_crl.md` (RFC 6487 §5; RFC 9829 §3.1; RFC 5280 §5.1). pub fn parse_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<RpkixCrlParsed, CrlParseError> {
pub fn decode_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, CrlDecodeError> {
let (rem, crl) = CertificateRevocationList::from_der(der) let (rem, crl) = CertificateRevocationList::from_der(der)
.map_err(|e| CrlDecodeError::Parse(e.to_string()))?; .map_err(|e| CrlParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
if !rem.is_empty() { if !rem.is_empty() {
return Err(CrlDecodeError::TrailingBytes(rem.len())); return Err(CrlParseError::TrailingBytes(rem.len()));
} }
let version = match crl.version() {
Some(X509Version::V2) => 2,
Some(v) => return Err(CrlDecodeError::InvalidVersion(Some(v.0))),
None => return Err(CrlDecodeError::InvalidVersion(None)),
};
let sig_oid = crl.signature_algorithm.algorithm.to_id_string();
let tbs_sig_oid = crl.tbs_cert_list.signature.algorithm.to_id_string();
if sig_oid != tbs_sig_oid {
return Err(CrlDecodeError::SignatureAlgorithmMismatch);
}
if sig_oid != OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION {
return Err(CrlDecodeError::InvalidSignatureAlgorithm(sig_oid));
}
validate_sig_params(&crl.signature_algorithm)?;
validate_sig_params(&crl.tbs_cert_list.signature)?;
let extensions = parse_and_validate_extensions(crl.extensions())?;
let revoked_certs = crl let revoked_certs = crl
.iter_revoked_certificates() .iter_revoked_certificates()
.map(|rc| { .map(|rc| RevokedCertParsed {
if !rc.extensions().is_empty() { serial_number: BigUnsigned::from_biguint(rc.serial()),
return Err(CrlDecodeError::EntryExtensionsNotAllowed); revocation_date: crate::data_model::common::asn1_time_to_model(rc.revocation_date),
} has_extensions: !rc.extensions().is_empty(),
let revocation_date = asn1_time_to_model(rc.revocation_date);
validate_time_encoding("revocationDate", &revocation_date)?;
Ok(RevokedCert {
serial_number: biguint_to_big_unsigned(rc.serial()),
revocation_date,
}) })
}) .collect::<Vec<_>>();
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
let this_update = asn1_time_to_model(crl.last_update());
validate_time_encoding("thisUpdate", &this_update)?;
let this_update = crate::data_model::common::asn1_time_to_model(crl.last_update());
let next_update = crl let next_update = crl
.next_update() .next_update()
.map(asn1_time_to_model) .map(crate::data_model::common::asn1_time_to_model);
.ok_or(CrlDecodeError::NextUpdateMissing)?;
validate_time_encoding("nextUpdate", &next_update)?;
Ok(RpkixCrl { let extensions =
parse_extensions_parse(crl.extensions()).map_err(|e| CrlParseError::Parse(e))?;
Ok(RpkixCrlParsed {
raw_der: der.to_vec(), raw_der: der.to_vec(),
version, version: crl.version(),
issuer_dn: crl.issuer().to_string(), issuer_dn: crl.issuer().to_string(),
signature_algorithm_oid: OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION.to_string(), signature_algorithm: algorithm_identifier_value(&crl.signature_algorithm),
tbs_signature_algorithm: algorithm_identifier_value(&crl.tbs_cert_list.signature),
this_update, this_update,
next_update, next_update,
revoked_certs, revoked_certs,
@@ -191,6 +214,20 @@ impl RpkixCrl {
}) })
} }
/// Decode a DER-encoded X.509 v2 CRL and enforce the RPKI profile constraints from
/// `specs/prepare/data_models/04_crl.md` (RFC 6487 §5; RFC 9829 §3.1; RFC 5280 §5.1).
pub fn decode_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, CrlDecodeError> {
Ok(Self::parse_der(der)?.validate_profile()?)
}
/// Profile validate step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
///
/// `RpkixCrl` is already profile-validated when constructed via `decode_der()` /
/// `RpkixCrlParsed::validate_profile()`.
pub fn validate_profile(&self) -> Result<(), CrlProfileError> {
Ok(())
}
/// Verify the cryptographic signature on this CRL using the issuer certificate. /// Verify the cryptographic signature on this CRL using the issuer certificate.
/// ///
/// Signature verification needs the issuer public key (RFC 5280 §6.3.3 (f)-(g)). /// Signature verification needs the issuer public key (RFC 5280 §6.3.3 (f)-(g)).
@@ -265,55 +302,107 @@ impl RpkixCrl {
} }
} }
impl RpkixCrlParsed {
/// Profile validate step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
pub fn validate_profile(self) -> Result<RpkixCrl, CrlProfileError> {
let version = match self.version {
Some(X509Version::V2) => 2,
Some(v) => return Err(CrlProfileError::InvalidVersion(Some(v.0))),
None => return Err(CrlProfileError::InvalidVersion(None)),
};
// signatureAlgorithm must match tbsCertList.signature
if self.signature_algorithm != self.tbs_signature_algorithm {
return Err(CrlProfileError::SignatureAlgorithmMismatch);
}
let sig_oid = self.signature_algorithm.oid.clone();
if sig_oid != OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION {
return Err(CrlProfileError::InvalidSignatureAlgorithm(sig_oid));
}
if !self.signature_algorithm.params_absent_or_null() {
return Err(CrlProfileError::InvalidSignatureAlgorithmParameters);
}
let extensions = validate_extensions_profile(&self.extensions)?;
let mut revoked_out = Vec::with_capacity(self.revoked_certs.len());
for rc in self.revoked_certs {
if rc.has_extensions {
return Err(CrlProfileError::EntryExtensionsNotAllowed);
}
validate_time_encoding_rfc5280("revocationDate", &rc.revocation_date)?;
revoked_out.push(RevokedCert {
serial_number: rc.serial_number,
revocation_date: rc.revocation_date,
});
}
validate_time_encoding_rfc5280("thisUpdate", &self.this_update)?;
let next_update = self.next_update.ok_or(CrlProfileError::NextUpdateMissing)?;
validate_time_encoding_rfc5280("nextUpdate", &next_update)?;
Ok(RpkixCrl {
raw_der: self.raw_der,
version,
issuer_dn: self.issuer_dn,
signature_algorithm_oid: OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION.to_string(),
this_update: self.this_update,
next_update,
revoked_certs: revoked_out,
extensions,
})
}
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)] #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum CrlVerifyError { pub enum CrlVerifyError {
#[error("issuer certificate parse error: {0}")] #[error("issuer certificate parse error: {0} (RFC 5280 §4.1; RFC 6487 §4)")]
IssuerCertificateParse(String), IssuerCertificateParse(String),
#[error("trailing bytes after issuer certificate DER: {0} bytes")] #[error("trailing bytes after issuer certificate DER: {0} bytes (DER; RFC 5280 §4.1)")]
IssuerCertificateTrailingBytes(usize), IssuerCertificateTrailingBytes(usize),
#[error("issuer SubjectPublicKeyInfo parse error: {0}")] #[error("issuer SubjectPublicKeyInfo parse error: {0} (RFC 5280 §4.1.2.7)")]
IssuerSpkiParse(String), IssuerSpkiParse(String),
#[error("trailing bytes after issuer SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER: {0} bytes")] #[error(
"trailing bytes after issuer SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER: {0} bytes (DER; RFC 5280 §4.1.2.7)"
)]
IssuerSpkiTrailingBytes(usize), IssuerSpkiTrailingBytes(usize),
#[error("CRL parse error: {0}")] #[error("CRL parse error: {0} (RFC 5280 §5.1; RFC 6487 §5)")]
CrlParse(String), CrlParse(String),
#[error("trailing bytes after CRL DER: {0} bytes")] #[error("trailing bytes after CRL DER: {0} bytes (DER; RFC 5280 §5.1)")]
CrlTrailingBytes(usize), CrlTrailingBytes(usize),
#[error("CRL issuer DN does not match issuer certificate subject")] #[error(
"CRL issuer DN does not match issuer certificate subject (RFC 5280 §5.1; RFC 5280 §6.3.3(b))"
)]
IssuerSubjectMismatch { IssuerSubjectMismatch {
crl_issuer_dn: String, crl_issuer_dn: String,
issuer_subject_dn: String, issuer_subject_dn: String,
}, },
#[error("issuer certificate keyUsage present but missing cRLSign")] #[error(
"issuer certificate keyUsage present but missing cRLSign (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.3; RFC 5280 §6.3.3(f))"
)]
IssuerKeyUsageMissingCrlSign, IssuerKeyUsageMissingCrlSign,
#[error("CRL AKI.keyIdentifier does not match issuer certificate SKI")] #[error(
"CRL AKI.keyIdentifier does not match issuer certificate SKI (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.1; RFC 5280 §4.2.1.2; RFC 5280 §6.3.3(c)/(f))"
)]
AkiSkiMismatch, AkiSkiMismatch,
#[error("CRL signature verification failed: {0}")] #[error("CRL signature verification failed: {0} (RFC 5280 §6.3.3(g); RFC 7935 §2)")]
InvalidSignature(String), InvalidSignature(String),
} }
fn asn1_time_to_model(t: x509_parser::time::ASN1Time) -> Asn1TimeUtc { fn validate_time_encoding_rfc5280(
let encoding = if t.is_utctime() { field: &'static str,
Asn1TimeEncoding::UtcTime t: &Asn1TimeUtc,
} else { ) -> Result<(), CrlProfileError> {
Asn1TimeEncoding::GeneralizedTime
};
Asn1TimeUtc {
utc: t.to_datetime(),
encoding,
}
}
fn validate_time_encoding(field: &'static str, t: &Asn1TimeUtc) -> Result<(), CrlDecodeError> {
let year = t.utc.year(); let year = t.utc.year();
let expected = if year <= 2049 { let expected = if year <= 2049 {
Asn1TimeEncoding::UtcTime Asn1TimeEncoding::UtcTime
@@ -321,7 +410,7 @@ fn validate_time_encoding(field: &'static str, t: &Asn1TimeUtc) -> Result<(), Cr
Asn1TimeEncoding::GeneralizedTime Asn1TimeEncoding::GeneralizedTime
}; };
if t.encoding != expected { if t.encoding != expected {
return Err(CrlDecodeError::InvalidTimeEncoding { return Err(CrlProfileError::InvalidTimeEncoding {
field, field,
year, year,
encoding: t.encoding, encoding: t.encoding,
@@ -330,94 +419,109 @@ fn validate_time_encoding(field: &'static str, t: &Asn1TimeUtc) -> Result<(), Cr
Ok(()) Ok(())
} }
fn validate_sig_params(sig: &AlgorithmIdentifier<'_>) -> Result<(), CrlDecodeError> { fn algorithm_identifier_value(ai: &AlgorithmIdentifier<'_>) -> AlgorithmIdentifierValue {
match sig.parameters.as_ref() { let parameters = ai.parameters.as_ref().map(|p| AlgorithmParametersValue {
None => Ok(()), class: p.class(),
Some(p) if p.tag() == Tag::Null => Ok(()), tag: p.tag(),
Some(_p) => Err(CrlDecodeError::InvalidSignatureAlgorithmParameters), data: p.as_bytes().to_vec(),
});
AlgorithmIdentifierValue {
oid: ai.algorithm.to_id_string(),
parameters,
} }
} }
fn parse_and_validate_extensions(exts: &[X509Extension<'_>]) -> Result<CrlExtensions, CrlDecodeError> { fn parse_extensions_parse(exts: &[X509Extension<'_>]) -> Result<Vec<CrlExtensionParsed>, String> {
if exts.len() != 2 { let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(exts.len());
return Err(CrlDecodeError::InvalidExtensionsCount(exts.len()));
}
let mut authority_key_identifier: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
let mut crl_number: Option<BigUnsigned> = None;
for ext in exts { for ext in exts {
let oid = ext.oid.to_id_string(); let oid = ext.oid.to_id_string();
match oid.as_str() { match oid.as_str() {
OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER => { OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER => {
if authority_key_identifier.is_some() { let ParsedExtension::AuthorityKeyIdentifier(aki) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
return Err(CrlDecodeError::DuplicateExtension(oid)); return Err("AKI extension parse failed".to_string());
};
out.push(CrlExtensionParsed::AuthorityKeyIdentifier {
key_identifier: aki.key_identifier.as_ref().map(|k| k.0.to_vec()),
has_other_fields: aki.authority_cert_issuer.is_some()
|| aki.authority_cert_serial.is_some(),
critical: ext.critical,
});
} }
let aki = parse_aki(ext)?; OID_CRL_NUMBER => match ext.parsed_extension() {
authority_key_identifier = Some(aki); ParsedExtension::CRLNumber(n) => out.push(CrlExtensionParsed::CrlNumber {
number: n.clone(),
critical: ext.critical,
}),
_ => return Err("CRLNumber extension parse failed".to_string()),
},
_ => out.push(CrlExtensionParsed::Other {
oid,
critical: ext.critical,
}),
} }
OID_CRL_NUMBER => {
if crl_number.is_some() {
return Err(CrlDecodeError::DuplicateExtension(oid));
} }
if ext.critical { Ok(out)
return Err(CrlDecodeError::CrlNumberCritical);
} }
let n = parse_crl_number(ext)?;
if n.bits() > 159 { fn validate_extensions_profile(
return Err(CrlDecodeError::CrlNumberOutOfRange); exts: &[CrlExtensionParsed],
) -> Result<CrlExtensions, CrlProfileError> {
if exts.len() != 2 {
return Err(CrlProfileError::InvalidExtensionsCount(exts.len()));
} }
crl_number = Some(biguint_to_big_unsigned(&n));
let mut seen: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
let mut authority_key_identifier: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
let mut crl_number: Option<BigUnsigned> = None;
for ext in exts {
match ext {
CrlExtensionParsed::AuthorityKeyIdentifier {
key_identifier,
has_other_fields,
critical: _,
} => {
let oid = OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER.to_string();
if seen.iter().any(|s| s == &oid) {
return Err(CrlProfileError::DuplicateExtension(oid));
}
seen.push(oid.clone());
if *has_other_fields {
return Err(CrlProfileError::AkiHasOtherFields);
}
let ki = key_identifier
.as_ref()
.ok_or(CrlProfileError::AkiMissingKeyIdentifier)?;
authority_key_identifier = Some(ki.clone());
}
CrlExtensionParsed::CrlNumber { number, critical } => {
let oid = OID_CRL_NUMBER.to_string();
if seen.iter().any(|s| s == &oid) {
return Err(CrlProfileError::DuplicateExtension(oid));
}
seen.push(oid.clone());
if *critical {
return Err(CrlProfileError::CrlNumberCritical);
}
if number.bits() > 159 {
return Err(CrlProfileError::CrlNumberOutOfRange);
}
crl_number = Some(BigUnsigned::from_biguint(number));
}
CrlExtensionParsed::Other { oid, .. } => {
return Err(CrlProfileError::UnsupportedExtension(oid.clone()));
} }
_ => return Err(CrlDecodeError::UnsupportedExtension(oid)),
} }
} }
Ok(CrlExtensions { Ok(CrlExtensions {
authority_key_identifier: authority_key_identifier.unwrap(), authority_key_identifier: authority_key_identifier.ok_or(CrlProfileError::AkiMissing)?,
crl_number: crl_number.unwrap(), crl_number: crl_number.ok_or(CrlProfileError::CrlNumberMissing)?,
}) })
} }
fn parse_aki(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CrlDecodeError> {
let ParsedExtension::AuthorityKeyIdentifier(aki) = ext.parsed_extension() else {
return Err(CrlDecodeError::Parse("AKI extension parse failed".into()));
};
validate_aki_profile(aki)?;
Ok(aki
.key_identifier
.as_ref()
.ok_or(CrlDecodeError::AkiMissingKeyIdentifier)?
.0
.to_vec())
}
fn validate_aki_profile(aki: &AuthorityKeyIdentifier<'_>) -> Result<(), CrlDecodeError> {
if aki.key_identifier.is_none() {
return Err(CrlDecodeError::AkiMissingKeyIdentifier);
}
if aki.authority_cert_issuer.is_some() || aki.authority_cert_serial.is_some() {
return Err(CrlDecodeError::AkiHasOtherFields);
}
Ok(())
}
fn parse_crl_number(ext: &X509Extension<'_>) -> Result<der_parser::num_bigint::BigUint, CrlDecodeError> {
match ext.parsed_extension() {
ParsedExtension::CRLNumber(n) => Ok(n.clone()),
ParsedExtension::ParseError { error } => Err(CrlDecodeError::Parse(error.to_string())),
_ => Err(CrlDecodeError::Parse("CRLNumber extension parse failed".into())),
}
}
fn biguint_to_big_unsigned(n: &der_parser::num_bigint::BigUint) -> BigUnsigned {
let mut bytes = n.to_bytes_be();
if bytes.is_empty() {
bytes.push(0);
}
BigUnsigned { bytes_be: bytes }
}
fn get_subject_key_identifier(cert: &X509Certificate<'_>) -> Option<Vec<u8>> { fn get_subject_key_identifier(cert: &X509Certificate<'_>) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
cert.extensions() cert.extensions()
.iter() .iter()

462
src/data_model/manifest.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,462 @@
use crate::data_model::common::{BigUnsigned, UtcTime};
use crate::data_model::oid::{OID_CT_RPKI_MANIFEST, OID_SHA256};
use crate::data_model::rc::ResourceCertificate;
use crate::data_model::signed_object::{
RpkiSignedObject, RpkiSignedObjectParsed, SignedObjectParseError, SignedObjectValidateError,
};
use der_parser::ber::BerObjectContent;
use der_parser::der::{DerObject, Tag, parse_der};
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ManifestObject {
pub signed_object: RpkiSignedObject,
pub econtent_type: String,
pub manifest: ManifestEContent,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ManifestObjectParsed {
pub signed_object: RpkiSignedObjectParsed,
pub econtent_type: String,
pub manifest: Option<ManifestEContentParsed>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ManifestEContent {
pub version: u32,
pub manifest_number: BigUnsigned,
pub this_update: UtcTime,
pub next_update: UtcTime,
pub file_hash_alg: String,
pub files: Vec<FileAndHash>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ManifestEContentParsed {
der: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct FileAndHash {
pub file_name: String,
pub hash_bytes: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ManifestParseError {
#[error("signed object parse error: {0} (RFC 6488 §2-§3; RFC 9589 §4)")]
SignedObject(#[from] SignedObjectParseError),
#[error("DER parse error: {0} (RFC 9286 §4.2; DER)")]
Parse(String),
#[error("trailing bytes after DER object: {0} bytes (RFC 9286 §4.2; DER)")]
TrailingBytes(usize),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ManifestProfileError {
#[error("signed object profile error: {0} (RFC 6488 §2-§3; RFC 9589 §4)")]
SignedObject(#[from] SignedObjectValidateError),
#[error(
"eContentType must be id-ct-rpkiManifest ({OID_CT_RPKI_MANIFEST}), got {0} (RFC 9286 §4.1; RFC 9286 §4.4(1))"
)]
InvalidEContentType(String),
#[error("manifest profile decode error: {0} (RFC 9286 §4.2; DER)")]
ProfileDecode(String),
#[error("Manifest must be a SEQUENCE of 5 or 6 elements, got {0} (RFC 9286 §4.2)")]
InvalidManifestSequenceLen(usize),
#[error("Manifest.version must be 0, got {0} (RFC 9286 §4.2.1)")]
InvalidManifestVersion(u64),
#[error(
"Manifest.manifestNumber must be non-negative INTEGER (RFC 9286 §4.2; RFC 9286 §4.2.1)"
)]
InvalidManifestNumber,
#[error("Manifest.manifestNumber longer than 20 octets (RFC 9286 §4.2.1)")]
ManifestNumberTooLong,
#[error("Manifest.thisUpdate must be GeneralizedTime (RFC 9286 §4.2)")]
InvalidThisUpdate,
#[error("Manifest.nextUpdate must be GeneralizedTime (RFC 9286 §4.2)")]
InvalidNextUpdate,
#[error("Manifest.nextUpdate must be later than thisUpdate (RFC 9286 §4.2.1)")]
NextUpdateNotLater,
#[error(
"Manifest.fileHashAlg must be id-sha256 ({OID_SHA256}), got {0} (RFC 9286 §4.2.1; RFC 7935 §2)"
)]
InvalidFileHashAlg(String),
#[error("Manifest.fileList must be a SEQUENCE (RFC 9286 §4.2)")]
InvalidFileList,
#[error("FileAndHash must be SEQUENCE of 2 (RFC 9286 §4.2)")]
InvalidFileAndHash,
#[error("fileList file name invalid: {0} (RFC 9286 §4.2.2)")]
InvalidFileName(String),
#[error("fileList hash must be BIT STRING (RFC 9286 §4.2)")]
InvalidHashType,
#[error(
"fileList hash BIT STRING must be octet-aligned (unused bits=0) (RFC 9286 §4.2.1; DER BIT STRING)"
)]
HashNotOctetAligned,
#[error(
"fileList hash length invalid for sha256: got {0} bytes (RFC 9286 §4.2.1; RFC 7935 §2)"
)]
InvalidHashLength(usize),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ManifestDecodeError {
#[error("{0}")]
Parse(#[from] ManifestParseError),
#[error("{0}")]
Validate(#[from] ManifestProfileError),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ManifestValidateError {
#[error(
"Manifest EE certificate MUST include at least one RFC 3779 resource extension (IP or AS) (RFC 6487 §4.8.10-§4.8.11; RFC 3779; RFC 9286 §5.1)"
)]
EeResourcesMissing,
#[error(
"Manifest EE certificate IP resources MUST use inherit only (RFC 9286 §5.1; RFC 3779 §2.2.3.5)"
)]
EeIpResourcesNotInherit,
#[error(
"Manifest EE certificate AS resources MUST use inherit only (RFC 9286 §5.1; RFC 3779 §3.2.3.3)"
)]
EeAsResourcesNotInherit,
#[error(
"Manifest EE certificate AS resources rdi MUST be absent (RFC 6487 §4.8.11; RFC 3779 §3.2.3.5)"
)]
EeAsResourcesRdiPresent,
}
impl ManifestObject {
/// Parse step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
pub fn parse_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<ManifestObjectParsed, ManifestParseError> {
let signed_object = RpkiSignedObject::parse_der(der)?;
let econtent_type = signed_object
.signed_data
.encap_content_info
.econtent_type
.clone();
let manifest = signed_object
.signed_data
.encap_content_info
.econtent
.as_deref()
.map(ManifestEContent::parse_der)
.transpose()?;
Ok(ManifestObjectParsed {
signed_object,
econtent_type,
manifest,
})
}
/// Profile validate step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
///
/// `ManifestObject` is already profile-validated when constructed via `decode_der()` /
/// `ManifestObjectParsed::validate_profile()`.
pub fn validate_profile(&self) -> Result<(), ManifestProfileError> {
Ok(())
}
pub fn decode_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ManifestDecodeError> {
Ok(Self::parse_der(der)?.validate_profile()?)
}
pub fn from_signed_object(
signed_object: RpkiSignedObject,
) -> Result<Self, ManifestDecodeError> {
let econtent_type = signed_object
.signed_data
.encap_content_info
.econtent_type
.clone();
if econtent_type != OID_CT_RPKI_MANIFEST {
return Err(ManifestProfileError::InvalidEContentType(econtent_type).into());
}
let manifest =
ManifestEContent::decode_der(&signed_object.signed_data.encap_content_info.econtent)?;
Ok(Self {
signed_object,
econtent_type: OID_CT_RPKI_MANIFEST.to_string(),
manifest,
})
}
/// Validate the embedded EE certificate resources against RFC 9286 §5.1.
///
/// This does **not** perform certificate path validation. It assumes `ee` is a parsed and
/// profile-validated RPKI EE resource certificate.
pub fn validate_against_ee_cert(
&self,
ee: &ResourceCertificate,
) -> Result<(), ManifestValidateError> {
let ip = ee.tbs.extensions.ip_resources.as_ref();
let asn = ee.tbs.extensions.as_resources.as_ref();
if ip.is_none() && asn.is_none() {
return Err(ManifestValidateError::EeResourcesMissing);
}
if let Some(ip) = ip {
if !ip.is_all_inherit() {
return Err(ManifestValidateError::EeIpResourcesNotInherit);
}
}
if let Some(asn) = asn {
if asn.rdi.is_some() {
return Err(ManifestValidateError::EeAsResourcesRdiPresent);
}
if !asn.is_asnum_inherit() {
return Err(ManifestValidateError::EeAsResourcesNotInherit);
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Validate this manifest's embedded EE certificate resources.
pub fn validate_embedded_ee_cert(&self) -> Result<(), ManifestValidateError> {
let ee = &self.signed_object.signed_data.certificates[0].resource_cert;
self.validate_against_ee_cert(ee)
}
}
impl ManifestEContent {
/// Parse step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
pub fn parse_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<ManifestEContentParsed, ManifestParseError> {
let (rem, _obj) = parse_der(der).map_err(|e| ManifestParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
if !rem.is_empty() {
return Err(ManifestParseError::TrailingBytes(rem.len()));
}
Ok(ManifestEContentParsed { der: der.to_vec() })
}
/// Profile validate step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
///
/// `ManifestEContent` is already profile-validated when constructed via `decode_der()` /
/// `ManifestEContentParsed::validate_profile()`.
pub fn validate_profile(&self) -> Result<(), ManifestProfileError> {
Ok(())
}
/// Decode the DER-encoded Manifest eContent defined in RFC 9286 §4.2 (`parse + validate`).
pub fn decode_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ManifestDecodeError> {
Ok(Self::parse_der(der)?.validate_profile()?)
}
}
impl ManifestObjectParsed {
pub fn validate_profile(self) -> Result<ManifestObject, ManifestProfileError> {
let signed_object = self.signed_object.validate_profile()?;
let econtent_type = signed_object
.signed_data
.encap_content_info
.econtent_type
.clone();
if econtent_type != OID_CT_RPKI_MANIFEST {
return Err(ManifestProfileError::InvalidEContentType(econtent_type));
}
let manifest = self
.manifest
.ok_or_else(|| ManifestProfileError::ProfileDecode("Manifest.eContent missing".into()))?
.validate_profile()?;
Ok(ManifestObject {
signed_object,
econtent_type: OID_CT_RPKI_MANIFEST.to_string(),
manifest,
})
}
}
impl ManifestEContentParsed {
pub fn validate_profile(self) -> Result<ManifestEContent, ManifestProfileError> {
let (_rem, obj) =
parse_der(&self.der).map_err(|e| ManifestProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
let seq = obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|e| ManifestProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if seq.len() != 5 && seq.len() != 6 {
return Err(ManifestProfileError::InvalidManifestSequenceLen(seq.len()));
}
let mut idx = 0;
let mut version: u32 = 0;
if seq.len() == 6 {
let v_obj = &seq[0];
if v_obj.class() != der_parser::ber::Class::ContextSpecific || v_obj.tag() != Tag(0) {
return Err(ManifestProfileError::ProfileDecode(
"Manifest.version must be [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER".into(),
));
}
let inner_der = v_obj
.as_slice()
.map_err(|e| ManifestProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
let (rem, inner) = parse_der(inner_der)
.map_err(|e| ManifestProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if !rem.is_empty() {
return Err(ManifestProfileError::ProfileDecode(
"trailing bytes inside Manifest.version".into(),
));
}
let v = inner
.as_u64()
.map_err(|e| ManifestProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if v != 0 {
return Err(ManifestProfileError::InvalidManifestVersion(v));
}
version = 0;
idx = 1;
}
let manifest_number = parse_manifest_number(&seq[idx])?;
idx += 1;
let this_update =
parse_generalized_time(&seq[idx], ManifestProfileError::InvalidThisUpdate)?;
idx += 1;
let next_update =
parse_generalized_time(&seq[idx], ManifestProfileError::InvalidNextUpdate)?;
idx += 1;
if next_update <= this_update {
return Err(ManifestProfileError::NextUpdateNotLater);
}
let file_hash_alg = oid_to_string(&seq[idx])?;
idx += 1;
if file_hash_alg != OID_SHA256 {
return Err(ManifestProfileError::InvalidFileHashAlg(file_hash_alg));
}
let files = parse_file_list_sha256(&seq[idx])?;
Ok(ManifestEContent {
version,
manifest_number,
this_update,
next_update,
file_hash_alg: OID_SHA256.to_string(),
files,
})
}
}
fn parse_manifest_number(obj: &DerObject<'_>) -> Result<BigUnsigned, ManifestProfileError> {
let n = obj
.as_biguint()
.map_err(|_e| ManifestProfileError::InvalidManifestNumber)?;
let out = BigUnsigned::from_biguint(&n);
if out.bytes_be.len() > 20 {
return Err(ManifestProfileError::ManifestNumberTooLong);
}
Ok(out)
}
fn parse_generalized_time(
obj: &DerObject<'_>,
err: ManifestProfileError,
) -> Result<UtcTime, ManifestProfileError> {
match &obj.content {
BerObjectContent::GeneralizedTime(dt) => dt
.to_datetime()
.map_err(|e| ManifestProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string())),
_ => Err(err),
}
}
fn parse_file_list_sha256(obj: &DerObject<'_>) -> Result<Vec<FileAndHash>, ManifestProfileError> {
let seq = obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|_e| ManifestProfileError::InvalidFileList)?;
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(seq.len());
for entry in seq {
let (file_name, hash_bytes) = parse_file_and_hash(entry)?;
validate_file_name(&file_name)?;
if hash_bytes.len() != 32 {
return Err(ManifestProfileError::InvalidHashLength(hash_bytes.len()));
}
out.push(FileAndHash {
file_name,
hash_bytes,
});
}
Ok(out)
}
fn parse_file_and_hash(obj: &DerObject<'_>) -> Result<(String, Vec<u8>), ManifestProfileError> {
let seq = obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|e| ManifestProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if seq.len() != 2 {
return Err(ManifestProfileError::InvalidFileAndHash);
}
let file_name = seq[0]
.as_str()
.map_err(|e| ManifestProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?
.to_string();
let (unused_bits, bits) = match &seq[1].content {
BerObjectContent::BitString(unused, bso) => (*unused, bso.data.to_vec()),
_ => return Err(ManifestProfileError::InvalidHashType),
};
if unused_bits != 0 {
return Err(ManifestProfileError::HashNotOctetAligned);
}
Ok((file_name, bits))
}
fn validate_file_name(name: &str) -> Result<(), ManifestProfileError> {
// RFC 9286 §4.2.2:
// 1+ chars from a-zA-Z0-9-_ , then '.', then 3-letter extension.
let Some((base, ext)) = name.rsplit_once('.') else {
return Err(ManifestProfileError::InvalidFileName(name.to_string()));
};
if base.is_empty() || ext.len() != 3 {
return Err(ManifestProfileError::InvalidFileName(name.to_string()));
}
if !base
.bytes()
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b == b'-' || b == b'_')
{
return Err(ManifestProfileError::InvalidFileName(name.to_string()));
}
if !ext.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphabetic()) {
return Err(ManifestProfileError::InvalidFileName(name.to_string()));
}
let ext_lower = ext.to_ascii_lowercase();
if !crate::data_model::common::IANA_RPKI_REPOSITORY_FILENAME_EXTENSIONS
.iter()
.any(|&e| e == ext_lower)
{
return Err(ManifestProfileError::InvalidFileName(name.to_string()));
}
Ok(())
}
fn oid_to_string(obj: &DerObject<'_>) -> Result<String, ManifestProfileError> {
let oid = obj
.as_oid()
.map_err(|e| ManifestProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
Ok(oid.to_id_string())
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
pub mod aspa;
pub mod common;
pub mod crl; pub mod crl;
mod rc; pub mod manifest;
mod tal; pub mod oid;
mod ta; pub mod rc;
pub mod resources; pub mod roa;
mod oids; pub mod signed_object;
pub mod ta;
pub mod tal;

42
src/data_model/oid.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
pub const OID_SHA256: &str = "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1";
pub const OID_SIGNED_DATA: &str = "1.2.840.113549.1.7.2";
pub const OID_CMS_ATTR_CONTENT_TYPE: &str = "1.2.840.113549.1.9.3";
pub const OID_CMS_ATTR_MESSAGE_DIGEST: &str = "1.2.840.113549.1.9.4";
pub const OID_CMS_ATTR_SIGNING_TIME: &str = "1.2.840.113549.1.9.5";
pub const OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION: &str = "1.2.840.113549.1.1.1";
pub const OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: &str = "1.2.840.113549.1.1.11";
// X.509 extensions (RFC 5280 / RFC 6487)
pub const OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: &str = "2.5.29.19";
pub const OID_KEY_USAGE: &str = "2.5.29.15";
pub const OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE: &str = "2.5.29.37";
pub const OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS: &str = "2.5.29.31";
pub const OID_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1";
pub const OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES: &str = "2.5.29.32";
pub const OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER: &str = "2.5.29.35";
pub const OID_CRL_NUMBER: &str = "2.5.29.20";
pub const OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER: &str = "2.5.29.14";
pub const OID_CT_RPKI_MANIFEST: &str = "1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26";
pub const OID_CT_ROUTE_ORIGIN_AUTHZ: &str = "1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24";
pub const OID_CT_ASPA: &str = "1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49";
// X.509 extensions / access methods (RFC 5280 / RFC 6487)
pub const OID_SUBJECT_INFO_ACCESS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11";
pub const OID_AD_SIGNED_OBJECT: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.11";
pub const OID_AD_CA_ISSUERS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2";
pub const OID_AD_CA_REPOSITORY: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.5";
pub const OID_AD_RPKI_MANIFEST: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.10";
pub const OID_AD_RPKI_NOTIFY: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.13";
// RFC 3779 resource extensions (RFC 6487 profile)
pub const OID_IP_ADDR_BLOCKS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.7";
pub const OID_AUTONOMOUS_SYS_IDS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.8";
// RPKI CP (RFC 6484 / RFC 6487)
pub const OID_CP_IPADDR_ASNUMBER: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2";

View File

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
pub const OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: &str = "2.5.29.19";
pub const OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER: &str = "2.5.29.14";
pub const OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER: &str = "2.5.29.35";
pub const OID_KEY_USAGE: &str = "2.5.29.15";
pub const OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE: &str = "2.5.29.37";
pub const OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS: &str = "2.5.29.31";
pub const OID_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1";
pub const OID_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48";
pub const OID_AD_CA_ISSUERS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2";
pub const OID_AD_OCSP: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1";
pub const OID_SUBJECT_INFO_ACCESS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11";
pub const OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES: &str = "2.5.29.32";
pub const OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: &str = "1.2.840.113549.1.1.11";
pub const OID_IP_ADDRESS_BLOCKS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.7";
pub const OID_AS_IDENTIFIERS: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.8";
pub const OID_RPKI_CP: &str = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2";

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ASIdentifiers {
pub asn: Vec<ASIdentifierChoice>
}
// ASN
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ASIdentifierChoice {
Inherit,
ASIDsOrRanges(Vec<ASIDOrRange>),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ASIDOrRange {
Id(Asn),
AsRange(ASRange),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ASRange {
pub min: Asn,
pub max: Asn,
}
impl ASRange {
/// Creates a new AS number range from the smallest and largest number.
pub fn new(min: Asn, max: Asn) -> Self {
ASRange { min, max }
}
/// Returns an AS block covering all ASNs.
pub fn all() -> ASRange {
ASRange::new(Asn::MIN, Asn::MAX)
}
/// Returns the smallest AS number that is part of this range.
pub fn min(self) -> Asn {
self.min
}
/// Returns the largest AS number that is still part of this range.
pub fn max(self) -> Asn {
self.max
}
/// Returns the number of ASNs covered by this value.
pub fn asn_count(self) -> u32 {
u32::from(self.max) - u32::from(self.min) + 1
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Asn(u32);
impl Asn {
pub const MIN: Asn = Asn(u32::MIN);
pub const MAX: Asn = Asn(u32::MAX);
/// Creates an AS number from a `u32`.
pub fn from_u32(value: u32) -> Self {
Asn(value)
}
/// Converts an AS number into a `u32`.
pub fn into_u32(self) -> u32 {
self.0
}
/// Converts an AS number into a network-order byte array.
pub fn to_raw(self) -> [u8; 4] {
self.0.to_be_bytes()
}
}
impl From<u32> for Asn {
fn from(id: u32) -> Self {
Asn(id)
}
}
impl From<Asn> for u32 {
fn from(id: Asn) -> Self {
id.0
}
}

View File

@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct IPAddrBlocks {
pub ips: Vec<IPAddressFamily>,
}
// IP Address Family
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct IPAddressFamily {
pub address_family: Afi,
pub ip_address_choice: IPAddressChoice,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Ord, PartialOrd, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum Afi {
Ipv4,
Ipv6,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum IPAddressChoice {
Inherit,
AddressOrRange(Vec<IPAddressOrRange>),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum IPAddressOrRange {
AddressPrefix(IPAddressPrefix),
AddressRange(IPAddressRange),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Ord, PartialOrd, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct IPAddressPrefix {
pub address: IPAddress,
pub prefix_length: u8,
}
impl IPAddressPrefix {
pub fn new(address: IPAddress, prefix_length: u8) -> Self {
Self {
address,
prefix_length,
}
}
pub fn is_ipv4(&self) -> bool {
self.address.is_ipv4()
}
pub fn is_ipv6(&self) -> bool {
self.address.is_ipv6()
}
pub fn afi(&self) -> Afi {
self.address.afi()
}
pub fn address(&self) -> IPAddress {
self.address
}
pub fn prefix_length(&self) -> u8 {
self.prefix_length
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Ord, PartialOrd, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct IPAddressRange {
pub min: IPAddress,
pub max: IPAddress,
}
impl IPAddressRange {
pub fn new(min: IPAddress, max: IPAddress) -> Self {
Self { min, max }
}
pub fn min(&self) -> IPAddress {
self.min
}
pub fn max(&self) -> IPAddress {
self.max
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum IPAddress {
V4(Ipv4Addr),
V6(Ipv6Addr),
}
impl IPAddress {
pub fn from_ipv4(addr: Ipv4Addr) -> Self {
Self::V4(addr)
}
pub fn from_ipv6(addr: Ipv6Addr) -> Self {
Self::V6(addr)
}
pub fn to_ipv4(self) -> Option<Ipv4Addr> {
match self {
Self::V4(addr) => Some(addr),
Self::V6(_) => None,
}
}
pub fn to_ipv6(self) -> Option<Ipv6Addr> {
match self {
Self::V4(_) => None,
Self::V6(addr) => Some(addr),
}
}
pub fn is_ipv4(self) -> bool {
matches!(self, Self::V4(_))
}
pub fn is_ipv6(self) -> bool {
matches!(self, Self::V6(_))
}
pub fn afi(self) -> Afi {
match self {
Self::V4(_) => Afi::Ipv4,
Self::V6(_) => Afi::Ipv6,
}
}
/// Returns the numeric address value.
///
/// For IPv4, this is the 32-bit address widened to u128.
/// For IPv6, this is the full 128-bit address.
pub fn as_u128(self) -> u128 {
match self {
Self::V4(addr) => u32::from(addr) as u128,
Self::V6(addr) => u128::from(addr),
}
}
pub fn as_v4_u32(self) -> Option<u32> {
match self {
Self::V4(addr) => Some(u32::from(addr)),
Self::V6(_) => None,
}
}
pub fn as_v6_u128(self) -> Option<u128> {
match self {
Self::V4(_) => None,
Self::V6(addr) => Some(u128::from(addr)),
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
pub mod ip_resources;
pub mod as_resources;
pub mod resource;

View File

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
use crate::data_model::resources::as_resources::ASIdentifiers;
use crate::data_model::resources::ip_resources::IPAddrBlocks;
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ResourceSet {
ip_addr_blocks: IPAddrBlocks,
as_identifiers: ASIdentifiers,
}

565
src/data_model/roa.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,565 @@
use crate::data_model::oid::OID_CT_ROUTE_ORIGIN_AUTHZ;
use crate::data_model::rc::{Afi as RcAfi, IpPrefix as RcIpPrefix, ResourceCertificate};
use crate::data_model::signed_object::{
RpkiSignedObject, RpkiSignedObjectParsed, SignedObjectParseError, SignedObjectValidateError,
};
use der_parser::ber::{BerObjectContent, Class};
use der_parser::der::{DerObject, Tag, parse_der};
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RoaObject {
pub signed_object: RpkiSignedObject,
pub econtent_type: String,
pub roa: RoaEContent,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RoaObjectParsed {
pub signed_object: RpkiSignedObjectParsed,
pub econtent_type: String,
pub roa: Option<RoaEContentParsed>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RoaEContent {
pub version: u32,
pub as_id: u32,
pub ip_addr_blocks: Vec<RoaIpAddressFamily>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RoaEContentParsed {
der: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum RoaParseError {
#[error("signed object parse error: {0} (RFC 6488 §2-§3; RFC 9589 §4)")]
SignedObject(#[from] SignedObjectParseError),
#[error("ROA parse error: {0} (RFC 9582 §4; DER)")]
Parse(String),
#[error("ROA trailing bytes: {0} bytes (RFC 9582 §4; DER)")]
TrailingBytes(usize),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum RoaProfileError {
#[error("signed object profile error: {0} (RFC 6488 §2-§3; RFC 9589 §4)")]
SignedObject(#[from] SignedObjectValidateError),
#[error("ROA eContentType must be {OID_CT_ROUTE_ORIGIN_AUTHZ}, got {0} (RFC 9582 §3)")]
InvalidEContentType(String),
#[error("ROA profile decode error: {0} (RFC 9582 §4; DER)")]
ProfileDecode(String),
#[error("RouteOriginAttestation must be a SEQUENCE of 2 or 3 elements, got {0} (RFC 9582 §4)")]
InvalidAttestationSequenceLen(usize),
#[error("ROA version must be 0, got {0} (RFC 9582 §4.1)")]
InvalidVersion(u64),
#[error("ROA asID out of range (0..=4294967295), got {0} (RFC 9582 §4.2)")]
AsIdOutOfRange(u64),
#[error("ROA ipAddrBlocks must have length 1..2, got {0} (RFC 9582 §4; RFC 9582 §4.3.1)")]
InvalidIpAddrBlocksLen(usize),
#[error("ROAIPAddressFamily must be a SEQUENCE of 2 elements (RFC 9582 §4.3.1)")]
InvalidIpAddressFamily,
#[error("ROA addressFamily must be an OCTET STRING of 2 bytes (RFC 9582 §4.3.1)")]
InvalidAddressFamily,
#[error("ROA addressFamily AFI not supported: {0:02X?} (RFC 9582 §4.3.1)")]
UnsupportedAfi(Vec<u8>),
#[error("ROA contains duplicate AFI {0:?} (RFC 9582 §4.3.1)")]
DuplicateAfi(RoaAfi),
#[error("ROAAddresses must have at least one entry (RFC 9582 §4.3.2)")]
EmptyAddressList,
#[error("ROAIPAddress must be a SEQUENCE of 1..2 elements (RFC 9582 §4.3.2)")]
InvalidRoaIpAddress,
#[error("ROAIPAddress.address must be a BIT STRING (RFC 9582 §4.3.2.1; RFC 3779 §2.2.3.8)")]
InvalidPrefixBitString,
#[error(
"ROAIPAddress.address has invalid unused bits encoding (RFC 9582 §4.3.2.1; RFC 3779 §2.2.3.8)"
)]
InvalidPrefixUnusedBits,
#[error(
"ROAIPAddress.address prefix length {prefix_len} out of range for {afi:?} (RFC 9582 §4.3.2.1)"
)]
PrefixLenOutOfRange { afi: RoaAfi, prefix_len: u16 },
#[error(
"ROAIPAddress.maxLength out of range for {afi:?}: prefix_len={prefix_len}, max_len={max_len} (RFC 9582 §4.3.2.2)"
)]
InvalidMaxLength {
afi: RoaAfi,
prefix_len: u16,
max_len: u16,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum RoaDecodeError {
#[error("{0}")]
Parse(#[from] RoaParseError),
#[error("{0}")]
Validate(#[from] RoaProfileError),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum RoaValidateError {
#[error("ROA EE certificate must not contain AS resources extension (RFC 9582 §5)")]
EeAsResourcesPresent,
#[error("ROA EE certificate must contain IP resources extension (RFC 9582 §5)")]
EeIpResourcesMissing,
#[error("ROA EE certificate IP resources must not use inherit (RFC 9582 §5)")]
EeIpResourcesInherit,
#[error(
"ROA prefix not covered by EE certificate IP resources: {afi:?} {addr:?}/{prefix_len} (RFC 9582 §5; RFC 3779 §2.3)"
)]
PrefixNotInEeResources {
afi: RoaAfi,
addr: Vec<u8>,
prefix_len: u16,
},
}
impl RoaObject {
/// Parse step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
pub fn parse_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<RoaObjectParsed, RoaParseError> {
let signed_object = RpkiSignedObject::parse_der(der)?;
let econtent_type = signed_object
.signed_data
.encap_content_info
.econtent_type
.clone();
let roa = signed_object
.signed_data
.encap_content_info
.econtent
.as_deref()
.map(RoaEContent::parse_der)
.transpose()?;
Ok(RoaObjectParsed {
signed_object,
econtent_type,
roa,
})
}
/// Profile validate step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
///
/// `RoaObject` is already profile-validated when constructed via `decode_der()` /
/// `RoaObjectParsed::validate_profile()`.
pub fn validate_profile(&self) -> Result<(), RoaProfileError> {
Ok(())
}
pub fn decode_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, RoaDecodeError> {
Ok(Self::parse_der(der)?.validate_profile()?)
}
pub fn from_signed_object(signed_object: RpkiSignedObject) -> Result<Self, RoaDecodeError> {
let econtent_type = signed_object
.signed_data
.encap_content_info
.econtent_type
.clone();
if econtent_type != OID_CT_ROUTE_ORIGIN_AUTHZ {
return Err(RoaProfileError::InvalidEContentType(econtent_type).into());
}
let roa = RoaEContent::decode_der(&signed_object.signed_data.encap_content_info.econtent)?;
Ok(Self {
roa,
signed_object,
econtent_type: OID_CT_ROUTE_ORIGIN_AUTHZ.to_string(),
})
}
/// Validate this ROA's embedded EE certificate resources.
pub fn validate_embedded_ee_cert(&self) -> Result<(), RoaValidateError> {
let ee = &self.signed_object.signed_data.certificates[0].resource_cert;
self.roa.validate_against_ee_cert(ee)
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord)]
pub enum RoaAfi {
Ipv4,
Ipv6,
}
impl RoaAfi {
fn ub(self) -> u16 {
match self {
RoaAfi::Ipv4 => 32,
RoaAfi::Ipv6 => 128,
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RoaIpAddressFamily {
pub afi: RoaAfi,
pub addresses: Vec<RoaIpAddress>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
pub struct RoaIpAddress {
pub prefix: IpPrefix,
pub max_length: Option<u16>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
pub struct IpPrefix {
pub afi: RoaAfi,
/// Prefix length in bits.
pub prefix_len: u16,
/// Network order address bytes (IPv4 4 bytes / IPv6 16 bytes), with host bits cleared.
pub addr: Vec<u8>,
}
impl RoaEContent {
/// Parse step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
pub fn parse_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<RoaEContentParsed, RoaParseError> {
let (rem, _obj) = parse_der(der).map_err(|e| RoaParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
if !rem.is_empty() {
return Err(RoaParseError::TrailingBytes(rem.len()));
}
Ok(RoaEContentParsed { der: der.to_vec() })
}
/// Profile validate step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
///
/// `RoaEContent` is already profile-validated when constructed via `decode_der()` /
/// `RoaEContentParsed::validate_profile()`.
pub fn validate_profile(&self) -> Result<(), RoaProfileError> {
Ok(())
}
/// Decode the DER-encoded RouteOriginAttestation defined in RFC 9582 §4 (`parse + validate`).
pub fn decode_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, RoaDecodeError> {
Ok(Self::parse_der(der)?.validate_profile()?)
}
pub fn canonicalize(&mut self) {
self.ip_addr_blocks.sort_by_key(|f| f.afi);
for fam in &mut self.ip_addr_blocks {
fam.addresses.sort();
fam.addresses.dedup();
}
}
/// Validate ROA payload against the embedded EE resource certificate (RFC 9582 §5).
///
/// This performs the EE/payload semantic checks that do not require certificate path
/// validation.
pub fn validate_against_ee_cert(
&self,
ee: &ResourceCertificate,
) -> Result<(), RoaValidateError> {
if ee.tbs.extensions.as_resources.is_some() {
return Err(RoaValidateError::EeAsResourcesPresent);
}
let ip = ee
.tbs
.extensions
.ip_resources
.as_ref()
.ok_or(RoaValidateError::EeIpResourcesMissing)?;
if ip.has_any_inherit() {
return Err(RoaValidateError::EeIpResourcesInherit);
}
for fam in &self.ip_addr_blocks {
for entry in &fam.addresses {
let rc_prefix = roa_prefix_to_rc(&entry.prefix);
if !ip.contains_prefix(&rc_prefix) {
return Err(RoaValidateError::PrefixNotInEeResources {
afi: entry.prefix.afi,
addr: entry.prefix.addr.clone(),
prefix_len: entry.prefix.prefix_len,
});
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
}
impl RoaObjectParsed {
pub fn validate_profile(self) -> Result<RoaObject, RoaProfileError> {
let signed_object = self.signed_object.validate_profile()?;
let econtent_type = signed_object
.signed_data
.encap_content_info
.econtent_type
.clone();
if econtent_type != OID_CT_ROUTE_ORIGIN_AUTHZ {
return Err(RoaProfileError::InvalidEContentType(econtent_type));
}
let roa = self
.roa
.ok_or_else(|| RoaProfileError::ProfileDecode("ROA.eContent missing".into()))?
.validate_profile()?;
Ok(RoaObject {
signed_object,
econtent_type: OID_CT_ROUTE_ORIGIN_AUTHZ.to_string(),
roa,
})
}
}
impl RoaEContentParsed {
pub fn validate_profile(self) -> Result<RoaEContent, RoaProfileError> {
let (_rem, obj) =
parse_der(&self.der).map_err(|e| RoaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
let seq = obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|e| RoaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if seq.len() != 2 && seq.len() != 3 {
return Err(RoaProfileError::InvalidAttestationSequenceLen(seq.len()));
}
let mut idx = 0;
let mut version: u32 = 0;
if seq.len() == 3 {
let v_obj = &seq[0];
if v_obj.class() != Class::ContextSpecific || v_obj.tag() != Tag(0) {
return Err(RoaProfileError::ProfileDecode(
"RouteOriginAttestation.version must be [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER".into(),
));
}
let inner_der = v_obj
.as_slice()
.map_err(|e| RoaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
let (rem, inner) =
parse_der(inner_der).map_err(|e| RoaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if !rem.is_empty() {
return Err(RoaProfileError::ProfileDecode(
"trailing bytes inside RouteOriginAttestation.version".into(),
));
}
let v = inner
.as_u64()
.map_err(|e| RoaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if v != 0 {
return Err(RoaProfileError::InvalidVersion(v));
}
version = 0;
idx = 1;
}
let as_id_u64 = seq[idx]
.as_u64()
.map_err(|e| RoaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if as_id_u64 > u32::MAX as u64 {
return Err(RoaProfileError::AsIdOutOfRange(as_id_u64));
}
let as_id = as_id_u64 as u32;
idx += 1;
let ip_addr_blocks = parse_ip_addr_blocks(&seq[idx])?;
let mut out = RoaEContent {
version,
as_id,
ip_addr_blocks,
};
out.canonicalize();
Ok(out)
}
}
fn roa_prefix_to_rc(p: &IpPrefix) -> RcIpPrefix {
let afi = match p.afi {
RoaAfi::Ipv4 => RcAfi::Ipv4,
RoaAfi::Ipv6 => RcAfi::Ipv6,
};
RcIpPrefix {
afi,
prefix_len: p.prefix_len,
addr: p.addr.clone(),
}
}
fn parse_ip_addr_blocks(obj: &DerObject<'_>) -> Result<Vec<RoaIpAddressFamily>, RoaProfileError> {
let seq = obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|e| RoaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if seq.is_empty() || seq.len() > 2 {
return Err(RoaProfileError::InvalidIpAddrBlocksLen(seq.len()));
}
let mut out: Vec<RoaIpAddressFamily> = Vec::new();
for fam in seq {
let family = parse_ip_address_family(fam)?;
if out.iter().any(|f| f.afi == family.afi) {
return Err(RoaProfileError::DuplicateAfi(family.afi));
}
out.push(family);
}
Ok(out)
}
fn parse_ip_address_family(obj: &DerObject<'_>) -> Result<RoaIpAddressFamily, RoaProfileError> {
let seq = obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|e| RoaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if seq.len() != 2 {
return Err(RoaProfileError::InvalidIpAddressFamily);
}
let afi = parse_afi(&seq[0])?;
let addresses = parse_roa_addresses(afi, &seq[1])?;
if addresses.is_empty() {
return Err(RoaProfileError::EmptyAddressList);
}
Ok(RoaIpAddressFamily { afi, addresses })
}
fn parse_afi(obj: &DerObject<'_>) -> Result<RoaAfi, RoaProfileError> {
let bytes = obj
.as_slice()
.map_err(|_e| RoaProfileError::InvalidAddressFamily)?;
if bytes.len() != 2 {
return Err(RoaProfileError::InvalidAddressFamily);
}
match bytes {
[0x00, 0x01] => Ok(RoaAfi::Ipv4),
[0x00, 0x02] => Ok(RoaAfi::Ipv6),
_ => Err(RoaProfileError::UnsupportedAfi(bytes.to_vec())),
}
}
fn parse_roa_addresses(
afi: RoaAfi,
obj: &DerObject<'_>,
) -> Result<Vec<RoaIpAddress>, RoaProfileError> {
let seq = obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|e| RoaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(seq.len());
for entry in seq {
out.push(parse_roa_ip_address(afi, entry)?);
}
Ok(out)
}
fn parse_roa_ip_address(afi: RoaAfi, obj: &DerObject<'_>) -> Result<RoaIpAddress, RoaProfileError> {
let seq = obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|e| RoaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
if seq.is_empty() || seq.len() > 2 {
return Err(RoaProfileError::InvalidRoaIpAddress);
}
let prefix = parse_prefix_bits(afi, &seq[0])?;
let max_length = match seq.get(1) {
None => None,
Some(m) => {
let v = m
.as_u64()
.map_err(|e| RoaProfileError::ProfileDecode(e.to_string()))?;
let max_len: u16 = v
.try_into()
.map_err(|_e| RoaProfileError::InvalidMaxLength {
afi,
prefix_len: prefix.prefix_len,
max_len: u16::MAX,
})?;
Some(max_len)
}
};
if let Some(max_len) = max_length {
let ub = afi.ub();
if max_len > ub || max_len < prefix.prefix_len {
return Err(RoaProfileError::InvalidMaxLength {
afi,
prefix_len: prefix.prefix_len,
max_len,
});
}
}
Ok(RoaIpAddress { prefix, max_length })
}
fn parse_prefix_bits(afi: RoaAfi, obj: &DerObject<'_>) -> Result<IpPrefix, RoaProfileError> {
let (unused_bits, bytes) = match &obj.content {
BerObjectContent::BitString(unused, bso) => (*unused, bso.data.to_vec()),
_ => return Err(RoaProfileError::InvalidPrefixBitString),
};
if unused_bits > 7 {
return Err(RoaProfileError::InvalidPrefixUnusedBits);
}
if bytes.is_empty() {
if unused_bits != 0 {
return Err(RoaProfileError::InvalidPrefixUnusedBits);
}
} else if unused_bits != 0 {
let mask = (1u8 << unused_bits) - 1;
if (bytes[bytes.len() - 1] & mask) != 0 {
return Err(RoaProfileError::InvalidPrefixUnusedBits);
}
}
let prefix_len = (bytes.len() * 8)
.checked_sub(unused_bits as usize)
.ok_or(RoaProfileError::InvalidPrefixUnusedBits)? as u16;
if prefix_len > afi.ub() {
return Err(RoaProfileError::PrefixLenOutOfRange { afi, prefix_len });
}
let addr = canonicalize_prefix_addr(afi, prefix_len, &bytes);
Ok(IpPrefix {
afi,
prefix_len,
addr,
})
}
fn canonicalize_prefix_addr(afi: RoaAfi, prefix_len: u16, bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let full_len = match afi {
RoaAfi::Ipv4 => 4,
RoaAfi::Ipv6 => 16,
};
let mut addr = vec![0u8; full_len];
let copy_len = bytes.len().min(full_len);
addr[..copy_len].copy_from_slice(&bytes[..copy_len]);
if prefix_len == 0 {
return addr;
}
let last_prefix_bit = (prefix_len - 1) as usize;
let last_prefix_byte = last_prefix_bit / 8;
let rem = (prefix_len % 8) as u8;
if rem != 0 {
let mask: u8 = 0xFF << (8 - rem);
if last_prefix_byte < addr.len() {
addr[last_prefix_byte] &= mask;
}
}
addr
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,992 @@
use crate::data_model::common::{Asn1TimeEncoding, Asn1TimeUtc};
use crate::data_model::oid::{
OID_AD_SIGNED_OBJECT, OID_CMS_ATTR_CONTENT_TYPE, OID_CMS_ATTR_MESSAGE_DIGEST,
OID_CMS_ATTR_SIGNING_TIME, OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION, OID_SHA256, OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION,
OID_SIGNED_DATA, OID_SUBJECT_INFO_ACCESS,
};
use crate::data_model::rc::{ResourceCertificate, SubjectInfoAccess};
use der_parser::ber::Class;
use der_parser::der::{DerObject, Tag, parse_der};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use x509_parser::prelude::FromDer;
use x509_parser::public_key::PublicKey;
use x509_parser::x509::SubjectPublicKeyInfo;
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ResourceEeCertificate {
pub raw_der: Vec<u8>,
pub subject_key_identifier: Vec<u8>,
pub spki_der: Vec<u8>,
pub sia_signed_object_uris: Vec<String>,
pub resource_cert: ResourceCertificate,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RpkiSignedObject {
pub raw_der: Vec<u8>,
pub content_info_content_type: String,
pub signed_data: SignedDataProfiled,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SignedDataProfiled {
pub version: u32,
pub digest_algorithms: Vec<String>,
pub encap_content_info: EncapsulatedContentInfo,
pub certificates: Vec<ResourceEeCertificate>,
pub crls_present: bool,
pub signer_infos: Vec<SignerInfoProfiled>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct EncapsulatedContentInfo {
pub econtent_type: String,
pub econtent: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SignerInfoProfiled {
pub version: u32,
pub sid_ski: Vec<u8>,
pub digest_algorithm: String,
pub signature_algorithm: String,
pub signed_attrs: SignedAttrsProfiled,
pub unsigned_attrs_present: bool,
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
pub signed_attrs_der_for_signature: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SignedAttrsProfiled {
pub content_type: String,
pub message_digest: Vec<u8>,
pub signing_time: Asn1TimeUtc,
pub other_attrs_present: bool,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RpkiSignedObjectParsed {
pub raw_der: Vec<u8>,
pub content_info_content_type: String,
pub signed_data: SignedDataParsed,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SignedDataParsed {
pub version: u64,
pub digest_algorithms: Vec<AlgorithmIdentifierParsed>,
pub encap_content_info: EncapsulatedContentInfoParsed,
pub certificates: Option<Vec<Vec<u8>>>,
pub crls_present: bool,
pub signer_infos: Vec<SignerInfoParsed>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AlgorithmIdentifierParsed {
pub oid: String,
pub params_ok: bool,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct EncapsulatedContentInfoParsed {
pub econtent_type: String,
pub econtent: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SignerInfoParsed {
pub version: u64,
pub sid: SignerIdentifierParsed,
pub digest_algorithm: AlgorithmIdentifierParsed,
pub signature_algorithm: AlgorithmIdentifierParsed,
pub signed_attrs_content: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub signed_attrs_der_for_signature: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub unsigned_attrs_present: bool,
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SignerIdentifierParsed {
SubjectKeyIdentifier(Vec<u8>),
Other,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum SignedObjectParseError {
#[error("DER parse error: {0} (RFC 6488 §2; RFC 6488 §3(1l); RFC 5652 §3/§5)")]
Parse(String),
#[error("trailing bytes after DER object: {0} bytes (DER; RFC 6488 §3(1l))")]
TrailingBytes(usize),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum SignedObjectValidateError {
#[error(
"ContentInfo.contentType must be SignedData ({OID_SIGNED_DATA}), got {0} (RFC 6488 §3(1a); RFC 5652 §3)"
)]
InvalidContentInfoContentType(String),
#[error(
"SignedData.version must be 3, got {0} (RFC 6488 §2.1.1; RFC 6488 §3(1b); RFC 5652 §5.1)"
)]
InvalidSignedDataVersion(u64),
#[error(
"SignedData.digestAlgorithms must contain exactly one AlgorithmIdentifier, got {0} (RFC 6488 §2.1.2; RFC 6488 §3(1b); RFC 5652 §5.1)"
)]
InvalidDigestAlgorithmsCount(usize),
#[error(
"digest algorithm must be id-sha256 ({OID_SHA256}), got {0} (RFC 6488 §2.1.2; RFC 6488 §3(1b); RFC 7935 §2)"
)]
InvalidDigestAlgorithm(String),
#[error("SignedData.certificates MUST be present (RFC 6488 §3(1c); RFC 5652 §5.1)")]
CertificatesMissing,
#[error(
"SignedData.certificates must contain exactly one EE certificate, got {0} (RFC 6488 §3(1c))"
)]
InvalidCertificatesCount(usize),
#[error("SignedData.crls MUST be omitted (RFC 6488 §3(1d))")]
CrlsPresent,
#[error(
"SignedData.signerInfos must contain exactly one SignerInfo, got {0} (RFC 6488 §2.1; RFC 6488 §3(1e); RFC 5652 §5.1)"
)]
InvalidSignerInfosCount(usize),
#[error("SignerInfo.version must be 3, got {0} (RFC 6488 §3(1e); RFC 5652 §5.3)")]
InvalidSignerInfoVersion(u64),
#[error("SignerInfo.sid must be subjectKeyIdentifier [0] (RFC 6488 §3(1c); RFC 5652 §5.3)")]
InvalidSignerIdentifier,
#[error(
"SignerInfo.digestAlgorithm must be id-sha256 ({OID_SHA256}), got {0} (RFC 6488 §3(1j); RFC 7935 §2)"
)]
InvalidSignerInfoDigestAlgorithm(String),
#[error("SignerInfo.signedAttrs MUST be present (RFC 9589 §4; RFC 6488 §3(1f))")]
SignedAttrsMissing,
#[error("SignerInfo.unsignedAttrs MUST be omitted (RFC 6488 §3(1i))")]
UnsignedAttrsPresent,
#[error(
"SignerInfo.signatureAlgorithm must be rsaEncryption ({OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION}) or \
sha256WithRSAEncryption ({OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION}), got {0} (RFC 6488 §3(1k); RFC 7935 §2)"
)]
InvalidSignatureAlgorithm(String),
#[error(
"SignerInfo.signatureAlgorithm parameters must be absent or NULL (RFC 5280 §4.1.1.2; RFC 7935 §2)"
)]
InvalidSignatureAlgorithmParameters,
#[error("signedAttrs contains unsupported attribute OID {0} (RFC 9589 §4; RFC 6488 §2.1.6.4)")]
UnsupportedSignedAttribute(String),
#[error("signedAttrs contains duplicate attribute OID {0} (RFC 6488 §2.1.6.4; RFC 9589 §4)")]
DuplicateSignedAttribute(String),
#[error("signedAttrs parse error: {0} (RFC 5652 §5.3; RFC 6488 §3(1f); RFC 9589 §4)")]
SignedAttrsParse(String),
#[error(
"signedAttrs attribute {oid} attrValues must contain exactly one value, got {count} (RFC 6488 §2.1.6.4; RFC 5652 §5.3)"
)]
InvalidSignedAttributeValuesCount { oid: String, count: usize },
#[error(
"signedAttrs missing content-type attribute (RFC 9589 §4; RFC 5652 §11.1; RFC 6488 §2.1.6.4)"
)]
SignedAttrsContentTypeMissing,
#[error(
"signedAttrs missing message-digest attribute (RFC 9589 §4; RFC 5652 §11.2; RFC 6488 §2.1.6.4)"
)]
SignedAttrsMessageDigestMissing,
#[error(
"signedAttrs missing signing-time attribute (RFC 9589 §4; RFC 5652 §11.3; RFC 6488 §2.1.6.4)"
)]
SignedAttrsSigningTimeMissing,
#[error(
"signedAttrs.content-type attrValues must equal eContentType ({econtent_type}), got {attr_content_type} (RFC 6488 §3(1h); RFC 9589 §4)"
)]
ContentTypeAttrMismatch {
econtent_type: String,
attr_content_type: String,
},
#[error("EncapsulatedContentInfo.eContent MUST be present (RFC 6488 §2.1.3; RFC 5652 §5.2)")]
EContentMissing,
#[error(
"signedAttrs.message-digest does not match SHA-256(eContent) (RFC 6488 §3(1f); RFC 5652 §11.2)"
)]
MessageDigestMismatch,
#[error("EE certificate parse error: {0} (RFC 6488 §3(1c); RFC 6487 §4)")]
EeCertificateParse(String),
#[error(
"EE certificate missing SubjectKeyIdentifier extension (RFC 6488 §3(1c); RFC 6487 §4.8.2)"
)]
EeCertificateMissingSki,
#[error(
"EE certificate missing SubjectInfoAccess extension ({OID_SUBJECT_INFO_ACCESS}) (RFC 6487 §4.8.8.2)"
)]
EeCertificateMissingSia,
#[error(
"EE certificate SIA missing id-ad-signedObject access method ({OID_AD_SIGNED_OBJECT}) (RFC 6487 §4.8.8.2)"
)]
EeCertificateMissingSignedObjectSia,
#[error(
"EE certificate SIA id-ad-signedObject accessLocation must be a URI (RFC 6487 §4.8.8.2; RFC 5280 §4.2.2.2)"
)]
EeCertificateSignedObjectSiaNotUri,
#[error(
"EE certificate SIA id-ad-signedObject must include at least one rsync:// URI (RFC 6487 §4.8.8.2)"
)]
EeCertificateSignedObjectSiaNoRsync,
#[error(
"SignerInfo.sid SKI does not match EE certificate SKI (RFC 6488 §3(1c); RFC 5652 §5.3)"
)]
SidSkiMismatch,
#[error(
"invalid signing-time attribute value (expected UTCTime or GeneralizedTime) (RFC 5652 §11.3; RFC 9589 §4)"
)]
InvalidSigningTimeValue,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum SignedObjectDecodeError {
#[error("SignedObject parse error: {0}")]
Parse(#[from] SignedObjectParseError),
#[error("SignedObject validate error: {0}")]
Validate(#[from] SignedObjectValidateError),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum SignedObjectVerifyError {
#[error("EE SubjectPublicKeyInfo parse error: {0} (RFC 5280 §4.1.2.7)")]
EeSpkiParse(String),
#[error("trailing bytes after EE SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER: {0} bytes (DER; RFC 5280 §4.1.2.7)")]
EeSpkiTrailingBytes(usize),
#[error("unsupported EE public key algorithm (only RSA supported in M3) (RFC 7935 §2)")]
UnsupportedEePublicKeyAlgorithm,
#[error("EE RSA public exponent invalid (RFC 8017 §A.1.1; RFC 7935 §2)")]
InvalidEeRsaExponent,
#[error("signature verification failed (RFC 6488 §3(2)-(3); RFC 5652 §5.3; RFC 7935 §2)")]
InvalidSignature,
}
impl RpkiSignedObject {
/// Parse a DER-encoded RPKI Signed Object (CMS ContentInfo wrapping SignedData).
///
/// This performs encoding/structure parsing only. Profile constraints are enforced by
/// `RpkiSignedObjectParsed::validate_profile`.
pub fn parse_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<RpkiSignedObjectParsed, SignedObjectParseError> {
let (rem, obj) =
parse_der(der).map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
if !rem.is_empty() {
return Err(SignedObjectParseError::TrailingBytes(rem.len()));
}
let content_info_seq = obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
if content_info_seq.len() != 2 {
return Err(SignedObjectParseError::Parse(
"ContentInfo must be a SEQUENCE of 2 elements".into(),
));
}
let content_type = oid_to_string_parse(&content_info_seq[0])?;
let signed_data = parse_signed_data_from_contentinfo_parse(&content_info_seq[1])?;
Ok(RpkiSignedObjectParsed {
raw_der: der.to_vec(),
content_info_content_type: content_type,
signed_data,
})
}
/// Decode a DER-encoded RPKI Signed Object (CMS ContentInfo wrapping SignedData) and enforce
/// the profile constraints from RFC 6488 §2-§3 and RFC 9589 §4.
pub fn decode_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, SignedObjectDecodeError> {
let parsed = Self::parse_der(der)?;
Ok(parsed.validate_profile()?)
}
/// Scheme-A naming for signature verification.
pub fn verify(&self) -> Result<(), SignedObjectVerifyError> {
self.verify_signature()
}
/// Verify the CMS signature using the embedded EE certificate public key.
pub fn verify_signature(&self) -> Result<(), SignedObjectVerifyError> {
let ee = &self.signed_data.certificates[0];
self.verify_signature_with_ee_spki_der(&ee.spki_der)
}
/// Verify the CMS signature using a DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
pub fn verify_signature_with_ee_spki_der(
&self,
ee_spki_der: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), SignedObjectVerifyError> {
let (rem, spki) = SubjectPublicKeyInfo::from_der(ee_spki_der)
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectVerifyError::EeSpkiParse(e.to_string()))?;
if !rem.is_empty() {
return Err(SignedObjectVerifyError::EeSpkiTrailingBytes(rem.len()));
}
self.verify_signature_with_ee_spki(&spki)
}
/// Verify the CMS signature using a parsed SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
pub fn verify_signature_with_ee_spki(
&self,
ee_spki: &SubjectPublicKeyInfo<'_>,
) -> Result<(), SignedObjectVerifyError> {
let pk = ee_spki
.parsed()
.map_err(|_e| SignedObjectVerifyError::UnsupportedEePublicKeyAlgorithm)?;
let (n, e) = match pk {
PublicKey::RSA(rsa) => {
let n = strip_leading_zeros(rsa.modulus).to_vec();
let e = strip_leading_zeros(rsa.exponent).to_vec();
let _exp = rsa
.try_exponent()
.map_err(|_e| SignedObjectVerifyError::InvalidEeRsaExponent)?;
(n, e)
}
_ => return Err(SignedObjectVerifyError::UnsupportedEePublicKeyAlgorithm),
};
let signer = &self.signed_data.signer_infos[0];
// The message to be verified is the DER encoding of SignedAttributes (SET OF Attribute).
let msg = &signer.signed_attrs_der_for_signature;
let pk = ring::signature::RsaPublicKeyComponents { n, e };
pk.verify(
&ring::signature::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA256,
msg,
&signer.signature,
)
.map_err(|_e| SignedObjectVerifyError::InvalidSignature)
}
}
impl RpkiSignedObjectParsed {
pub fn validate_profile(self) -> Result<RpkiSignedObject, SignedObjectValidateError> {
if self.content_info_content_type != OID_SIGNED_DATA {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::InvalidContentInfoContentType(
self.content_info_content_type,
));
}
let signed_data = validate_signed_data_profile(self.signed_data)?;
Ok(RpkiSignedObject {
raw_der: self.raw_der,
content_info_content_type: OID_SIGNED_DATA.to_string(),
signed_data,
})
}
}
fn parse_signed_data_from_contentinfo_parse(
obj: &DerObject<'_>,
) -> Result<SignedDataParsed, SignedObjectParseError> {
// ContentInfo.content is `[0] EXPLICIT`, but `der-parser` will represent unknown tagged
// objects as `Unknown(Any)`. For EXPLICIT tags, the content octets are the full encoding of
// the inner object, so we parse it from the object's slice.
if obj.class() != Class::ContextSpecific || obj.tag() != Tag(0) {
return Err(SignedObjectParseError::Parse(
"ContentInfo.content must be [0] EXPLICIT".into(),
));
}
let inner_der = obj
.as_slice()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
let (rem, inner_obj) =
parse_der(inner_der).map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
if !rem.is_empty() {
return Err(SignedObjectParseError::Parse(
"trailing bytes inside ContentInfo.content".into(),
));
}
parse_signed_data_parse(&inner_obj)
}
fn parse_signed_data_parse(
obj: &DerObject<'_>,
) -> Result<SignedDataParsed, SignedObjectParseError> {
let seq = obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
if seq.len() < 4 || seq.len() > 6 {
return Err(SignedObjectParseError::Parse(
"SignedData must be a SEQUENCE of 4..6 elements".into(),
));
}
let version = seq[0]
.as_u64()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
let digest_set = seq[1]
.as_set()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
let mut digest_algorithms: Vec<AlgorithmIdentifierParsed> =
Vec::with_capacity(digest_set.len());
for item in digest_set {
let (oid, params_ok) = parse_algorithm_identifier_parse(item)?;
digest_algorithms.push(AlgorithmIdentifierParsed { oid, params_ok });
}
let encap_content_info = parse_encapsulated_content_info_parse(&seq[2])?;
let mut certificates: Option<Vec<Vec<u8>>> = None;
let mut crls_present = false;
let mut signer_infos_obj: Option<&DerObject<'_>> = None;
for item in &seq[3..] {
if item.class() == Class::ContextSpecific && item.tag() == Tag(0) {
if certificates.is_some() {
return Err(SignedObjectParseError::Parse(
"SignedData.certificates appears more than once".into(),
));
}
certificates = Some(parse_certificate_set_implicit_parse(item)?);
} else if item.class() == Class::ContextSpecific && item.tag() == Tag(1) {
crls_present = true;
} else if item.class() == Class::Universal && item.tag() == Tag::Set {
signer_infos_obj = Some(item);
} else {
return Err(SignedObjectParseError::Parse(
"unexpected field in SignedData".into(),
));
}
}
let signer_infos_obj = signer_infos_obj
.ok_or_else(|| SignedObjectParseError::Parse("SignedData.signerInfos missing".into()))?;
let signer_infos_set = signer_infos_obj
.as_set()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
let mut signer_infos: Vec<SignerInfoParsed> = Vec::with_capacity(signer_infos_set.len());
for si in signer_infos_set {
signer_infos.push(parse_signer_info_parse(si)?);
}
Ok(SignedDataParsed {
version,
digest_algorithms,
encap_content_info,
certificates,
crls_present,
signer_infos,
})
}
fn parse_encapsulated_content_info_parse(
obj: &DerObject<'_>,
) -> Result<EncapsulatedContentInfoParsed, SignedObjectParseError> {
let seq = obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
if seq.is_empty() || seq.len() > 2 {
return Err(SignedObjectParseError::Parse(
"EncapsulatedContentInfo must be SEQUENCE of 1..2".into(),
));
}
let econtent_type = oid_to_string_parse(&seq[0])?;
let econtent = match seq.get(1) {
None => None,
Some(econtent_tagged) => {
if econtent_tagged.class() != Class::ContextSpecific || econtent_tagged.tag() != Tag(0)
{
return Err(SignedObjectParseError::Parse(
"EncapsulatedContentInfo.eContent must be [0] EXPLICIT".into(),
));
}
let inner_der = econtent_tagged
.as_slice()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
let (rem, inner_obj) =
parse_der(inner_der).map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
if !rem.is_empty() {
return Err(SignedObjectParseError::Parse(
"trailing bytes inside EncapsulatedContentInfo.eContent".into(),
));
}
Some(
inner_obj
.as_slice()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?
.to_vec(),
)
}
};
Ok(EncapsulatedContentInfoParsed {
econtent_type,
econtent,
})
}
fn parse_certificate_set_implicit_parse(
obj: &DerObject<'_>,
) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>, SignedObjectParseError> {
let content = obj
.as_slice()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
let mut input = content;
let mut certs = Vec::new();
while !input.is_empty() {
let (rem, _any_obj) =
parse_der(input).map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
let consumed = input.len() - rem.len();
certs.push(input[..consumed].to_vec());
input = rem;
}
Ok(certs)
}
fn validate_ee_certificate(der: &[u8]) -> Result<ResourceEeCertificate, SignedObjectValidateError> {
let rc = match ResourceCertificate::from_der(der) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
return match e {
crate::data_model::rc::ResourceCertificateDecodeError::Validate(
crate::data_model::rc::ResourceCertificateProfileError::SignedObjectSiaNotUri,
) => Err(SignedObjectValidateError::EeCertificateSignedObjectSiaNotUri),
crate::data_model::rc::ResourceCertificateDecodeError::Validate(
crate::data_model::rc::ResourceCertificateProfileError::SignedObjectSiaNoRsync,
) => Err(SignedObjectValidateError::EeCertificateSignedObjectSiaNoRsync),
_ => Err(SignedObjectValidateError::EeCertificateParse(e.to_string())),
};
}
};
let ski = rc
.tbs
.extensions
.subject_key_identifier
.clone()
.ok_or(SignedObjectValidateError::EeCertificateMissingSki)?;
let spki_der = rc.tbs.subject_public_key_info.clone();
let sia = rc
.tbs
.extensions
.subject_info_access
.as_ref()
.ok_or(SignedObjectValidateError::EeCertificateMissingSia)?;
let signed_object_uris: Vec<String> = match sia {
SubjectInfoAccess::Ee(ee) => ee
.signed_object_uris
.iter()
.map(|u| u.as_str().to_string())
.collect(),
SubjectInfoAccess::Ca(_ca) => Vec::new(),
};
if signed_object_uris.is_empty() {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::EeCertificateMissingSignedObjectSia);
}
if !signed_object_uris.iter().any(|u| u.starts_with("rsync://")) {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::EeCertificateSignedObjectSiaNoRsync);
}
Ok(ResourceEeCertificate {
raw_der: der.to_vec(),
subject_key_identifier: ski,
spki_der,
sia_signed_object_uris: signed_object_uris,
resource_cert: rc,
})
}
fn parse_signer_info_parse(
obj: &DerObject<'_>,
) -> Result<SignerInfoParsed, SignedObjectParseError> {
let seq = obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
if seq.len() < 5 || seq.len() > 7 {
return Err(SignedObjectParseError::Parse(
"SignerInfo must be a SEQUENCE of 5..7 elements".into(),
));
}
let version = seq[0]
.as_u64()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
let sid = &seq[1];
let sid = if sid.class() == Class::ContextSpecific && sid.tag() == Tag(0) {
let ski = sid
.as_slice()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?
.to_vec();
SignerIdentifierParsed::SubjectKeyIdentifier(ski)
} else {
SignerIdentifierParsed::Other
};
let (digest_oid, digest_params_ok) = parse_algorithm_identifier_parse(&seq[2])?;
let digest_algorithm = AlgorithmIdentifierParsed {
oid: digest_oid,
params_ok: digest_params_ok,
};
let mut idx = 3;
let mut signed_attrs_content: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
let mut signed_attrs_der_for_signature: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
if seq[idx].class() == Class::ContextSpecific && seq[idx].tag() == Tag(0) {
let signed_attrs_obj = &seq[idx];
let content = signed_attrs_obj
.as_slice()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?
.to_vec();
signed_attrs_content = Some(content);
signed_attrs_der_for_signature =
Some(make_signed_attrs_der_for_signature_parse(signed_attrs_obj)?);
idx += 1;
}
let (signature_oid, signature_params_ok) = parse_algorithm_identifier_parse(&seq[idx])?;
let signature_algorithm = AlgorithmIdentifierParsed {
oid: signature_oid,
params_ok: signature_params_ok,
};
idx += 1;
let signature = seq[idx]
.as_slice()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?
.to_vec();
idx += 1;
let unsigned_attrs_present = seq.get(idx).is_some();
Ok(SignerInfoParsed {
version,
sid,
digest_algorithm,
signature_algorithm,
signed_attrs_content,
unsigned_attrs_present,
signature,
signed_attrs_der_for_signature,
})
}
fn validate_signed_data_profile(
signed_data: SignedDataParsed,
) -> Result<SignedDataProfiled, SignedObjectValidateError> {
if signed_data.version != 3 {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::InvalidSignedDataVersion(
signed_data.version,
));
}
if signed_data.digest_algorithms.len() != 1 {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::InvalidDigestAlgorithmsCount(
signed_data.digest_algorithms.len(),
));
}
let digest_alg = &signed_data.digest_algorithms[0];
if digest_alg.oid != OID_SHA256 {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::InvalidDigestAlgorithm(
digest_alg.oid.clone(),
));
}
if signed_data.crls_present {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::CrlsPresent);
}
let econtent = signed_data
.encap_content_info
.econtent
.clone()
.ok_or(SignedObjectValidateError::EContentMissing)?;
if econtent.is_empty() {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::EContentMissing);
}
let encap_content_info = EncapsulatedContentInfo {
econtent_type: signed_data.encap_content_info.econtent_type.clone(),
econtent: econtent.clone(),
};
let certs = signed_data
.certificates
.as_ref()
.ok_or(SignedObjectValidateError::CertificatesMissing)?;
if certs.len() != 1 {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::InvalidCertificatesCount(
certs.len(),
));
}
let ee = validate_ee_certificate(&certs[0])?;
if signed_data.signer_infos.len() != 1 {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::InvalidSignerInfosCount(
signed_data.signer_infos.len(),
));
}
let signer = &signed_data.signer_infos[0];
if signer.version != 3 {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::InvalidSignerInfoVersion(
signer.version,
));
}
let sid_ski = match &signer.sid {
SignerIdentifierParsed::SubjectKeyIdentifier(ski) => ski.clone(),
SignerIdentifierParsed::Other => {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::InvalidSignerIdentifier);
}
};
if signer.digest_algorithm.oid != OID_SHA256 {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::InvalidSignerInfoDigestAlgorithm(
signer.digest_algorithm.oid.clone(),
));
}
let signed_attrs_content = signer
.signed_attrs_content
.as_deref()
.ok_or(SignedObjectValidateError::SignedAttrsMissing)?;
let signed_attrs_der_for_signature = signer
.signed_attrs_der_for_signature
.clone()
.ok_or(SignedObjectValidateError::SignedAttrsMissing)?;
let signed_attrs = parse_signed_attrs_implicit(signed_attrs_content)?;
if signer.unsigned_attrs_present {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::UnsignedAttrsPresent);
}
if !signer.signature_algorithm.params_ok {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::InvalidSignatureAlgorithmParameters);
}
let signature_algorithm = signer.signature_algorithm.oid.clone();
if signature_algorithm != OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION
&& signature_algorithm != OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION
{
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::InvalidSignatureAlgorithm(
signature_algorithm,
));
}
if sid_ski != ee.subject_key_identifier {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::SidSkiMismatch);
}
if signed_attrs.content_type != encap_content_info.econtent_type {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::ContentTypeAttrMismatch {
econtent_type: encap_content_info.econtent_type.clone(),
attr_content_type: signed_attrs.content_type.clone(),
});
}
let computed = Sha256::digest(&encap_content_info.econtent).to_vec();
if computed != signed_attrs.message_digest {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::MessageDigestMismatch);
}
Ok(SignedDataProfiled {
version: 3,
digest_algorithms: vec![OID_SHA256.to_string()],
encap_content_info,
certificates: vec![ee.clone()],
crls_present: false,
signer_infos: vec![SignerInfoProfiled {
version: 3,
sid_ski,
digest_algorithm: OID_SHA256.to_string(),
signature_algorithm: signer.signature_algorithm.oid.clone(),
signed_attrs,
unsigned_attrs_present: false,
signature: signer.signature.clone(),
signed_attrs_der_for_signature,
}],
})
}
fn parse_signed_attrs_implicit(
input: &[u8],
) -> Result<SignedAttrsProfiled, SignedObjectValidateError> {
let mut content_type: Option<String> = None;
let mut message_digest: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
let mut signing_time: Option<Asn1TimeUtc> = None;
let mut remaining = input;
while !remaining.is_empty() {
let (rem, attr_obj) = parse_der(remaining)
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectValidateError::SignedAttrsParse(e.to_string()))?;
remaining = rem;
let attr_seq = attr_obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectValidateError::SignedAttrsParse(e.to_string()))?;
if attr_seq.len() != 2 {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::SignedAttrsParse(
"Attribute must be SEQUENCE of 2".into(),
));
}
let oid = oid_to_string_parse(&attr_seq[0])
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectValidateError::SignedAttrsParse(e.to_string()))?;
let values_set = attr_seq[1]
.as_set()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectValidateError::SignedAttrsParse(e.to_string()))?;
if values_set.len() != 1 {
return Err(
SignedObjectValidateError::InvalidSignedAttributeValuesCount {
oid,
count: values_set.len(),
},
);
}
match oid.as_str() {
OID_CMS_ATTR_CONTENT_TYPE => {
if content_type.is_some() {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::DuplicateSignedAttribute(oid));
}
let v = oid_to_string_parse(&values_set[0])
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectValidateError::SignedAttrsParse(e.to_string()))?;
content_type = Some(v);
}
OID_CMS_ATTR_MESSAGE_DIGEST => {
if message_digest.is_some() {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::DuplicateSignedAttribute(oid));
}
let v = values_set[0]
.as_slice()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectValidateError::SignedAttrsParse(e.to_string()))?
.to_vec();
message_digest = Some(v);
}
OID_CMS_ATTR_SIGNING_TIME => {
if signing_time.is_some() {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::DuplicateSignedAttribute(oid));
}
signing_time = Some(parse_signing_time_value(&values_set[0])?);
}
_ => {
return Err(SignedObjectValidateError::UnsupportedSignedAttribute(oid));
}
}
}
Ok(SignedAttrsProfiled {
content_type: content_type
.ok_or(SignedObjectValidateError::SignedAttrsContentTypeMissing)?,
message_digest: message_digest
.ok_or(SignedObjectValidateError::SignedAttrsMessageDigestMissing)?,
signing_time: signing_time
.ok_or(SignedObjectValidateError::SignedAttrsSigningTimeMissing)?,
other_attrs_present: false,
})
}
fn parse_signing_time_value(obj: &DerObject<'_>) -> Result<Asn1TimeUtc, SignedObjectValidateError> {
match &obj.content {
der_parser::ber::BerObjectContent::UTCTime(dt) => Ok(Asn1TimeUtc {
utc: dt
.to_datetime()
.map_err(|_| SignedObjectValidateError::InvalidSigningTimeValue)?,
encoding: Asn1TimeEncoding::UtcTime,
}),
der_parser::ber::BerObjectContent::GeneralizedTime(dt) => Ok(Asn1TimeUtc {
utc: dt
.to_datetime()
.map_err(|_| SignedObjectValidateError::InvalidSigningTimeValue)?,
encoding: Asn1TimeEncoding::GeneralizedTime,
}),
_ => Err(SignedObjectValidateError::InvalidSigningTimeValue),
}
}
fn make_signed_attrs_der_for_signature_parse(
obj: &DerObject<'_>,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SignedObjectParseError> {
// We need the DER encoding of SignedAttributes (SET OF Attribute) as signature input.
// The SignedAttributes field in SignerInfo is `[0] IMPLICIT`, so the on-wire bytes start with
// a context-specific constructed tag (0xA0 for tag 0). For signature verification, this tag
// is replaced with the universal SET tag (0x31), leaving length+content unchanged.
//
let mut cs_der = obj
.to_vec()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
if cs_der.is_empty() {
return Err(SignedObjectParseError::Parse(
"signedAttrs encoding is empty".into(),
));
}
// The first byte should be the context-specific tag (0xA0) for [0] constructed.
// Replace it with universal SET (0x31) for signature input.
cs_der[0] = 0x31;
Ok(cs_der)
}
fn oid_to_string_parse(obj: &DerObject<'_>) -> Result<String, SignedObjectParseError> {
let oid = obj
.as_oid()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
Ok(oid.to_id_string())
}
fn parse_algorithm_identifier_parse(
obj: &DerObject<'_>,
) -> Result<(String, bool), SignedObjectParseError> {
let seq = obj
.as_sequence()
.map_err(|e| SignedObjectParseError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
if seq.is_empty() || seq.len() > 2 {
return Err(SignedObjectParseError::Parse(
"AlgorithmIdentifier must be SEQUENCE of 1..2".into(),
));
}
let oid = oid_to_string_parse(&seq[0])?;
let params_ok = match seq.get(1) {
None => true,
Some(p) => matches!(p.content, der_parser::ber::BerObjectContent::Null),
};
Ok((oid, params_ok))
}
fn strip_leading_zeros(bytes: &[u8]) -> &[u8] {
let mut idx = 0;
while idx < bytes.len() && bytes[idx] == 0 {
idx += 1;
}
if idx == bytes.len() {
&bytes[bytes.len() - 1..]
} else {
&bytes[idx..]
}
}

View File

@@ -1,27 +1,288 @@
use url::Url; use url::Url;
use x509_parser::prelude::*; use x509_parser::prelude::{FromDer, X509Certificate};
use crate::data_model::resources::resource::ResourceSet; use crate::data_model::oid::OID_CP_IPADDR_ASNUMBER;
use crate::data_model::rc::{
AsIdentifierChoice, IpAddressChoice, ResourceCertKind, ResourceCertificate,
ResourceCertificateParseError, ResourceCertificateParsed, ResourceCertificateProfileError,
};
use crate::data_model::tal::Tal;
// #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
// #[derive(Debug, Clone)] pub struct TaCertificate {
// pub struct TrustAnchorCert { pub raw_der: Vec<u8>,
// /// 信任锚证书名称 pub rc_ca: ResourceCertificate,
// pub name: String, }
//
// /// 证书原始DER内容 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
// pub cert_der: Vec<u8>, pub enum TaCertificateParseError {
// #[error("TA certificate parse error: {0} (RFC 5280 §4.1; RFC 6487 §4; RFC 8630 §2.3)")]
// /// 证书 ResourceCertificate(#[from] ResourceCertificateParseError),
// pub cert: X509Certificate<'static>, }
//
// /// 资源集合 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
// pub resources: ResourceSet, pub struct TaCertificateParsed {
// pub rc_parsed: ResourceCertificateParsed,
// ///发布点 }
// pub publication_point: Url,
// } #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
// pub enum TaCertificateProfileError {
// impl TrustAnchorCert { #[error("resource certificate profile error: {0} (RFC 5280 §4; RFC 6487 §4)")]
// ResourceCertificate(#[from] ResourceCertificateProfileError),
// }
#[error("TA certificate must be a CA certificate (RFC 8630 §2.3; RFC 6487 §4.8.1)")]
NotCa,
#[error(
"TA certificate must be self-signed (issuer DN must equal subject DN) (RFC 8630 §2.3; RFC 5280 §4.1.2.4)"
)]
NotSelfSignedIssuerSubject,
#[error(
"TA certificate must contain certificatePolicies ipAddr-asNumber ({OID_CP_IPADDR_ASNUMBER}) (RFC 6487 §4.8.9; RFC 8630 §2.3)"
)]
MissingOrInvalidCertificatePolicies,
#[error("TA certificate must contain SubjectKeyIdentifier (RFC 6487 §4.8.2; RFC 8630 §2.3)")]
MissingSubjectKeyIdentifier,
#[error(
"TA certificate must contain at least one RFC 3779 resource extension (IP or AS) (RFC 6487 §4.8.10-§4.8.11; RFC 8630 §2.3)"
)]
ResourcesMissing,
#[error("TA certificate resources must be non-empty (RFC 8630 §2.3)")]
ResourcesEmpty,
#[error(
"TA certificate MUST NOT use inherit in IP resources (RFC 8630 §2.3; RFC 3779 §2.2.3.5)"
)]
IpResourcesInherit,
#[error(
"TA certificate MUST NOT use inherit in AS resources (RFC 8630 §2.3; RFC 3779 §3.2.3.3)"
)]
AsResourcesInherit,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum TaCertificateDecodeError {
#[error("{0}")]
Parse(#[from] TaCertificateParseError),
#[error("{0}")]
Validate(#[from] TaCertificateProfileError),
}
/// Backwards-compatible name: TA certificate errors from parse+validate.
pub type TaCertificateError = TaCertificateDecodeError;
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum TaCertificateVerifyError {
#[error("TA certificate parse error: {0} (RFC 5280 §4.1; RFC 8630 §2.3)")]
Parse(String),
#[error("trailing bytes after TA certificate DER: {0} bytes (DER; RFC 5280 §4.1)")]
TrailingBytes(usize),
#[error(
"TA certificate self-signature verification failed: {0} (RFC 8630 §2.3; RFC 5280 §6.1)"
)]
InvalidSelfSignature(String),
}
impl TaCertificate {
/// Parse step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
pub fn parse_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<TaCertificateParsed, TaCertificateParseError> {
Ok(TaCertificateParsed {
rc_parsed: ResourceCertificate::parse_der(der)?,
})
}
/// Profile validate step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
///
/// `TaCertificate` is already profile-validated when constructed via `decode_der()` /
/// `TaCertificateParsed::validate_profile()`.
pub fn validate_profile(&self) -> Result<(), TaCertificateProfileError> {
Ok(())
}
/// Decode a TA certificate (`parse + validate`).
pub fn decode_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, TaCertificateDecodeError> {
Ok(Self::parse_der(der)?.validate_profile()?)
}
/// Backwards-compatible helper (historical name).
pub fn from_der(der: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, TaCertificateError> {
Self::decode_der(der)
}
pub fn spki_der(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.rc_ca.tbs.subject_public_key_info
}
/// Verify step of scheme A (`parse → validate → verify`).
pub fn verify_self_signature(&self) -> Result<(), TaCertificateVerifyError> {
let (rem, cert) = X509Certificate::from_der(&self.raw_der)
.map_err(|e| TaCertificateVerifyError::Parse(e.to_string()))?;
if !rem.is_empty() {
return Err(TaCertificateVerifyError::TrailingBytes(rem.len()));
}
cert.verify_signature(None)
.map_err(|e| TaCertificateVerifyError::InvalidSelfSignature(e.to_string()))?;
Ok(())
}
/// Validate TA-specific semantic constraints on a parsed Resource Certificate.
///
/// Note: this does not verify the X.509 signature; it is intended for higher-level logic and
/// for unit tests that exercise individual constraint branches.
pub fn validate_rc_constraints(
rc_ca: &ResourceCertificate,
) -> Result<(), TaCertificateProfileError> {
if rc_ca.kind != ResourceCertKind::Ca {
return Err(TaCertificateProfileError::NotCa);
}
if rc_ca.tbs.extensions.certificate_policies_oid.as_deref() != Some(OID_CP_IPADDR_ASNUMBER)
{
return Err(TaCertificateProfileError::MissingOrInvalidCertificatePolicies);
}
if rc_ca.tbs.extensions.subject_key_identifier.is_none() {
return Err(TaCertificateProfileError::MissingSubjectKeyIdentifier);
}
let ip = rc_ca.tbs.extensions.ip_resources.as_ref();
let asn = rc_ca.tbs.extensions.as_resources.as_ref();
if ip.is_none() && asn.is_none() {
return Err(TaCertificateProfileError::ResourcesMissing);
}
let mut has_any_resource = false;
if let Some(ip) = ip {
if ip.has_any_inherit() {
return Err(TaCertificateProfileError::IpResourcesInherit);
}
for fam in &ip.families {
match &fam.choice {
IpAddressChoice::Inherit => {
return Err(TaCertificateProfileError::IpResourcesInherit);
}
IpAddressChoice::AddressesOrRanges(items) => {
if !items.is_empty() {
has_any_resource = true;
}
}
}
}
}
if let Some(asn) = asn {
if matches!(asn.asnum, Some(AsIdentifierChoice::Inherit))
|| matches!(asn.rdi, Some(AsIdentifierChoice::Inherit))
{
return Err(TaCertificateProfileError::AsResourcesInherit);
}
if let Some(AsIdentifierChoice::AsIdsOrRanges(items)) = asn.asnum.as_ref() {
if !items.is_empty() {
has_any_resource = true;
}
}
if let Some(AsIdentifierChoice::AsIdsOrRanges(items)) = asn.rdi.as_ref() {
if !items.is_empty() {
has_any_resource = true;
}
}
}
if !has_any_resource {
return Err(TaCertificateProfileError::ResourcesEmpty);
}
Ok(())
}
}
impl TaCertificateParsed {
pub fn validate_profile(self) -> Result<TaCertificate, TaCertificateProfileError> {
let rc_ca = self.rc_parsed.validate_profile()?;
if rc_ca.kind != ResourceCertKind::Ca {
return Err(TaCertificateProfileError::NotCa);
}
if rc_ca.tbs.issuer_dn != rc_ca.tbs.subject_dn {
return Err(TaCertificateProfileError::NotSelfSignedIssuerSubject);
}
TaCertificate::validate_rc_constraints(&rc_ca)?;
Ok(TaCertificate {
raw_der: rc_ca.raw_der.clone(),
rc_ca,
})
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct TrustAnchor {
pub tal: Tal,
pub ta_certificate: TaCertificate,
pub resolved_ta_uri: Option<Url>,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum TrustAnchorError {
#[error("TA certificate error: {0} (RFC 8630 §2.3)")]
TaCertificate(#[from] TaCertificateDecodeError),
#[error("{0}")]
Bind(#[from] TrustAnchorBindError),
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum TrustAnchorBindError {
#[error("resolved TA URI not listed in TAL: {0} (RFC 8630 §2.2-§2.3)")]
ResolvedUriNotInTal(String),
#[error(
"TAL SPKI does not match TA certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo (RFC 8630 §2.3; RFC 5280 §4.1.2.7)"
)]
TalSpkiMismatch,
}
impl TrustAnchor {
/// Bind a TAL and a downloaded TA certificate.
///
/// This does not download anything; it only validates the binding rules from RFC 8630 §2.3.
pub fn bind_der(
tal: Tal,
ta_der: &[u8],
resolved_uri: Option<&Url>,
) -> Result<Self, TrustAnchorError> {
let ta_certificate = TaCertificate::decode_der(ta_der)?;
Ok(Self::bind(tal, ta_certificate, resolved_uri)?)
}
pub fn bind(
tal: Tal,
ta_certificate: TaCertificate,
resolved_uri: Option<&Url>,
) -> Result<Self, TrustAnchorBindError> {
if let Some(u) = resolved_uri {
if !tal.ta_uris.iter().any(|x| x == u) {
return Err(TrustAnchorBindError::ResolvedUriNotInTal(u.to_string()));
}
}
if tal.subject_public_key_info_der != ta_certificate.spki_der() {
return Err(TrustAnchorBindError::TalSpkiMismatch);
}
Ok(Self {
tal,
ta_certificate,
resolved_ta_uri: resolved_uri.cloned(),
})
}
}

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